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CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO-DAY[1]

By Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern

Anyone confronted with the task of describing to a British audience the situation in "Czechoslovakia to-day," whether "to-day" be considered as covering the period following the week-end of May 21st or the rather longer period following the *Anschluss* with Austria in March, finds himself confronted at the outset with a serious difficulty of method. For what most of his audience expect of him is an account of the Czechoslovak problem conceived as a problem of the relations between a majority and a minority within the borders of the Czechoslovak State, to use the language of Miss Elizabeth Wiskemann in the title of her recently published and most useful book, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia.*[2] But in actual fact, as the visitor very soon discovers, this is not at all the Czechoslovak problem as it presents itself to-day. For the time being, the problem of the mutual relations of the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia has receded into the background. No doubt it will emerge again in the future and will remain a staple of controversy for many years and even generations to come: for it is a problem of a kind which cannot be solved, though it can be alleviated, by governmental action, but will finally only yield to the healing action of time. But when it does re-emerge, it will not be within a Europe such as we have before us to-day. For the present another problem holds the stage, a problem embracing an area far wider than that of the Historic Provinces and involving issues far more momentous for the world as a whole. We may call this, if I may adopt Miss Wiskemann's title and at the same time take the term used by the map displayed before you: "The Empire of the German People (*das Volksdeutsche Reich*) and the Small Nations: a study of the struggle in the zone between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea." I borrow the term "zone" from the lecture delivered by Professor Masaryk, as he then was, at King's College, London, on October 19th, 1915, at the inauguration of the School

[1] Address given at a meeting at Chatham House on Tuesday, June 14th, 1938, with Mr. H. Wilson Harris in the Chair. Sir Alfred Zimmern had just paid a visit to Czechoslovakia, where he was studying the situation.

[2] Oxford University Press, 1938.

of Slavonic Studies. In that lecture Masaryk defined the aim of the War as the "Organisation of Europe" as against "the Conquest of Europe." "No *Herrenvolk* but national equality and parity: *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* among nations as among individuals." For reasons for which Masaryk himself was not responsible and for which the peoples of Great Britain, the United States and France bear a larger share of the blame than any of the peoples in the East Central European zone, the "Organisation of Europe" has not been achieved and these peoples, and the world as a whole, are again faced with the same issue as in 1915—but with this difference, that to-day these peoples, with the single exception of the Ukrainians, are struggling to maintain the independence that they gained twenty years ago, whilst the would-be master people has lost its position of strategic advantage in the Danube valley and in what is now Western Poland. In that new struggle the Slavs of the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia occupy the most important and the most exposed strategic position. They are, so to speak, at the Pass of Thermopylæ where the invading mass, so greatly outnumbering them, can best be held at bay. "Who holds Bohemia is master of Europe." Whether it was Bismarck who first put this into words we need not inquire. It was true, and known to be true, many centuries before he said it. And there is not a Czech in the two provinces who does not feel this in his bones to-day.

But let us be fair and look at the problem from the opposite angle, the angle of the master people or Great Power. It is an angle very familiar to our British vision. "Antwerp," said our forefathers, "is a pistol pointed at the heart of England"—without stopping to ask themselves whether England might not also be a menace to Antwerp. "Our frontier is no longer the cliffs of Dover," said a recent British Prime Minister, "it is on the Rhine"—without stopping to ask himself whether, by the same reasoning, the frontier of Germany might not be on the Thames. In the same way, to anyone who looks at the map through German eyes, is not Prague a pistol pointed at the heart of Germany? And is it not natural for the rulers of Germany to seek to straighten out the dangerous salient of the Historic Provinces which renders some of their greatest cities so easy a mark for attack from the air? Should not the strategic frontier of the Reich run at least as far east as a line from the point where Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia meet near Bohumin (Oderburg), to the point where Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia meet near Bratislava (Pressburg), roughly along the eastern border of Moravia? No

doubt this would involve a partition of the Czechoslovak State: but States in this part of Europe have been partitioned before. No doubt also it would bring into existence a new minority problem, the problem of the Western Slav minority within the improved and extended frontiers of the Third Reich. Those Slavs would certainly not be easy to govern, as all past experience shows. The most convenient solution would be, if I may coin a word, to Albanianise them—that is to say, to leave them as large a measure of autonomy as could be made compatible with German control over foreign affairs and defence. It is from this angle—that of the autonomy of the Historic Provinces, rather than of the German minority within them—that the question of autonomy presents itself to realistic minds to-day. It is no longer, if it ever was, a question of drawing a line between the regions of predominant Czech and German speech. It is a question of the future government of the Historic Provinces themselves. This was the issue which every Czech felt to be at stake on the night of Friday to Saturday, May 20th–21st. It is a problem of life and death; and beside it all the minor controversies sink into triviality.

Nevertheless there is another problem, the problem which forms the subject of Miss Wiskemann's book. It was never a major problem, and it is less than ever a major problem to-day. So far as the larger issues are concerned, the grievances of the German minority in the Historic Provinces are simply a pretext. If they did not exist they would have needed to be created or invented: or some other pretext would have been found in their place. Nevertheless these grievances do exist; and they have become intertwined with the larger issue, to some extent on the spot and to a greater extent in the public opinion of this and other countries. It is therefore impossible to leave them on one side, even though, strictly speaking, a discussion of them is to-day hardly relevant to a study of the general situation in Czechoslovakia. Thus it came about that, in my recent short stay in the country, I felt bound to devote what was really a disproportionate share of my time to an inquiry into these grievances which, to me at least, raised questions of very great interest; but their interest is rather one for the political scientist who is concerned with the working of institutions under normal conditions, than for the student of international politics in the climate of present-day Europe.

It will now be clear what I meant when I said that I was faced with a difficulty as to how to present the subject. I shall in

fact be dealing with two quite distinct and separate subjects: firstly, the general situation, what I called just now the real Czechoslovak problem, as I observed and experienced it during my stay in the country from midday on Saturday, May 21st, till Sunday, June 5th; and secondly the grievances of the German minority. In dealing with the first I will avoid repeating facts already known to you from the newspapers, and will try to give you impressions formed from a living contact with the country during that time of tension.

We reached Prague by air from Strasbourg at midday on Saturday, May 21st. There seemed to be an unusually large crowd at the aerodrome, and very soon one sensed a state of tension. The newspapers were uncommunicative, but by word of mouth one learnt that troops had been called up during the night. Then one met people who had actually seen the soldiers entraining in the early hours of the morning, some already in uniform, others on their way to their depot. One heard of how the order had come to this or that village or suburb in the middle of the night and how the men called up had gone at once to the appointed rendezvous. Many motor-cars were also placed at the disposition of the Government. One young man of means, returning to Prague with a new car on the Friday, went to the front, car and all, within a few hours.

Everyone was agreed that the military movement had been effected with remarkable efficiency. It seems, indeed, to have been carried through well ahead of the time-table. The order went out during the evening, and the troops, it was said, were at their posts on the frontier at two o'clock in the morning. According to the general belief, the other side had expected to cross it at four, though some said five. The call appears to have been obeyed without demur by all whom it concerned, including the Germans. In one town in the German-speaking area I was told in the following week that some of the subordinate local leaders of the Henlein Party, being in doubt as to whether to obey the call or not, decided to consult their chiefs, but when they visited them they found they had already left on military duty. One also heard stories of how, in the Czech villages along the frontier, the whole population turned out to help the soldiers in unloading their equipment or constructing rough defences. Some of these improvised works were visible to the ordinary traveller in the following days. Barriers guarded by one or two soldiers were to be found at a few vital spots on the main roads. These consisted of a series of obstructions each covering half the

road, so placed as to force the traffic to proceed at a slow zig-zag. Close to the frontier the secondary roads were in some cases completely closed with barriers consisting of country carts and masses of metal and of timber from the woods near by. Some of the democratically minded of the Germans volunteered to set these in place, and are reported to have said that they would rather cut down the trees themselves than be hanged on them by Hitler. Apart from the few soldiers at these barriers and at bridges, all of them guarded and some obviously mined, the military were very little in evidence, though no doubt a practised military eye would have been able to detect the exact whereabouts of the various defence lines at which one caught traces on the two main roads one traversed from Prague to the northern frontier. Wherever we encountered them they were not only civil, if the word may be used in this connection, but courteous, and decidedly less fussy than Czech officials are apt to be. Wishing to be sure that we could drive right to the frontier near Eger, I paid a visit to the barracks there. I was passed on by the Private at the gate to an N.C.O., and so through various ranks to the Commandant, who offered me a drink and called in an expert in commercial correspondence reputed to be conversant with the English language. The ensuing conversation was not exactly brisk; but I wish that some of those, not in this country, who write about the savage Czech "*soldateska*" could have witnessed this homely scene. Incidentally, I learnt that the troops quartered there included a fair proportion of Germans and Ruthenians, as well as Czechs and Slovaks.

The Czechs are very proud of their army, as they have reason to be in the light of its record, or rather the record of its original constituent elements, on various fronts during the War and in Siberia in 1919. One hears the claim that, in the quality of its armament, it is the best in the world, and as against this it was frequently said that the German military movement last March had revealed grave defects in equipment. Czechoslovakia, of course, is one of the principal arms-manufacturing countries in the world, and it would be strange if she did not keep the best of her products for her own use. Moreover, the present crisis has not taken her unawares. The Government, more skilled than our own in reading the signs of the times, foresaw as early as 1932 the coming of a new armaments race, and took its measures accordingly. This systematic preparation has helped to diffuse a general state of confidence in the defences of the country which those who consider the matter from a distance with the aid of small-

scale maps find it difficult to understand. Let me remark in passing that, though the centre of the Skoda works is at Pilsen, a predominantly Czech town though only a few miles from the first villages of the mixed German–Czech area, all the eggs are not kept in that single basket. The Skoda works have been decentralised : one of these local centres was pointed out to me whilst I was travelling in Slovakia last March.

I cannot conclude this digression on military matters without saying something on the subject of morale. We ought not to forget that the men who left their homes in the darkness on that night of Friday to Saturday, May 20th to 21st, were keyed up for a supreme struggle for the independence of their country : and so were their women-folk from whom they took leave. As matters turned out, not a shot was fired. But this does not alter the fact that everyone was ready for the worst. Indeed, one heard from younger men in the succeeding days expressions of regret at the kind of anti-climax which had supervened. To minds of this temper the renewal of the previous harassing strain seemed harder to bear than the supreme ordeal. Upon the subject of the issue at stake one encountered a striking unanimity not only in the feeling of the people, but also in the way in which they put it into words. Over and over again one heard it said by men, and even more emphatically by women, that they had had twenty years of liberty following on three hundred years of slavery, and that life would simply not be worth living if liberty were once again lost. Another statement commonly expressed was that the "idyll" of the years following 1918 had been too good to be true, and that they were now back in the exposed position familiar to their forefathers : they were accustomed to it : it did not alarm them : come what may, they would not go under.

I return now to the Saturday of our arrival. The news of the calling up of troops was officially made known later in the day. At the same time the newspapers published the report of a speech made on that morning by President Beneš at Tabor, a place sacred to all Czechs through its association with the Hussite Wars. This speech was in the main a calm and dignified statement of the standards of justice, democracy and mutual tolerance for which the Czechoslovak nation stood, seen against their background in history. But it contained an unmistakable note of warning. "I am reminding you of these lessons of our history," he said, "because I say to myself and to you on this historic spot that we are living through very important moments, the gravest

since the end of the War. Therefore we must say to ourselves that we must avoid all the mistakes and blunders of the past." (It is remarkable he should have spoken of mistakes and blunders at that moment.) "We must keep calm, control our nerves, have a clear goal before our eyes and never lose sight of developments in the surrounding countries, the development of Central Europe and of Europe as a whole. . . . Above all, we must not be afraid, we must cast out all fear and be ready for everything, good or bad, come what may."

Without access to official information it is not possible for anyone to say, nor is it part of my purpose in this address to surmise, how far this grave warning was actually justified by military movements on the part of Czechoslovakia's neighbours. Of one thing, however, I think there can be no doubt. The Czechoslovak authorities believed, rightly or wrongly, that their country was facing a grave danger, and it was that, and not, as has since been insinuated, any consideration arising out of the conditions in the German-speaking areas, which led to the calling up of the additional troops. Moreover, apart from any reports that they had received on the purely military side of the matter, their anxiety could not help being strongly aroused by the tone of the German press and the German wireless during the previous days. To take only one example, an affray that took place at Komotau, an industrial town in the German-speaking district, early on the Friday evening was reported by the official German News Agency to have caused a hundred casualties, whereas careful inquiries from a neutral source revealed the number to be no more than fifteen.

After the event, of course, there were many stories in circulation suggesting that the adherents of the Henlein Party had had reason to expect the arrival of the German troops and of the Leader himself. If I mention some of them, it is simply for the sake of conveying to you some of the local colour, which, after all, has its own place in history. Thus it was said that the German villages and towns in the border districts were so keyed up with the expectation of a German occupation on that Friday night that when they heard the march of the troops in the darkness windows were flung open to the cry of "Heil Hitler!", only to be closed again with a bang. Another story was that people who went to buy stamps at the Post Office on Friday were advised not to buy too many, since they would not serve for long. Again, one heard that many young people staying in Prague whose homes were in the German area received telegrams from their relations

on that Friday urging them to return, as it might be difficult for them to do so later. For obvious reasons it was not possible to find out later on the spot, from German sources, how far such expectations had really been entertained. But there was a piece of doggerel in circulation, which attributed to the Führer a timetable in which March was reserved for Austria, April for a pause of reorganisation and May (*Mai*) for Czechoslovakia (*die Tschecko-slovakei*, or, in some versions, *die Tschechei*).

On the following day, Sunday, May 22nd, the first batch of the municipal elections was held. In Prague they were carried through in complete calm and outward placidity. The polling was over at four o'clock, and from about five o'clock onwards large and leisurely crowds were strolling in the streets and gathering before the newspaper offices where the figures were posted up as they came in. One had the impression of a thoroughly mature electorate accustomed to all the vagaries and nuances of a democratic electoral system resembling that of France rather than that of our own country. It was hard to believe, as one watched this sober-suited Sunday afternoon crowd scanning the prosaic notice-boards, that one was in one of the storm-centres of the world. But no doubt, had the siren sounded, every one of these Sunday strollers would have known what to do. Air-Raid Precautions have been developed to a very fine point, as I realised when I was in the city during a practice last March and found my eyes smarting with the tear-gas which accompanied the rehearsal.

The election results were published in the papers of Monday and Tuesday, accompanied by arithmetical calculations on the part of the various parties between which I would not venture to decide. The Henleinists claimed that they had secured 88 per cent. of the German vote, whilst the Communists put the figure at under 80. The latter result was arrived at on the assumption that a certain number of German Communists and German and German-Jewish bourgeois had voted for Czech candidates of their own political persuasion rather than for either the Henlein Party or the German Social-Democrats. I extract this comment from an issue of the *Red Flag* bearing the significant inscription: "Second Improved Edition." This leads me to say a few words about the press censorship. This is being exercised on the part of the authorities with great vigilance, as can be observed from blank spaces left not only in newspapers, but also in the pamphlet literature. But it must not be thought that the Government is simply out to repress what would in this country be called seditious opinions. It is at least as much concerned to prevent the provo-

cative criticism of other countries and their rulers—particularly, of course, Germany. This has affected the literature of the German and other refugees; but it has even been applied to the editorial comments of that *Manchester Guardian* of Czech journalism, the *Lidove Noviny* of Brno. After the occupation of Austria, a certain number of foreign journalists previously stationed at Vienna made Prague their headquarters, and this led the Foreign Minister to make a public appeal to them to be studiously moderate in their despatches. The result is that newspapers of every colour find their style considerably cramped. This is particularly noticeable in the absence of news from Austria. I do not think that this impression of sobriety which I gained is in any way due to my inability to read the Czech newspapers, for the daily Henlein organ is most conscientious in picking out and translating offensive passages in the papers of its opponents.

On Saturday, May 28th, we left Prague by car for a visit to the German-speaking area in the North-West. It happened to be the President's birthday, when it is customary for the national flag to be flown on both public buildings and private houses. This enabled one to judge at a glance the gradual transition, beyond Pilsen, from the predominantly Czech, through the mixed, to the predominantly German area. It was at Stříbro (in German Mies) that we first came across the Henleinist white stockings on the legs of a young man strolling arrogantly across the Town Hall Square. They had, it appears, been much more in evidence even in Prague up to the end of the previous week, when the Henleinist leaders advised their followers to refrain from wearing them. Nevertheless we saw a great many of them, worn by the younger generation of all ages from childhood to manhood, during the four days we spent in the German-speaking area.

Let me now try to give some impressions derived from two brief visits to that area, one to the North-Western district round Eger and the other to the Reichenberg district due north of Prague. These two areas are very different in temper. The Egerland, where the Henlein movement took its rise and has its centre, is much more interested in politics, whilst in the Reichenberg district economic preoccupations predominate. The German-speaking area of Bohemia and Moravia is, indeed, divided into a number of separate districts, all exhibiting local varieties, and it is misleading to think of them as a single block. They do not, of course, form a single contiguous territory. How many geographical areas they comprise depends on the view taken as to

the districts that lie between them. The map issued under the auspices of the Henleinist Party reveals four considerable areas and some minor islands, whilst a map from a Czechoslovak source shows eight areas in which the German population is over 90 per cent. But even this way of putting the matter is misleading, for the larger areas in each map have peculiar shapes very ill-suited for administrative purposes. It is not surprising, then, that the German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia should not, until quite recently, have begun to think of themselves as a distinct political and social unit. The term "Sudeten German," as denoting the Germans throughout the two provinces, is, in fact, even newer than the term "Czechoslovak." During the troubled period in October and November 1918, when an attempt was made to form a government at Reichenberg, the name Deutsch-Böhmen (German Bohemia) was used. It was further east, at Troppau in Silesia, that an effort was made to group the Germans of Silesia, Eastern Bohemia and Northern Moravia in a territory to which, after the romantic title of "Altvaterland" had been rejected, the designation of "Sudetenland" was applied. The name was not applied to the wider area until the middle 'twenties. The Sudeten mountains are in fact only one of the mountain ranges under which the Germans of the two provinces live.

There was a prelude to my visit to the German-speaking area. In Prague I had met the Mayor of Reichenberg, who is also a member of the Upper House of the Republic. Senator Kostka is the very type of experienced and responsible administrator whom we are accustomed to associate with the notion of German municipal government. He was elected to his position in 1929, after many years of public activity and association with Big Business in the district. He is, one might say, one of Nature's Burgomasters. But what was he doing in Prague, away from his desk? He had thought it better to leave the city, he told me, because he found it impossible to carry on his work. His offence was that he had done his best to promote co-operation with the Czech element in the population. So he had handed over his duties to the Vice-Mayor.

When I tried to interpret this incident in terms of British conditions, I realised that I should find a situation that was very far from normal; and so indeed it was, as soon as one probed below the surface. Outwardly there is perfect order. We were at Komotau, an industrial town of some thirty thousand inhabitants, on polling day, and visited one of the booths. The representatives of all the parties were seated peaceably at a table

together, collaborating with the authorities in supervising the proceedings. The Party bills were side by side on the placards with the announcements of their meetings. The only unpleasantness one encountered was that some of the more youthful passers-by displayed a rather un-English habit of trying to remain within earshot of our conversation. It is in individual talks behind closed doors that one learns of the moving forces in these communities. At Reichenberg, where our arrival had become known, spokesmen of many varieties of local opinion came to the hotel, and I sat continuously in a small room for some five hours—from about three o'clock to eight—receiving them, sometimes in a small group, but more often individually. I had, of course, little or no opportunity of verifying individual statements made to me, though I had many other conversations, sometimes, I am afraid, feigning a most unprofessorial ignorance, with all and sundry. But the general lines of the situation emerged very clearly, since the main allegations of the minority were not contested by the spokesmen of the Henleinist Party. This was represented in the hotel *viva voce* by a young man of pleasant address and a pronounced philosophical disposition who would find himself quite at home in the Oxford School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics. As he unfolded to me the theory of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and its application to the community life of his city—how, for instance, it was only natural, and indeed self-understood, that one should only have economic and social relations with persons of one's own persuasion—he did not seem to understand that I could visualise the working out of these theories in terms of human values. "The word Terror has been used to me," I remarked at one point, "of the conditions in the German areas?" This did not put him out of his stride. He carried through his thesis to its logical conclusion, a totalitarian German community. Finally I asked him point blank which of the two he would prefer, a Nationalities State with all the grievances on which he had enlarged redressed, or incorporation in the Greater Germany. He hesitated for a moment, as though it was a dangerous question. Then his intellectual honesty got the better of him, and he replied that of course he would prefer the latter, since it followed from all that he had been saying.

It is this young man and those who think, or perhaps I should say feel, as he does who have secured control of the political machinery of the German parties, with the exception of the Social Democrats, and of far more than the political machinery, for their ramifications extend right through the community to

the municipal, business, professional and other organisations, the Trade Unions, the sporting activities, and not least the schools and the Churches. Only the Courts seem so far to be relatively unaffected. The result is that these areas are being subtly assimilated to the Nazi way of life. The combined resources of intimidation and propaganda are amazing in their range and ingenuity, especially when they are exercised upon a simple-minded people such as are the majority of the Sudeten German people of that area. Many of them, for example, have acquired the habit of disbelieving everything that is printed in the Prague newspapers, and relying on the German wireless as their main source of information about the world outside their city or village. The local newspapers, of course, confirm them in this tendency. When you go into a bookshop it is hard to believe that you are not in Germany. It is true that my young philosopher complained that the German newspapers and other literature were banned by the authorities; but the former, at any rate, dribble through in individual copies by post and were on sale in numerous places, and even openly displayed. One result of all this is that the notions current in the district about conditions in Germany are quite fantastic: it is presented to a population depressed with unemployment as a paradise for the working man. One allegation that was made to me, and supported with full details, was that it was part of the policy of the Henleinist Party actually to discourage the revival of industrial activity in the district, and even to bring pressure to bear on employers to refuse orders. This I was not in a position to verify. What is certain is that the alarums and excursions of the Party and its foreign backers are ruining the season in the West Bohemian watering-places where the Henleinist slogan, "One People, One Empire, One Leader," has been re-edited by local wags to read "One People, One Empire, One Visitor."

There is, however, another side to this. Since the annexation of Austria, with whom the Sudeten German population has many more family ties than with Germany proper, news is beginning to reach the district through private channels. This is, I am told, particularly the case in Southern Bohemia, where a marked change in opinion is already noticeable.

Politics apart, the Sudeten Germans are a rather old-world and distinctly attractive people. Let me set against the young Henleinist philosopher an old inhabitant, heavily bearded and smoking a long pipe, whom I accosted in a village in the mountains. It was election day, and every house had a Henlein placard.

"We are all for Henlein here," he said. "What do you want?" I replied. "To manage our own affairs," he said. "Well, what's wrong?" said I. "I noticed a German school as I came along the road. Are you not satisfied with the schoolmaster?" "Yes, perfectly." "And with the people who appoint the schoolmaster?" This was a conundrum, for neither he nor his companions knew how the schoolmaster had come there: some said it was through the District Inspector, others said it was the President of the District Council. But the real grievance, it soon appeared, was the Czech postmaster, with his fabulous salary, and the Czechs on the railway staff. I will return to these points later. Here I only want to emphasise my conviction that this old villager is far more typical of the German-speaking community than the enthusiastic young Henleinist philosopher. The Germans are, on the whole, a conservatively-minded community, distinctly more so than the Czechs. Though the Germans originally came in as townspeople and the Czechs as cultivators, the relationship is now, to a large extent, reversed. The Czechs are the people of the rich sugar-beet lands of the plateau. The Germans, on the other hand, are among the sources of power in the mountains, where, as Miss Wiskemann puts it, "the castles and forests are interspersed with factories and mines," and their horizon has until quite recently been limited to their own province.

It is to this population, rather than to our young philosopher, that the main propaganda of the Henlein Party has been directed. The result is that, when one examines the Party literature sold in the bookshops, one becomes aware of a curious discrepancy between it and the election posters. The literature emphasises the part played by the Germans in the history of Bohemia and Moravia from the Marcomanni and Quadi on the Roman monuments down to Abbot Mendel in his priory in Brünn. The German connections with Prague throughout its long history are thrown into high relief; even the great Charles IV, though admittedly his mother was a Czech princess, belonged to the German nation. Then one turns to the election posters. "One People, One Will, One Aim." What People? Clearly the German people. What Aim? Clearly union with Germany and separation from the Slavs.

And yet both from a common-sense and from a strictly Nazi point of view the German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia are closer to their Czech neighbours than to the Germans across the mountains. They are certainly very mixed in race. One recent observer defined the issue as a struggle between Germanised

Slavs on the one hand and Slavised Germans on the other. I was not able to verify a statement made to me at Reichenburg that thirty years ago a learned priest traced thirty-five thousand local pedigrees back to the fifteenth century and discovered only seven that were purely German. It is perhaps enough to say that Herr Henlein had a Slav grandmother, a fact of which I found no trace in the biographical material that was supplied about him to the electors, but of which I doubt whether he is himself ashamed. For I am confident that the temporary "*Anschluss* frenzy," as it has been called, will die down and that the claims of neighbourhood will reassert themselves. "For centuries," said Herr Henlein at Chatham House in December 1935, "Czechs and Germans have lived in the Crown lands of Bohemia. . . . Those who wish sincerely and without any mental reservation for peaceful collaboration between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans must once and for all abandon the idea of the totalitarian national State." I believe that the policy outlined in these words represents the deeper needs and the permanent outlook of the Germans of the Historic Provinces. The literature written before last March is a truer guide to their mind and feelings than the raging, tearing propaganda of the present moment.

This brings me to the last point on which I wish to touch: the grievances of the German population. As I said at the outset, these grievances, genuine though they are, have little or nothing to do with the Czechoslovak problem in its international aspect. Moreover, they are of a kind that does not admit of a rapid remedy. Thus, though we ought to wish well to M. Hodža's efforts, we must not delude ourselves with the notion that a cut-and-dried settlement is in sight. I will therefore interpose at this point, where we are passing from short-distance to long-distance considerations, some conclusions on the immediate situation.

In so far as there is a danger of war arising out of any occurrence inside the borders of Czechoslovakia—and I am expressly keeping myself in this address within this limitation—it is simply and solely due to the possibility of an outbreak of violence on the part of the Henleinist partisans, acting on instructions from outside. There is not the least danger of any provocative action on the part either of the Czech army or the Czech police, both of which are under excellent discipline, as they showed by their behaviour in the very difficult period before May 21st. From what I was able to hear and observe, I am satisfied that the passivity of the Czech authorities during the weeks that intervened between the Austrian occupation and May 21st was mis-

understood by the German-speaking population as denoting fear and weakness, and that by May 21st the authority of the Government had been reduced to a point considerably lower than was justifiable on the most *laissez-faire* theory of governmental powers. Quite apart from the admitted and systematic violation of the principle of equality between all citizens, which we are accustomed to take for granted in this country, the population had become accustomed to witnessing open exhibitions of contempt for the State authorities. No doubt when a street urchin makes a Hitler salute to a policeman there is nothing to do but to grin, though the Czechs are not so good at grinning as we are. But when a Mayor from the height of his official balcony spits on the soldiers below him, who are assisting the police in their duties, it would seem to call for something more than registration in the official report of the incident. Since May 21st the presence of the military in the vicinity, however unobtrusive, has gone far to restore the authority of the Government and to remove the worst fears, though not, of course, the present hardships, of the various minorities, German, Czech and Jewish. As things now are, the maintenance of the troops to reinforce the police in case of need is essential. If they were removed, the resulting situation would be worse than before May 21st, for everyone remembers that the occupation of Austria succeeded not at the first attempt, but at the second. If, as is sometimes asserted, the passivity of the Czech authorities was due to advice from Great Britain and France, these Powers took on themselves a heavy responsibility in tendering it. Still more heavy would be their responsibility if they repeated it in the circumstances of to-day. On this matter the Czechoslovak Government, which, to say the least, has as great an interest in preventing an outbreak as we have, is the best judge. Such influence as we can exert should be used to ease the task of the Government, and particularly of the Prime Minister, in remedying the real grievances of the German and other minority groups.

One final remark on this subject. I have no means of knowing the nature of the relations between the local Henleinist leaders and the German Government. One fact that seems to be established is that the designated leader in the event of a German occupation is not Herr Henlein, but a certain Herr Krebs, an old associate of Herr Hitler's from as early as 1920, and an exile from the district since 1933. Moreover, Herr Henlein's own ideological past is far from orthodox from a Nazi standpoint. However this may be, and whether or not the leaders are prepared

to face the ordeal of war for their cause, it seems clear that the enthusiasm of the rank and file, which developed into such a frenzy after the *Anschluss*, has been largely due to the belief that it would be carried through without war, as in Austria. "He is coming, he is coming, join us and be on the safe side," was the burden of the whispering propaganda during those weeks. It had already started when I was in the country in March. This belief that to-morrow or the day after the Führer will be driving down the main street of their town or village has been dispelled from the minds of very many by the events of May 21st, and therein lies their principal psychological influence. It is one thing to cast a ballot for the *Anschluss* in the abstract; it is quite another to take the responsibility of making one's own district and city the cockpit of a modern war.

I come now to the German grievances. They can be summed up under two heads: those arising out of the character of the Czechoslovak State itself, and those arising out of its administrative system. The first type of grievance is best illustrated by a sentence from that most scrupulously correct of all publications, the *Statesman's Year Book*. "Of the Czechoslovak citizens," we there read, "estimated in 1936 to number 15,186,944, 9,688,770 are Czechoslovaks." To a British mind there is something very odd about these five and a half remaining millions of Czechoslovaks who are not Czechoslovaks. What are they? Hitherto the official answer has been that they are minorities within the Czechoslovak State, enjoying certain rights guaranteed by the League of Nations. But I have yet to meet a Scotsman or a Welshman who would be satisfied with this kind of second-class citizenship, however respectably guaranteed. In Great Britain and Northern Ireland, a State little less variegated than the Czechoslovak Republic, there are no minority groups: or rather, there are no permanent majority and minority lines. The minoritarian of this year may be a majoritarian after the next election. Nay, more, an event may occur which will turn the majoritarian of Monday into a minoritarian on Tuesday. The Czechoslovak Republic suffers from the disability that it has not succeeded in adopting a designation as colourless as "Great Britain" to embrace all the citizens within its borders. Such a name would not be difficult to find. Indeed, there is one ready to hand—"The Central European Republic." But take this innocent British-made label to Czechoslovakia and study the reactions which it produces, and you will realise how deep-rooted is the theory of the Nation-State and how strong are the feelings

associated with it. "This is our own State which we have created and where we achieve our self-expression and realise our ideals of government," one of my Czech friends wrote to me recently, and as a matter of history his claim cannot be disputed. If Czechoslovakia is to-day an island of democracy surrounded by States more backward in political manners, this is due to the traditions and to the determination of the nine and a half million Czechoslovaks, and indeed principally to the seven and a half million Czechs amongst them, and not at all to the five and a half million non-Czechoslovak Czechoslovaks.

It is true that this democracy and its many benefits are participated in also by the five and a half million; but, on the whole, they have been passive recipients. They did not collaborate actively in framing the Constitution, and, indeed, it was some years before they could persuade themselves that the new state of things after the War was going to last. For instance, many otherwise hard-headed Germans believed in the early 'twenties that the German mark was a better investment than the Czechoslovak crown. The framers of the Constitution were quite conscious of the ambiguity involved in the double use of the term Czechoslovak, though they did their best to gloss it over for the public. Being in a mischievous mood, and having procured a copy of the constitution in French in the principal bookshop in Prague, I read through the preamble to the obviously well-educated assistant, and asked him how he would feel about it if he were not a Czechoslovak Czechoslovak, but a German or Magyar Czechoslovak. "We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the complete unity of the Nation (first sense), to introduce just laws into the Republic (second sense), to guarantee the peaceable development of the Czechoslovak Fatherland (back to the first sense) and to ensure the benefits of liberty to future generations" (again the second sense). An English shop assistant, thus caught unawares by a stranger, would probably have changed the conversation, but my victim was far too much of a Czech to run away from a difficulty, intellectual or otherwise. He thought for a moment, and then gave me the answer. "But the Germans and Magyars joined in voting the Constitution. It was carried by a majority." Excellent formal logic, for if the Germans and Magyars were not present when the Constitution was voted, they could have been. But what would Burke have said of such a reply, or Bagehot, or Balfour, who said of our Party conflicts that "Our whole political machinery presupposes people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker"? The

fact is that the Nation-State theory is a theory which does not fit the facts of Central and Eastern Europe. The British and Swiss theory, which regards the State as a framework within which many nationalities and cultures and other local or personal varieties can live side by side, is far more sensible and far more fool-proof, and this is the theory on which Mr. Hodža is now trying to remodel the Republic (without, of course, changing the name). But Switzerland and Great Britain are not objects of manufacture. They cannot be brought into existence within a few weeks, least of all in a time of crisis. It is only fair to add that, in my analysis of the Czechoslovak Constitution, I have been following in the footsteps of a Czech exponent, Professor Radl, who wrote a book on the subject in 1928 which was soon afterwards translated into German. As one of his colleagues at the Czech University of Prague remarked to me, "All that Hodža is doing is to try to put into practice what Radl recommended in his book ten years ago."

In 1928 three German Ministers had lately been admitted into the Cabinet, and conditions were propitious for German–Czech collaboration. Why was the occasion let slip? This brings me to the more practical side of the German grievances, and here we touch on the administrative system of the country. In order to establish a system of perfect equality in proportion to numbers, 22 per cent. for the Germans and 67 per cent. for the Czechs and Slovaks, as is now proposed, it would have been, and still is, necessary to interfere with a large number of individual established positions or vested interests. This involves a political effort of the kind which democratic politicians are only accustomed to embark on under powerful pressure. It has been in some ways a misfortune for Czechoslovakia that she has international obligations under the so-called and ill-named minority treaties. They provided a line of least resistance. It was so easy to say, and to say with perfect truth, that, since all these obligations had been fulfilled, and more than fulfilled, no further effort was necessary. It was equally easy to compare the very favourable conditions of the minorities in Czechoslovakia with those of the minorities, and not least the German minorities, in adjoining countries—in Poland, Hungary, Italy and elsewhere. The result is that, after the entry of the German Ministers into the Cabinet, a period of comparative stagnation supervened and the German electors, in their disappointment, were ready to turn to more radical policies. This is not the chief reason why the German Agrarian and Christian Socialist Parties, which have been represented in the Government, merged themselves with the Henleinists in the stampede last

March; but it was undoubtedly an important contributory factor.

The old villager in the mountains declared that he wanted self-government, and complained of the local Czech officials and workmen. What are these Czech officials and workmen doing in the German districts? The answer is to be found in the system of local government in Bohemia and Moravia, and in the influence of the political parties over the making of appointments.

Let me take the latter point first. There is in Czechoslovakia nothing corresponding to our Civil Service Commission. Nor is there, for the matter of that, in any adjoining country or in the United States or in Canada or in many other places that could be mentioned. The appointments to the Civil Service are therefore made by the individual Ministers. As conditions were in the early days of the Republic, when everything had to be built up from the ground, a state of things inconceivable to us in this ancient country, it was inevitable that the great majority of the posts, especially the higher posts, should go to Czechs. Now, Czechoslovakia, partly owing to the working of proportional representation, has been under a system of coalition government during the whole of the last twenty years. This has meant that particular Ministries have remained over a considerable period of years in the hands of a Minister belonging to a single Party. Thus the Agrarians have occupied the Ministry of the Interior throughout, the Ministry of Agriculture since 1921 and the Defence Ministry, except for an interval of one year, since 1922. The Ministry of Posts has been in the hands of the National Socialist Party since 1929, and the Ministry of Railways in the hands of the Czech Social Democrats since 1932 and the Ministry of Justice since 1929. I need not multiply instances. It is inevitable, under such conditions, that particular Ministries should acquire a certain party-political colour and that party members, national and local, should entertain expectations in consequence. The influence of the Parties in the administrative machine is increased by the fact that in Czechoslovakia, unlike Great Britain, the parties wield a certain amount of financial power. The Agrarians, for instance, have an interest in the armaments industry, the National Socialists (not to be confounded with the German Party of the same name) own a large publishing business, and the Social Democrats are deeply engaged in co-operative enterprises. Thus the task of a reformer bent on setting up a Civil Service Commission on British lines would not be easy, and it apparently baffled even a Masaryk.

But now comes a further complication. The system of local government in Bohemia and Moravia is modelled on that which existed in Austria. The country is divided into Lands (Bohemia and Moravia each forming a Land), districts and communes, with certain defined spheres of activity. So far the system seems to be familiar to us, but when it is examined more closely, three peculiarities appear. In the first place, there is in each Land and district a President who is appointed by the Minister of the Interior. So far as I can discover from the text of the law, this official does not possess a right of veto over the proceedings of these local bodies, except when they go beyond the law. But it is obvious that the presence of Whitehall, so to speak, in the local Council room makes the atmosphere rather different from that in this country. In the second place, the Presidents are closely associated with the local appointments, all of which must, in the case of the Lands, be submitted for their approval. In the third place, one-third of the members of the Provincial and District Councils are nominated by the Ministry of the Interior. They are supposed to be experts, but there is more than one way of being an expert.

It is quite impossible for an outsider to form a judgment as to the working of a system of local government from the text of the law and from casual inquiries; but I have formed at least the provisional conclusion that the agitation for what is called autonomy is not so much a demand for the splitting off of a compact German area (even if this were possible, which it is not) as a protest against what seems to British eyes a rather cumbrous form of central control. In this respect the Austrian tradition has lived on. My Czech friends seemed sometimes surprised when I told them that, though Whitehall was absent from our local Council chambers, it could still on occasion, if necessary, as in the case of Rotherham, take over the administration bodily from an offending local body. I am convinced that the remedy is not to be found by taking away powers that are at present in the hands of Czech political parties in Prague and handing them over to what would in effect be German political parties at Reichenberg or elsewhere. The remedy lies deeper down. It is to familiarise both sections of the population with the methods of local government, as practised under the best conditions. It may sound a trivial thing to say, but I firmly believe that if there had been regular courses of lectures by a British authority on this subject both in the Czech and the German Universities at Prague during the last twenty years, much of the present confusion might

never have arisen. As it is, the Prime Minister is trying to tinker with the system by setting up German sections inside the various Ministries, on the analogy of the Welsh Department of the Board of Education. This may be a palliative for the moment, and may even succeed in screwing the number of German and other minority appointees to the right arithmetical ratio; but it will never solve the main problem.

Let me repeat, in conclusion, that the German grievances, genuine though they are, are not relevant to the present crisis. Perhaps the best proof of this is that it is impossible to discover in the Henleinist literature any clear statement either of their grievances or of suggested solutions. The closest approach to a connected statement is Herr Henlein's lecture at Chatham House, which does credit to his understanding of our way of looking at things. But he does not seem to have conveyed this understanding to his colleagues in Parliament. Anxious to find out their desiderata, I waded through a book of over three hundred pages describing their parliamentary activities. It contained only seven pages devoted to administrative questions, and these were not treated on a very serious level. But at least I found there a good story, and with this I will conclude. In a certain place in Eastern Bohemia application was made to the District authority by a German association one Easter for permission to hold a public collection in the style of our Alexandra Day roses, but the object in this case was not a rose, but a diminutive chicken emerging from an Easter egg. The local authority, whether through the vote of the Czech members, including perhaps the experts, or on the advice of the official President, allowed the collection but forbade the symbol, on the ground that it was not a mere nondescript chicken (*Hühnchen*) but a young cock (*Hähnlein*). Bureaucrats are apt to run true to type, and so do Parliamentary Oppositions. When the Henlein Party returns to issues of this kind we shall be able to feel that the acute stage of the crisis is over.

Summary of Discussion

MR. JOHN H. HUMPHREYS said he had understood the lecturer to say that under proportional representation several of the Ministers had held office for long periods, and that the parties from which the Ministers were drawn exercised considerable patronage in Civil Service appointments. Was such patronage a consequence of proportional representation? Was it not due to the fact that Czechoslovakia had not yet adopted the British form of Civil Service? Patronage was rife in many countries which did not use proportional representation. No settlement of the problem presented by Czechoslovakia was possible

which did not provide for the fair treatment, including the fair representation, of the minorities; any new constitution must be based on this fundamental condition; this condition did not preclude Civil Service or other requisite reforms.

MR. RENNIE SMITH said that he would like to deal with the main issue, the problem of a certain way of life as conceived at headquarters in Munich and Berlin with representation in Sudeten Bohemia and its possible consequences. He would like to give a German point of view.

He had received a document which had been published in a German newspaper describing an essay which had received a prize in Germany. It belonged to the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps in Salzburg, and had been awarded the prize by the German Military Academy as the best essay on how to accomplish the conquest of Czechoslovakia. The essay had been divided into seven parts. The outstanding fact was that the action should be completed in fourteen days, and if possible in a shorter time. The world must be confronted with the *fait accompli*. Troops must be ready for eventual use in the West in the case that France might decide to help her ally and seek to alter a matter already successfully concluded. Germany could not stand a long war, and any campaign must be ended as quickly as possible. Therefore the writer advocated a mass concentration and the swiftest advance possible, the first object being the destruction of the capital.

The second paragraph of the essay dealt with the assumption that France and Russia were still allies of Czechoslovakia and that Poland was still allied to France, and Czechoslovakia still a member of the Little Entente. The German agreement and her present disposition made it unlikely that any help for Czechoslovakia would come from Poland; indeed, there might be a Polish occupation of the district of Teschen. The same was to be expected from Hungary. As a military power factor the Little Entente disappeared. Yugoslavia stood outside any combination against the Reich. Roumania was incapable of action. The writer then pointed out that the only way in which the Soviet Union would be able to help would be by sea from the Baltic or through Carpathian Russia, and by this time Germany would be able to deal with the situation, since Poland could be trusted to care for Germany's eastern frontier. This left France as the one important factor. Should this country take automatic action, as she was pledged to do, then the dangerous long war might arise. But there were strong objections. Mobilisation in France required so much time that in the interim period the fate of Prague might be decided. Whether, after an accomplished fact, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by a completely mobile German Army with victories already behind it, the French people, without being threatened, would be willing for such a fearful war merely in order to restore an already destroyed Czechoslovakia was a matter of doubt.

Section three pointed out that the troops operating in Czechoslovakia would not for a large part have to be mobilised, but would

remain in a mobile condition. The occupation of Austria also showed that mobilisation could take place unnoticed. The mobilisation of the rest of the army could take place normally while the invading army was at work.

Then co-operation with the S.S. and S.A. units in the Sudeten area was discussed. It was considered that the Czechs were not very strong from a military point of view, although they could probably put up a fair fight. Co-operation with the Henlein Groups was discussed, and the fact stressed that Prague must be captured at whatever sacrifice. To emphasise the importance of this the writer used the example of Mussolini's conquest of Addis Ababa and Abyssinia as compared with Franco's failure to capture Madrid and therefore Spain, from the point of view of achieving a swift, decisive campaign. Then the German troops in the West were warned to be careful to take no action which would of itself annoy France, and opinion in Great Britain was to be carefully studied.

This essay was an example of the thinking of men like General Goering, and would continue to be a part of the situation for some time to come.

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON said that the idea of a plebiscite had been very frequently mentioned in the British press. He considered that this whole idea was completely out of date. It had been rendered farcical by the methods adopted in the totalitarian States.

Secondly, the speaker did not wish to justify everything which the Czech Government or local authorities had done, but it was a misuse of words to speak of terror in this connection. The real terror was being applied by the Henlein Party towards the Social Democrats and certain sections of the Clerical Party. Again, why should people in other countries demand a plebiscite when the Sudeten Germans themselves repudiated any such idea? At the present moment Herr Henlein himself was negotiating on the basis of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, and absolutely denied all idea of separatism or partition. It was better to wait until he and his Party repudiated the present basis of discussion before making wild suggestions which could only complicate the situation. Within what boundaries would such a plebiscite be conducted? Or what would be the boundaries within which autonomy would be granted? The boundaries of the outside shell of Bohemia were very clear, but who could draw a clear internal line as between Czechs and Germans? Even when they were drawn there would be something like four hundred thousand Czechs in the German territories and about eight hundred thousand Germans in the Czech territories. As the lecturer had pointed out, it would be necessary to have at least four or five separate German units.

The speaker had that afternoon read in a collection of diplomatic documents a phrase of the Prussian Minister in Paris in December 1858 in which he had said that conditions intended to fortify European peace could very easily be made, by inaccurate presentation, to contribute

towards endangering that peace. A few months later had come the Franco-Austrian War in Italy. The speaker would remind those making suggestions of plebiscites and extreme cantonal arrangements of this statement.

He also quoted a recent conversation with a German of the Reich, in which they had both expressed their sincere desire for harmony between their two countries: and when the speaker had asked his German visitor what Great Britain could do to ensure this, he had replied: " For God's sake stand firm as you did on May 20th. It's the only hope."

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV said that he had discussed the Czechoslovak problem very recently in France.

The first consideration he would like to mention was purely strategical. The French considered that as the British had in effect given them a military alliance, they must bear in mind the strategical implications of Europe as a whole. As far as one could ascertain, the German plan in case of emergency was that she could not sustain a long war, and that therefore France must be immobilised, and she must be in a position to give Great Britain an overwhelming blow before 1940 (*i.e.*, before the British Air Force should be equal to their own). The German aerodromes were in the region of the Dutch frontier and the North Sea—including the Frisian Islands. The German vital centres were round Berlin, in the area between Leipzig, Magdeburg and Cassel, and between Nürnberg and Stuttgart—all not easily accessible from our aerodromes. But Czechoslovakia was a magnificent bombing base for those three vital areas. Hence the importance of reducing Czechoslovakia—by dismemberment or forced neutrality—before 1939 if possible.

Secondly, the speaker understood that when the French Ministers had visited London they had put forward an economic plan for the support of the whole Central and South-Eastern European area. There was a growing idea that this area would be capable of starting that type of economic rehabilitation which M. Van Zeeland had in mind when putting forward his Report. But the argument that this was the sphere of natural German influence must result, if it were allowed to persist, in this area becoming a totalitarian " bloc " with no chance of developing into any freer economic system. Had the Czechs mentioned this aspect of the question, and had they mentioned their treaty with the United States? This treaty, recently concluded, had, it seemed, an interesting provision with regard to the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, because it did not exclude preferential economic co-operation in the Danubian basin. For this reason it was a very important step forward towards reconciling Most-Favoured-Nation and " Low Tariff " Clauses and should be supported.

Thirdly, the Czechs believed—or so the French thought—that although Britain was prepared to stand by them, in an emergency, yet, as long as there was no violence, the British would be content to see

them gradually enslaved economically by Germany. This might be a slow but sure method of strangulation. Therefore if they had any hint of such treatment, they might be prepared to take action which in turn might provoke the risk of a conflict. They felt that it was better to fight for their freedom—which they had achieved after three hundred years of domination—than to submit to slow strangulation. Such an attitude on the part of the Czechs might make the situation extremely dangerous. It would be well if, in this instance, the British were to adopt the more logical attitude of the French—*e.g.*, be prepared to implement any alliance they might make in a practical way, to realise the necessity for long-term economic support of such countries as Czechoslovakia as wished to be independent, and above all not to encourage the legitimate aspirations of any country if the secret guiding principle of British policy was—as Calverly put it—" Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive officiously to keep alive."

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that the lecturer had mentioned the salient of Bohemia into Germany. Had he found among the Czechs the belief that it was the settled intention of Nazi Germany to obliterate that salient? Had he found among them any belief that a compromise was possible?

The speaker had that morning received a letter mentioning the significant document referred to by the second speaker. His correspondent had stated that the German Academy for War had offered a prize for the best contribution on the subject of the military conquest of Czechoslovakia, saying that the prize had been awarded to the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps. It was significant that a prize should have been offered for an essay on this subject and that the winner should arrange for that conquest in fourteen days. Some two months ago a speaker from Czechoslovakia had said that the German plan would be to shorten the salient between Pressburg and Troppau. This would be of immense advantage to Germany in the case of a future campaign, and would set free one million or perhaps one million five hundred thousand troops for operations against the West.

On June 9th Field-Marshal Goering had paid a visit to inspect the new fortifications in the West, particularly in the Palatinate and the Saar Basin. Further north a military barricade had been built on the road from Aix-la-Chapelle to Liége which could be opened or closed by electricity. The whole German frontier from Dresden, Leipzig down to Northern Bavaria was full of troops sixty miles deep. These troop movements had caused the British Ambassador to make inquiries in Berlin. On being told that they were purely routine movements, he had expressed some surprise, and had probably remembered that the same had been said before the occupation of Austria. Since then troops had marched out at the rate of one battalion out of three during the day. By night two battalions had marched in. In the last fortnight immense quantities of gas containers had been carried up to the frontier a very few miles from Czechoslovakia. This did not necessarily

mean that an attack was imminent, but the speaker thought that it was probable that there was a connection between the recent bombing of British ships off Spain and the attack on the Franco-Spanish frontier—obliging the French to send down a certain number of aircraft—and the events of May 21st. It was an attempt to see how far France and Great Britain would stand together. If there were any hesitation or wavering, there would probably be a transference of pressure to the Czechoslovak frontier. The situation was extremely strained, not necessarily extremely grave.

The speaker had heard from an entirely reliable source in Germany of the tremendous increase in the prestige of Great Britain in Munich and Dresden when it had been felt that her action had averted war. It was necessary to reckon not merely with the designs of Herr Hitler and his advisers, but also with the interests of the German people and the people of Central Europe, who knew that firmness on the part of Great Britain would contribute not only to her own peace, but also to the peace of Germany and Central Europe.

MR. W. J. ROSE said that the document referred to by the second speaker was to be found on the front page of the weekly, *Der Deutsche in Polen*. He was glad that the lecturer had mentioned Professor Radl's notable book. He remembered discussing the whole matter with him four years ago in Prague. A very bitter attack had been made upon it at the time of publication by extreme nationalists who would not hear of any fair dealings for their German fellow-citizens, but Dr. Radl had not despaired. Another book had been published on the same subject at the same time which had been fairly impartial and not at all extremist—*Der Kampf der Deutschen und Tschechen*, by Dr. Peters. There was still at that time good hope of an understanding being reached by the Czech majority and their German neighbours, the relations with whom had improved after 1926. From 1931–1932 on, however, thanks to the rise of Nazi power in the Reich, this hope diminished.

In regard to this wider issue, he would like to put one question to the lecturer. Did he think that both sides honestly desired a settlement? There was little doubt that Prague desired one. But did the lecturer think that there was in Berlin any desire for a settlement which would give that peace with which some said that the Nazi economy could not live: since in order to live it must have a state of war?

MR. PETER MATTHEWS said that he had that morning received a piece of propaganda from Germany entitled: "Is the Prague Republic an Anachronism?" The reference to Albania made by the lecturer had been very interesting. It was often said that it would weaken Germany were she to try to swallow the seven million Czechs. This was not her plan. Italy was not the mistress of Albania in the sense that Albania was a province of Italy. She was mistress of Albania in the sense that

the Albanian Government took its orders from Rome. This was the German solution of the Czechoslovak problem.

From the British point of view there were two main considerations when shaping policy with regard to Czechoslovakia. First, the average man did not want to fight for the Czechs. Secondly, the Czechoslovak Republic was an actual and potential producer of arms quite out of proportion to the size of the population. The Skoda works ranked with the largest British works and with the great American firms. Czechoslovakia was amongst the three greatest arms-exporting countries of the world. Mr. Garvin told the British to allow the Germans to have their way in Czechoslovakia, but at the same time to attain arms parity with them. If to present German resources were added those of Czechoslovakia, it would be realised that the two things were incompatible.

It was largely the fault of the Czechs that the attempt to co-operate with the German activists had failed. It was difficult to go on believing that a solution could be found whereby Czechoslovakia could be "neutralised" and rendered independent both of the Franco-Russian bloc and of Germany.

An internal solution seemed equally impossible. The economic aspect in this case was most important. The struggle between Czechs and Germans was being fought out in an area closely resembling South Wales, which formerly had been a great and flourishing industrial district and which had lost its markets in Austria-Hungary and then in the world. Also adding to this grievance there had been a considerable importation of Czech labour into this area. To the Germans it was tantamount to an importation of foreign labour at a time when unemployment was particularly distressing. This was the dynamic factor in the internal situation. No agreement could be reached without a drastic improvement in the economic condition of the Germans. The unemployment relief for unorganised labour at present was ten or twenty crowns a week, when the rate of exchange was a hundred and forty to the pound.

MR. WILSON HARRIS (in the Chair) referred to the fact that the lecturer had stated that only one class of the Czech Army had been called up, and yet this had been occasioned by fear of danger from outside, not because of fear of internal conflict. Did not the fact that only one class had been called up lend colour to the theory that this had been effected through fear of internal disorder?

SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN said that the figure of the number of people called up which had been given to him had been, two hundred and twenty thousand troops already in training, and an additional hundred and eighty thousand, making the total four hundred thousand in all. Amongst these had been a large number of "specialists," engineers, etc. It had been stated that the numbers of Germans mobilised had been about equal.

The lecturer had mentioned the German grievances because they had been so much discussed in Great Britain. Also, the Czechs were not plaster saints. They were the only democrats in that part of the world, but it did not follow that they were a perfect democracy. They had not got a system as good as that in Switzerland. How could it be expected, starting from zero and living in a very difficult part of the world, to evolve all at once a perfect form of democracy?

In no conversation had the subject of a plebiscite been mentioned. The idea was not at all current in Czechoslovakia at the present time.

The importance of Czechoslovakia as an air base was axiomatic. It might not be mentioned, but it was in people's minds all the time. Everyone knew how assailable Germany was from this point, and the Czechs realised perhaps better than the British public the contribution they could make to the defence of London.

The lecturer had not greatly examined economic questions, but certainly the Czechs were very pleased about the Treaty with America both morally and materially. They had not in fact complained about British economic policy, but the lecturer agreed on this point with Mr. Amery, that we had been in this respect not quite fair to the Danubian countries in insisting on the maintenance of our rights under the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause.

The Czechs did not anticipate economic strangulation, because they were confident that they would always have access through Poland, since the Poles were very anxious to promote their Baltic trade and the prosperity of Gdynia.

The last speaker had mentioned the economic condition of the Sudeten Germans. The lecturer had visited glass factories in this area where the men were only employed three days a month. It was a misfortune that the export trade happened to be in the German area, while the more prosperous arms trade was in the Czech area. He had not heard much about Czech labour being introduced into these areas. The complaints had been mainly of the Czech officials.

In answer to the fifth speaker, the Czechs could not conceive of the salient being obliterated. Their position was that they were going to fight until the last, if necessary. They also realised that as long as the present regime continued in Germany a state of danger and tension would exist.

Did both parties desire a settlement? The lecturer could not answer for the German people, but so far as Berlin was concerned, the danger of the situation lay in the fact that the German Government did not desire a settlement in any way acceptable to the Czechs. The Czechs were willing to fight. If they did fight, there would be a general war. The *coup* would not succeed in a fortnight. No one could guess to what degree the Czech mobilisation and British and French diplomacy had contributed to avert the danger on May 21st, but it had been a great satisfaction to feel that there had been greater firmness in London. In this latter fact lay the only hope of averting the catastrophe of a European War.

foreign affairs, and the bedrock policies of nations which are safeguarded by diplomacy. The treaties and alliances which are the outcome of diplomacy are entered into for the furtherance of security. Either they minimise the chances of an outbreak of war, or they improve the strategical situation should war be inevitable. I have already instanced our attitude of suspicion towards those river-mouths in Holland, and how apprehensive we were of a danger issuing from them. Let me mention one or two others of the same sort.

Why must Italy keep a tight, possessive hand on the Kingdom of Albania? Because the Albanian harbour, Valona, opposite the heel of the Italian boot, is of first-class strategic importance for a country which desires complete control of the Adriatic. Why did we go round in circles when the Kaiser was wheedling the Baghdad Railway Concession out of Abdul Hamid? Because we feared that Germany would emerge at the head of the Persian Gulf and threaten our Imperial communications with the East. Why was Lansdowne's Anglo-French Agreement hailed with such delight as a master-stroke of diplomacy? Because, in return for giving France a fairly free hand in Morocco, it gave us a completely free hand in Egypt, thereby enabling us to consolidate our hold on territory adjoining the Suez Canal. And lastly, why did we insist so firmly on an International Zone in Tangiers? Because we could not risk the possibility of a rival Power facing us across the Straits of Gibraltar.

In each and every case, wherever you look, you will find the principle observed. Strategy has ruled the arrangement on a basis of mutual accommodation, and the instrument of strategy up to the present has been surface warfare. The name of these political arrangements is legion. The whole map of Europe, and of most of the world besides, is criss-crossed with them; and the pact or understanding thus arrived at is just as much part and parcel of any national defensive system as is the law of conscription or the laying-down of battleships.

And now, I think, we have a fairly complete picture of the way in which our human affairs have been planned for us by what might be called the survival-urge of nations, a collective instinct which is stronger than any other. If countries can, they nestle snugly behind their natural boundaries because they feel themselves more secure in doing so. And the internal arrangements of each, the communication system, the sites of towns and the general distribution of population are, from the early beginnings, to a large extent conditioned by the strategical necessities of

the moment, always with the aim of security. Lastly, the bottom planks of national policy have been laid in place and the changing network of treaties, alliances, pacts and understandings has been knitted, in this and every other age, for no other purpose. Our whole social edifice, in fact, as it exists to-day, has been built up from a ground plan which was drawn for it in accordance with a defensive scheme; and it rests finally on a foundation of armed force which itself has been the slow product of time. Each separate family in the huge apartment house hopes for permanence of occupation as a result of the fighting efficiency with which the development of military science has endowed the modern army and the modern navy.

If therefore (and here, if I may so express myself, I am getting near the knuckle) these old foundations should be severely shaken, it is not unnatural to presume that the structure which has been raised above them will be badly rocked. Well, they are at this very moment imminently threatened with something in the nature of an earthquake, and the centre of the seismic disturbance is in the air. Air Power, in other words, is calculated to produce just that very effect.

The military system itself, as far as description is necessary, can be defined in a few words. Because it evolved itself when the only possible form of fighting was on the surface of the land or sea, it had necessarily to assume what might be called a " barrier " formation. Armies barred each other's way, and so did navies. The frontier mountain chain or river was a line to bar invasion. The walled town or the chain of fortresses answered the same necessity; and so, in modern fashion, do the underground fortifications, on the principle of General Maginot, which certain European nations are so intent on. So long as barriers held, whether made of flesh and blood of fighting men or constructed by the hand of Nature or of man, so long was defeat averted and security maintained. Wars did happen with disastrous regularity; barriers were breached; and defeat had to be again and again acknowledged. But when the turmoil had subsided and when the winner had finished with the map of Europe, the gaps in the defences were repaired, and, in default of something new to take its place, the old, old system rumbled on.

The actual part which the military machine plays in war is not always understood. War itself is merely the fisticuff end of a political argument, and its real object is for one government to impose its will on another, so that victory in the field, strangely enough, is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. No self-

respecting nation, however, will submit to mere threat, and so invasion becomes necessary to possess the adversary's soil and, from his capital for choice, to dictate terms of peace. The real point of attack is the war spirit of the people and their will to war, for if this is broken badly, it is quite obvious that there will be no powers of resistance left. As long as the defending forces hold their ground, and as long as the populace behind do not suffer too bitterly under the rigour of war, so long will the national morale remain high and, with varying fortune, the conflict be continued.

A case in point, and a glaring one at that, is provided by Germany in 1918. After four years of not unsuccessful fighting the people, as distinguished from those in uniform, cruelly short of food and the necessities of life, found they could endure no more, and broke out in open revolution. As an immediate consequence the Armistice came about and the military power of Germany collapsed like a house of cards. There was plenty of fighting spirit at the front, but none at home, and so the war was over. A slow process of blockade finally broke the popular spirit of resistance, and broke with it into fragments the whole of Germany's elaborate military machine. The Allies had been pegging away at this, the real point of attack, from the very beginning, though it is doubtful if they recognised its true importance in the scheme of things; and in that way they finally accomplished a victory, surprising in its suddenness, which could never have been so simply won on the field.

I wonder how many people have seen the real significance of what happened then, or, after seeing it, have related it to the possibility of what might happen now. For while the German armies were locked with ours on the various fronts, she was really being invaded all the time, and with a pressure which constantly increased, by the insidious forces of famine and of general want. These could not be kept out, for they were able to overleap all barriers and mock the futility of the slaughter on the ground.

To do likewise is the essence of Air Power in its proper application. For it also can leap the barriers in derision of the struggle going on below and rain destruction on the nerve-centres of a country. But, compared with the interminably slow process of blockade, its results will be immediate; and they will be achieved by violence in a particularly terrifying form rather than insidiously by slow starvation tactics. Air Power, as exemplified by the bomber aircraft, does not work in devious ways. The

barriers have fallen flat to suit its purpose, for it has no obstacle before it. Air fleet does not fight air fleet up above in a manner similar to encounter on the ground. They make a bee-line for their respective targets, undergoing no risk on the way, and little on arrival, owing to the safety factor of surprise which speed and altitude and the immensity of space confer.

Moreover, Air Power can be applied with, literally, the unexpectedness of a bolt from the blue. It requires no mobilisation period, or time for other preparation, and it need not advertise its intention. The squadrons stand always ready to depart, as poised for action as an arrow strung to the bent bow. And no military or naval force, whatever their size or disposition, can avail to hinder the progress of the bomber or prevent it from reaching its destination.

This irresistibility, combined with the ability to strike repeatedly and hard at places unattainable in any other way, and so to bring immediate pressure on that real point of attack, the national will, surely supersedes the older form of fighting. With the barrier system fallen flat the whole elaborate military system founded on it must surely have fallen too. Security no longer exists in the older meaning of the word, and this must affect more than fighting. Surely a new world order, based on a new strategy, must gradually take shape, and a new system of treaty and alliance between countries; for one cannot pour new strategical wine into old diplomatic bottles. Failure to recognise that fact is partly accountable for our troubles to-day.

It will not matter any longer now what danger afloat issues from those river-mouths in Holland, when a much greater one can travel by air from remote parts of Europe, with nothing to stop it on the way, to bombard any town or city in the British Isles. Ever since the opening of the Suez Canal seventy years ago, British policy has been directed towards making it territorially secure from attack, and in the process we have built up a Near-Eastern pyramid of power the foothold of which is now as far afield as Iraq. Our Mediterranean diplomacy had only that one single aim and object. And to-day, or to-morrow at the latest, one hostile bomber out of a few, or several out of many, could put it out of action long enough in the course of a single flight.

If, as a result of the Civil War in Spain, the Western Mediterranean should also become a Fascist stronghold, could our Navy be certain of a passage through the Straits, with locally-based Air Power against them in addition to all other modern

means of prevention? We failed to force the Dardanelles in 1916 before the bomber was invented, and it is a purely naval undertaking in either case. Would the problem be so different now that we could laugh the difficulties to scorn? And if not, what further point is there in an International Zone?

Supposing, in the like case, that Portugal should have to trim her sails to the breeze of power politics and forsake her old alliance. We ourselves answered to an American helm in that way in 1921 when we forsook the alliance we had long held with Japan. Those Atlantic island groups of Portugal are just as nicely situated as the Canaries for aircraft and submarine bases; and if the Azores, Madeira and the Cape Verde Isles were so adopted, it is not difficult to imagine the sort of gauntlet which our shipping would have to run along the Cape route, if the Mediterranean should become unusable.

If Air Power were non-existent and sea power still supreme, what need would there be for us to seek an accommodation with Italy in the face of her proud boast that the Mediterranean Sea shall again become a Roman Lake? For the first time in all history she is securely astride our right of way, and she has attained that exasperating situation because she is *de facto* the Air Power on the spot.

Already, and manifestly so, the surface of political waters is being disturbed by this ascendancy of Air Power. Warfare in the third dimension, with all its compelling power of offence, has unroofed the world, which lies exposed beneath it as bare and vulnerable as if the chicken-coop were removed from a sitting hen. Domestic politics apart, and speaking only from the standpoint of security, self-interest now demands that we patch up our differences and shake hands in all sincerity with Italy if it can be done. Otherwise, with practically unlimited Air Power at her local beck and call and a central situation than which no other could be strategically so strong, she is in a position to do us infinite harm.

Every country in future will have to exercise much more care in cutting its coat according to the cloth, and we, strung out promiscuously over the face of the globe, most of all. And that brings me to a separate phase of the subject which might be called "Air Power in the Working." With only a superficial knowledge on the matter, it is easy to conclude that Air Power can be applied on a principle of tit-for-tat, so that in the long run each will cancel the other out. Even if that were the case, it would be small comfort for the generality of mankind, who would continue to

exist, while hostilities lasted, in a state of terrified expectation of death from the air. But it is very far indeed from being the case, as I shall endeavour to show; particularly as the easy catchword "Air Parity" seems to have crept into our Parliamentary vocabulary of late.

Naval Parity, or Power Standards, are familiar to us, and we know all about them; the latest example being Italy's reputed claim to that sort of equality in the Mediterranean, and the earliest our pre-War undertakings with Germany concerning naval strength in the North Sea. Thus used, the principle is a simple matter of arrangement and quite effective for its purpose; the main points of agreement being, of course, tonnage, either in the aggregate or by category of ships, and the calibre of big guns. The general effect is to call a halt in the race for naval armaments and to prevent one sea-power country stealing a naval march on another. The main advantage is that each country knows exactly how the other stands, and can calculate with fair nicety the probable result of a main fleet engagement. Naval Parity, in other words, works to a tick.

Military Parity, in the sense of a flat agreement between Powers, is not known. Firstly, there is not the same need for it; and secondly, the possibilities of evading whatever obligation were involved would be immense. But it does not really matter. The raw material of a navy is steel and iron ore; while the raw material of an army is the untrained conscript. The vital statistics of any country are easily procurable, and from these, read in with the service and conscription laws, may be deduced the average manhood power which is a constant on either side of the equation. Like absolute zero in temperature, the military effectives of a nation can be counted as just so many and no more. But there is no computation for ultimate heat, and it is just the same with naval strength, which can be increased to unknown limits by feverish energy in the shipyards.

But although navies and armies, considered in combination as a total of military strength, have not that in common, they are alike as two peas in another sense. For neither has any other purpose in life, and no reason whatever for existence, except to meet in battle, and overthrow, if possible, their opposite numbers on the enemy side. It is team against team, though without a referee, and with the non-combatant for the time being in the rôle of highly interested onlooker. Measured in weight of capital ships, the chances of one navy against another can be roughly calculated, and there is never that disproportion between

the armies of military nations which would mean a walk-over for the slightly stronger.

Now let us examine Parity in the light of Air Power. It means, according to several official pronouncements on the subject, that we retain the right to build up to the first-line air strength of any potential enemy within effective bombing range of the British Isles; thereby excluding, it might be noted, the United States of America and Japan. This definition, of course, takes no account of the size or efficiency of bomber aircraft, nor of the relative merits of the equipment which they carry. In fact, it is worth noting that a single valuable discovery might upset the balance altogether. But at present, and possibly for long to come, countries are fairly equal in those respects, and so that flaw in definition can be discounted. Air Parity, therefore, means in effect that if two rival Air Forces took the air *en masse* over their own territory and were weighed in counterbalance, then neither of the bomb loads taken up would tip the scale.

Now let us see the principle in working order. The peculiarity of Air Power as a weapon of war is that Air Forces are not, and never can be, drawn up in line of battle to go at it hammer and tongs for victory, as do the forces by land and sea below. Indeed, it would be a senseless thing to do, even were it feasible, for evasiveness in the emptiness of space is their strongest card, and to throw away this advantage at the outset would be to forgo leading trumps. On this account they cannot measure themselves against each other, and already the expression " Parity " assumes a vagueness, for if there is no natural enemy, what point can there be in a power standard?

In spite of this, however, the principle would work, and work like clockwork too, if only two essential conditions could be fulfilled, *pace* the feelings of the civilians on either side about to be bombarded from the air. One is that the principal objectives on either side—the rival capitals, for instance—should be commensurable in size and in importance; and the other that the distances which either side would have to fly to reach them should be approximately equal.

This I can make clearer by reference to the situation of Russia *vis à vis* Japan. Imagine Air Parity between those two countries. Every teeming city of Japan is within range of the Red Banner Air Force of Russia's Far Eastern Area, and most of them could be reached from the Siberian mainland in about two hours of flight. The whole life of Japan lies open to damage

or destruction, and the shape and situation of her Island Empire are such that it lies along the segment of a circle of which Vladivostock is the centre. What has Russia to offer in fair exchange for those priceless opportunities to make unendurable the lot of the citizens of Japan? Practically nothing, and certainly nothing equivalent. The largest centre of population is Vladivostock, with one hundred and thirty thousand; whereas Tokyo has five and three-quarter million inhabitants and Osaka two and a half million. Japan has 350 persons to the square mile; Russia in Asia has eight. Parity has obviously lost all meaning in this connection. But what about distance? If the Russian Air Force has from six to seven hundred miles to fly to bring destruction on Japan, how far must the Japanese pilots go to secure an equivalent result? The answer is about six thousand miles; for not until Moscow and Leningrad are reached will they be over anything which is really worth their while as a tit-for-tat response to what their country will be undergoing. And, to cap it all, the one country will have the advantage of a sea approach all the way, while the other must fly overland, if she is ever so foolish as to set out.

In plain terms, the principle of Parity applied to Air Power is nonsensical. It is impossible to measure relative strength because the items in the calculation are impalpable, and it could easily so happen that an inferior Air Force might inflict much more damage, moral and material, than one with a decided superiority. These are the matters to be taken into account: the frontier configuration of the two enemy countries and the situation of the principal objectives, which rules the distances to be flown; whether the journeys will be over land or sea, which will have a decided influence on the efficacy of a warning organisation; and the number of vital points for attack, which will decide the strategy to be employed.

Unless I weary you, I should like to give another supposititious example of Air Parity in the working. We will assume that our policy has been implemented and that we have achieved to the best of our belief a bombing capacity equal to that of Germany. War breaks out, and both sides immediately despatch on prepared missions their brigades of bombers. I make no doubt myself that the enemy, for very good and sufficient reasons, would descend on London; and I hope that we (although it is only my lecturing half that says so) would make for Berlin, which, if only half the size of our capital, yet contains four and a quarter million inhabitants. To do so, at any rate, was our

declared programme in 1919, if the War had continued, and I know of no alteration of circumstance.

The enemy bombers would make a bee-line over water from the neighbourhood of Borkum in Friesland, where full preparation has been going forward for, apparently, just that very purpose; and they could be over London in about an hour. Our own bombers, presumably, would start from somewhere in Norfolk, but not to make a bee-line for Berlin, for Holland intervenes, and so does Belgium, which has now resumed a neutral status. In consequence of this, after an equal passage over water, during which our pilots might wave a greeting to the enemy outward bound, they would have a further distance to fly of nearly three hundred miles, during which the whole of the enemy warning organisation would be on the alert. Personally I do not believe that the local defence will ever do more than take a small percentage toll of the hostile aircraft overhead, but whatever efficiency it may possess depends almost entirely on a warning organisation; and it is quite obvious that a warning organisation is in much better working order over land than over water. The German bombers, then, would have a distance to fly little more than half the journey ours would have to go; their passage would be entirely over water, with all the advantage that would give them, while ours would be over land for half its length; and their target at the other end would be the largest city in the world, so elaborately contrived as regards its services of supply and transport and all the other amenities of civilised existence, that if these were destroyed or seriously disarranged a quarter of the population of the British Isles would be affected. So much for Parity.

And now I have come to the end of my tether and possibly of your patience. It is a difficult subject to treat of in the course of a short lecture, and I fear I may have left many gaps in my argument. If so, I am prepared to fill them to the best of my ability; my last words before I am unhorsed being, "May Providence be on our side in the next war."

Summary of the Discussion.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER said that he was in entire agreement with the lecturer as to the complete failure of the principle of parity; it might be a good democratic principle, but it was not a military or scientific principle. He differed in thinking that the attack on the civil will by frightfulness was not so rapid or decisive as expressed by the lecturer; in its earlier form of the sacking of captured cities it had not had that effect; the sack of Magdeburg had not ended the

Thirty Years' War and Cromwell's sack of Drogheda did not prevent him from having to sack Wexford. For the attack on the civil will to be effective it must be combined with attack on the civil stomach. If the economic and moral attacks coincided, as they would in the case of Great Britain if London were bombed, then they might well be effective. A point which perturbed him was the fact that pilots never knew quite where their bombs were going to fall. It was alleged, for instance, that a thousand bombs had been dropped on Teruel, but it was clear from his own observation there that not more than ten per cent. could have fallen on Teruel itself; there were bomb-holes a mile away. Much of the needless slaughter of air bombardment was due to this fact.

CAPTAIN BERNARD ACWORTH thought that General Fuller's remarks reduced what the lecturer had said to very little. He considered that flying, now thirty years old, was not so much in its infancy as in its dotage; railways within twelve years of starting had been able to run express trains at sixty miles an hour. But speed was not in itself a fighting characteristic. Air enthusiasts in Great Britain and in other countries, in telling people what would happen in the next war, always neglected what had actually happened in the late wars. Great Britain during the last year of the World War had turned out ninety aeroplanes a day and built a total of 119,000. The collapse of Germany in 1918 had shown that what happened in the air was totally irrelevant to what happened on the land, for the blackest day in German naval and military history had synchronised with the greatest air victory in which they brought down eighty-five British aeroplanes. Anybody who studied the air operations in the Spanish struggle against sea power, either in the North or South of Spain, must have been struck by their ludicrous futility.

The lecturer appeared to assume that terrorism, frightfulness, baby-killing, for which the Germans were anathematised during the late war, was not only an appropriate form of warfare, but also effectual. Actually it had no effect except to drive people into the appropriate fighting forces; or if it did not, then the country deserved to be beaten. Could the lecturer give any instance of a nation, Arabs, Kurds, North-West Frontiersmen, Englishmen, Germans or Italians, who were cowed because their womenfolk and babies had been killed?

On the question of parity he agreed with the lecturer; any attempt to achieve parity was futile. There was nothing to prevent any nation from turning out aeroplanes like rabbits. The country which relied on them would be defeated. From time immemorial the bomb had been regarded as the assassin's weapon. The futility of air power to achieve its object was even more deplorable than the spirit which inspired it.

AIR-COMMODORE W. F. MACNEECE FOSTER rose to refute the suggestion that those who feared for the future of air power in Great

Britain were alarmists. In France at a time of great financial crisis an emergency budget for defence had just been passed voting sixteen million pounds of which twelve million were allotted to the air, and of the remaining four million allotted to the army, a large proportion was for air defence. The question of air attack was the most vital military problem of the day. The absence of any air parity was the reason for Great Britain's recent diplomatic humiliations and the main source of the dangers which beset her in the future. At the end of the War Great Britain had the greatest Air Power in the world with four hundred squadrons, two hundred abroad and two hundred at home. Within four years she had only twenty-eight squadrons, and of those eight were in Egypt, seven in India, five in Mesopotamia, five with the fleet, two with the army, leaving the magnificent total of one squadron for the defence of Great Britain. Fortunately the French had a hundred squadrons. The country had at last woken up to the fact that it was faced with dangers it had never known before as a result of its weakness in the air. In the past the time factor had always been on Great Britain's side, and the threats had been directed against the outposts of the Empire rather than against the Mother country. In wars of the future the outposts of Empire might suffer not from direct action but because the heart of the Empire was so vulnerable to attack.

A MEMBER said that his reaction to the question of the air menace was that the effect of attack by bombers on the civil population was considerably over-exaggerated; he was not convinced that the attempt to create a general fear in the mind of the population had succeeded in those parts where actual warfare had taken place, and he doubted whether a sudden air attack over London, wiping out a section of the city and leaving the population in a state of panic, would completely put the country out of action. Nothing had been said about the organisation of counter-attack.

MR. A. G. LIAS also thought the effect of air-attack had been exaggerated; as bombs nearly always missed, one got used to them after a time. There was a tendency for writers to spread the idea of panic about air attack, and this was exactly the sort of propaganda most welcomed by Hitler and Mussolini; the one thing they wanted was to make the British afraid. Surely such writers ought to try to put the fear of God into Germany and Italy, not into their own people.

AIR-COMMODORE CHARLTON said that he wished he could.

MR. LIAS said that if it were possible to build up a system of collective security by co-operation with others on the Continent who had not much use for either of those potential enemies, then use could be made of frontiers and aerodromes a great deal nearer Berlin and Rome than the Norfolk coast. Poland was allied to France, and would

be in any general war; the Polish frontier was very near to Berlin, so was the Czech frontier. If air power was going to be the decisive factor in any future war, it was essential as soon as possible to try to rebuild the system of collective security which the existing Government was trying to pull down.

MR. J. T. WALTON NEWBOLD drew attention to the importance to Germany of the industrial area between Cologne and Münster which was vital as an armament centre and to the whole German economy. This area was quite as important as Berlin, and fairly accessible from Great Britain, especially if she did not refrain from crossing Belgium, and she might be better upholding the spirit of her treaties if she did fly over it. Then there was a second area west of Nuremburg where light industries were centred, particularly the machine-gun, aeroplane and motor-car industries; this was easily approached from Alsace and Lorraine. And a third area, the extremely important modern centre of German armaments between Magdeburg, Halle and Leipzig, was dangerously affected by collaboration between the French and Czechoslovakians. The vulnerability of this centre was responsible for a great deal of the talk in Germany regarding the necessity of dealing with Czecholosvakia. The alarm which must be felt by Germans should be remembered when there was talk of panic in London. One of the speakers in the discussion had spoken as if Great Britain were fed from London; that was nonsense. She was fed from Liverpool and Bristol, and need not depend on London at all. He thought the lecturer had put too much emphasis on vital statistics regarding men and too little on the capacity to produce machine-guns, rifles and field artillery.

THE DOWAGER LADY NUNBURNHOLME supported the lecturer's contention that the effect of bombing civilians was very great. During the War she herself had been in twenty-seven air raids and had lived in a provincial town which had been very severely bombed and she had seen the effect. Thousands of people trekked into the fields every night and hundreds of women and children died of pneumonia; many professional people who could afford it gave up their houses in the town and lived outside.

WING-COMMANDER A. S. W. DORE said that it was the inaccuracy of the bomb which created panic. Although a military objective might be aimed at, it was generally the civilian who was hit. The recent evacuations in Shanghai and in Spain contradicted the argument that the effect of aerial attack on civil population was small.

In reply to the speaker who suggested that the Air Force was in its dotage, he mentioned the flight from Edinburgh to London in forty-eight minutes.

MISS NESTI SANDERS said that the speaker had demonstrated that

so-called parity was unsafe as a standard for defence. Even on this basis, had anyone any real idea as to the size of the German air force or its potential air strength? For years German commercial air lines had been subsidised by their Government, as they all ran at heavy losses. Recently she had been told by an English technician, retired from the British Army, that he had been shown in one of the big Lufthansa machines at Croydon Aerodrome the place and fittings already arranged in the nose of the machine to carry bombs, so that it would take very little time to convert such commercial machines into bombers. The same technician had shown her a copy of a letter, refused by *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* in December 1937 (because the press did not want to put the wind up people in Great Britain), in which he had given the estimated figure of German military aircraft as five thousand machines during 1937, compared with Great Britain's official figure of 1540, and had made a further probable estimate that Germany had over twenty thousand aircraft suitable for military purposes, not all of the latest type, but even the least up to date effective when the enemy defence had been broken. Granted that parity was unsafe to rely on, was not Great Britain aiming at much too low a figure even on a parity basis? Would the lecturer also say something about anti-aircraft guns? She had been told, curiously enough by a German, that Great Britain had the most powerful in the world.

QUESTION: Was not the effectiveness of air power as a weapon for creating an effect on the civil will very much linked up with the use of gas? The absence of striking effect in China and Spain might be due to the fact that gas was not being used.

MR. H. J. BAXTER asked what would be a proper constructive air policy for Great Britain to pursue. The lecturer had shown that air parity could not be relied upon; whatever the relative strength of air forces, Berlin would still remain twice as far from England as London was from Germany.

One speaker had suggested that attention should be directed towards endeavours to frighten the German people rather than people in Great Britain; those responsible for propaganda in Germany were doing this themselves, and for several years past newspaper articles had emphasised the horrors of bombing likely to come upon them as a result of air attacks by Great Britain or France. In 1937 the main part of a news item was the air pageant at Hendon, and the vast numbers of aeroplanes shown on the screen obviously impressed the audience with alarm.

THE CHAIRMAN (Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield) said that the corollary to the lecturer's argument—that nothing could prevent the bomber from reaching its objective—was that every country which suffered from the disadvantage of position was completely at the

mercy of an opponent holding that advantage; there was presumably nothing for the former to do but to submit and do what it was told.

He himself was not so despondent. The lessons of the history of war were that every new development tended to provoke a reaction and so to bring its antidote into being. To take, for instance, the Russo-Japanese position quoted by the lecturer. The Japanese retaliation for a bombing attack on Tokyo could not, as Air-Commodore Charlton had clearly demonstrated, be an attempt to bomb Moscow. Recognising that fact, might not Japan make her objective the fighting forces of the enemy, and devote all her energies and ingenuity to devising effective means to that end, so as to provide effective defence against bombing attack at home?

That consideration was also applicable nearer home. The conclusion from past studies of war—albeit two-dimensional war only—was that for success, the true objective of armies and navies must be the armed forces of the enemy. Was it definitely established that that general conclusion was really invalid to-day? To accept without question the assertion that the bomber could always get through, and therefore to make no effort to evolve and develop methods of preventing it getting through, was a council of despair.

AIR-COMMODORE CHARLTON, in answering General Fuller's doubts about the attack on the civil will, said that Madrid offered a good example of conditions like those in a mediæval city continually being sacked, and the result had been to heighten the resistance of the population. But that had not happened in Shanghai or Barcelona, and the reason was that the inhabitants of Madrid were in a front-line position face to face continually with the facts of war, whereas the effect of air raids in the interior on cities which knew nothing of war was quite literally that of a bolt from the blue.

He did not know how best to reply to Captain Acworth's smashing assault; express trains might have gone as fast twelve years after Stevenson's first train as they did now, but he doubted if they had dining-cars, a development comparable to that of bombing arrangements in modern aircraft. With regard to the victory in the air on Germany's blackest day, his whole purpose had been to show that where air power was concerned, no lessons should be deduced from the happenings of the last or even contemporary wars.

The speaker who had doubted whether the civil will could be attacked in the way described had been largely answered by a subsequent speaker. There was incontrovertible evidence that the effect on London's civil will during the Great War had been very great indeed. Bombs had frightened Londoners to such an extent that a quarter of a million people would go down into the Underground Tube accommodation without any air-raid warning, just because it was a moonlight night and they anticipated an attack.

He agreed that the antidote to the ills he had described would be collective security; in view of Great Britain's geographical

disadvantage, there was no hope from the air point of view except in that way. Without collective security the British Empire was in very grave danger of ceasing to exist.

With regard to the doubt whether attack on Berlin would be more important than attack on the German industrial districts, the idea of air power was to deal a knock-out blow from the very first; an attack on industrial districts would not have that effect, because every country had reserve stocks of material specially calculated to withstand such blows. If the capital city was not reduced by bombardment, then the slower process would be adopted of attacking industrial regions.

It was a matter of guesswork whether the standard aimed at was approaching or exceeding that of the air power it was hoped to equal; if there were an agreement, as in the case of navies, one would have to rely on the integrity of the other countries in observing their obligations.

With regard to the accuracy of anti-aircraft guns, a shell would take fifteen to eighteen seconds to reach a height of about fifteen to eighteen thousand feet; modern aircraft were so fast that they could change altitude or put two or three miles between them and the *rendezvous*. Anti-aircraft guns might produce excellent results, but it would be by luck.

As to whether the future would produce some antidote in course of time to balance the insuperable disadvantage of geographical position, he was completely at a loss to say.

THE FUTURE IN FRANCE: DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF NATIONAL UNION[1]

PROFESSOR PAUL VAUCHER

THE title of this paper suggests that I am going to make prophecies. The most I can hope to do, however, is to analyse the present situation and to investigate the possible developments latent in it. It is easy to guess what questions you would like me to answer. You will wish to know whether France is going to be successful in the attempted rehabilitation of her finances. You will also wish to know what decisions she will be called upon to make in the domain of foreign relations. I do not feel myself qualified to venture into the financial sphere, especially in the presence of the Chairman. I shall therefore limit myself to describing the present state of affairs in our internal politics, for in my opinion there will be no salvation, either financial or national, without national union.

I imagine you can hardly do otherwise than view with surprise and anxiety developments in France at the present day. You had grown accustomed to believe that in spite of ministerial instability—perhaps even because of it—there were in France hidden forces, possibilities of coalition, and exceptional powers of recovery, and that miracles would happen at the moment when they became necessary. You saw something of the kind take place in 1914 and in 1926, under the pressure of external aggression and of financial danger. But since then you witnessed in 1934 an attempt at recovery which was neither complete nor decisive, and in March of this year you saw the failure of an attempt at union. Does this mean that something has changed? Have new circumstances intervened which make the repetition of such miracles more difficult?

The French people have not, in fact, lost their traditional common sense, nor their patriotism, nor even their readiness to work. But the problem to-day is a much more complicated one than that which was so quickly and satisfactorily solved in 1926. The present crisis in France is not a recent phenomenon dating from the advent of the Front Populaire. It began in

[1] Translation of an address given at Chatham House on Wednesday, May 11th, 1938, with the Hon. George Peel in the Chair.

1932, and was going on during the whole period covered by the previous Parliament. It is well to recall that at the beginning of the crisis the monetary factor was decisive. The French did not grasp this fact, and thus, though they made a very considerable effort, which is now too often forgotten, they met with no success. Since 1936 the principal cause of weakness has been social disorder. The keynote to-day is thus not so much confidence as production. Confidence and production are, of course, closely allied. But production, even more than confidence, demands active co-operation on the part of the whole country. Confidence is in a way a passive attitude and one which, ultimately, need only be adopted by people who have some financial resources, more especially by subscribers to Treasury Bonds.

Many people in France have misunderstood the fundamental causes of this long crisis and have failed to grasp its lesson. The lesson, nevertheless, is before their eyes. It lies in the career of the Front Populaire. But a great many French people have ignored the significance of that career. They believed that they were witnessing a vast conspiracy, a plot set in motion, I need hardly say, by the Communist Party. Whatever the rôle of that party may have been, it is obvious that the Front Populaire is a mass movement the wide appeal of which is not to be explained by a mere plot. The success of the Front Populaire is the outcome of all the disappointments of the post-War period, plus six years of economic crisis. It constitutes a two-fold protest against the impotence of Parliament and the impotence of the anti-Parliamentary Leagues, which are as ineffective as Parliament and more dangerous. When one has grasped the real significance of the *Rassemblement Populaire*, one is in a better position to tackle the problem which lies before France to-day—namely, the problem of bringing the Front Populaire to an end and replacing it by national union : a problem of social psychology rather than of technique, for it is a case rather of re-assimilating a popular movement than of exposing a revolutionary plot or breaking up a political coalition.

This is how the problem has presented itself to Monsieur Blum since 1936, and I should be surprised if he had interpreted it in any other way. Convinced Socialist though he is, I do not think he can ever have thought that his Government would be able to transform itself into a Socialist Government. He is much more of a psychologist than a financier, and his work presents a curious mixture of psychological truths and financial

heresies. He may have believed that the strength of a psychological movement would produce economic recovery, but he cannot have been in doubt as to whether a period of social progress would be followed, according to the usual French tradition, by a period of pause and consolidation. In his revolutionary policy a desire for consolidation is very readily discernible.

Let us consider this problem of national union from the parliamentary point of view, but taking care to bear in mind the country as a whole over and above its Parliament. Two solutions are being discussed at present. The first would be to detach the Radical Party from the Socialist Party in order to form a majority of the Centre. The Opposition parties, a considerable portion of the bourgeoisie, have for two years held the belief that they were about to succeed in detaching the Radicals from the Socialists. The Radical Party has frequently shown anxiety and fear with regard to its Socialist allies. But it has not deserted them, and its fidelity may seem surprising. As a matter of fact this is no new question; it has existed in France for the last thirty-five years. Throughout the whole of the present century the Radicals have been very nearly always allied to the Socialists. It has often been said that the alliance was of a purely electoral character and was not based on any common programme. But it would be a strange thing if the French electorate had lent itself for so long to a comedy, an electoral intrigue carried on at its expense. It is wiser to admit that more serious reasons for an alliance between the Socialists and the Radicals were already in existence.

There is, however, a new factor. The Radicals, who up till the present were numerically the strongest party, have now taken the second place. The Socialists have gained more seats than they, and, in combination with the Communist seats, a very dangerous grouping has formed itself, on the side on which the Radicals have always feared attack. Will the Radicals now turn towards the Centre?

It is necessary at this point to look at the composition of the present Chamber. Without overburdening you with statistics, suffice it to say that in 1936 the movement towards the Left became so pronounced that it was no longer possible to obtain a majority of the Centre. A government which is threatened by the Socialists must obtain the co-operation or the support of the Right. I do not want to lead you into the labyrinth of small parliamentary groups. So I will merely mention that among

those groups which are opposed to the Front Populaire, two have a particular importance, and stand out both by reason of their own strength and because the other neighbouring parties tend to group themselves round them. One of these two parties, under the leadership of Monsieur Flandin, has always aimed at forming a coalition of the Centre. The other, under the leadership of Monsieur Marin, has worked towards a government of the Right. I do not think this description is an artificial over-simplification of the position. Now it is obviously more difficult to get the Radicals to approach the Right than the Centre.

But any such attempt comes up against an obstacle which is even more insurmountable. People do not always realise what transformations have taken place in French society since the War. Economic developments, the progress of large-scale industry, the decline of the "petite bourgeoisie" have all had their repercussions on political life. The parties of the Right and of the Centre have become, much more than was previously the case, the organs of economic groups. How then can they ally themselves with the Radical Party? The Radical Party is the most democratic of all the parties. It is not Socialist, although it contains elements which tend more and more in a socialistic direction and form, so to speak, an "advance guard." But the Radicals in France have always relied chiefly upon the support of the humbler citizens, artisans, peasants, petty officials and "petits bourgeois," who are to-day threatened by big business. In the struggle against the Front Populaire the profound divisions which separate the large-scale from the small-scale employer are a most important factor. It is understandable that the Radical Party should feel some surprise and distrust at finding itself courted to-day by its enemies. Its two leaders, Monsieur Daladier and Monsieur Chautemps, were formerly the object of violent attacks for the part attributed to them in the riots of February 6th, 1934, and in the death of Monsieur Prince, and in certain circles in Paris they were even respectively allotted the sobriquets of "the mass murderer" and "the individual murderer." They now find themselves treated as saviours by their former accusers.

Without allowing ourselves to be too much surprised by such *volte-faces*, let us try to understand the significance of the offer of collaboration which has been made to the Radicals. They have been asked to co-operate towards the economic rehabilitation of the country—and that is all very well. Their support is asked in order to fight the Socialists—and that is a good deal

more difficult. They are being asked to contribute towards the construction of an economic society in which the principles that guide them and the social groups they represent would be hard put to it to find a place. The Conservatives may be right in wishing to concentrate the whole attention of the country on economic problems; but to sacrifice politics to economics, and ideologies to interests, would be, for any political party in France, and especially for the Radical Party, tantamount to committing suicide.

The second solution proposed for the parliamentary problem would consist of absorbing the Socialists into a national coalition while separating them from the Communists. Since the War the Socialists and Communists have carried on a violent struggle. There are very lively causes of disagreement between them. But would they be prepared to fight each other?

In 1936 they joined together in the same Trades Unions. Within the Trades Unions the struggle for the extension of their rival influences still goes on and, while it may not be possible to know exactly what the result will be, it is, nevertheless, apparent that the Communists have succeeded, particularly in Paris and its surroundings, in gaining much ground at the expense of their Socialist comrades. But it is difficult to see how they could break their alliance. This is all the more serious because Trades Unionism, which until the War kept out of political life, has throughout the post-War years, and especially since 1936, claimed to influence and even to direct the actions of politicians.

Moreover, surprising as it may seem, the Communists in France to-day have grown greatly in wisdom. It is Hitler's doing rather than Stalin's. No doubt they have received different directions from Moscow, but it would be wrong to put down as mere manœuvring or tactics their preoccupation with national defence and their ardent professions of patriotism. I do not believe that manœuvres and tactics produce any very great effect in our democracies, and, as a historian, I find it quite natural to see my revolutionary compatriots taking up the cudgels for the defence of French democracy just as the Jacobins did in the French Revolution. Be that as it may, the Communists of to-day are moderates, and are denounced as such by other extremists who often pass unnoticed outside France. There are, as a matter of fact, in France to-day a considerable number of small committees or leagues which claim allegiance

to Lenin, Trotsky or the Fourth International and which declare themselves anti-Stalinists. Their influence is greater than their small resources suggest. It would be greater still if they were not, fortunately, deeply divided among themselves, united only by their hatred of the Communist Party. On the other hand they seem to be in close relations with a group of the Socialist Party, the so-called " Revolutionary Left." It is worth noticing that the latest strikes were the work, not of the Communists, but of those other associated groups. In these circumstances it is no easy matter to effect a separation between the Socialists and the Communists. It would be impossible to do so without breaking the unity of the Socialist Party, which, despite opposing tendencies within itself, has continued to be strongly disciplined.

Pressure of outside events is really what is needed to force a solution of the parliamentary problem whose difficulties I have just outlined to you. It is obvious that such events are taking place to-day. In the middle of March the destruction of Austria very nearly brought about the reconciliation of the French people. Let us recall the conversation which took place at that time between Monsieur Blum, who was charged with the formation of a Cabinet, and Monsieur Flandin, who was speaking in the name of the Opposition parties. Monsieur Blum proposed " national union centring round the Front Populaire." Monsieur Flandin's reply took the form of four questions. He took the four main articles of the Communist programme—two dealing with foreign policy in relation to Spain and Italy, and two dealing with internal policy, with finance and with the social laws. He demanded that on these four points Monsieur Blum should declare himself to be in opposition to the views held by the Communists. This was tantamount to excluding the Communists from the national reconciliation. In my opinion, and this view is shared by many Frenchmen of all parties, Monsieur Flandin was making a grave mistake. Was it wise to exclude from the nation, to denounce as outsiders, the Communists—one and a half million voters—who were offering to defend their country when danger threatened? Was it not lacking in political sense to provoke them to fight rather than to accept their co-operation in the hope of being able to guide and control their actions? It would have been easily understandable if Monsieur Flandin had declared Monsieur Blum to be badly qualified to act as leader of a Cabinet of union. But that is not what he did. It is also easily understandable that the Opposition may

have feared lest, in agreeing to participate in a Government formed, so they were told, "around the Front Populaire," they might seem to be capitulating to the Front Populaire. But in French politics, I might almost say in all democratic governments, formulæ and professions of faith have a significance which a little political experience teaches one to appreciate and not to exaggerate.

What was needed was that the Front Populaire should change its methods and turn aside somewhat from its course. Why did not the Opposition accept this rôle? It is the duty of the so-called ruling classes to rule.

In April a financial crisis provided a new reason for national union. But the Government in power at present is not yet a national government. The Socialists refused to take part in it, and Monsieur Daladier confined himself, apart from his own party, to asking for the co-operation of certain representatives of the Centre. It is true that he chose them chiefly from among members who, contrary to the opinion of Monsieur Flandin, were in favour of a coalition with the Socialists. It is also true that when Monsieur Daladier presented himself before the Chambers nearly the whole Parliament voted in his favour. But Monsieur Chautemps had already had the same experience in January, and yet he did not succeed in staying in power long. In both these cases the parties which supported these two Governments did so in order to bring them over to their side, and not to leave their adversaries the means of gaining a preponderant influence over the Government. The predominant tendency of the Daladier Cabinet is indicated by the presence in the Finance Ministry of Monsieur Marchandeau, who seems to have been chosen for this post not so much for his technical competence as because of the confidence placed in him by certain leaders of banking and industry. Monsieur Marchandeau, who belongs to the Right Wing of the Radical Party, is best known in France for the really remarkable work which he did as Mayor of Rheims after the War.

Although Monsieur Daladier is certainly anxious to realise a wide coalition, he found himself thus compelled first of all to make the experiment that Monsieur Flandin expected. With the support of the Centre Parties and that of the Senate, his Government aims at re-establishing social order and averting the financial crisis. If he should succeed, the French bourgeoisie which supports him could then gain the adherence of the

working class, which would profit by the improvement in business to free itself from the tyranny imposed upon it by the Trades Union leaders. The country would thus be saved not by a truce between the parties, but by the services of an energetic minority whose victory over Socialism would put it in a position to effect national union.

Is this programme in a fair way to being realised? Monsieur Daladier has succeeded in putting an end to the dangerous strikes that were going on, and he at once managed to bring back to France some 3 milliards of exported capital. Parliament, in giving him full powers, left him free to try his luck. But the country has not had the feeling that it was receiving a vigorous impulse. It expected to be told how the social laws voted by the Front Populaire were to be adapted to the necessities of national production. It was waiting to hear what methods and sacrifices were to be adopted in order to effect financial rehabilitation. It has had to wait. The Government has only published a first batch of decrees, a first part—and that not the most important—of its reforms. The public fancied that they perceived that the members of the Government were not in agreement among themselves. The people may have feared that their leaders, paralysed by disagreements, would allow themselves to expect salvation to come from a simple and, so to speak, automatic revival of confidence. Finally, they witnessed a new devaluation, and the pressure exerted upon the franc made it difficult for them to believe that this devaluation was actually a strategical retreat, a manœuvre voluntarily conceived and executed.

The uneasiness thus created did not, however, destroy the general goodwill. It merely seemed to strengthen the opinion of all those who hold the view that if it is to succeed and to possess the authority it needs, the Government should be transformed and should resolutely adopt the character of a government of national union.

I have shown you what difficulties stand in the way of such a change. But it is an incontrovertible fact that the country wants it and understands the necessity for it. The dangers that threaten us render it necessary. I will now attempt to show you that those very dangers make possible its realisation.

Let us consider in turn the main problems before us: on the one hand the financial and social questions, on the other hand the external situation.

I can only deal briefly with the technical aspects of the

financial question. The French are asking themselves how far it is wise to have recourse to loans or taxes. Monsieur Blum did not think it possible, in view of the external situation, to launch a big loan, but he proposed a tax on capital, a tax very cleverly thought out so as not to be overwhelming, which, if it could be brought into effect, would produce 12 milliards. The present Finance Minister has so far only asked for less than 4 milliards by means of raising the existing taxes, but he has launched a small loan with great success, and he is planning a larger one. Lively discussion is to be expected on this question, but I do not believe that it will be impossible to arrive at an agreement. There is general agreement, moreover, as to the necessity of doing away with extraordinary budgets and of attacking the budget problem as a whole. Wider credit facilities and an extensive programme of public works are universally recognised as being indispensable for the recovery of business. The Government's tariff policy has not yet been defined, although some lowering of tariffs is expected as a result of the devaluation. Finally, there is no opposition to expenditure on armaments. Moreover, it is important to realise—the fact is a vital one—that public opinion is no longer what it was at the beginning of the period of depression. During the period 1932–34 it was impossible to demand any considerable sacrifice from any one group of citizens without provoking the resistance of that group, and even the denunciation on their part of the privileged position of those citizens who were not affected. To-day the public seems to be more reasonable, or at any rate more passive. The attempts made this winter to stir up reciprocal jealousy between persons possessing a fixed income and those whose fate is dependent on economic fluctuations have met so far with complete failure.

If we may view the financial problem, so to speak, from outside, it is obvious to everyone that the charges on the budget are too heavy for the country, that they can only be reduced very slightly, and that consequently the thing to do is to try to strengthen and enrich the country itself. This can only be brought about by getting more work from the workers and more money from the capitalists. The two principal aspects of the problem are the re-establishment of the social order by "regulation of the social laws," and the restoration to France of exported capital. Both aspects are obviously essential, but both are equally difficult. There seems to be plenty of goodwill among the working classes. This goodwill manifests itself, for instance, by the development of that curious movement of "professional

Trades Unions" which were founded in 1936 under the initiative of employers for the purpose of resisting the claims of the C.G.T., but which could not have developed to their present extent if they had remained under the protection of the employers. Although their numbers have not been published as far as I know, one may conclude from the success they have obtained in the "workshop delegates'" elections that they have reached considerable dimensions. One may therefore admit that an important part of the working class desires to free itself from the fetters that the C.G.T. wished to impose upon it. But the C.G.T. itself did not adopt an intransigent attitude with regard to the maintenance of the present social laws. We should not let ourselves be misled by the speeches of their leaders, which are always necessarily of a more or less combative turn. What they fear, and what they refuse to accept, is that all the responsibility for the crisis, and all the weight of recovery from it, should fall on the working classes.

The maintenance of exported capital which escapes taxes and the losses involved in devaluation makes national recovery much more difficult, both morally and financially. It is estimated to-day that 15 milliards out of a total of 80 milliards have returned to France. That means that the movement is too big to be explained as mere speculators' manœuvres, but it also means that success has not yet been achieved. I would merely say that it is in sight. If it were possible without compromising that success to get at the immoral and illicit profits which originated in this way, all social difficulties would be greatly reduced. But if nothing effective can be done in that direction, the ruling classes will have to exert a good deal of psychological understanding if they are to avoid discouraging the popular goodwill. In the work of "regulating the social laws," what has sometimes been called the "mysticism" of the working classes must be borne in mind; the formulæ which express it should be respected, and their aims and ideals should be preserved when practical necessities prevent their realisation. There is a section of the French bourgeoisie which still does not fully realise this, but which thinks that a strengthening of the employers' authority would suffice to restore order. But I know that another section of the bourgeoisie does understand this.

Turning to foreign affairs, we come to a sphere in which real progress has been made in the way of internal agreement. How shall I describe the state of mind of the French people?

Only a small minority inform themselves about foreign affairs, and reflect and form their own judgments. The worker is guided by a mixture of commonsense, courage and "ideology." He simplifies problems—which is not necessarily a bad method of solving them. His strong sympathy for democracies carries him away without his always realising the dangers that he runs. A considerable portion of the bourgeoisie remains silent—a silence born of ignorance and timidity. In explanation of this silence one must bear in mind the fact that most of the questions which have arisen since the War in the sphere of international relations, especially economic questions, were simply incomprehensible to the average citizen. A great many people have got into the way of not expecting to understand. The policy adopted by several governments, a policy calculated to distract attention from questions which they would prefer not to tackle, has also served to encourage this laziness. Without going into the reasons behind this governmental attitude, one can at least take count of the disastrous effect which their policy has produced upon the morale of the people.

To-day, nevertheless, definite progress has been made. Many of those whose attitude I have just defined know that they are in the wrong, and that they cannot maintain that attitude. To put it on the lowest grounds, their laziness is no longer comfortable. Two or three years ago the French used to carry their domestic quarrels into the sphere of foreign affairs. They do that much less nowadays. The admirers of Mussolini or Stalin, vociferous though they still may be in the press, are much more reserved in public. Since the crisis of March one may say that in many respects the country is on the alert and the French people are prepared to agree among themselves.

The Franco-British solidarity is approved on all hands. The Anglophobes of 1935 have disappeared, and the only subject of discussion is to what extent we shall allow ourselves to be led by you or to lead you with us.

Opinions regarding Spain and Italy are naturally strongly influenced still by social conditions and dissensions. I fancy, however, that a fairly general opinion is forming, somewhat on the following lines. Let us first consider the security of France. We must not let an enemy front establish itself on the Pyrenees and in the Mediterranean. In the present situation of Europe we must try if possible to reach an agreement with Italy. But we do so with some scepticism and with our eyes open, resolved not to let Italy take advantage of our weakness, and not to pay

for her neutrality or her co-operation by sacrificing the French position in North Africa or the independence of Spain. Many people in France would be glad to know whether the confidence shown in Great Britain that Spain will be finally liberated from foreign intervention rests on definite facts or intentions.

As far as Central Europe is concerned, you know the definite undertaking which each of our successive governments has given with regard to Czechoslovakia. They have given rise to some public protests. An article by Professor Barthélemy in *Le Temps*, another article in *Gringoire*, caused some stir. The most significant fact to my mind, however, is that these protests have given rise to no widespread movement of opinion. When Monsieur Flandin appeared to wish to declare his views in this direction, his policy, described by his adversaries as a "policy of abdication," aroused no echo. No doubt many Frenchmen say among themselves, "Must we fight for Czechoslovakia?" But at that point they stop, and their horror of war does not go so far as to make them try to hold the Government back. So they let the moment slip by when they could have done so. I think their hesitation can be explained in two ways. They know that a crisis with regard to Czechoslovakia would be quite a different matter from the Austrian crisis. There would be a struggle in which we could not avoid taking part. Moreover, the fate of the whole of Central Europe is bound up with the fate of Czechoslovakia. If Czechoslovakia were to collapse, Mittel-Europa would be realised, and France would then be subjected to a pressure so strong that she literally would not be able to breathe.

Thus although the union of the French people has been retarded and is still hampered by the various causes which we have just examined, I think, nevertheless, we may conclude that it is in a fair way to becoming an accomplished fact, because the principal problems confronting them are problems on which the French can agree. On the Right one still finds too little realisation of political necessities, on the Left too little understanding of economic necessities. But necessity imposes itself on all alike, and to that extent at any rate one may say that the situation is stronger than man.

Summary of Discussion.

QUESTIONS: What was the difference between the Communists and the revolutionary groups mentioned by the lecturer? Also would he give some information on the contemplated tariff reform? Thirdly, was there a great growth of Fascism in France or not?

What were the numbers of the Communists in the French Chamber, the Socialists, the Radicals and the remaining parties of the Centre?

PROFESSOR VAUCHER replied that the Socialists numbered 156, the Communists 73, the Radicals 124, with another fifty members who usually followed the Radical Party, M. Paul-Boncour and his group. There was one big Centre group with eighty members, with some fifty other members following its lead. Then the Right Parties had one big group of 53 members in a total of some 89 members.

The difference between the Communists and the Fourth International was very important with regard to mysticism. It constituted the difference between Stalin and Lenin.

As regards the Fascist question, there had been large Fascist Leagues which had been very dangerous, but they had not succeeded in uniting their forces, but had fought each other bitterly, and apparently had lost all opportunity for the present. The largest League still claimed to have a great number of members, but maybe many of them just paid their subscriptions because they did not know where else to subscribe.

The lecturer did not know very much about the question of tariff reform. He knew that the Ministers were divided on the matter. It was a double problem. More money from tariffs was needed for the Budget, but on the other hand since the devaluation there was another aspect and the Government realised that this must lead to some lowering of tariffs and that something must be done to increase and restore international trade. Profits could only be made by lowering prices and increasing exports.

MISS NESTI SANDERS said that she thought that there had been a great change in France since 1935, and particularly since 1936. She had been there during the last autumn, and had heard from both English and French friends that the strength of the Front Populaire had been much weakened and that the type of thing which had happened in 1936, when the French police had arrested people for singing the Marseillaise and joined with people singing the Red Flag, could no longer take place because the feeling of the general public in France was too strongly opposed to it. Also she had heard that the Centre and Right were getting stronger. Motoring near Paris one might see the sign of the clenched fist, but further out in the countryside Communist meetings had been broken up with pitchforks by the peasants themselves.

The speaker considered that for some years past the Right Wing and Centre in France had become so much afraid of Bolshevism and the extremism of the Front Populaire that this had weakened their ideas on foreign policy. They had become definitely less afraid of Hitler and Germany than of revolution and Communism in their own country.

PROFESSOR VAUCHER said that he was in full agreement with the

ceau, who was then sitting on the extreme left side of the Assembly, had made one of the most violent speeches of his career, accusing Ferry of having been bribed by Germany to divert France from her European destiny. Nowadays, however, French public opinion has decided in favour of Jules Ferry. There has been, chiefly since the War, a rapidly growing interest in France in oversea territories, due partly to the fact that French people travel more than they did formerly; partly to the fact that the War made them realise more clearly the connection between the most remote parts of the world and France; and also to the fact that in this new world, which is every day driven further towards protection, the economic value of empires has increased. This has become true for the French as well as for the British Empire.

Indo-China is probably, after North Africa, the colony in which the French are most interested. It is the most highly populated of French oversea territories. It affords the most varied resources. The market for French products is quickly increasing; Indo-China is to-day the third highest colonial customer of France, and her second highest colonial vendor. French investments in the colony have considerably increased; the total amount of French investments made since 1890 in the colony is estimated at 25 billions of present-day francs (investment figures are, of course, always extremely doubtful), a large proportion having become nearly six times more valuable since the War than during the thirty preceding years. During the last year or two, chiefly since the devaluation of the franc, Indo-China has probably emerged more successfully from the depression than any other French colony. It is the only colony to show a balance of trade with foreign countries with considerable surplus.

The interest of France in Indo-China is not only on economic grounds; the moral link has tightened. The question of introducing Western civilisation in the territory is a great concern of French administration. Primary and secondary schools have been developed, together with university teaching. Notwithstanding the desire to introduce Western civilisation, it is the aim of French policy not to uproot the Asiatic tradition, mainly the Chinese culture.

Indo-China is indeed, morally as well as materially, a kind of French headland in the Far East. Its strategic importance is beyond question. Its borders march in common with those of China for a long stretch, and Indo-China is thus most interested in the peace and prosperity of the neighbouring Republic. It is

an important port of call between France and the Far East, and a great landing-place for the aeroplanes which connect France and Hanoi with Shanghai in one week. There is a good possible naval base in Annam, at Camranh, where the fleet of the Russian Admiral Rodjestvensky stayed for some time on its voyage from Europe to the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War. Indo-China also offers to-day (and I shall refer to this later) an important continental means of access to China, through Yunnan.

No responsible man in France, no political party, would agree to see France leave this French territory in Asia.

France also has important interests in the two great Far Eastern countries, China and Japan. Her interests, both moral and economic, are far more important in China than in Japan. In fact, while Japan was still a closed land for foreigners, mutual influences were already strong between China and France. French missionaries have settled in the great Empire since the sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century, the philosophers, like Voltaire, or the Encyclopædists, sometimes great admirers of Confucianism, spread many ideas from the East in French society. Intellectual or cultural intercourse has become more frequent with time. Chinese students are amongst the most numerous from foreign countries in the French universities. French institutes have developed in Peking, Shanghai and Canton. Still more numerous are the missionary foundations. Since the Franco-Chinese treaty in 1844, soon after the end of the Opium War, France has been recognised by the Chinese Government as the Protector of Roman Catholic Missions in China.

French economic interests are, again, greater in China than in Japan. Both France and Indo-China have some small trading intercourse with Japan; a trade agreement between Japan and Indo-China regulates commercial exchanges at a somewhat scanty level, and there is hardly one part of the French Empire where some Japanese product is not sold. Exports from the French Empire to Japan are, however, not numerous. Trade between Indo-China and China is more important, but is not on a large scale. After France, China is the best customer of Indo-China. And though France and Indo-China together account for only 5 per cent. of the total trade of China (five times less than the percentage of the British Empire), they are the fifth highest supplier of China and their fourth highest customer, coming as a customer just ahead of Germany.

Nevertheless, French economic interests in China are less of a commercial than of a financial character. French investments

in China are important, reaching 5 or 6 billions in loans to the Chinese Government or business investments. As far as Government loans are concerned, France is the second highest creditor of China, creditor in fact for more than a quarter of the total amount. For business investments, France comes fourth—far behind Great Britain and Japan, nearly on a level with the United States. The investments are of two types: those made in the concession ports (Shanghai for the greater part), and those concerning railway construction, chiefly the Yunnan railway.

More than 60 per cent. of French investments in China are located in the French concession in Shanghai. Nearly half of the French investments there are in land property, another half in business firms, such as transport, banking or town services. Nearly nine-tenths of Roman Catholic missionary property is in the French concession in Shanghai. The population of the concession has been steadily increasing; it nearly doubled from 1925 to 1930, and is to-day over 500,000. The Yunnan railway, which joins Hanoï in Indo-China to Yunnan-Fu, the capital of Yunnan, was opened only a few years before the War. A million francs were invested in it. It has sometimes been said that it was mainly a political operation; the aims of the constructors were, in fact, mainly economic. Their principal intention was to open the rich provinces of Southern China to Western trade and to drive part of the traffic of Southern China to Northern Indo-Chinese sea-ports. This means of access is becoming increasingly important. General Chiang Kai-shek anticipated it a few years ago. Since 1936 he has steadily pursued the development of the means of communication between Central China and Yunnan. Chengtu, the present capital of China, was to be connected by railway to Yunnan and Indo-China. At the beginning of 1937, a deed was signed for the construction, with French investments, of a Chengtu-Chungking railway, and negotiations were conducted with syndicates of countries other than France for the construction of railways connecting Chungking, Kueiyang and Yunnan-Fu. General Chiang probably thought that in the event of a sea blockade of China, quick communication between Central China and Indo-China would be necessary. Air lines already link Indo-China to Chengtu; Chinese air lines connect Chengtu and Yunnan-Fu and, since last December, a German line has been operating between Yunnan-Fu and Hanoï. The strategic importance of Yunnan has greatly increased. In fact, the central school for training air pilots is now located in Yunnan-Fu.

I have tried to indicate the real importance of French interests in the Far East. How far do these interests in China or Indo-China affect French policy in that part of the world?

As far as China is concerned, French interests have not always acted in favour of the country in which they were vested. After the War, political campaigns against unequal treaties, and against the privileges of the foreigners in the concessions, set the vested interests against Chinese Nationalism; then the spread of Communism in the Republic frightened them. In 1925 and 1926, even in Indo-China, people saw with apprehension the setting-up of Communist régimes in Southern China; they were suspicious about Communist propaganda in French Indo-China, through the Chinese from Southern China who settled in the French colony. In face of anarchy in China, Japan appeared to them as the champion of order, as the barrier against Communism, and even perhaps as one of the guarantors of the rights of foreigners. This idea was still current in 1932 among people in the Far East.

Nowadays, however, things have changed. The Chinese Government has shown convincingly how strongly opposed to Communism it is. For the last four or five years it has directed all its efforts towards reconstruction, and these efforts have proved successful. On the other hand, Japanese invasion in China seems deeply to endanger the rights of the Westerners in that country.

There is already in Shanghai a direct threat against French as well as British or American interests. A practical blockade exists in the great Far Eastern port, though war has not been declared between China and Japan. Shipping has become, in fact, most limited. The Japanese have obtained control of the Post Office; they have changed European for Japanese officials in the Customs administration; they have claimed all the rights formerly exercised by Chinese Governments, and friction has become more and more frequent between Japanese and Consular authorities.

Many of the rights of Western nations are, it is true, still maintained. French authorities in Shanghai have shown real firmness. It was agreed, for instance, by the Japanese authorities that Japanese troops should only cross the French concession when they had received a pass from the French authorities, and when they were unarmed and escorted by French police.

But will these rights be maintained in the future? The same question, I think, troubles both the French and the English residents in the concessions. Last November, General Matsui announced to the Press that Japan's intention was to take over

from the Chinese Government its rights concerning foreign concessions in Shanghai. And Prince Konoye declared in December that while China has long tried in vain to abolish extraterritoriality, Japan has already made this desire a reality in Manchukuo.

Though the Japanese have perhaps no interest in ruining a town like Shanghai and the foreign trade of concession ports, Japanese economic aims in China might be fatal to Western economic interests. The idea of an economic bloc between Japan, Manchukuo and China, which seems to-day to be a slogan not only for the army, but also for business people in Japan, and has even been officially proclaimed as an aim, means nothing if not the end of the " open door " in China, and the direction by Japan of Chinese economic policy, without regard to the interests of foreigners.

On all these questions, the French point of view is no doubt the same as the British. Not only are the representations of the Ambassadors of the two countries in Tokyo generally made on the same occasions and with the same objectives, but also the reactions of the people are the same on both sides.

What are the consequences for Indo-China of the Far Eastern conflict?

Some years ago few Frenchmen would have thought that, in the very near future, the question of the security of Indo-China might arise. But to-day it has to be discussed. First, as I have mentioned, the geographical position of Indo-China has become strategically of greater importance, chiefly as providing continental access to Central China. To-day access to China is limited. The ports of Northern and Central China are in the hands of the Japanese. Access through Hong-Kong is still free, but nobody knows for how long. Continental access through Turkestan means weeks and weeks of travel. Access through Indo-China has thus become very important indeed. But this new strategic importance of Indo-China is not without danger. The question of traffic in arms to China has already been greatly discussed.

Arms traffic through Indo-China and the Yunnan railway was always subject to a licence from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Colonies. In fact, before 1937 few arms were licensed to pass through by the Yunnan railway. In October last the French Government decided that, while no embargo should be placed on arms from France to China, the only arms to be allowed over the Indo-China–Yunnan border

line should be those ordered before the conflict or at sea before October 12th.

Our means of defending Indo-China by sea are not strong. The French fleet in the Pacific is small and scattered, since the Washington Treaty strictly limited the number and tonnage of large units. The question is open to discussion whether France, with her distant Empire, was wise to agree, under pressure from other Powers, to limit her high seas fleet to such an extent. There are, I think, no more than a few submarines and a few torpedo boats along the Indo-China coast. Along the China coasts two dreadnoughts, a few torpedo boats or submarines and some gunboats on the Yangtse form the whole French Far Eastern Fleet. Three cruisers, I think, have recently been sent from the home waters to cruise in this area.

Indo-China is rather open to invasion from the sea. On the north-east, the island of Hainan directly controls the entrance to the gulf of Tonkin and the northern coast of Indo-China. Japanese aeroplanes or Japanese warships have recently more and more frequently been cruising in that region.

And on the other side of Indo-China is Siam, where recently Japanese, and also German and Italian, influences have steadily grown at the expense of British and French influences. The economic influence of Japan and Japanese exports, for instance, have greatly increased in Siam since 1933. In the last two years arms orders from Siam to Japan and Germany, and orders for ships to Italy, have increased. It is true that last November Siam signed a new trade agreement and general convention with France, but Siam asked that all reference to the League of Nations should be dropped out of this agreement; and the fact seems rather significant. There is no proof of a political understanding between Tokyo and Bangkok, but the influence of Japan is undoubtedly growing in this small independent country, and Japan may sooner or later try to use this influence in favour of her policy of expansion.

Will this Japanese policy be ambitious enough to lead the Japanese to attack Indo-China or other European colonies in southern Asia? Personally, I am rather doubtful about it, at least for the time being. The Japanese already have to sustain a military campaign in China which they probably did not expect to be as long and as hard. They have to keep reserves (and they are said to keep their best men) in case of a conflict with Russia. But nobody can guess what may be the reactions of an army which acts independently of the Government, of a navy which

wants to equal the army in successes and victories. The so-called Monroe doctrine with the slogan "Asia to the Asiatic" is rapidly spreading in Japan. And, even in the revised text of the interview which Admiral Suetsugu gave last November, one may read about "the libération of coloured people, who suffer in a wretched situation under the white men's yoke."

Such a view of the question as that expressed in Admiral Suetsugu's interview shows in itself that, for a country like France, the interests involved go far beyond a purely local setting.

Having discussed the consequences of the present conflict for the regional interests of France, I should like to review shortly some of their consequences for the general lines of French foreign policy.

Nobody will deny the close connection between the Far East and Europe. Even before the Great War, events in Asia had an immense influence upon events in the West. It is well known, for instance, that the British–Russian agreement in regard to Asia in 1907 made an entente for the two countries possible in Europe. Later, the Sino-Japanese conflict about Manchuria introduced the first important breach in the general organisation of the collective system which had been slowly built up since the War.

The German–Japanese Anti-Communist Pact, which Italy recently joined, has in fact connected Far Eastern and European policies more closely than ever. It has to a great extent brought Japan into Europe. It has also extended to Asia, in a large measure, the division of the European nations. Some people have said that the Franco-Soviet Pact was the first to extend to Europe the risks of a war in Asia. The Franco-Soviet Pact (the facts are recalled several times in the text of the Pact itself) would only apply in the event of an attack upon Russia from a European aggressor. It does not apply in the event of a conflict in Asia alone.

It is difficult to gauge with accuracy what reality lies behind the Anti-Communist Pact, and how strong are the links between Japan, Italy and Germany. The latest signatory, Italy, seems to show the fervour of a neophyte in the matter, while Germany, driven towards Japan by her political affinity and towards China by her economic interests, has seemed, up to the present, much more hesitant. The Anti-Communist Pact, together with the general political grouping it implies, has given Japan, as well as Germany and Italy, the means of combining at the same time, in

remote parts of the world, military, diplomatic or political offensives, directly or indirectly, against the interests of their diplomatic opponents. Those opponents would be compelled to yield or to divide their forces in a dangerous manner. No doubt the answer of France as well as of Great Britain to the threat against their interests in the Far East would have been much stronger if it had not been for the Mediterranean difficulties. However important the Far Eastern developments are to France, they cannot divert her from European difficulties and the Mediterranean situation.

But whatever these difficulties might be, France could, and I think would, agree to go as far as any other nation within the framework of collective action. A close understanding of the Western nations which are interested in the integrity of China would possibly have stopped Japan. As M. Lucien Romier recently wrote in a French newspaper, " Yellow Peril comes from the White Man." Lacking this general co-operation, an understanding between the United States, Great Britain and France might have had some similar fruitful results. But coming after the Chicago speech of Mr. Roosevelt, the Brussels Conference disappointed French public opinion. French opinion had not, I think, actually realised the fact that the interest of American opinion in the Far East had greatly declined, that the Americans wanted to preserve their neutrality in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, and that the very fear of being obliged to give up neutrality in Europe, if they gave it up in the Far East, deterred them from action. American partial retirement from the Far East has upset the equilibrium of forces there in favour of Japan. During the nineteenth century the principal nations of Europe complained one after the other of what they called the policy of the Balance of Power pursued by Great Britain on the continent. But lacking the application of collective security, a policy of Balance of Power would be of great value in the Pacific. I must add, however, that whatever may have been the position of the United States during the last few months, action from America does not appear impossible. The American people, though sticking to neutrality, are not neutral at the bottom of their hearts. With regard to this possible action of the United States, French hopes are the same as those of Great Britain. I think that these hopes are not to be loudly expressed, because though American public opinion might move spontaneously, any appeal made from Europe would have an opposite result to the one desired. However, hopes of co-operation have been many times discreetly

expressed by British and French Governments. The communiqué which ended the meeting of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Chautemps proclaimed that in the Far East the two Governments were ready to co-operate with other countries similarly placed, to protect their rights and interests, and "to meet the obligation arising from international treaties relating to that part of the world."

This text, while containing prudent appeal to the United States, also implies Franco-British co-operation in the Far East. To-day the solidarity of British and French policy is not only a hope, it is a fact, one of the solid realities in the Far East, as elsewhere. The interests of France and of Great Britain are the same in the Pacific, as they are the same in the Mediterranean and in continental Europe. France, like Great Britain, has to watch the security of its Far Eastern territories. Both countries are interested in the integrity of Chinese territory, in the "open door" in China, in the prosperity of the Chinese people. Neither country has any feeling of hostility towards the Japanese people. Only last spring, when there was a Foreign Minister in Japan who seemed to hold more friendly views towards China and the West, French people were still hoping for better relations between Britain and France on the one hand and Japan on the other. But since that time, Japan has decidedly chosen a course of violence. Japan has invaded China. And, beyond the wish to protect their interests in China, beyond their local rights, what links Great Britain and France is a still larger interest, the strong love of peace, a peace which can only be attained through firmness and co-operation.

Summary of Discussion.

THE CHAIRMAN (Mr. G. E. Hubbard) asked what was Monsieur Dennery's opinion, and opinion in France generally, as to the possibilities of Russian intervention? It was impossible to say what the end of the struggle between China and Japan would be, but it seemed far from unlikely that Japan would succeed in attaining at any rate a part of her aims in China. China might be unable to carry on resistance beyond a certain point; Chinese forces might be expelled from the maritime provinces, and Japan might establish in those provinces some sort of Government subordinate to herself. In that case Japan would presumably draw a very considerable access of strength from economic control of Chinese natural resources, and might achieve her ambition of establishing a base for heavy industries in North China, thus increasing her military power. That possibility must be faced. Would Japan then turn to her second line of expansion and become a very real danger to her neighbours in the south, Indo-China and Hongkong, and later the Netherlands East Indies and British colonial possessions in the Pacific? The question whether Russia was, or was

not, likely to interfere with Japanese plans was therefore absolutely essential to any consideration of the future.

MONSIEUR DENNERY replied that he personally thought spontaneous Russian intervention was improbable in the near future; he did not think that Russia was prepared for conflict in the Far East, although she had done much to develop her military forces in the maritime provinces and along the northern borders of Manchukuo. It was quite true that Japan had kept her best reserves in Manchukuo with the idea of a war with Russia in mind, and such a war would be popular with the Army; the Navy would prefer war in the south. But the struggle with China was proving so much longer and more painful than the Japanese had anticipated when they started that the reserves she had kept in Manchukuo might be needed in China itself, and it was unlikely that Japan would start against a new country while that was the case. Russia would probably act if she felt that action would also be taken by others, *i.e.*, collective action.

QUESTION: If an advisory council on matters of common interest in the Far East were formed, would France, and possibly the United States, join that Council?

MONSIEUR DENNERY replied that he thought French people would be glad of any kind of collective co-operation in the Far East as elsewhere, advisory or active, and the United States, as a signatory of the Washington Treaty, could hardly refuse to take part in an advisory council, but the result of the Brussels Conference did not suggest that such a council would be of much use.

QUESTION: Was Kwangchowwan, which was marked French on the map, of any importance?

MONSIEUR DENNERY replied that Kwangchowwan was leased to France in 1898 at the time Weiheiwei was leased to Great Britain, Dairen and Port Arthur to Russia, and Kiaochow to Germany; it was of little importance as it could not be made a naval base and had no economic value.

MR. E. M. GULL said he had heard a report that the prohibition with regard to arms traffic from Indo-China had been due to a direct threat conveyed by the Japanese Government to the French Government that if the traffic continued they would seize Hainan. Was there any basis of truth in this? The Chinese had undoubtedly been relying on that particular means of access to the outside world, together with the way through Hongkong, and that through Turkestan.

He did not regard the possible danger to Hongkong as being in the remote future; he thought Great Britain would be lucky if she came out of the existing situation without a head-on collision with Japan over Hongkong. It would depend on whether Japan captured Canton,

and there was every indication that she intended to do so; Great Britain might avoid conflict by accepting the resulting situation, but it might prove extremely difficult for her to do so. There was clearly forced upon Great Britain and France the highest possible degree of co-operation, though whether in the existing state of not only the Far East, but also Europe, co-operation could be put to any sort of practical use was very doubtful.

MONSIEUR DENNERY said that in a report of an interview given to the British press, not to the French press, Viscount Ishii had said that Japan was not at war with China, and that arms were pouring steadily into China from certain sources, for instance from French territory, and that if these were not stopped, the Japanese would bomb and destroy the Yunnan Railway. But this declaration was made in December, whereas the regulation stopping the traffic had been made on October 12th. With regard to Hainan, the Japanese from time to time sent boats and aeroplanes, and had even made an attempt to land troops as a demonstration. He did not think there had been any direct threat to France, but the Japanese had certainly done all that was necessary to make the French understand what they intended to do. In fact, it would be easy enough for the Japanese to take Hainan. The French mistake had been not to occupy Hainan at the same time as Indo-China, it was so vital for the safety of northern Indo-China, but France had relied on the Chinese declaration of 1898.

MR. ZVEGINTZOV said that he was frightened by all the talk about co-operation and conferences which would only drive a determined country like Japan to act more quickly to prevent any combination from becoming useful. Japan must safeguard herself against the combination of Russia and the United States in the north and of Great Britain and France in the south. The chances of Russia coming in were small, as Japan had fifteen or twenty first-line divisions in Manchukuo and four railways, against the Russian one by which all supplies for the Russian Far East Army must come. If that railway were cut, Russia would be out.

MONSIEUR DENNERY said that the best co-operation would be with the aid of the United States; America had the same interest in the equilibrium of the Far East as Great Britain had had during the nineteenth century in the equilibrium of Europe. Lacking American support, there was no doubt that Great Britain and France had to be prudent. But it was possible to envisage some kind of naval help for French colonial territory from Great Britain and of military help from France, who had an important army in its colonies.

MR. A. G. LIAS said that there was not the slightest possibility at present of American co-operation to use force of any kind either in the Far East or anywhere else. The United States was not prepared to fight, even if the Japanese sank fifty *Panays*. At least ninety per cent.

of the American people was against any action to resist Japan. Papers like *The New York Times*, which understood the international point of view, did not represent American opinion. Papers like *The Oregonian* or *The Chicago Examiner* and other Hearst papers were absolutely against American intervention.

MONSIEUR DENNERY pointed out that President Wilson had been elected during the War on the slogan of "America out of the War," yet a very short time after she had entered it; that type of change might happen again. Certainly the feeling of neutrality was very strong in the United States, and interest in the Far Eastern question had diminished with the practical closing of the immigration question. Also American economic relations were possibly more important with Japan than with China. But feeling against Japan was nevertheless violent.

QUESTIONS: Was the army of thirty thousand men in Indo-China native or French? What was the reaction of the intellectuals and the leaders of the population in Indo-China? What had been the effect of the Franco-Soviet Pact on the unfavourable attitude in France to Communism and Communist propaganda in Indo-China?

MONSIEUR DENNERY said that there were about twenty thousand natives in the army in Indo-China; then there was a French army and a foreign legion. Governor General Varenne, a former Governor General of French Indo-China, who had become a Member of Parliament, had recently lectured at the Centre d'Etudes advocating an increase in the native army and the giving of more political rights to the Indo-Chinese.

There had been Communist propaganda in Indo-China through three channels. First, from the south of China in 1925 and 1926; there were not far from five hundred thousand Chinese in Indo-China, but they were chiefly merchants, and had property, so they did not take to Communism. Secondly, there was Communist propaganda from France through French people or Indo-Chinese who had been connected with the Communist Party in France, but since the Franco-Soviet Pact the French Communist Party had become nationalist, and Russia, for the time being and for reasons easy to understand, would not like to see France lose Indo-China; in a translation of a recent Russian article in the *Isvestia* it had been stressed that the defence of Indo-China must be organised. Thirdly, there were some Communists among the Annamites, the most numerous of the races in Indo-China; a few of them had gone in 1926 to the Communist military school in Canton. Lately, however, Communist propaganda against French domination had decreased. There was a tendency to call all kinds of movements Communist, when some were purely movements among natives for greater opportunities for self-government.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1*. SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1918–1937. 2 vols. Edited with an introduction by Arthur Berriedale Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt., LL.D. 1938. (Oxford University Press. 16mo. lv + 290, x + 267 pp. 2s. each volume.)

THESE two volumes, published in the World's Classics Series, clearly printed, in convenient form and at a price within the reach of all, will undoubtedly be welcomed by all those who wish to keep by them the texts of the principal treaties and documents which have been made public since 1918. The task of selecting the documents to form such a collection is no easy one, and individual views must inevitably differ as to what should or should not have been included. On the whole the Editor's selection is a good one. There are, however, several rather surprising omissions: *e.g.*, the Washington Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (and all documents on Palestine), the British Memorandum of December 18th, 1926, on policy in regard to China, the Treaties between Italy and Albania (1926–7), the Statute of the Little Entente (1933), the Balkan Pact (1934), the German-Polish Non-aggression Agreement (1934), the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935), the Franco-Italian Rome Agreement (1935), and the German Declaration regarding the status of Belgium (October 1937) which completed the Anglo-French Declaration of April 1937.

Other examples might be cited, but most, if not all, of these documents would appear to be of sufficient importance to have merited their inclusion.

When this has been said, however, it only remains for the reviewer to felicitate the Editor on the way in which he has carried out a difficult task and so ably summarised in his introduction world events from 1918 to 1937. These two small volumes should prove to be indispensable to those who speak or write on foreign affairs. There is nothing comparable at so modest a price. S. A. HEALD.

2*. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN MODERN EDUCATION. By S. H. Bailey. 1938. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. xvii + 309 pp. 15s.)

NEW sciences come into being in response to the stimulus of newly felt needs. The beginnings of the modern peace movement in Great Britain and the United States can be traced back to the end of the

Napoleonic Wars. But, broadly speaking, it was still assumed, right down to 1914, that war was a job for professional soldiers; and the corollary was that international relations could be left to professional diplomats. The revelation that war was the intimate personal concern of every member of the community was followed by a widespread popular demand to understand what international relations were really about. During the War, the Union of Democratic Control and other similar organisations popularised the belief that war was due to the bungling of diplomats and politicians or, more specifically, to the conclusion of treaties which the man in the street knew nothing about; and though subsequent research has done little to substantiate this particular belief, the conviction remained that the cause of peace could most effectively be served by the organised study on a wide scale of the problems of international politics. The establishment of this organised study in the past twenty years has been rendered possible mainly by the benefactions of philanthropic individuals and foundations interested in promoting the maintenance of peace.

Born in these conditions, the study of international politics developed a markedly Utopian character. It concentrated on the goal to be attained, and failed to make any adequate analysis of those human relations and reactions which are the stuff of politics. It was too often content to describe or devise machinery, and forgot to examine the nature of the forces by which alone that machinery could be operated. It not only divorced politics from power, but also blurred the boundary line between politics and law, endeavouring to incorporate international politics into international law—with ultimately disastrous consequences to the latter. The hard realities of the last three years have revealed the bankruptcy of these methods of approach. The problem of the moment is to place the study of international politics on a more fundamental and more philosophical basis, and to give it some claim to be regarded as an objective science.

Mr. Bailey's review of *International Studies in Modern Education* appears therefore at an opportune time. He does not, it is true, tackle this basic problem, starting from the assumption that "the objective study of international relations . . . has made remarkable headway since the Great War." But it is unnecessary to criticise the book for not achieving what it has not set out to attempt. Mr. Bailey's purpose was to investigate the provision which has been made since the War for the academic study of international politics, and within this scope his work is both exhaustive and valuable. The record is an impressive one, stretching as it does from "current events" classes in schools to university undergraduate courses and post-graduate studies in international relations, to adult education courses and to international exchanges sponsored by educational bodies and by other quasi-academic institutions.

Of the place of international studies in schools and in adult education it is unnecessary to speak. Such teaching is inevitably in some degree superficial, but it has come to stay. It produces, at its present stage, many dogmatic opinions and half-baked emotions (such as have been freely engendered, for instance, by the Spanish Civil War among people who have no knowledge or understanding of the Spanish political scene). But the remedy for this is more, not less, education. At the opposite end of the scale, the place of international relations in post-graduate study is equally assured. Here the principal scene of activity has hitherto been the United States, and the characteristic

defect the accumulation of mere factual material without any serious attempt at philosophical analysis. But here, too, the start has been made, and time must provide the remedy.

The really moot question is the suitability of international politics for undergraduate study. Broadly, three systems are now current. Under the first, unconnected courses are given in various international topics, and students working in related, or even unrelated fields, may select one or more of these more or less at random. This system, which prevails in some American universities, has little to recommend it, and will probably soon disappear. Under the second system, students working in certain related fields take (usually as one of several options) a short course in international politics. This worked fairly well so long as the course consisted primarily of instruction in the aims and machinery of the League of Nations. But now that this been revealed as an inadequate approach to international politics, these short courses have become unsatisfactory, and can be expected to yield results only where there is a fairly solid background of history, political philosophy and economics (with one or more foreign languages as an important desideratum). The third system is a full undergraduate course leading up to a degree in international politics, and comprising modern diplomatic history, national and international institutions, international law, international economics and finance, and political philosophy with special application to international problems. In most universities, at any rate in Great Britain, scepticism still prevails as to the propriety of introducing a degree course of this kind. But this would appear to be the ideal to which teachers must work if they wish to see international politics established as a subject of serious undergraduate study. E. H. CARR.

3. THE MENACE OF THE CLOUDS. By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 1937. (London: William Hodge. 8vo. viii + 295 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE first three parts of this very interesting book analyse the air menace, both generally and in relation to particular countries. Great Britain is peculiarly exposed to it. London is 320 miles from East Friesland, Berlin 475 from Norfolk. German bombers could be over London a second time while our bombers had just returned from Berlin—and " Germany is banking up for war." In such a situation our navy would be so much " tinware." Only air power would count. Modern war is " a static military condition and intensive air activity."

The fourth part contains Air-Commodore Charlton's constructive proposal. It is " sane collectivism," expressing itself in an international tribunal and an international air force, here called an " International Strategic Reserve." It would be composed of 3000 first-line aircraft, in 170 squadrons, stationed in Tunis. The personnel would be recruited voluntarily from all participating countries, in equal numbers, and denationalised. The cost would be borne in accordance with national taxable capacity.

The " I.S.R." would be launched into action by an order of the " International Executive." Here is the basic difficulty. The Executive would represent many different countries, with varying forms of government, ideologies, sympathies, interests.

Would not the position be very much as if the mobilisation of the R.A.F. had to be approved by six different British Cabinets, all in office at the same time and presided over by Prime Ministers drawn

from each of the various political parties in this country? Must not the political pattern of Europe become much less variegated before such a scheme is practicable? J. M. SPAIGHT.

4. AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By various hands. [*Harvard Tercentenary Publications.*] 1937. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. x + 371 pp. $3.00, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

OF the papers read at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference a number are offered here to a wider public, and while an attempt has been made to group them into some sort of unity, even this volume, one of three, ranges from Mr. D. H. Robertson's "The State and Economic Fluctuation" to Mr. E. J. Dent's "The Historical Approach to Music."

The sixteen papers here reprinted are arranged into four groups: The State and Economic Enterprise; Stability and Social Change; The Place and Functions of Authority; Classicism and Romanticism. The first three groups are in fact concerned, in one form or another, with the two closely related problems of the relation of authority and the individual, and of the relation of politics and economic life. And there is indeed a remarkable inner unity running through them all, notwithstanding the variety of environment and specialism of the writers. There is one exception, and that equally significant. Signor Corrado Gini, of Rome, discerns in the life of nations, as of individuals, a "cyclical evolution"; and also a cyclical evolution of races, "at the end of which one of the great races of mankind, previously hegemonic, declined and another took its place on the stage." Dictatorship at such times may become permanently necessary, because "the struggle between nations indeed assumes preponderance over competition between individuals: success and free expansion of nations become of greater import than individual freedom and welfare" (p. 278). Consequently, "the free behaviour of nations and abandonment by international bodies of paternalistic restrictions upon State initiative constitute the policy most in keeping with the interest of mankind" (pp. 278–9).

The other papers seem to belong to a different age, so alien to them is all that perverse romanticising. Their common keynote is set by Professor Dewey, who writes on "Authority and Social Change," when he insists that those dictatorial experiments are "reinstating reliance upon the method of external authority that has always broken down in the past" (p. 188). None of them suggest a return to *laissez-faire*. Professor Copland, in "The State and the Entrepreneur," indeed argues in a way that to some may seem paradoxical for the "increasing need for State action if capitalism is to continue to yield its best fruits" (p. 49). But if they, too, in a varying measure, accept the need of action by the State, unlike the Italian contributor, they want it not for the State, but for the people, for the individual. For them all the test of intervention by authority is its utilitarian value. This new situation, says Professor MacIver, in "The Historical Pattern of Social Change," "does not spell the greater liberty of the individual, but it does mean that authority must, as never before, specify its objectives and justify them in the eyes of the masses . . ." (p. 152).

It is unfortunately not possible when reviewing a work of this kind to deal with all the contributions—and for more than one reason

it would have been especially appropriate to discuss Professor Corwin's paper on "The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol." But read as they were on an historical occasion, these papers may well be taken by some future student of the evolution of culture also as a historical landmark. They are remarkable for their detached and fearless spirit, the simple acceptance of the need for adaptation to changing material needs and conditions, instead of the special pleading for this or that doctrinal position. The one exception only serves to set out more strongly this fine illustration of the new scientific attitude in the social sciences. D. MITRANY.

5. DIE PRESSE GROSSBRITANNIENS : Ihr geistiger und wirtschaftlicher Aufbau. By Dr. Max Grünbeck. 2 Bde. [*Bde.* 5 *u.* 6 *von Wesen und Wirkungen der Publizistik.*] 1936. (Leipzig: Noske. 8vo. xv + 390, viii + 311 pp. *Rm.* 24.)
6. KRIEGSPROPAGANDA UND KRIEGSVERHÜTUNG. By Konrad Morgen. [*Band* 4 *von Wesen und Wirkungen der Publizistik.*] 1936. (Leipzig: Noske. 8vo. v + 144 pp. *Rm.* 5.)
7. WELTPRESSE UND WELTKRISE. By W. Waldkirch. 1936. (Ludwigshafen: Waldkirchdruckerei. 8vo. 228 pp. *Rm.* 3.50; *gbd., Rm.* 4.50.)

DR. GRÜNBECK'S study consists of elaborate and detailed exposition, in two considerable volumes, of the structure and operation of the modern English press. His first volume gives a telescopic account of the history of our press from the middle of last century to the present day, passes on to describe the organisation of the contemporary press classified in accordance first with form and functions and then with intellectual content, and deals with technical problems, advertising policies and methods and costs of production. The second volume is devoted to the phenomena of press amalgamation, the causes, methods and consequences of which the writer methodically enumerates. Primarily intended as a source of information for his compatriots, Dr. Grünbeck's volumes may nevertheless, by reason of the wealth of facts which they contain and their systematic arrangement, prove useful as an up-to-date source of reference for English readers. Enlightenment upon facts being the writer's objective, criticism and controversy find little place in his pages.

The same thing cannot be said of Konrad Morgen's book, which, forming, like the volumes just mentioned, part of a series of studies of the international press regarded from various aspects, affords evidence of the attention now being paid in Germany to the topic of international propaganda. Herr Morgen argues for toleration and understanding in international press dealings. His book well repays study by those who wish to acquaint themselves with the National Socialist view of the manner in which the press might be used as an instrument of international conciliation. It also contains a useful list of extracts from international agreements and proposed agreements relating to propaganda.

Weltpresse und Weltkrise covers similar ground, in a rather more interesting as well as more partisan fashion, and employs similar arguments. It concludes that the World Press as it at present functions must bear a heavy share of the responsibility for international crises and mistrust between peoples. TERENCE O'BRIEN.

8. THE CHURCHES SURVEY THEIR TASK. The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community and State. With an Introduction by J. H. Oldham. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 314 pp. 5s.)
9. THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH AND THE WORLD OF NATIONS. By the Marquess of Lothian, Sir Alfred Zimmern, O. H. von der Gablentz, Max Huber, John Foster Dulles, V. A. Demant, Wilhelm Menn, Otto Piper, and C. E. Raven. [*Church, Community and State,* vol. 7.] 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xii + 315 pp. 8s. 6d.)
10. CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE MODERN STATE: AN ŒCUMENICAL APPROACH. By Nils Ehrenström. 1937. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 240 pp. 6s.)

THE cosmopolitan character of the Oxford Conference is indicated by the names of those who shared in the preparation of the Report on its work. Dr. J. H. Oldham, who writes the Introduction, evidently took a main part, but five sections of the Congress contributed Memoranda, under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Moberley (London), Prof. Max Huber (Zurich), John Maud (Oxford), President Henry Sloane Coffin (New York), and President John Mackay (Princeton).

The Oxford Conference of 1937 was a natural, almost inevitable sequel of that at Stockholm in 1925, as the Archbishop of Canterbury stated in his Opening Address, in which he paid a tribute of remembrance to the late Archbishop Soderblom, who had been the initiator and director of the latter.

The subjects of the two conferences were, however, different. At Stockholm " Life and Work " was the subject, at Oxford " Church, State and Community." As the Oxford Conference proceeded, the essential theme that emerged was the struggle between Christian Faith and the secular and pagan tendencies of our time.

The Oxford Conference was organised, and its proceedings carried on, in a business-like and admirable manner. Considering the number of churches—only two, the Roman Catholic and the German Confessional Churches, were absent—and the extent of the intellectual fields to be explored, as this Report clearly shows, there was neither confusion of subjects nor neglect of any germane subject.

The innate weakness of Conferences, from those of the Y.M.C.A. even to Œcumenical Conferences, is that of choosing subjects too great to be handled in the time. This weakness was obviated at Oxford by division of the delegates into groups and assigning to each a section of the subject.

What has the Oxford Conference achieved? Dr. Oldham answers,

" The results of the Conference may be summed up under three heads. The first is the answer to the prayers that were offered in common. Secondly, there is the contribution of the Conference to the thought of the Church. Thirdly, there is the effect of the Conference on the lives of those who took part in it, and of those who came under its influence. What was given at Oxford was not the end but a beginning."

The Universal Church and the World of Nations is Volume VII of a series which should enable the thought and influence of the Oxford Conference to be spread over the Christian world. It might be criticised for its ambitious title, but for little else. It may prove the most popular of its series, as it possesses the personal note due to each subject being treated by a chosen writer. Both the subjects and the

writers will command the reader's attention. The Marquess of Lothian contributes the first article, on "The Influence of National Sovereignty"; Sir Alfred Zimmern follows on "Ethical Presuppositions of a World Order"; von der Gablentz on "Material Foundations of an International Order"; Max Huber on "Christian Understanding of Law"; John Foster Dulles on "Peace in a Dynamic World"; V. A. Demant on "Tragedy of War and Hope of Peace"; Wilhelm Menn on "Church of Christ and International Order"; Otto Piper on "War and Christian Peacemaking"; and C. E. Raven on "Religious Basis of Pacifism." A great work has been achieved by the Oxford Conference. So far it has assembled, as David did, the materials from all quarters, wherewith to build a great Church of Christ. The defects which have to bear some of the blame for the condition of the world which it has to confront have yet to be considered, and our Lord's vision of an undivided Church has now to be realised. The results of the Oxford Conference of 1937 would seem to demand soon a second edition.

Christian Faith and the Modern State was also prepared for the World Conference at Oxford. It is valuable as a contribution to the understanding, rather than to the solution of the perplexing problem the Totalitarian State has suddenly set the Christian world. As Dr. Oldham states in the preface he contributes to the book, it is also a fresh contribution, because written from the Continental standpoint. Based on papers written for small Continental conferences on the subject, it displays serious research, and full interpretation of tendencies of thought.

Intensely aware of the grave and urgent realities of the present situation, and convinced that they demand a fresh effort of thought on the part of the Church, Mr. Ehrenström handles his theme with earnestness which at times carries him into, for the reader, embarrassing details. Starting with the statement, "The substance of the State was as old as humanity itself. The Incarnation was the decisive event that produced a new and different relationship," he sets forth in turn the view of the State held by each of the following churches; Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Calvinistic and Continental Protestant.

The book provides abundant material for discussion. Its least clear portions are the chapters concerning the Church in the Totalitarian countries. While lacking a lucid and imaginative style to commend it to the ordinary reader, Mr. Ehrenström is to be congratulated on producing for the student a compendium well worth consultation. The absence from a book written in German, but well translated, of how the State has forced the problem on the Church speaks louder than words. Having dealt only with the Faith of the Church in this volume, Mr. Ehrenström might well supplement it with a similar thorough examination of "the Modern State's" attitude to the Faith of the Church. JOHN LOVE MORROW.

11*. THE FREEDOM WE SEEK. Edited by Wyatt Rawson, with an Introduction by Professor F. Clarke. 1937. (London: New Education Fellowship. 8vo. 202 pp. 5s.)

IN this account of the proceedings of the Seventh World Conference of the New Education Fellowship, the editor has arranged the material around the central issues with which the Conference was

concerned, but has at the same time preserved as far as possible the original words of the contributors to the discussions. While educationalists will perhaps be most interested in the section "What the School can Achieve," which describes the different types of secondary schools in various parts of the world, students of international affairs, concerned more with the content than with the methods of education, will turn to the first two parts of the book, "The Way to Freedom," and "Freedom and Man's Institutions."

Although no representatives of the totalitarian States were present at the Conference, and there are large parts of Europe where, officially at least, the ideas set forth in the report would not find support, it is nevertheless an encouraging document. There is a frank recognition of the difficulty of defining "freedom" as a first step towards attaining it. The whole question of the right or duty of the teacher to "indoctrinate" is discussed and there seems to be support for the view that

"he has no right to do propaganda for any attitude hostile to organised society, nor has he the right to try to persuade his pupils to accept any ready-made political, social or economic programme; . . . but he has the right to uphold the ideal of freedom of discussion and freedom of judgment, and a sense of social obligation."

H. G. LIDDELL.

12. HALF A LIFE LEFT. By James Strachey Barnes. 1937. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. 8vo. 329 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

THE two main sections of Major Barnes's new book fill gaps in most people's knowledge of happenings in parts of the world which seem to be almost equally distant and unknown. The only real link between them is the author's incurable taste for adventure. In post-War Albania anything might and did happen; tragedy and *opera bouffe* trod on each other's heels; with undefined frontiers, warring tribes and intriguing politicians the country ran a serious danger of being swallowed up in the maelstrom of the Peace Conference only to emerge again when it had been shared out among its neighbours. Major Barnes flung himself enthusiastically into the fight for Albanian independence; as a member of the Southern European section of the British Delegation he was brought into the closest touch with the Albanian Delegation, and formed the highest opinion of the abilities not only of Konitza, the Foreign Minister, but also of the young Minister of the Interior, Zog. In 1921 Major Barnes's reward came: he returned to a country whose independence was assured and set to work to travel from one end of it to another. In the chapters which follow he blends personal experiences, descriptions of the country, and character studies of its inhabitants with the history of two troubled years. He was at Tirana when General Tellini was murdered, and having but a few days before been along the very road where the tragedy occurred, he is able to give a good deal of new information about the events which immediately preceded it and about the opinion of people on the spot.

Skipping twelve years, Major Barnes takes up his tale again when in October 1935 he was appointed Reuter's correspondent with the Italian Expeditionary Force in East Africa. He very soon left the Northern Front for Somalia. There are few things more mentally debilitating than the modern habit of refusing to read anything with which one disagrees. Probably many people will disagree with Major Barnes's review of the British and Italian policy and actions during

the Abyssinian crisis, but the important fact remains that he is able to set out quite clearly what the Italians thought and felt, and why they acted as they did. MURIEL CURREY.

13. MIND, MEDICINE AND METAPHYSICS: The Philosophy of a Physician. By William Brown. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. viii + 294 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

14. IN THE REALM OF MIND: Nine Chapters on the Application and Implications of Psychology. By Charles S. Myers. 1937. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 251 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

BOTH authors are well known psychologists of mature experience and wide vision. Among the very readable and interesting lectures and essays here collected each author has included a contribution on the problems of international relations which merits consideration.

Dr. Brown, in Chapters VII and VIII and in an Appendix which reprints three important letters, finds no solution yet in sight for the problem of war and peace; the necessary knowledge has not yet been mustered. Reactions between States are powerfully but unwittingly determined by the unconscious primitive tendencies of their citizens, acting through their unconscious thoughts and feelings; tendencies which, fed by current events and devilish propaganda, may build up complexes which make international understanding impossible. We need a deeper understanding of the forces at work below consciousness and, in particular, have to find means to sublimate the self-assertive instinct in every nation and individual, and to relieve nationalistic repressions. Material disarmament must be preceded by moral disarmament which in turn calls for the support of psychological disarmament.

Dr. Myers, in his chapter "Towards Internationalism," sees this movement being forced on the world by the necessity of co-operation for prosperity, notes *inter alia* the growth of a faith in the ideal of an increase of general prosperity and happiness as a condition for increasing individual prosperity and happiness, and concludes that, despite the present reign of nationalism and the existence of serious conflicts and difficulties which must be solved, there is a slow movement of the social-mental environment in the direction of a wiser internationalism.

Both authors believe that international force in some form will have to be available to secure acceptance of international decisions.

G. MERTON.

15*. POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1938. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. Issued under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 1938. (New York: Harper and Brothers. La. 8vo. 210 pp. $2.50.)

IN these days of many and rapid political changes in all parts of the world, this Handbook (the eleventh to be issued) performs an increasingly useful function, covering, as it does, for each country governments, political parties with their programmes and leaders, and the press with its political affiliations. As far as can be seen without an exhaustive examination, the present volume is free from the slips which were noted in the 1937 Handbook. The editing of such a publication is a considerable undertaking, and Mr. Mallory is to be congratulated on the way in which he has maintained the standard of accuracy. S. A. H.

16. Nationalität als Wesen und Rechtsbegriff. By Hermann Raschhofer. 1937. (Berlin: Julius Springer. 8vo. iii + 45 pp. *Rm.* 2.80.)

Membership of a national group is commonly taken to depend upon the will of the individual at the moment, and this subjective attitude has had much influence on minority legislation. Dr. Raschhofer argues that the subjective will only exists where the individual possesses certain objective characteristics which are not a matter of choice. But these characteristics do not admit of precise definition, so that law, which requires certainty, has to rely upon the criterion of will. The pamphlet is carefully written and deserves the attention of all interested in the subject. But its thesis can hardly be used to justify German racial legislation, although in the last paragraph a sudden attempt is made to employ it for that purpose. M. B.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

17*. International Legislation: An Essay on Changes in International Law and in International Situations. By Torsten Gihl. Translated from Swedish by Sydney J. Charleston. 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. vii + 158 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

In this essay Dr. Gihl examines the methods by which, on the assumption that the absence of a supernational legislature is likely to be a permanent feature of the international order, changes can be introduced into international law. He treats the distinct but related problems of the development of general rules of law, and the alteration of particular legal situations, in separate parts, and in both he finds that changes are very difficult. The only source of general rules that Dr. Gihl admits is custom, and custom is essentially a conservative mode of growth; treaties he regards as contracts and nothing more, and therefore as incapable of being their source. As to the means of changing particular situations, which, as Dr. Gihl says, is the problem that those who deplore the absence of a supernational legislature most often have in mind, the argument leads him to the conclusion that the choice is between violence and voluntary agreement. If we believe that peace cannot be maintained without changes, we must establish a super-state.

This may seem a depressing conclusion, and it may be that Dr. Gihl has over-stated the difficulties in the way of international legal change. But on any view those difficulties are formidable, and perhaps one useful result of Dr. Gihl's book may be to raise the question whether recent discussion has not tended to exaggerate the importance of legal changes as an alternative to war. Certainly war is not undertaken in order to secure changes in the *general* rules of law. It is sometimes undertaken in order to alter a particular existing situation, but it is doubtful whether a system of legal change making it possible for states to secure their reasonable interests by peaceful means would go very far to help in such a case. Unfortunately it is the unreasonable interests of states, and motives too intangible to be called " interests " at all, that constitute the danger, and against these legislation can offer little protection.

Apart from the general interest of the main thesis, Dr. Gihl's book has a special interest for the international lawyer. In the course of his argument he touches on most of the questions which students of

international law are debating to-day, and on each he has something interesting, though often controversial, to say. Dr. Gihl anticipates that he will be branded as a "hardened and antiquated positivist," though actually his positivism rejects some of the doctrines, such as the "voluntarist" theory of the nature of international law, which are usually associated with positivism, and which especially tend to discredit that doctrine in the eyes of its critics. He dismisses rather summarily all attempts to find a basis for the *validity* of international law; for him its character is a historical, and not a metaphysical, problem. But there *is* a metaphysical problem too, though Dr. Gihl may not be interested in it. On this and on other points, such as his failure to recognise the creative function of courts of law among the influences by which law is developed, he can hardly expect to escape criticism from those who find his premises unsatisfying.

J. L. BRIERLY.

18. THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Professor M. D. A. R. von Redlich. 2nd Edition. 1937. (New York: World League for Permanent Peace. 8vo. xxiii + 640 pp.)

PROFESSOR VON REDLICH, as becomes a convinced pacifist, approaches his subject more on the basis of popularising the principles of international law than of writing a scientific treatise. This explains his long chapters on the diplomatic relations of the United States, which properly belong to a historical or diplomatic work, and not to a book on the law of nations. In his treatment of the legal principles, he restricts himself to an exposition of what international law actually is, and not what it ought to be—a most praiseworthy method in a work of this character. On the pressing question of recognition, he is of the opinion that recognition is entirely a political act, and that therefore its grant or refusal is not a question of international law, but of international policy dependent upon "expediency, convenience or other extra-legal grounds." This view has been challenged both in the United States and in England by many distinguished publicists (see, for instance, the recent edition of Oppenheim's *International Law* by Professor Lauterpacht). Professor von Redlich's style is clear and concise and his chapters on Pan-Americanism and the League of Nations are an example of admirable exposition. He is emphatically of the opinion that the Permanent Court of International Justice provides "the most excellent and assuredly impartial tribunal." It is to be hoped that a wide circulation of this book, assisted by the efforts of the "World League for Permanent Peace," may tend to influence American public opinion in favour of the Hague Court.

C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

19. CAUSES DE NULLITÉ LA DE SENTENCE ARBITRALE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. (Prix Carlos Calvo 1937.) By Dr. A. Balasko. 1938. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 403 pp. 100 *frs.*)

THIS carefully prepared treatise is divided into four parts, which deal respectively with (*a*) the various grounds of nullity of an arbitral award as envisaged by international Conferences and the Covenant of the League of Nations; (*b*) the author's own conception of nullity, accompanied by a Draft Convention; (*c*) a short review of the decided cases on the subject, and (*d*) the provisions contained in various international treaties regarding the re-examination of an arbitral award. The author's view is that every claim based on nullity should be submitted for determination to the Permanent Court of International

Justice unless there has been an express agreement to the contrary. The book is admirably written and contains an exhaustive review of all the possible grounds on which an arbitral award might be challenged. In many respects, however, the treatment adopted by the author appears too technical, as, for instance, in his long dissertation on the differences between "static" and "dynamic" grounds for nullity, which would probably strike every Anglo-Saxon jurist as being rather too artificial. C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

20*. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL IN THE NON-FERROUS METALS. By W. Y. Elliott and others. [*Bureau of International Research, Harvard University and Radcliffe College.*] 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxi + 801 pp. 28s.)

THIS formidable volume is the result of a difficult piece of co-operative research carried out under the auspices of the Harvard Bureau of International Research. It is written in two parts, the second consisting of a series of monographs by experts on nickel, aluminium, tin, copper, lead and zinc, with supplementary monographs on special United States aspects of the tin, copper, lead and zinc industries. These monographs contain a great deal of very valuable information. Necessarily the treatment, as is inevitable with the work of specialised experts, follows closely the organisation of the industries concerned.

The analytic essays which constitute the first part of this volume, therefore, represent a *tour de force* of reasoning. Professor Elliott deals suggestively with the political implications of international control schemes, his main thesis being the probability of new forms of regulated trade associating business organisation with governments in trade negotiations. Mr. Rowe deals with "Some General Economic Aspects," and Mr. Skelton discusses "The Mechanics of International Cartels." That the general problem discussed in these essays is important and the treatment of it suggestive and stimulating goes without saying. Whether the tentative conclusion, for example by Mr. Rowe, regarding the desirability of international control is proven is, however, open to much debate. The problem is too vast to discuss in a brief notice; but the linking of existing business organisation with governments in an effort to regulate the production of basic commodities obviously raises large questions not only concerning consumers' interests, but also concerning the future development of international specialisation. J. B. C.

21. THE GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE ECONOMY. By F. E. Lawley. 2 vols. 1938. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xx + 524, xv + 485 pp. 35s. the 2 vols.)

THE first volume of this ambitious study is an effort to give an exhaustive account of the growth of national collective economy, under such headings as War-time Government Control and Towards Collective Economy in the Basic Services. It has chapters devoted to the question of compensation or confiscation, to the methods of collective intervention, and to the treatment of the various grades of workers. It is a valuable collection of data on State internal economic intervention throughout the world. A short chapter on central economic planning bodies and economic advisory councils provides an

interesting summary, but it is a pity that it is not a more complete and satisfying one; there is no account in it of the *Reichswirtschaftsrat*, of the committee development of the British Economic Advisory Council, nor any adequate account of the Russian central planning organisation, although valuable comparisons could be made. Mr. Lawley has directed himself to the destruction of that old belief, which belongs peculiarly to the few years following the War, with its necessarily hasty and sometimes inefficient experiments in State control, that public ownership is inevitably incompetent, temporary and exceptional. He gathers together a mass of evidence to show how unreal this attitude is in each of its three particulars. It is true that the extent and success of public enterprise and State economic regulation are still inadequately recognised. Governments are still able to pay lip-service to *laisser-faire* principles and ardently to condemn socialism out of hand, while in fact a large sector of their national economies is under one form or another of collective control. Mr. Lawley therefore performs a useful service. What little survives of this attitude will find continued survival more difficult after Mr. Lawley's book.

It would, of course, be impossible to produce such a work without inviting criticism. Above all, the arrangement might be improved. We find, for instance (p. 106), the statement that the Netherlands Government decided in 1936 "to spend a further sum of about £10 million on a Five-Year Plan in the Zuyder Zee." This is made as an illustration of public land activity. But what we need to know is the cost of the Zuyder Zee dam, the method by which the money was raised, the extent of new land resulting, the method of reclamation, the land tenure, State research and departmental direction of development, and actual as well as estimated returns. Again, on State forests there are useful percentages of European State-owned forests, but no account of the British Forestry Commission's activities except three lines (p. 210) on its membership. Mr. Lawley is better on the simple question in general terms "collectivism or not?" than on the really vital problem of the best type of collective control. The government-department method he regards as dead, but surely the Post Office is anything but dead; and recent criticism has been directed far less against it than against the newer boards. It is not clear enough what distinction, if any, Mr. Lawley draws between Socialist and Fascist collectivism.

The second volume, which gives an account of the many movements in the direction of international economic co-ordination and planning, is very valuable as a record. H. R. G. GREAVES.

22. BANKING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: a study of the Great Depression in the United States. By C. A. Phillips, T. F. McManus and R. W. Nelson. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 274 pp. Bibl. 10s. 6*d*.)

THE special objective of the three authors of this book is to "integrate" the three main theories of the business cycle into one theory which will provide a complete answer. They argue that (1) the monetary or bank credit theory explains the origin of the boom, (2) the structural view, emphasising the balance between saving and investment, and the changes in the structure of production, explain the boom in being, while (3) the equilibrium theory explains the depression, its severity and its persistence.

The central thesis of the book is that the structure and operation of the American banking system were the main causes of the great depression in the United States. This very thorough work should prove of considerable interest to English readers, as the authors have studied closely the books of Keynes, Robertson, Gregory, Hayek and other writers well known in this country. However, they do not appear to appreciate the very considerable differences which exist between the Central Banks of the United States and of Great Britain.

But the book is not an attack on "the bankers." It is constructive in tone. The authors suggest that the best objective of banking policy should be the control of the total amount of credit—without watching any special set of index figures. The results should be the elimination of violent booms and depressions, and a price-level falling slowly as productivity increases. They argue that the advantages of this course are many and the disadvantages few.

Turning to the existing depression, the authors believe that the efforts of Hoover and Roosevelt to maintain purchasing power could never have any permanent results. It is the capital-goods industries which become so dislocated in a depression : all governmental assistance should therefore be directed only towards them. Wage rates must be reduced so that costs fall into line with prices. Purchasing power need not fall because of this, as more men can be employed at the lower rate of wages. The public, instead of spending heavily on consumption goods, should save for investment in the capital-goods industries.

The joint authors do not think this course will be easy, but they are certain that the alternative will be a prolonged period of heavy unemployment. GEORGE NICKERSON.

23. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES. By Charles R. Whittlesey. 1937. (New York and London : McGraw Hill. 8vo. ix + 252 pp. 15s.)

THIS is a book with which supporters of the gold standard and of orthodox monetary principles will find themselves in violent disagreement.

Mr. Whittlesey's case against the gold standard rests, firstly, upon the extreme instability of gold since the War and, secondly, on the comparative steadiness of the price level during the years 1931–6 in countries that had devalued their currencies.

The book deals with the international aspects of the gold standard rather than with its internal aspects, and the author favours such an international monetary system as will reduce disturbances in commerce to a minimum. He points out that under the orthodox gold standard, monetary disturbances abroad are apt to lead to sharp variations in the internal price level, the exchanges remaining approximately constant; and he suggests as a better method that the necessary adjustments should be made by variations of the exchanges, leaving the monetary authorities free to pursue undeviatingly a steady and consistent policy in internal currency affairs. He does not discuss in detail what this policy should be (though many might think that this was vital), but he makes it clear that gold would play no part in it, and that the avoidance of any substantial or sustained deflation would be regarded as essential.

It may be suggested, however, that the risk of deflation during the next twenty years may be considered negligible; on the other hand, the risk of uncontrolled inflation resulting from the dethronement of gold is a very real one. Economists of the old school would also

object that confidence in any currency has always been grounded upon its actual or *prospective* value in terms of gold; they would therefore question the author's contention that the volume of "hot" money would be reduced under a system of free currencies—the present excessive volume of fugitive money is due precisely to currency instability.

Since it cannot be denied that gold has been extremely unstable in the past twenty years, is not the remedy to *mend* the gold standard rather than to end it? and might it not be possible in the coming stabilisation of currencies to reduce the price of gold to such a level as would ensure an approximately non-flationary gold standard?

JOHN F. L. BRAY.

24. THE ECONOMICS OF INFLATION. By C. Bresciani-Turroni. [Sir Halley Stewart Publications, IV.] 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 464 pp. 25s.)

THIS is a translation of Professor Bresciani-Turroni's *Le vicende del marco Tedesco*, one of the most distinguished studies in applied economics which has appeared since the War. It is a detailed analysis, statistical and theoretical, of monetary and economic developments in Germany from 1919 to the stabilisation in 1924, while an appendix summarises developments up to 1931. Economists and financial experts will be greatly indebted to Mrs. Millicent Sayers, who is responsible for the translation, to Professor Robbins who provides an introduction and appears to have sponsored the project, and to the Sir Halley Stewart Trust, which enabled the project to be carried through.

The German inflation has its historical importance, not only because of its dramatic qualities, but also because of the long-drawn-out and melancholy consequences which ensued. To the economist, however, it has a further added and special interest—that it shows the body economic reacting under extreme and abnormal conditions, when certain latent forces come to the surface and are magnified until they appear almost unreal and grotesque. Thus Professor Bresciani-Turroni shows how the velocity of circulation increased to such an exaggerated extent (money having completely lost its significance as a store of value) that this very fact made possible the stabilisation of 1924; the rentenmark survived miraculously because (as Luther, quoted by the author, wrote) "any piece of paper, however problematical its guarantee, on which was written 'constant value' was accepted more willingly than the paper mark." The velocity of circulation had proceeded so far that almost any change would bring a slowing down, and once this came it strengthened the currency with cumulative force.

Again, the inflation had played havoc with the economic structure on account of the transfer of wealth which it entailed. Vast windfall profits had been made, while at the same time real wages—and general consuming power—had fallen to a low level. The demand for fixed capital and for luxuries was abnormal, but stabilisation revealed a shortage of circulating capital and of everyday necessities. Yet after the stabilisation Germany got over her economic difficulties surprisingly rapidly; looking back it is the social and political disintegration which seems to have had the more lasting consequences.

A. T. K. GRANT.

25. THE WAY OUT: The Political and Economic Problems that Constitute a World Danger. By Sir George Paish. 1937. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. vii + 256 pp. 6s.)

A plea for a world settlement involving general free trade; an international standard with unrestricted lending; loans of £100 million to Germany and £50 million to Italy; return of colonies to Germany; Italy and Japan to make restitution; and a universal League of Nations, the United States included. A. T. K. G.

PRE-WAR HISTORY

26. DEUTSCHE GESANDTSCHAFTSBERICHTE ZUM KRIEGSAUSBRUCH 1914. Im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes. Herausgegeben von August Bach. 1937. (Berlin: Quaderverlag. 162 pp. *Rm.* 4.50).

27*. EUROPA UND DIE DEUTSCHE FRAGE. By Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster. 1937. (Luzern: Vita Nova Verlag. 517 pp. 12 Swiss francs (bound); 11 Swiss francs (paper).)

THE first of these books is a collection of the reports sent to the Saxon, Baden, and Württemberg governments between June 30th and August 5th, 1914, by their representatives in Berlin. The documents do not contain any startling revelations, and certainly do not compare in importance with the Bavarian documents published some years ago, but they help to confirm certain general impressions. Both the German General Staff and the Government desired an Austrian war against Serbia and expected that Russia would climb down without a fight as in 1909; when, however, a general war became possible, the Government began to hesitate, but the General Staff were convinced that they would never have such a favourable opportunity again; the Government realised all along that in a general war England would take part.

The editor contributes a disproportionately long introduction (34 pages to 91 of documents) in defence of German policy: it was, he argues, a "vital interest" for Germany that Austria should crush Serbia, whereas for the Entente Powers no vital interest was involved. He sometimes inclines to the argument that the directors of German policy did not know what they were up to; but he soon abandons this for the nonsense, which is not even funny, that the Entente Powers deliberately transformed into a general war the conflict which Germany had nobly tried to localise. The introduction as a whole is no credit to German historical studies.

Professor Foerster's book is a contribution to the War Guilt question of a very different character. It ranges over every aspect of European and German history from Charlemagne to Hitler; it discusses the significance of the Crusades, the policy of Bismarck, the Austrian problem, the events of July 1914, and a thousand things besides. Its theme, crudely summarised, is this: the mission of the German peoples was to act as leaders in a central European federation, transcending national divisions; but under the influence of the Reformation and of Prussian success the Germans were false to their mission and worshipped the false gods of nationalism and militarism. German nationalism inevitably provoked Slav nationalism, and this the Germans could answer only with increased militarism, until finally Germany deliberately provoked the war of 1914. In 1919 the victorious Allies, weary of war, wished only to forget, and did not

habits of the people, and Messrs. Madge and Harrisson are telling us. The critics, I venture to prophesy, will chiefly be academic ignoramuses who know no sociology. Nevertheless the Lynds' admirable continuation of their great classic *Middletown* shows an alternative method, inevitably more limited, but indubitably more exact, which will set Mr. Harrisson in Bolton a high standard to surpass. Here is the detailed picture of life in a Middle West township (Mr. Hannen Swaffer will supply those interested with the name) just after the last Depression Years, painted in 1935. The study of 1924–5 is available for comparison. It is not statistics or answers to questionnaires that best reveal the citizens, but remarks made off their guard and noted by trained observers. It is, in the highest sense, the novel of a town, of which the novelists are philosophers. It is only possible to quote here one illuminating generalisation, of which the English part must be judged in the light of the comments of Calder-Marshall and Cole.

"The sense of psychological 'arrival' [in Middletown America] is minimised by the fact that—unlike a country such as England, where one can look at other members, *e.g.*, of the 'lower middle class,' appraise one's own position, and say with some show of contentment that 'What we've got is pretty good for the likes of us'—from every point on the unbroken incline one can look ahead and see others with more than one has oneself. And the spirit of the culture tells one to hurry to catch up with those ahead."

All America's citizens, hitherto, are would-be capitalists, all racing competitively for equality. Perhaps that means that the American is a more vital, exacting, ruthless civilisation than the British. Is it more practicable? On neither side of the Atlantic has humanity learned how to control its own civilisation. This book immensely adds to clarity in the statement of the problem, if not of the solution.

GEORGE CATLIN.

37. THOSE ENGLISH! By Kurt von Stutterheim. 1937. (London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 8vo. vii + 245 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)
38. ENGLAND: THE ARBITER. By Herbert W. Moxon. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 319 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

HERR VON STUTTERHEIM has written quite an interesting book, but he has tried to kill too many birds with one stone. Many chapters are plain descriptions for German readers of English institutions, social and political, in so far as they concern the English upper middle class and aristocracy. He makes some mildly penetrating comments on the said institutions, and seeks to point out the characteristics of English political and cultural development which make for community of interest between the English and German peoples. The translator rarely fails to maintain a high standard of English style.

Mr. Moxon is very worried about the world in general, and about England in particular. His concern is not surprising, since many English readers are aware of the muddled indecision of English political programmes since the War, of the wrath to come unless more courageous policies appear in the near future and of the responsibility of each English man and woman for their appearance. Mr. Moxon's argument would be worth more consideration, however, if his political prejudices were less violent and less obvious. Moreover, no book whose theme is lost in such exhausting pomposity of style can hope to reach a very wide public.

H. G. WANKLYN.

39. CANADA, THE PACIFIC AND WAR. By William Strange. 1938. (London: Nelson. 8vo. 229 pp. 7s. 6d.)

MR. STRANGE is a realist, not in the political sense of considering only immediate national expediency, but in facing the fact that no amount of pacts, pledges or treaties which aim at maintaining the *status quo* but ignore the underlying causes of conflict will ever bring peace to the Pacific.

The book should form a useful link between the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the general public, for, while not claiming to be an exhaustive study of these causes, it succeeds in presenting in a very readable form the broad lines of most of the Pacific problems, and, as Professor Angus stated in "Responsibility for Peace and War in the Pacific"—a Canadian data paper for the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Yosemite in 1936—until the general public is aware of these problems, it will cheerfully overthrow any government which attempts to solve them by advocating a policy of "give" as well as "take."

After a brief summary of the first "impacts" of West on East, Mr. Strange examines the particular problems facing Canada, China, Japan and the United States. There is a chapter on the present undeclared war, and finally an estimate of what Canada's position might be in a trans-Pacific conflict. Mr. Strange's analysis of Japan's position is admirably clear and impartial, and he is equally objective when speaking of his own country's handling of such problems as immigration from the East. He treats the position of Canada in a trans-Pacific war chiefly from its strategic aspect. If one feels that the necessarily large number of "ifs" in this section makes it less valuable than the rest of the book, one may draw comfort from the fact that the technical possibility of such a war is still remote. There will be more time for the study and spread of the knowledge of the causes of war, to which the book is a valuable contribution.

A. G. ELLIOT-SMITH.

40. CANADIAN-AMERICAN INDUSTRY: A Study in International Investment. By Herbert Marshall, Frank A. Southard, Jr., and Kenneth W. Taylor. 1937. (New Haven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xv + 360 pp., tables, charts. 13s. 6d.)

IT was perhaps a happy augury that the first of a series of studies of Canadian-American relations, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, should deal with the movement of capital for industrial purposes across the border.

The financial contacts between Canada and the United States have been among the most intimate, and it was appropriate that, in an area where progress is apt to be computed in dollars and cents, the results of the financial investigations should precede others of perhaps deeper, although less popular, concern.

The task of tracing the industrial outlets for capital has obviously required painstaking and laborious research. That the results have been so complete is due to the characteristic thoroughness of the three collaborators whose past research efforts are well known in North America.

Invasion of Canada by foreign capital is an old story of over forty years' standing. Its form, its availability, its transfer,

its obligations, its penalties have always had a continuing, and frequently a vital importance in Canadian economic history. These aspects have yet to be surveyed minutely in terms of their larger implications, and the authors of this volume have made no pretence of dealing with them at any length. Theirs has been the exacting effort of presenting in readable style the fascinating factual background of what, we hope, will be future interpretative studies of an outstanding international capital movement.

In this connection an excursus on the Canadian Balance of Payments by Professor Frank A. Knox, which is included, gives an interesting glimpse of some of the complex problems that will be encountered in the preparation of future studies. COURTLAND ELLIOTT.

41. MY DISCOVERY OF THE WEST: A Discussion of East and West in Canada. By Stephen Leacock. 1937. (London: John Lane. 8vo. 325 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

THOSE whose good fortune it is to know Stephen Leacock will agree that there are several of him. There can be little doubt which particular Leacock it is that dominates this book. The humorist and the economist reveal their presence frequently enough, but it is the Canadian that is all-pervading. A lecture tour through the West seems to have provided both the opportunity and the stimulus for some lively and often original observations upon conditions and prospects in the prairie provinces and British Columbia. There is not much in the general structure of the book, apart from some pungent allusions and occasional discussions, to justify the sub-title; it is the West as such that we are hearing about most of the time. But that, as treated by so hearty a writer, is enough to afford good material for a book which is much more than entertaining. A real concern for the troubles and difficulties of Western Canada, a warm admiration for those who are standing up to them with so much courage, and an unshaken faith in the future, reveal themselves again and again in its pages. It is neither a travel book nor a humorous essay: it is a deeply sympathetic and understanding tribute by a distinguished Canadian to fellow-citizens of the West who, he feels, have not always had a square deal from Canadians of the East.

It will be sufficient to quote one short passage on a highly topical subject to show how the economist can array his criticism in the bright dress of the humorist. The author is speaking of Social Credit in Alberta, and after discussing the cheque-passing function of the "Soddy-Douglas Credit Shop," he goes on to discuss its further function of making loans:—

"But what about making loans? Can it do that? Oh, indeed it can—free loans like free lunch. It can lend Comrade Smith—who hasn't a nickel and hasn't worked since he was old enough to drink—a thousand dollars a day. Who's to stop it? A real bank has to think, will Comrade pay it back? The Soddy-Douglas-House answers, what the h— if he doesn't? Fetch another cheque-book."

A little unfair, perhaps, but real Leacock, and there is much more like it.

But there is also much serious discussion and a good deal of luminous description. The almost incredible complications of what the author calls "Our Railway Muddle"; the reasons why old "homestead" methods will no longer serve in settling the West, and a suggested alternative for them; a really charming description of

Vancouver Island with a scheme for quite another kind of settlement; some speculations about the Far North ("The Land of Dreams"); the state of the wheat-growing industry, with some striking suggestions for its restoration—these are some of the topics upon which Dr. Leacock writes with unfailing gusto and point. Some of his contentions will provoke strong dissent, but there will be many, beside Canadians, who will read his book with sympathetic interest.

It has a tonic quality, too. Thus, after writing of the boom times of the 'seventies in the West, he adds :—

> "We have never understood the nature of a 'boom.' We look at it as a sort of economic fever. Not at all; a 'boom' is a burst of economic health."

Do I not seem to hear a voice, half husky whisper and half low growl, which appears to emanate from the East, saying laconically: "Might have been so then!" F. CLARKE.

42*. AUSTRALIAN TRADE POLICY: A Book of Documents, 1932–1937. By D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes. 1937. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 8vo. xxviii + 454 pp.)

THIS volume is one of a series: a volume on Australian finance was published recently, and others on Australian marketing policy and Australian debt adjustment will follow soon. Professor Copland is continuing, in collaboration with other experts, the work of public education which he and the late Professor Shann initiated during the crisis years. The work is most admirable, and could be with great profit imitated in England and other constitutional countries where a policy aiming at the common good cannot be imposed from above, but has to be achieved by a public opinion sufficiently resolute and informed to discipline and harmonise the action of sectional interests. The present volume reveals as in a map the operation of the distinct interests which help to make Australian trade policy, and by its statements of their successive points of view suggests the relevance of each to Australia's basic economic needs. The method ensures that no case can go without default, but it also ensures that no case can go without criticism. Governmental and expert economic opinion have their fair share of representation in the documents. The only improvement which may be suggested is an appendix of concise statistical tables which would reveal the weight of the main categories of trade with which the discussions are concerned. The editors point out that many of the elaborate arguments which they print are based on the flimsiest statistical data. An appendix of the kind suggested would have supplied a corrective of real educational value.

The documents are divided into five chapters. Two of the most interesting deal with the controversy over Ottawa and the trade diversion policy. The reader who peruses these documents will realise that there has been in Australia a growing awareness of the need for a diversity of markets. For Australia, as for Great Britain, imperial trade is important, but is not enough. W. K. H.

43. ECONOMIC PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA, 1929–1936. By W. R. Maclaurin. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xiv + 304 pp. 15s.)

THIS book gives a useful account of the economic adjustments made in Australia during the great depression. All aspects of recent

economic policy are surveyed, though the measures designed to remedy the sorry state of the public finances and the political difficulties involved therein dominate the study. Full credit is given to the courageous way in which the outstanding problems of budget deficits, the unfavourable balance of trade, high labour costs, unemployment, and the burden of farm debt were attacked under the now famous Premiers' Plan. The writer also stresses the advantage which Australia had at that time over a number of other countries in having already established four important institutions—the Loan Council, the Commonwealth Bank, the Arbitration Court, and the Tariff Board—which could be trusted to initiate policies which commanded the confidence of a majority of the people.

In one respect this study is rather disappointing, in that no real attempt seems to have been made to give any general analysis of the economic significance and effects of the different policies put into operation. Thus, though the weaknesses of the measures taken in the agricultural sphere are stressed, the effects upon present and future productivity and standards of living of Australia's continuing to follow fundamentally incompatible policies towards agriculture and secondary industry are hardly brought out at all.

N. M. Windett.

44*. Marketing Australia's Primary Products. By D. B. Copland, N. F. Hall, Norman Cowper and E. Ronald Walker. Edited by W. G. K. Duncan. [*Pamphlet Series*, No. 1, of the Australian Institute of Political Science.] 1937. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 8vo. 89 pp.)

This slender pamphlet contains four stimulating essays. Professor Hall outlines what the British market, the destiny of most of Australia's exports, is and what it might be; Mr. Walker argues that Australia would gain by " an advance towards a broader international co-operation than the principles of Ottawa would allow." Professor Copland criticises the " home price," bringing a plethora of proof for his contention that this device penalises the general consumer and the unsheltered exporting industries. This leads Mr. Cowper to conclude his legal survey with the suggestion that the constitutional hindrances to planned marketing in Australia may be benevolent rather than mischievous.

Mana Hodson.

45. England and the Maori Wars. By A. J. Harrop. 1938. (London: New Zealand News, Ltd. 8vo. 423 pp. 15*s*.)

A carefully documented and detailed study by a New Zealand historian of the official records relating to colonial policy in an important period of Imperial development. Dr. Harrop illustrates from the decisions taken in regard to New Zealand, the development of Imperial policy concerning the disposal of waste lands, imperial defence, native affairs, and colonial responsibility. This is an important contribution to the study of Commonwealth relations.

J. B. C.

46. The Imperial Factor in South Africa. By C. W. de Kiewiet. 1937. (London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 341 pp. 15*s*.)

47. Der Status der Südafrikanischen Union. Von Otto W. A. Hoops. 1937. (Hamburg: Hans Christian Druckerei und Verlag. 8vo. 237 pp.)

The tangled history of South Africa in the latter part of the nineteenth century is by no means wholly unravelled. Dr. de Kiewiet's

book, undoubtedly the most skilful contribution that has been made for many years, covers the critical period 1871 to 1885. It is solidly based on original papers in the Public Record Office, and the author seems to have spared no pains to extract from them the last relevant detail. The story he tells is largely a record of hesitations, leading to mistrust and downright mistakes, that affected the fortunes of Bantu, Boer and Briton alike. But he has not succumbed to the temptation to applaud one party as heroes and condemn the others as villains. Indeed, if any villain does emerge from these pages, it must be an impersonal Treasury always stinting British efforts of the money necessary to fulfil good intentions. No wonder that in due time the conclusion appears that "the only true cure for over-expenditure of imperial money was local self-government."

It was the Zulu War which produced this view in its most emphatic form, and, especially in view of the unsatisfactory treatment the war received in the recent *Cambridge History of South Africa*, it is a pity that Dr. de Kiewiet has not given us an ampler interpretation here. It is, however, probable that the last word about the events that culminated in the war must await an authorised biography of Bishop Colenso as well as a proper scrutiny of that rare *Digest of Zulu Affairs* which came from the Bishopstowe Press, and a copy of which is fortunately to be found in the British Museum.

Herr Hoops has compiled an account of the present constitutional position of the Union, particularly in relation to her neighbours and to the Empire. He has drawn on most of the usual sources, and provides lengthy appendices in which the documents speak for themselves in English. His work will no doubt be useful to foreign students, provided they remember that in constitutional controversies it is seldom the letter of the law that carries the day. JULIUS LEWIN.

48. INSIDE INDIA. By Halidé Edib. 8vo. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 378 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

IT is illuminating for British readers to look at modern India through Madame Edib's unprejudiced eyes. For her the British are only an incident in its long history, though on the whole a useful incident. When Madame Edib inquired of Mahatma Gandhi and Mrs. Naidu what the British had created in India, they both instantly replied, "A nation." But she thinks Great Britain made the fundamental mistake of building from the top instead of from the bottom, and so "is closing the 'incident' with an India miserably poor, resting upon no sure foundation of peasant well-being. Briefly, it is a 'rural slum.'" For the rest, Madame Edib ignores the British.

Madame Edib lived in close intimacy with both Hindus and Muslims, and shows insight into the problems and personalities of both camps. In town and village this trained observer picks out the significant feature, and records it in terse phrases, some of which may be quoted, with the *caveat* that her terseness occasionally degenerates into dogmatism. For instance:—

"The frontier was the only place where no one talked of freedom. Each and all gave the impression of being absolutely free. I believe if one saw them labouring in chains one would still have that impression. Elsewhere in India a young Indian in European dress was commented on as 'uprooted.' Here dress meant nothing."

"Hinduism is amorphous in spirit, not in form. Hence the strange vagueness of the Hindu and the rigid pattern of his life. In no human society can one

meet individuals with such unlimited freedom of mind yet living such minutely regulated lives."

Madame Edib was too occupied with the deeper currents of Indian life to have time for the description of places, but there are occasional vignettes showing her appreciation of what she saw. Of a lovely, filthy little Afridi girl she writes :—

"I had the sensation of having discovered a tiny masterpiece of the best Greek period which had lain in dust for thousands of years. No human being has ever given me such an intense desire to give it a hot bath, and scrub to see what was underneath."

The most challenging chapter in the book is that concerned with "Pakistan," the vast Muslim tract west of the Punjab, which, if it should achieve nationhood, would be a democratic state larger than all but four now in the League of Nations.

As a Muslim, Madame Edib cannot believe that any caste-ridden society, with eyes always turned away from the passing shows of this life, can ever be truly independent. It must have inner freedom or outside control. H. GRAY.

EUROPE

49*. GERMANY'S CLAIM TO COLONIES. [*Information Department Paper No.* 23.] 1938. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 75 pp. Map. 2*s.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 1*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is a timely paper, very well done. It begins by summarising Germany's pre-War acquisition of colonies. This is especially useful, as it is information hard to come by in compact form. It is interesting to compare the slow generation of growing pre-War imperialism with the whirlwind national conversion wrought since 1933. The pamphlet sketches the peace settlement and the mandates system, and then relates German colonial propaganda and British reactions to it in detail. This account is excellent, written with scrupulous fairness. It leaves a remarkable impression. The German demands are made crescendo, stretto, up to fortissimo; the British responses piano, with of course a number of unrelated noises off. On the whole Britain has been non-committal; Mr. Amery and Lord Noel Buxton are not, from their opposed eminences, the Government. The attitudes of other mandatories are just indicated, except for a précis of South Africa's dealings with Nazi settlers in South-West Africa. The paper makes no pretence of dealing with the problem of the native future, save for a few references and a quotation from Miss Margery Perham. This aspect to the lay mind seems much the most important, for the government of colonies surely matters more to their peoples than to anybody else. But it hardly appears in German claims or British attempts to deal with access to raw materials. The whole thing has been treated as a competition in power-politics, and this treatment is, quite fairly, reflected in the pamphlet. FREDA WHITE.

50. WIR RUFEN EUROPA. By Rudolf Lengauer. 1937. (Munich: F. Bruckmann. 8vo. 203 pp. *Rm.* 3.50.)

HERR LENGAUER has written a book to state in detail the anti-Russian thesis which is sufficiently familiar from the speeches of Herr Hitler and from other authoritative German utterances. It is asserted that the aim of Bolshevism is to establish a European hegemony; it is

assumed without proof that this would be an evil to be resisted at all costs, and it is argued that Germany and Italy must guard and lead a yet unseeing world against this trouble.

The thesis implies the customary attacks on Czechoslovakia as the "Aircraft-carrier of the Soviet Union." We are also told that the Maginot Line has an essentially offensive function, and that Pan-Islamic movements are fostered to the detriment of the British Empire by Russia.

It may be inferred that the book, if not officially inspired, is at any rate strictly orthodox. On such an assumption it is interesting to read the definition of Bolshevik agression against which the anti-Bolshevik alliance is meant to act. "Such an attack, against which Europe would march, need not necessarily be made by the Red Army. . . . The principle of any European alliance must be to regard any Communist revolutionary activity within a given State as an attack on Europe."

W. H. JOHNSTON.

51. ONCE YOUR ENEMY. By Heinrich Hauser. Translated from the German by Norman Gullick. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. vi + 273 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

As the author did not see service in the Great War, the title of this book may at first sight mislead the English reader. It can in fact only be applied appropriately to the ultimate breaking down of the barriers which through his upbringing seem to have separated Herr Hauser from members of a lower social order than his own, of whose human qualities he often appears quite unaware. It is only after he has worked his shifts in the Ruhr or served before the mast that he at last accepts the fact that he is "not outside that organism which is the people."

A more literal translation of the original German title "Kampf" would give a clearer indication of the contents. The author had just graduated to the Naval Cadet School before the Armistice, and the most interesting part of his reminiscences concerns the two years that followed. The son of a professional man, he is at a loss in the struggles of the proletarian revolution which followed the German collapse. This "uprooted" feeling is one which he shares with men who actually saw service in the War. Like many of them, he seeks refuge from the mental and material chaos of the times by joining a "volunteer corps," not so much interested in the constitution which he is called upon to defend, as glad to feel the embrace of military discipline and comradeship with a temporary return to the set of values which he best understands.

On the demobilisation of his corps his restless wanderings take him, in turn, to the steel works of the Ruhr, the Republican navy during the Kapp *Putsch* and the occupied territory during the inflation. Finally becoming a merchant seaman, he voyages to Australia and South America. Only in his seafaring experiences and in open spaces does he seem at home. His return from these travels finds him still despairing in Germany's "degradation." He dislikes the smug prosperity of the middle classes as much as he hated the confusion under mob rule. He is of a restless temperament, a pioneer by instinct and ambition, but the direction in which he would blaze his trail for German regeneration remains a little obscure. For a Germany regenerated he sees a future as pioneer and champion of Europe, guided by the spirit of her "front-line fighters."

This book, if it had no other claim, should be an education to those who still have not realised the sense of humiliation and disillusionment in Germany at that time. To read it is to go a long way towards understanding the spiritual conditions which made the Third Reich inevitable.

The translation at times appears more faithful than inspired.

T. CAMERON FRASER.

52*. THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM. By Edward Yarnall Hartshorne, Jr. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 185 pp. 6*s*.)

THIS is a widely documented study of the history, results and prospects of the National-Socialist revolution in the German Universities. The first three chapters are largely a compilation of data from various sources, including many statistics, but the reader receives the impression that the author tends to start with a definite bias, which prevents him from appreciating that certain actions of officials of the present German Government need not necessarily be interpreted as repressive, and that in Germany now crude-sounding verbal conformity must sometimes be used while the attempt is made, in fact, gradually to introduce common-sense moderation in practice.

In chapters IV, V and VI the author seems to reveal, in the words of the preface, "his own conclusions . . . formed after maturer consideration of the material on returning to U.S.A." The result is an interesting and valuable psychological study by one who obviously holds firmly to the faith of all scholars throughout history—the search for Truth—and who has found that in Germany this is no longer the governing principle.

In the final assessment of the gains and losses, the author adopts the curious antithesis of "gain for Germany" and "loss to science." This seems inexplicably narrow unless he includes in "science" all branches of knowledge for which Germany was famous and which are undoubtedly suffering now.

The numerous quotations, references in the text and voluminous footnotes no doubt greatly enhance the value of the book as a piece of research, but are very trying to the ordinary reader. M. Z.

53. A NEW SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By Werner Sombart. 1937. (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xii + 295 pp. 16*s*.)

THE German original of this book, published in 1934, was reviewed in this periodical Vol. XIV, no. 3, May–June 1935, pp. 425 *seq*. There is no need to add anything further except that a few words must be said about the translation and more particularly about its new title. The translation by Karl F. Geiser of Princeton University is deserving of all praise. Sombart's crisp style, which combines a pseudo-logical indulgence in definitions with the persuasive *parlando* of the Romance languages, makes lively and good reading in its American rendering; the few unimportant omissions made are carefully recorded, so that the new circle of readers really gets what Sombart meant to say.

But what about the title of this edition, which has been chosen by the translator but for which Sombart does not disclaim the responsibility? In its German form it was adequately called *Deutscher Socialismus*, a label well befitting a book which was a kind of *catalogue*

raisonné of the possible historical and political meanings of this combination of words. The choice of the title *A New Social Philosophy*, however, is a questionable one. For the study deals actually with rather old philosophy the manifold ingredients of which are selected from Plato's *Republic* down to Nietzsche's *Pathos der Distanz*, carefully blended and matured in the familiar-shaped wooden casks of enlightened and slightly benevolent conservatism. But the author, living under a misapprehension as regards the novelty of the contents of his book, suffers, even without the express words of the new title, from another more serious illusion. After having condemned the mechanistic attitude of modern technique in words similar to those of Carlyle, Ruskin or Samuel Butler, he nevertheless seems to believe that a new marketable philosophy can be manufactured by tastefully selecting valuable materials and weaving them together into a nice pattern of conduct. This process may give quite satisfactory results when employed in order to produce some new variety of the logical tools of economic theory or descriptive sociology. But a social philosophy lives up to its ambitious title only as a real confession, as the metaphysical faith of a great personality commanding confidence at least in his spiritual leadership.

Sombart himself may be called to witness that this is the real criterion for a book which aims at shaping our social life. In his essay on *Das Lebenswerk von Karl Marx* (Jena 1909), he wrote on the concluding page that his "Oeuvre" will stand in all eternity spreading its beauty before our eyes: "Weil das, was es gross macht, die einzigartige Aeusserung einer über alles normale Mass hinausragenden Persönlichkeit ist, die eine hellseherische Schau mit einer gewaltigen Kraft der Darstellung und einer leidenschaftlichen Glut des Gemütes verband." His was a work, says Sombart in summing up, which conjured life and which at any time was able to give new impulses of life to others. Sombart's book, the last one in a series of vicissitudinous attitudes as regards theory as well as politics, seems pale in the glamour of this standard. Yet, as a *signatura temporis*, this latest book of Sombart should be read. JOAN HORNER.

54*. DER FELDZUG IM BALTIKUM BIS ZUR EINNAHME VON RIGA, JANUAR BIS MAI 1919. Hrsg. von der Forschungsanstalt für Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte. [*Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps, Bd. II.*] 1937. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. Maps, plans. 157 pp. *Rm.* 4.)

Der Feldzug im Baltikum bis zur Einnahme von Riga is the second volume produced by the Institute for Research in Military History at Berlin by order of the German War Ministry for the purpose of bringing to notice operations conducted by the German Army after the War. The first volume, *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, dealt with the break-up of the German Army in the Eastern theatre of war on the publication of the Armistice and with the difficulties experienced in getting the troops back to Germany. The second describes the formation of volunteer corps and local militia primarily for the defence of the eastern border of Germany against a Bolshevik advance, but eventually also for the re-establishment of the German hold over the Baltic provinces.

The operations conducted by these forces are described in detail up to the capture of Riga towards the end of May 1919. From the strategical and tactical point of view the work is of undoubted value;

and the difficulties of the political situation, and more especially the harmful influence of the soldiers' councils on the orderly conduct of military service, are clearly brought out. The description of the international situation also is generally correct, but in several regards it is misleading. It is admitted that the German command would not allow the Lettish Provisional Government to conscript its nationals for the defence of Latvia, but gives as the reason for this action the fear that a Lettish army raised by conscription would make common cause with Red Russia, whereas the main reason was the fear that such an army would render the presence of the German forces in Courland unnecessary, which in turn would adversely affect the chances of German colonisation there. Some explanation has to be given for the British efforts to help the Lettish authorities to raise and arm troops with a view to establishing the independence of Latvia; they are accounted for as being due to the desire to foster British commercial enterprise in the Baltic provinces.

The appendices are of special interest. One of them gives the Order of Battle of the troops in March and May 1919. Another is a copy of the treaty between Germany and the Provisional Lettish Government dated December 29th, 1918, authorising the recruiting of Germans in Latvia and conceding to certain members of the German army the rights of Lettish citizenship. And the third is a copy of a German recruiting poster calling for volunteers for the defence of the Baltic Provinces and promising that at the end of the operations facilities for settling would as far as possible be granted to all who had participated in the operations. H. F. P. PERCIVAL.

55. DIE OSTSEEHÄFEN UND DER OSTSEEVERKEHR. By Dr. Peter-Heinz Seraphim. [*Schriften des Instituts für Osteuropäische Wirtschaft.*] 1937. (Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag. 8vo. 314 pp. Map. *Rm.* 15.)

THE fact that Dr. Seraphim's new book on "The Baltic Ports and the Baltic Trade Traffic Communications" has been published under the auspices of the Institute for East-European National Economy at the University of Koenigsberg is in itself a recommendation, considering the high standard of their publications.

The great political changes brought about through the upheaval of the years 1914–1918 have affected the flow of trade to and through the Baltic to a greater extent than any other part of Europe. Many publications have been issued during recent years dealing with individual ports in the Baltic and their specific sphere of interest. To my knowledge Dr. Seraphim is the first to meet a much needed want by providing a comprehensive picture of the general situation as it presents itself to-day, together with a comparison, through diligently collected data, with the past. The alterations of frontiers and consequent diversion of trade have made and marred the prosperity of many ports through the drastic changes in their Hinterlands, and perhaps the most important of them is noticeable in the turnover of the ports of Riga and Danzig, where the change in the Hinterland of these ports has been quite revolutionary.

The book contains numerous statistical tables and diagrams, sketches and plans of various ports, and should consequently become a valuable book of reference, not only for the economist, but also for the trader and the technician.

It appears to me that only at one point has the national temper

of our time diverted the author's discretion from historical accuracy. On page 314 he considers it important enough to give a special list of those Baltic ports to which in his book he has given German names, although not belonging to the "Reich," his explanation being that they were all of German origin. Amongst others in this list are the ports of Gotenburg, Helsingfors, and St. Petersburg. *Sic!*

H. A. ARMITSTEAD.

56*. MEMELFRAGE HEUTE. By R. Pregel. [Heft 2 der Reihe *Kämpfendes Volk.*] 1936. (Berlin: Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland. 8vo. 31 pp.)

A short review of the Memel question, in which the author expresses the hope that the recent trade agreement between Germany and Lithuania may lead to better relations, but says at the same time that they will depend on the Lithuanian Government's attitude towards Memel.

57*. SVERIGE OCH FINLAND 1917/1918. By Herman Gummerus. 1936. (Stockholm: Holger Schildt. 4to. 64 pp. *Kr.* 2.50.)

PROFESSOR GUMMERUS, of Helsingfors University, has written his book in reply to the Swedish Blue Book of 1936 on the same subject,[1] and in his preface deplores the fact that this Blue Book should have been issued at a time when the whole question was no longer of actual, but merely of historical, interest.

The two books must naturally be read together, since Professor Gummerus contradicts point by point a very great number of the statements made by Justitieråd Hellner, the Swedish Foreign Minister, during the period in question, and attacks vigorously Sweden's Åland policy in 1917–1918. It must be regretted that both books contain a number of statements which cannot be substantiated, and some of Professor Gummerus' assumptions are hardly a sufficient basis for such a serious attack on the good faith of the men who guided Sweden's foreign policy in 1917–1918. On the other hand, Professor Gummerus also quotes the protests made by certain leading Swedish nationals against Sweden's Åland policy, and states, towards the conclusion of his memorandum, that Finland is quite ready to believe Justitieråd Hellner's assurances that his Government with its Åland expedition did not intend a definite occupation, but considered it more important to make a free and independent Finland a reliable friend and good neighbour of Sweden, rather than acquire Åland without Finland's knowledge and against her wishes. But he continues that "if the Swedish Government had been seriously desirous of making Finland Sweden's friend and good neighbour, it could hardly have adopted a less suitable policy towards Finland than the one shown by its attitude in the arms question for the White Army and in that of the Åland expedition."

A very controversial book and one which has raised a good deal of feeling in Sweden.

A. H. HICKS.

58. THE MONETARY EXPERIENCE OF BELGIUM, 1914–1936. By Henry L. Shepherd, Ph.D. 1937. (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xvii + 271 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS summary, painstaking, lucid, and rather uninspired, of the monetary history of Belgium during some rather critical years is of a

[1] "Memorandum on Sweden's policy *vis-à-vis* Finland from Finland's declaration of independence to the conclusion of the Finnish Civil War" (by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs F. Justitieråd Hellner, issued by the Swedish Foreign Office). Kungl. Boktryckeriet P. A. Norstedt & Soener, 354,320.

nature to give substance to reflections on the incurable optimism and other factors for miscalculation to which bankers and human beings in general are liable. Taught by experience, the reader can wonder how it was ever possible that people should believe that the German currency introduced into Belgium during the War could be redeemed, or the large capital outlay of reconstruction be effected without inflation; or that a serious hope could even have been entertained that the Belgian franc would be restored to its pre-War parity.

But this book also shows that it is, after all, possible to learn by experience. A comparison between the 1926 and the 1935 stabilisation shows that the correct conclusions had been drawn from the failure of the former measure.

Some interesting technical points emerge. Statistics show that bank credit played a minor part in the earlier inflation, which is another way of saying that due weight must be allowed to velocity of circulation. Some interesting figures show how extremely costly a process the "defence" of a currency by means of official purchasing can be. A psychological element like the confusion between devaluation and inflation is shown to be a matter which cannot be left out of account by finance ministers, as Dr. Schacht has learned.

W. H. Johnston.

59. Blackmail or War. By Geneviève Tabouis. 1938. (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 8vo. 246 pp. 6*d*.)
60. Mussolini's Roman Empire. By G. T. Garratt. 1938. (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 8vo. vi + 244 p. 6*d*.)
61*. What Italy owes to Mussolini. By Mario Missiroli. 1938. (London: John Heritage, The Unicorn Press. 8vo. 191 pp. 5*s*.)

The important fact about the first two books is their appearance in the Penguin series, which ensures their being read by many who would not embark on a more formidable-looking work. But looks are deceptive, and there is solid reading to be got through. When the War ended, we thought to have established a new world, and Madame Tabouis tells in a capable manner how this was lost through misunderstanding, fitly calling her first chapter "Lost Horizons." It is interesting to have the French view of events given us, and we see how far in advance Briand was in real understanding of the situation. In the Memoranda of Signor Goicoechea Madame Tabouis gives us important new data, also noticed by G. T. Garratt, regarding the agreement made by Signor Mussolini in 1934 with the Spanish monarchists for the overthrow of the Spanish Government, by supplying money, men and arms. The German intrigues were even more systematic, and will be more difficult to deal with, since they involve not only propaganda, but also the placing of Spanish Morocco under a German commander, and nearly all of Franco's arrangements in German hands.

In *What Italy owes to Mussolini* we have in concise form all the organisations created by the Fascist Government for the Corporative State. It is pleasant to turn from Italy's foreign policy to her internal efforts at improvement, and there can be no doubt that the social services are much improved. In particular the youth movements have done for children what the old Liberal governments failed to do. On every page there is praise for the substitution of the State for the individual, in which we can hardly join, but experience has shown

that few enterprises can really flourish in Italy unless State run. The last chapter, on the Abyssinian adventure, is the best piece of gloss I have ever read. G. L. VERSCHOYLE.

62. THE FASCIST, HIS STATE AND HIS MIND. By E. B. Ashton. 1937. (London: Putnam. 8vo. xv + 303 pp. 8s. 6d.)

IT is always a relief to read a book about Fascism which is realistic and grinds no obvious axe. Mr. Ashton sets out to understand Fascism before criticising it. The dictators, who disdain reason, will not be grateful for being rationalised. Their opponents, whose motto is "*écrasez l'infame*," will have no use for anybody who stops to explain, especially when the explanation is that such régimes are what their peoples want. We must hope that there is an intermediate class capable of appreciating this book, for on the size of that class depend not only Mr. Ashton's sales, but also the future of mankind.

The writer's standpoint is that countries differ too much in tradition and environment for any one type of government to suit them all. What made it possible for Fascists to combine with Capitalism Collectivism, which sets the community supreme over individuals, was that Germans and Italians find it natural to think collectively. "To the vast majority, Fascism is not a yoke. What we could offer them instead, would be."

But Mr. Ashton believes that Fascism is by nature aggressive, and that it may be the duty of other communities to protect their members from such aggression. This probably involves "overpowering the Fascist States and ending their national existence." That would mean imposing on the members of those States our form of government—a yoke. Even if such a solution could be lasting, would it not involve our behaving in exactly the way for which we blame Fascists? Does Mr. Ashton's attempt to be historical lead then to an impasse, which only power, and not justice, can resolve? M. G. BALFOUR.

63. NEW EDUCATION IN ITALY. By Howard R. Marraro. [Published under the auspices of the Italian Historical Society.] 1936. (New York: Vanni. 8vo. 505 pp.)

THE present work is designed to give a complete description of the organisation of elementary, technical, secondary and university education in Italy, as shaped and functioning since the Fascist régime was established; the title indicates and even a slight perusal of the book reveals it as a work of propaganda. It may be questioned whether anything deserving the name of education still survives in such a centralised system, the aims of which are confessedly, not to educate, but to *mould* the spirit of youth. On some points the narrowness of the system is incredible. For example in Appendix D, page 354, we find mentioned among the philosophers of the modern age to be studied for a degree in philosophy the name of Gentile, but no reference to Croce, clearly because Croce is not an admirer of the régime, and in spite of the fact that Gentile is in no small degree indebted to Croce!

In the preface the author speaks of the previous system as "worn-out and bureaucratic." It is to be wondered whether any reader of this work will consider the present system less bureaucratic. We may agree with the author in all he says concerning the spiritual deficiency of the previous system of education, inspired with the positivist outlook on life and its blindness to the essential bearing of art and religion on the formation of mind and character; but is Gentile's

outlook on education, which inspires the present system, in the least better? Is there any respect for the personality of the child or adolescent in an educational system every ladder of which reminds the competent reader of Prof. Gentile's maxim (April 24th, 1924), that "there is no difference, from the moral standpoint, between the cudgel and the sermon, since both aim at the bending of the will of man"? The author obviously ignores the formidable criticism to which the present system lends itself and shows complete ignorance of the not less formidable objections to it from many creditable Italian exponents of that Catholic Faith to which, he says, the "new education" completely conforms. ANGELO CRESPI.

64. L'EMPIRE FASCISTE: les Origines, les Tendances et les Institutions de la Dictature et du Corporatisme Italiens. By Marcel Prélot. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. xii + 258 pp. 24 *frs.*)

PROFESSOR PRÉLOT'S title is slightly misleading; it does not mean "the Empire" in the modern Italian sense, and the book should really have been called "The Fascist Régime." It begins with the usual account of the rise to power of the Fascist Party in which there are curious omissions and mistakes. There is no reference to the strikes which tormented the country from 1919 to 1922, and which played so large a part in making the average Italian accept with thankfulness any government that would give him peace and comfort in his everyday life. Professor Prélot is quite unable to decide as to the correct date of the march on Rome, different days, months and years appear on different pages, nor is his description of the political events which accompanied it any more accurate.

The larger portion of the book is, however, devoted to a most erudite study of what the author considers are, or ought to be, the political theories of Fascism. His pages are sprinkled with words such as "statocratic," "monocratic," "autocratic" and long quotations from speeches, books and reviews. Despite all his learning and research, however, the author shows no understanding of Italian psychology in general or Fascist in particular. M. C.

65*. BURGOS JUSTICE: A Year's Experience of Nationalist Spain. By Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana. Translated by W. Horsfall Carter. 1938. (London: Constable. 8vo. x + 258 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

66. CORRESPONDENT IN SPAIN. By H. Edward Knoblaugh. 1937. (London: Sheed and Ward. 8vo. xii + 233 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THE first of these two books is an account of conditions in General Franco's territory by a Spaniard and is based on first-hand experience. Señor Vilaplana had no political affiliations and held a post in the judiciary in Burgos before the war. He retained the same post, and left Nationalist Spain only after the fall of Bilbao. "I might have borne it by a determined effort of will and spirit of compromise . . ." he writes, "but the insolent, utterly cynical, infamous foreign invasion removed the last vestige of indecision from my mind."

He describes a period of unauthorised violence in Burgos corresponding to that described by Mr. Knoblaugh in Madrid. Even more disturbing is his account of the price that is paid in Nationalist territory for the preservation of law and order. Señor Vilaplana tells some illuminating stories about Generals Franco, Mola and Queipo de Llano, and explains the conflict of aims among different sections of people, especially the Phalangists, Requetés, the Church and the

landowners. He does not admire General Franco. He throws some light on the reactions of different classes of people to the foreign invaders, and gives an ironic description of the conversations of well-to-do refugees from Madrid who told tales of horror to curry favour, and of their departure to take up posts in Madrid following over-optimistic communiqués announcing its imminent fall.

The answer to the accusations made against Señor Vilaplana in the House of Lords is given in the introduction.

Mr. Knoblaugh was correspondent of the Associated Press in Madrid for four years. He has, he declares, " no interest in the war or its outcome," and " there is no conscious bias on his part." He does not like the Spanish Government. He has a sense of news value, though his style is rather lurid, and his interpretation of the political situation is naïve. For example, of the advent of Señor Negrín to the premiership he writes : " The presence of a moderate Socialist at the head of the new government was a boon to the régime because it strengthened the fiction of a ' democratic ' government abroad."

He seemed to have an uncanny knack of " getting in wrong " with everyone. The following story he tells explains a good deal. Before he left Spain he sent a banknote to an Austrian in the censorship department as a " present." The head of the department returned the note with this letter, and a " present " for Mr. Knoblaugh. " I greatly appreciate the friendly attention you have shown us in the person of our comrade Selke. I interpret it as a gentle token of your satisfaction with our work as censors. We likewise feel that way with your uncommon merits as correspondent, and particularly your subtlety." He is inclined to attribute the worst motives to everyone, including his fellow-journalists. HELEN F. GRANT.

67. MODERN SPAIN AND LIBERALISM : A Study in Literary Contrasts. By John T. Reid. 1937. (Stanford University, California : Stanford University Press; London : Humphrey Milford. 8vo. viii + 236 pp. $2.25, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

68. SPAIN BETWEEN DEATH AND BIRTH. By Peter Merin. Translated from the German by Charles Fullman. 1938. (London : John Lane, The Bodley Head. 8vo. x + 326 pp. Illus. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

DR. REID's book helps to make clear the nature of the problems at the root of the present struggle in Spain. The civil war is not a question of ideological preferences suddenly adopted, but the outcome of a long process of development. For the past century the literary life of Spain has been intimately linked with political life, and Spanish liberalism has been fostered by the intellectual atmosphere. The evolution of ideas which led to the establishment of the First and Second Republics, and to the consequent increase of militant Marxism among Spanish workers and peasants, was largely due to literary intellectuals. The author carefully distinguishes between the general, philosophic interpretation of liberalism, the nineteenth-century conception of liberalism, and the neo-liberalism of the twentieth century by which society is required collectively to provide positive opportunities for individual development. The political and social ideas expressed in the writings of Pío Baroja and Ricardo León are analysed in the light of these theories. The two novelists are represented in marked contrast, Baroja anti-traditional, anti-clerical, restless and

turbulent, León traditional and religious, yet both contributing to an understanding of the complexity of the problem. Baroja calls for a modern and positive interpretation of the concept of individual freedom, but his anarchist characters exemplify his objections to the movement. He does not accept democracy, republicanism, socialism or anarchism in their present crystallised forms as desirable solutions of the problem of social injustice. León's novels admit parliamentary democracy as a theoretical ideal, but explain the ideology which motivated those who supported the revolt of July 1936. To them the liberalism of the Second Republic which threatened to curtail the power of the Church and Army was hateful, and its reforms were anti-traditional. Both writers reflect the social ferment, but neither envisages the possibility of liberal social change. Spanish individualism triumphs and liberalism fails to achieve unity. Hence the formation of "splinter"-parties in a government which is more radical than liberal. Dr. Reid views with pessimism the future of liberalism in Spain, but wisely makes no attempt to prophesy the future of the Spanish nation.

Mr. Merin is well read in Spanish history and literature, and intimately acquainted with contemporary Spain. His book, written from the Left point of view, describes his experiences in Republican Spain at the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937. These are related with cinematic adroitness, and testify to the workers' courage and idealism. Of chief interest are his accounts of the outbreak of the revolution, of the trials on the prison-ship *Uruguay*, of the deaths of Durruti and Urtubi, and of his visit to the "Solidarity" Brigade. The work is artistically composed, admirably translated, and illustrated with photographs skilfully selected for their propaganda value.

S. GEORGE WEST.

69*. DIE TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHEN DENKSCHRIFTEN FÜR DIE FRIEDENSKONFERENZ VON PARIS 1919/1920. Edited by Dr. Hermann Raschhofer. [*Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht*, Heft 24.] 1937. (Berlin: Carl Heymann. 8vo. xxi + 331 pp. Maps.)

DR. HERMANN RASCHHOFER has collected and published in a single volume the various memoranda which were laid by the Czechoslovak delegation before the Peace Conference of 1919. A German translation accompanies, page for page, the French original, which, it is interesting to note, is not nearly so grammatically perfect as the official publications of the Czechoslovak Government are to-day. There is little here that was not known before; but these documents have never been available in so convenient and handy a form. They are published here in full and, except for a brief introduction, to which the Czechs themselves take no violent exception, without commentary. The *Prager Presse* (14. x. 37) had even a word of praise for the scholarly way in which Dr. Raschhofer had "appraised the value, political ideas and doctrines of the memoranda."

DAVID STEPHENS.

70*. GREECE'S ANATOLIAN VENTURE—AND AFTER. By A. A. Pallis. A Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor (1915–1922). 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xv + 239 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

MR. PALLIS has written a most interesting and well-argued book. He, originally a follower of Venizelos, has lately, after studying the

history of Greece during and since the War, come to the conclusion that the Cretan statesman was unwise in his policy of attempting to claim and to hold as part of a Great Greece Smyrna and the adjoining area in Asia Minor. After a short introduction comes a reasoned historical account of the Anatolian venture from the political aspect. Then he sums up the pros and cons, and in his third chapter discusses the responsibilities of the Allies and of the individual Powers. Here his judgments are sober, but make terrible reading, and no one emerges unscathed. In his view the responsibility is shared by President Wilson, whose obstinacy over Eastern Thrace led directly to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the Macchiavellian policy of Italy dictated throughout by hatred of Greece as a Mediterranean rival, the vacillations of England torn between Gladstonian philhellenism and Disraelian sympathy for the Turk, and French policy inspired solely by French financial interests in Turkey. He next treats the aftermath of the Greek defeat in 1922, and devotes two chapters to the Greek protagonists, Constantine and Venizelos, and closes with a few conclusions. His judgments are fair, and he indicates clearly that if Constantine's fault was lack of moral courage, Venizelos was too sanguine. A few points call for remark. It is said that one reason for the Greek failure to secure recruits among the Greek population of Asia Minor was the Turkish practice of regarding them as rebels and punishing them accordingly. He does not bring out quite clearly enough the responsibility of the royalist ministers of 1921–22, who, in the hope of establishing their political supremacy through military success, undertook an offensive in Asia Minor, even when France and Italy were supplying the Turks with munitions. In 1922, when the royalist press in Athens was writing of the Asia Minor campaign in a defeatist tone, the Government allowed those papers to circulate freely among the troops at the front. Opposition papers were practically forbidden. This naturally sapped the morale of the Greek army when the Turkish offensive came. The first demobilisation of the Greek army was in June, not in November 1916. Mr. Pallis does not seem to believe that there was a pro-German party in Greece from 1914 onwards. There was, however, such a party, as in Roumania, and it was supported by a section of the press, and rightly or wrongly Constantine was associated with it. In this connection the influence exercised by the German military attaché should be recognised. Also, after Venizelos' return to Athens in 1917—during the mobilisation of the Greek army for service against Bulgaria on the Salonica front—mutinies were fomented to impede the actions of the Allies without any thought of what it might mean to Greece. In this connection the mission of the two officers of the Greek troops interned in Germany, who, after a visit to Switzerland, then Constantine's residence, were landed from a German or Austrian submarine in the Peloponnese and made their way to Athens, ought to be mentioned. There seem to have been Medizers in Greece then just as much as in 480 B.C. One point more; it is conceivably possible that, given a free hand, the Greek army in Asia Minor in the summer of 1920, after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, might have crushed the Kemalist movement before it had gained strength. There are endless might-have-beens to speculate upon: if Constantine had died in 1915, if Alexander had not died in 1920. . . . This is a book to read and re-read. To the bibliography might be added *Griechenland und die Grossen Mächte*, by E. Schramm-von Thadden, Göttingen 1933.

A. J. B. WACE.

71. WHIRLPOOLS ON THE DANUBE. By Christopher Sidgwick. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 287 pp. 18s.)

A PLEASANTLY-WRITTEN, light-hearted account of a young man's tour to Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The obvious criticism against it is that it contains rather little straw for quite a large-sized brick. Mr. Sidgwick did not spend very long on his journey, nor did he ever penetrate very far below the surface of things. Thus, although in places there is some acute observation, most of his book is made up of personal experiences which are decidedly trivial, and sometimes hardly worth the recording at the substantial price of 18s. Nevertheless, he leaves the impression of an agreeable personality, and to travel with him, if not the joy or enlightenment that a journey made with the author of a really great travel book would have been, at least escapes the irritation which the authors of many books of this type inflict on their readers. C. A. MACARTNEY.

72. BELGRADE SLANT. By John W. E. Evans. 1937. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 192 pp. 5s.)

MR. EVANS's book suffers from some rather obvious blemishes. It is written in a highly irritating style, recalling the less classic kind of American journalism, and it suffers from some carelessness. There are misspellings in the German quotations on pp. 22 and 23; and we find the spellings "ustasi" and "Borgotaro" on p. 47, and "oustachi" and "Burgataro" on p. 48.

The book is frankly partisan: but no attempt is made to hide the fact, and a bias ceases to be dangerous if allowance can be made for it: Mr. Evans has elected to state the Yugoslav case, and can claim the liberty of an advocate. It follows that the Croat problem, for example, is treated from the point of view of Belgrade.

It is the activity of the potential adversaries of Yugoslavia which bulks largest in the book. Here the criticism—probably an unescapable one—is that the book is no longer up to date. The attitude of Italy has changed a good deal from the hostility, the phases of which are described at considerable length—though the author has anticipated this criticism.

Mr. Evans's judgment is sensible when he proceeds from the assumption that Yugoslav policy pursues the country's own interests.

"Friendly relations with Germany present no disadvantages for the moment. They assure a very important market for Yugoslav exports. They appear to offer a certain guarantee against any Italo-Austrian attempts at a Habsburg restoration. The fact that Germany and Yugoslavia have no direct friction points does not in itself imply friendship, enmity or indifference."

This is sound sense. Mr. Evans is less successful when he goes beyond this assumption to that of pure unselfishness. "The Balkan pact," he says, "is not directed, nor is it even suspected of being directed, against any third Power or group of Powers." A different view might well have been held until quite recently in Bulgaria.

W. H. JOHNSTON.

73. DIE SOZIALÖKONOMISCHE STRUKTUR DER JUGOSLAWISCHEN LANDWIRTSCHAFT. By Dr. Otto von Frangeš. [*Schriften der Internationalen Konferenz für Agrarwissenschaft.*] 1937. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 8vo. 288 pp. *Rm.* 12.)

THIS book is the result of a decision of the International Conference of Agricultural Economists in 1934, which recommended the preparation

of comprehensive surveys of the "social structure of the agricultural population" in all countries represented at the conference. Dr. von Frangeš is an authority on this subject, and, so far as Yugoslavia is concerned, his book fulfils this purpose admirably. He begins by examining the geographical and climatic conditions, and proceeds to survey the main branches of agricultural production in the country, with special reference to the capital employed and the level of wages. This is followed by a sketch of the development of the country's agricultural organisation up to the Great War, and a detailed description of the agricultural reforms which began in 1918. There are interesting sections on the "Zadruga," the development of the co-operative system, and agricultural education; and a final chapter on the thorny question of the relief of agricultural debtors rendered necessary by the fall of prices in 1930–1932. There is no index, but the book is fully documented, and each chapter has a bibliography attached. This work will be indispensable to all serious students of the subject.

D. B. B.

74*. BIBLIOGRAPHIE BALKANIQUE 1937. Rédigée par Léon Savadjian. Septième volume. 1938. (Paris: Société d'Imprimerie et d'Edition. 8vo. 118 pp. 100 *frs.*)

This volume, the seventh of its series, provides a bibliography of the books and articles on the Balkan countries which appeared during 1937. It also includes an index to the main events of Balkan concern during 1937.

75*. LA COLONISATION AGRICOLE EN ALLEMAGNE. By P. V. Grégoire. 1938. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. viii + 144 pp.)

This book gives a detailed objective survey of German agricultural colonisation since the War. There is a short geographical description of Germany east of the Elbe, and a history of colonisation in this area. This is followed by an account of colonisation since 1919, the forms which it has taken, and of government and financial organisation. The last chapter considers the conditions of life in these colonies, and is followed by an appendix describing the colony of Giesenbrügge.

76*. OESTERREICH IM PRISMA DER IDEE. [*Katechismus der Führenden.*] By Leopold Andrian. 1938. (Graz: Verlag Schmidt. 8vo. 423 pp.)

This is an academic discussion between four members of the class which has hitherto been in power in Austria—an aristocrat, a Jesuit, a Heimwehr officer and a man of letters. The scene is Vienna in the spring of 1935, and the subject of the discussion is culture—its philosophical aspect, its historical development, and culture in relation to Austria, the seat of Germanic culture. Her past glories are reviewed, and the solution of her future is found in the restoration of the house of Habsburg. Those who know Austria well will have participated in many such conversations, which serve as a partial explanation as to why other classes in Austria wished to link their future with Hitler and Greater Germany.

77*. DIE ERSTE SCHLACHT: Aus der Geschichte des Bataillons Edgar André. By Bodo Uhse. 1938. (Strasbourg: Editions Promethée. 8vo. 55 pp.)

Die Erste Schlacht is a vivid description of the part played by the Edgar André Batallion of the International Brigade in the defence of Madrid against General Franco's Moorish troops. It is published by German emigrés outside Germany.

78*. MES IDÉES POLITIQUES. By Charles Maurras. 1937. (Paris: Fayard. 8vo. 295 pp. 18 *frs.*)

This is a consideration of politics from the Royalist standpoint. M. Maurras reviews political science, in general, all forms of government,

and the individuals who are to be governed. He leads up to the conclusion that the re-establishment of the monarchy is the solution of France's political problems.

79*. Ou s'Unir ou Mourir. By Pierre-Étienne Flandin. 1937. (Paris: Flammarion. 8vo. 23 pp.)

M. Flandin's pamphlet considers the French political situation, and the dangers which threaten France both from within and without. He stresses the necessity of achieving national unity, if she is to escape complete chaos.

U.S.S.R.

80*. The History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R. Edited by Joseph Stalin, Maxim Gorki, S. Kirov, K. Voroshilov and A. Zhdanov. Volume I: The Prelude to the Great Proletarian Revolution. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. ix + 557 pp. 2s. 6*d*.)

A new generation has grown up in Soviet Russia of men and women who have never lived under any other régime. The old generation has practically disappeared. The days of revolution and civil war are now considered sufficiently remote for the successful partisan of those days to write a history of them as seen exclusively from his point of view. Much if not most of the material from which this book has been compiled is already known (partly thanks to the publications of the Soviet Government), but here it is presented not in an objective manner (as, for instance, in Serge Oldenbourg's *Le Coup d'État Bolchéviste*), but is full of class hatred and vituperation against the Bolshevik's political opponents. Of course the very names of the authors preclude their treating this subject with the broadness of vision of a scientific historian. For them there exists only the narrowest party point of view. Nevertheless the book provides much interesting reading matter, as it is the product of the diligent and painstaking collection of material from many sources, not the least interesting of which are the minutes of the meetings and congresses of the Bolshevik party. These give the reader an insight into the ceaseless labours of the Bolsheviks to undermine the existing Russian State edifice which had already been so severely shaken by the February revolution of 1917. One cannot help asking, however, while reading all this self-glorification, what would have become of these much-vaunted successes if the despised capitalistic Allies had not defeated the Central Powers in spite of the disappearance—under Bolshevik influence—of the Russian front, and after the Bolsheviks had already been obliged in Brest-Litovsk to accept a treaty under which Russia would, virtually, have become a semi-colonial country.

The only heroes in this history are the Bolsheviks; the rest of the world consists of villains, bent on betraying, cheating and robbing the "toilers." There are the Mensheviks, the socialist-revolutionaries, the petty-bourgeois, the bourgeois, the cadets, the imperialists and what not else; one and all are traitors, counter-revolutionaries, enemies of the proletariat, actuated only by the vilest and basest motives. But worse than all these are the "Kornilovites," and no words are bad enough to depict General Kornilov; it is even insinuated that he was a traitor who maliciously surrendered Riga to the Germans (p. 339 and p. 343).

The general picture that the authors draw is a distorted one, however true their dates and quotations may be. What they evidently

want to impress on the minds of present-day Russia and of their sympathisers abroad is that it was the Bolsheviks who put an end to Tsarism (p. 92); that a Provisional Government arose—as a usurper—side by side with the Soviets (p. 114); that it took power only with the purpose of combating the revolution (p. 173); that the bourgeois leaders were hostile to the revolution and attacked it (p. 200); that they established their dictatorship (p. 219); and that it was by their counter-revolution that the economic disintegration of the country took the proportions it did (p. 321).

The sabotage of the capitalists (p. 368) and their offensive against the working class by striving to bring about a famine (p. 358), together with the utter vileness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' and Mensheviks' treachery (p. 296), moved the country irresistibly towards disaster (p. 399). Only the self-sacrificing fight of the (Bolshevik) party (p. 401) could bring about an improvement. Any interference with their activities constituted a violation of elementary civil rights (p. 449). One of those elementary rights was to "raspropagandirowat" (dissolve by propaganda) the regiments at the front, and one cannot help wondering what would happen to any one who claimed that right to-day in the U.S.S.R.

The above picture—grotesque as it is to anybody who, like the reviewer, lived through those days in Russia—is cleverly, even in a masterly way, worked out, and the book is to be recommended to everyone who wishes to obtain an insight into, and understand, the Bolshevik mind. The same material, however, could be used to draw a picture in exactly the opposite colours.

The book calls itself "the first comprehensive and authoritative history of the period." Authoritative it naturally is; but comprehensive it certainly is not. Too much has been left out which a real historian would have put in.

The English translation is perfect. W. J. OUDENDYK.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

81*. IRAQ: A Study in Political Development. By Philip Willard Ireland. 1937. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 510 pp. 15s.)

No one who buys this book can complain that he has been swindled, for it has the merit of being no more and no less than is claimed by the author in the title and by the publishers in their blurb—" An exhaustive and authoritative study of Iraq, its origins as a post-War State, its development, its constitution and economic organisation, its position with regard to other Powers, its administrative and general problems."

The author deals with the past, and makes no pretence to be up-to-date. The assassination of General Bekr Sidqi last summer and the formation of the present cabinet are excluded; in the author's preface, although Ja'far Pasha has the prefix of *the late*, Yāsīn Pasha al Hāshimī, who died early in 1937, is not so mentioned; while the K.C.M.G. awarded G. Ogilvie Forbes, Esq., and the C.M.G. awarded C. H. Bateman, Esq., M.C., in the Coronation Honours List are omitted; and the photographs are old ones—details which fix the end of the author's study of Iraq's problems as soon after the *coup d'état* of 1936.

The book may be accepted as an excellent and accurate historical record, but one that is out of touch with present-day Iraq. *From its*

pages the reader will learn much of the reasons why the Iraqi girl left home, but little of that modern young woman herself.

The book is well documented, has a good index, and is supported by an extensive bibliography—altogether a scholarly analysis and a record of considerable academic merit. E. L. HOWARD-WILLIAMS.

82. LE KEMALISME. By Tekin Alp. With a preface by President Edouard Herriot. 1937. (Paris: Alcan. 8vo. viii + 298 pp. 30 *frs.*)

AT times of dire stress Turkey was fortunate in finding a son to extricate her out of her difficulties. In this book the author gives a Turk's reactions to the master-builder of his country; he might have compared the Ataturk with the famous family of Kioprülüs who, in the seventeenth century, rendered eminent although not very far-reaching services. The author adopts the term "Kemalisme" to denote the present régime, but is careful to explain that the present reforms are typical to Turkey. Informal after-dinner discussions at Tchankaya developed after careful incubation into well-planned changes in administration.

But his genuine enthusiasm is apt to mar his judgment. He is right in his assessment of the disestablishment of the Church, but forgets that profound disbelief is the doubtful luxury of profound thinkers. Again, in his discussion of Nationalism (p. 227) he forgets that Nationalism achieved various degrees in different countries. England was conscious of Nationalism before the reign of Edward I, whilst France saw its awakening in the days of Joan of Arc. It is not strictly true that classical democracy is on the wane (p. 175). Let the author visit a Norwegian winter resort where the nearest policeman is 100 miles away. He will recapture his belief in man as a political animal.

But these are academic points not having a direct bearing on the main issue. Much work has been done, and is ably stated by the author; whatever the result of his pre-adamite excursions, Western Europe will look with sympathy and calm upon the peaceful progress made. The hardest task before the present rulers will be to create a ruling tradition to prevent, as the author soundly warns us, a retrogression with the first fatigue. H. M. BOSTANDJIS.

83*. LA CONVENTION DES DÉTROITS (MONTREUX, 1936). Par Georges D. Warsamy. Preface by M. N. Politis. 1937. (Paris: Pédone. vi + 158 pp. 8vo. 288 pp. 65 *frs.*)

An account of the Black Sea Straits Convention signed at Montreux in July 1936, including a long historical introduction and a résumé of the proceedings of the Montreux Conference. This monograph is little more than a chronicle, which, though on the whole accurate in its facts, pays insufficient attention to the bigger issues underlying the facts to be of any real value to the student. This is particularly true of the section describing the Montreux Conference itself, which is simply an *abrégé* of the official minutes of the Conference. The bibliography at the end is incomplete. D. A. ROUTH.

84. AUS DER FINANZWELT DES ISLAMS. By Dr. J. Hans. 1938. (Wien: Selbstverlag. 8vo. 80 pp.)

This is a short study of post-War finance and currency in Islamic countries. The first half of the book deals with the Near and Middle East in general, giving the historical and political background of the years 1918–37, the legal problems arising out of the differences between Islamic and Western law, and a survey of the financial and economic conditions

prevailing there. The question of oil in Iran and Irak, as an economic and financial factor, is also considered. The second half of the book gives a more detailed description of the financial structure and the currency of each country.

85. **Kemal Ataturk.** By Hanns Froembgen. Translated by Kenneth Kirkness. 1937. (London: Jarrolds. 8vo. 285 pp. 18*s*.)

It is difficult to produce new facts, but there are many ways of telling a story, especially one for the general public.

The author starts his story from the battle of Gallipoli, and appropriately closes it with the resumption of Turkish sovereignty over the Dardanelles. In between we get a detailed account of Mustapha Kemal's early life, his struggles, ambitions, failures and successes.

If Ariburnu was the green room, Sakaria is the proscenium from which Mustapha Kemal steps on the European stage. Turkish victory is complete, and the motto "Turkey for the Turks," his principle through life, is at last accomplished. Minorities are liquidated or exchanged, and the movements of large masses of populations are reminiscent of ancient race migrations. The slow work of regeneration and peaceful reconstruction is to begin. Revolutions devour their authors; minor risings in Kurdistan and conspiracies in Angora and Smyrna follow the traditional pattern. Turkish criminal justice is swift; the Tribunal of Independence admits of no delay, where the salvation of the Republic is considered the supreme good. We are reminded of Montesquieu's—

"En Turquie on termine promptement d'une façon ou d'autre toutes les disputes. . . ."

The machine-gun style is apt to leave the reader with impressions contrary to, or at least different from, those intended by the author.

Some day historians will assess objectively the events of the first quarter of the present century; they are too close for a dispassionate analysis of personalities, frustrated hopes and satisfied ambitions. In Lydia Niobe mourns for her children, but out of this suffering may arise a more peaceful and hopeful East. H. M. Bostandjis.

86. La Nationalité Égyptienne. Par M. A. M. Riad. 1937. (Paris: Nizet et Bastard. 8vo. vii + 235 pp.)

The author first sets out the successive Egyptian laws and projected laws on nationality since 1869, and discusses their provisions in the light of the French Law of Nationality. In the second part of his thesis, he summarises the proceedings of The Hague International Conference on the Law of Nationality of 1930, and concludes that the Egyptian Law of 1929 is in general accord with the principles adopted by the Conference, and on several points even in advance of them. H. A. R. G.

87. Jewish State or Ghetto. By J. M. Machover. 1937. (London: Robert Anscombe. 8vo. 208 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

The Jewish State Party, which more than any other Zionist group might have been expected to regard political independence as some consolation for the restriction of the National Home, was in the forefront of the opposition to proposed partition at the twentieth Zionist Congress. Mr. Machover, who is a member of the Executive of the Party, explains its attitude in this book. His main objection is naturally to the small size of the proposed Jewish State; but his attempt to represent it as analogous to the Jewish Pale in pre-War

Russia, or to the Native Reserves in Africa, is unconvincing because it ignores the vital factor of sovereignty. A further grievance is that the new State, small as it would be, would nevertheless contain a large number of Arabs. This argument is made more impressive by an almost complete disregard of the Peel Commission's provision for the transfer of population; and it leads Mr. Machover to the rather disturbing statement that "only if the Jewish State were co-equal with the boundaries of Tel-Aviv would it be really Jewish."

In general the book is a well-documented recapitulation of the Jewish case from an extremist point of view. Its exclusively legalist outlook, however, and the absence of any assessment of practical difficulties, give it a remote and almost irrelevant air. H. Beeley.

88. Der Neue Orient. By Alfred Bonne. 1937. (Tel Aviv: Hitachduth Olej Germania. 8vo. 89 pp.)

This is an exceedingly compressed, but very useful survey of economic conditions (both agrarian and industrial) in all the Middle Eastern lands. Dr. Bonne is Director of the Economic Archives for the Near East at Jerusalem, and the foremost authority on his subject. In addition to the separate analyses, there is a masterly introduction on the historical and the new factors which have affected the economic outlook of the individual and the State in the East, and a final section underlining the importance of Zionist activity in Palestine for the general development of the neighbouring countries. H. A. R. G.

89. L'Évolution Économique de L'Iran et Ses Problèmes. By Hassan Sotoudeh. 1937. (Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique. 8vo. 255 pp.)

If proof were required of the economic and political development of Iran, the mere possibility of this book being written would be sufficient to convince. Mr. Sotoudeh makes the fact of this advance more striking by giving a short outline of the conditions in his country from early times, and by describing the depth of its decadence during the period covered by the Kajar dynasty in the last century.

He rightly ascribes the progress which has been made to the genius and driving power of Reza Shah Pehlevi, who, formerly a non-commissioned officer in the Cossack Brigade, which he ultimately commanded, became, in the troubled times of the birth of the Persian constitution, Minister for War and, finally, with the support of the Army, was elected Shah.

It makes an interesting study—with a bearing on certain European countries—to consider whether, in the conditions which existed, anything but a dictatorship, such as he developed, would have been able to obtain the unity of command necessary for the regeneration of the country.

Mr. Sotoudeh traces the causes which produced the fall of Persia from its prosperity during the Saffavian period (Elizabethan) and the circumstances which prevented its earlier recovery. He places these under four headings:—

1. Instability and feebleness of government, with consequent interior troubles, external wars and general insecurity.
2. Discovery of the new route to India via the Cape of Good Hope, with the loss of the carrying, and other, trade across Persia.
3. Loss of trade by the invention of machinery of which the East did not avail itself.

4. The eyes cast by foreign nations upon Persia and their consequent interference in the internal affairs of the country.

While he thoroughly realises that this last trouble arose out of the desire of Russia for a port in warm waters, *i.e.* in the Persian Gulf, and that Great Britain's interest was dictated by the desire to maintain a "buffer" State between India and other European nations—indeed, he states that the policy of Russia was "offensive and active," whilst that of England was "defensive and passive"—he appears to consider that the two nations were equally to blame for Persian conditions. Yet the very statement of the case shows that Russia's policy threatened the independence of Persia, whilst that of Great Britain was founded on maintaining that same independence. It is curious that few Persians realise that, but for Great Britain, they would be part of the Russian Empire.

Even the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which delimitated a sphere of influence, economic and political, for Russia and England, with a neutral sphere between, was obviously concluded in order to protect us, and incidentally Persia, from Russian encroachment, an encroachment which would have been impossible to prevent by other means.

The abortive Treaty of 1919 with Persia, which was unwise in the amount of assistance Great Britain was to give, had as its aim the definite restoration of Persia's power. Nevertheless Mr. Sotoudeh is correct in saying that these two treaties undermined the trust which the Persian had in Great Britain. Yet a little thought will show that a country in the condition which Mr. Sotoudeh paints could hardly be protected without "interference."

In detailing the measures which the new Government, under the direction of the Shah, has taken for the evolution of Iran, Mr. Sotoudeh has produced a book of great interest and value. Twenty years ago the country, in general, followed the customs of the Middle Ages. To-day there are schools and colleges in every town and in the larger villages. Education is not confined to mere school subjects, but there are colleges for instruction in agriculture, medicine, veterinary surgery, engineering and all the other sciences of the modern world, a task in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has taken its share. Students are sent to Europe to take European degrees, and return to their country to instruct their countrymen. The army has been re-constituted and officers are trained in Europe, mainly with the French army.

To the student of economics, Iran is specially interesting. Finding that the trade balance was heavily adverse, with no prospect of amelioration, a system of rigorous protection was instituted with the object of making the country self-supporting. Local industries were fostered and the use of foreign goods was discouraged by a prohibitive customs barrier. A railway is in course of construction from north to south to prevent the country being dependent on the Russian market for its exports. Since this is a project beyond the normal internal powers of a country with so small a population, a special tax was levied on tea and sugar and dedicated to this purpose alone.

Foreign exchange has been made a government monopoly, while no import can be made except against a permit founded on a certificate of export for a similar value. The Iranian theory is that it is wrong to state that exports necessarily pay for imports since a country, like a man, can live upon capital.

A. R. E.

90*. La Politique de l'Iran dans la Société des Nations. By Mostafa Mesbah Zadeh, Docteur en Droit. 1936. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 176 pp.)

This is actually the publication of the thesis which gained for the writer the degree of Docteur en Droit of Paris. It is well written, and is worth the study of those who are interested in the outlook of the smaller nations, which is, above all, dictated by personal security.

As the second title of the work, " La Conception de l'Organisation de la Paix," suggests, it is, in controversial matters affecting Iran, written from the Iranian point of view. This is especially the case in the disputes with Great Britain.

The book is very easily readable, and, entirely apart from its Iranian setting, is interesting as a record of the institution and progress of the League of Nations. The conclusion arrived at by the Iranian delegates on the disarmament question is worthy of note. It is that disarmament is a moral, and not a physical condition.

The author shows the complete accord of Iran with the League of Nations in its intention and aims, and the support which it has given to all its measures. It details the agreements which the country has made under its auspices, or in sympathy with its policy, and the amicable settlements which have been made in matters which have been referred to the League.

Apart from the Iraq frontier, the main unsettled question which is of interest to Great Britain is the claim to Bahrain, which, indeed, it has always been difficult for Great Britain to understand.

Since the termination of the Portuguese conquest, which was brought about by joint British and Persian effort in 1607, the Islands were in Persian occupation off and on till 1783, when the Persians were ejected and the Islands occupied by the Uttabi tribe of Arabs. The previous Arab Shaikhs during Persian suzerainty belonged to the Huwalah tribe. The Uttabi Shaikhs have been in control for the last hundred and fifty years, but at different times the Islands have come for short periods under the sway of Muscat, the Wahabi rulers, Egypt and Turkey. In their difficulties the Uttabis have turned to whichever State was not at the moment attempting to usurp, and have, as a temporary expedient, been ready to accept the nominal suzerainty of any who would help. Thus Persia and Turkey have both claimed the Islands. In 1860 the Persian flag was hoisted by the Shaikh in April, only to be hauled down by him in May to be replaced by the Turkish standard. In 1861 both flags were flown side by side without any executive power from either country. For a hundred and fifty years the Persians have had no control or executive authority. In 1888 and in 1898 Turkey claimed the Islands, but Great Britain has always denied the claim of either country. Apart from the fact of her position in Bahrain, to attempt to force (and force would be necessary) Persian suzerainty on a country which has been in independent Arab hands for so long would to-day, with the growing Arab National spirit, be likely to produce an Arab–Persian conflagration in territories which have so long been in close relationship with the British, and whose protection they are glad to accept.

A. R. E.

91. Le Problème de l'Opium en Iran. By Mohamed Chahkar, Docteur en Droit of Paris University. 1936. (Paris: Maisonneuve. 8vo. 184 pp.)

Though the chief object of M. Chahkar has been to explain the position of his country *vis à vis* the opium question, his book contains a record of the attempts made, during the last thirty years, to regulate the production, and the supply, of opium as a matter of world concern.

If at present no really satisfactory result has been attained in practice, one definite and most important object has been achieved, viz., the forming of a standard of world opinion and a propaganda which must in time to come produce the result desired. The main difficulty, as M. Chahkar shows, is to be met on the economic side, a difficulty at which the British cannot sneer, for we also have found it in India, and the East, though our problem has not been so acute as that of Iran.

M. Chahkar gives an interesting account of the history of the drug which would have seemed to have appeared first in Southern Mesopotamia, though its cradle was Asia Minor. It was carried to the East and to China by the Arabs and Portuguese. The method of its cultivation has always been the same. A knife, shaped rather like a comb, is used to scratch the head containing the poppy seeds, and the juice which exudes is the opium to be, and unfortunately its preparation is a simple matter. Its regulated production is required for medical purpose for the morphine, and other drugs, which are made from it.

The harm which opium-smoking does is fully realised in Iran, and the present Shah has done much to attempt to stop it by the stringent laws which have been made and by the fact that no addict is allowed to take government service or to enter the army. Lists are made of the regular established users to whom opium should be issued in lessening quantities, and no name can be added to the list. There is, however, much contraband, and in a country where the poppy is so extensively grown it is a difficult task to control.

The main difficulty is the economic one. Opium represents one twelfth of the total revenue of the country and one sixth of the exports. Suddenly to cut this off would produce an impossible financial crisis. The question is still more difficult in regard to production. It is the chief means of livelihood of large numbers of people in certain parts of the country. Were it suddenly to cease as many people would die of starvation as are now ruined by its consumption. Measures have been taken both by the Iranian Government and by a foreign commission appointed for the purpose to advise on some cultivation to take its place but so far without much success. One of the difficulties is that opium takes water—that important commodity in Iran—when water is obtainable, and no crop can easily replace it economically.

In the meanwhile the League of Nations has taken over the task of limiting the supply. The Convention of 1931 was signed by all nations concerned and to-day every nation forecasts its requirements for medical purposes and the production and supply are both earmarked. Unfortunately both production and sale by contraband are far in excess of requirements.

M. Chahkar has given us an interesting record, somewhat marred, however, by unnecessary repetition. Lionel Haworth.

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AIR POWER AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY[1]

Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Air Power is a subject which is ever present in men's minds to-day. One can hardly take up anything to read nowadays without coming across it in some form or other. If it is not the gruesome account of an air raid over a densely populated town in Spain or China, it will be a story of development and how designers' brains have again achieved the marvellous in weight-power ratio, still farther to extend the range and destructive effect of the bomber aircraft.

We take it all in eagerly, and soon begin to think we know a lot about it; even to the extent of taking comfort to ourselves because the worst air raids in those two unhappy countries do not seem to be having a decisive effect on the towns which are bombarded. People do not pause long enough to consider those events in their true proportion; for nothing we have read of hitherto is anything like what will happen in our own case if Europe goes to war and the armament programmes are completed.

Japan, for instance, although she possesses a considerable air force, very modernly equipped, must needs distribute it over the vastness of China on various widely scattered fronts. In consequence, she has not as yet concentrated for air attack in overwhelming strength. She has not as yet used her air arm strategically as it is capable of use; another reason very likely being that it is still in leading-strings to her army and her navy, as was indeed our own throughout the greater part of the last war.

In Spain, on the other hand, there is no really great assemblage of air power on either side, with possibly some four hundred mixed aircraft with General Franco, and rather more than half that number in the hands of the Government forces. That is not Air Power as we may come to know it; as little like the real thing as a skirmish on the outpost line is like a massed attack.

But I am a little astray from my purpose, which is certainly not to deduce lessons on air warfare from anything which is

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 1st, 1938, Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield in the Chair.

going on around us in the world to-day. We have actually no experience to guide us, for nowhere yet has the air arm of any country at war been free to work its mischief at full power and quite independently of operations by land or sea.

Aviation saw the light of day during a period of world conflict, and quite naturally, things being as they were, and Generals being what they are, it was seized on and adapted as an extension of the existing methods for defeating the enemy in the field, rather than as a newcomer on the scene with power to wage a new variety of war entirely on its own. Our chief enemy, it is true, did glimpse the truth when he raided over England, and we, it is also true, did follow tardily in his footsteps by raiding over the Rhineland in reprisal. But none the less those were purely military undertakings, with military brains behind them, and air strategy in the full acceptance of the term was non-existent.

Even to-day it is highly doubtful whether it is being accorded the importance it deserves. It is hard, we know, to change the habits of a lifetime; how much harder must it be to change the military thought of centuries, attuned as it is, and always has been, to the give and take of fighting on the flat surfaces of land and water.

Let me define the meaning of the term " Air Power " in this paper. It will, for instance, have nothing to do with the air force at the disposal of an army or a navy for co-operation purposes. How they use it is their own concern and may, or may not, affect the outcome of a struggle between professional opponents. Neither will it refer to the niceties of air defence when locally employed, for that again is a thing entirely apart. By Air Power I shall mean the bomber strength of a metropolitan air force, used separately as a third arm of offence, and unconnected with the surface activities going on below; which carries out its missions without having to fight its way across the sky; and which is always favourably handicapped when it encounters local opposition from the ground or air, owing to the immensity of space above and the accidents of weather. Air Power thus conceived is much more than a mere development in military technique: it is a new and revolutionary method of waging war. And as it fulfils its destiny it will profoundly affect the life of this and future generations, their habits and their mode of thought.

Consider for a moment the real, underlying reason for armed force. It is a national sense for security which demands it, working on the well-known principle of "safety first." Even

to an obvious aggressor the same thing applies. For if a country, in its own estimation, knows that it must expand or bust, it naturally takes the road of military adventure rather than submit tamely to an oncoming fate. History is the witness that the law of survival works at fullest pressure in such a case. Accordingly, from the dawn of civilisation down to now, armed force has been the sole guardian of national liberty, which is merely another way of stating the obvious truth that there could be no security without it. And in the course of untold ages military science has advanced from a thing of sticks and stones to the highly specialised and enormously powerful weapons of to-day. And modern war, meaning by that sea battles like Jutland and land battles like the Somme, has been slowly evolved, step by step, from the days of sword and shield. It has been a process of infinite gradation.

But if this instinct for security, which happens to be particularly active just at this moment in world affairs, has succeeded in evolving the methods and equipment of modern war, it has also had not a little to do as well with the actual shape and size of national territory. It is, for instance, very largely responsible for the configuration of frontiers, so that strong natural features might confine the borders and make them proof against invasion. We ourselves, since we became a United Kingdom, have the sea as our strategical surround, while other countries have a mountain chain or river, marshland or the section of a coastline. Sometimes, for the greater safety of a greater Power, a territory is artificially divided, as in the case of the Low Countries. For there the great rivers, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, are the natural lines of communication from and through the coal- and iron-fields of that part of Europe, and make of Holland and Belgium, geographically and economically, a single territorial unit. Unfortunately the mouths of all three rivers happen to be gaping wide at England with a threat to our sea power in the Channel, and so, after finally knocking out the Dutch in the middle of the eighteenth century, we have always ruled that the territory shall be divided.

I am not leading you down the path of history in idleness. All this has a direct bearing on my argument. We have got this far in it, that the ceaseless search for security has at last developed conscript armies and produced super-destructive weapons of war; and that the seizure of *strarwfix deonriwea*, governing the size and shape of national territory, took place for identically the same reason. But it does not end at that.

Bearing always in mind that its sign-manual is military strength, and that war is in the background as an eventual solvent of international dispute, it has been, and still is, a controlling factor in two other fields of human activity.

For instance, if Nature's barrier, whether mountain range or river, was not uniformly strong throughout its length, then the pass or crossing had to be artificially strengthened by the works of man. So grew the science of fortification, of which the most modern expression is the Maginot line of France, covering her eastern frontier with Germany, and other lines of the sort which are so rapidly becoming a feature of the European landscape. The military post so formed became in time a walled town and, for the support of its defenders, reserves were stationed to the rear in places from which they could quickly reinforce a choice of several points. Hence the situation of many large towns to-day, for it was safe where soldiers were, and so commerce was attracted and a citizen population to carry it on. Military roads were next constructed to connect these towns, and along their length and at their terminals other towns sprang up, originated by the necessities of defence. In the case of an island Power, harbours as well were selected for an exactly similar reason, and the necessary dockyard labour soon brought a town to the vicinity which, in the course of time, became also a considerable centre of population.

In this way the process of human hiving went on, and it is no exaggeration to claim that a fair proportion of the world's inhabitants are clustered as they are to-day on account of the safety which was thus assured to them; while as for the remainder, none of them would have been able to thrive at all but for the fringe of military security by which they were encircled. In other words, population to a considerable extent has been distributed on the principle of "safety first," and this ordering of society also rested on a foundation of military efficiency and success in war. The crowning example of this universal tendency is our own London, which grew from its small beginnings as a stockaded military camp to become by far the largest city in the world, because the Romans found it safe and advantageous to use the estuary of the Thames for the reinforcement of their British legions from Gaul across the way.

And now to complete the list of ways in which our human affairs have been ordered by the motive of security, based on a military system which came down to us from Noah, mention must be made of the most important item on it, the field of

last point made by the last speaker, and considered that this state of affairs had done a great deal of harm, because through concentrating on the danger from Communism people had lost sight of the much more serious danger, from many points of view, but especially because France was the neighbour of Germany. Speaking on the radio on March 13th, M. Reynaud had said that it was not M. Stalin who was entering Vienna.

He had never heard of the police arresting people for singing the Marseillaise. During the days of the Front Populaire the Marseillaise had regained its character as a patriotic song of a revolutionary country and it had been very popular. The Front Populaire had certainly been weakened, but those who for the last two years had prophesied its immediate death had minimised the strength of the mystic in politics. There had been a very strong streak of mysticism in the Front Populaire. That was why, in spite of economic factors, it had lasted so long, and why it must still be dealt with.

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV said that having spoken with members of the C.G.T. and persons connected with industry, he felt that the Front Populaire had been a social and economic movement amongst the working class in order to obtain those conditions which had been arrived at over a period of thirty years in Great Britain. Naturally anything accomplished at such a great speed could not help being done too quickly and going too far. But the ideas behind it had been good, and it would be dangerous for the masses behind the C.G.T. to get the idea that these reforms were being combated.

It was probable that the franc was now considerably under value, and if it were to find its place with other currencies, prices inside France would have to rise unless the other currencies moved at the same time. If prices did rise very much, would not the working classes think that this was a subtle attack on their achievements, and might there not then be a recurrence of the passive and active resistance to financial reform and reconstruction which had taken place hitherto? Might not the advantages of devaluation, which in fact was a capital levy, be lost by the disadvantages of its repercussions amongst the working classes?

PROFESSOR VAUCHER replied that Parliament had passed a Bill by which there was to be a sliding scale, so that whenever the cost of living increased to beyond a certain level, then all collective agreements must be renewed. On the other hand, the classical way for a devaluation to proceed decently was to give some time before the rise in the cost of living really became equivalent, and so destroy the effects of the devaluation. Meanwhile there was a hope that the general state of business would be more satisfactory, so that it would be possible to increase the wages in the proportion necessary when the cost of living really did increase. The working classes were quite prepared to demand and insist upon a rise in wages when the cost of living really rose, and this would create difficulties.

The question was one for the future. The lecturer would only say that the general attitude of Frenchmen had changed from that of 1932–34, when every one had been determined personally not to suffer from any new step taken. There was the question of the relationship between the official who had a fixed wage or pension and the working classes. Attempts had been made during the past winter to excite feelings of hostility between them, but both of them realised that to fight each other would be quite fatal. The lecturer hoped that there would be a large proportion of the working class who would co-operate in the kind of mechanism which he had described for the common interest.

MR. W. P. MORRELL asked whether the lecturer thought that the moderation of the Communist Party was genuine, or whether it was merely tactical. Had they given up the idea of converting the whole of France to Communism, or were they hoping to permeate the Front Populaire, at least the Socialists, with their Communistic ideas? Secondly, was there any truth in the assertion, often made, that French politicians were often corrupt?

PROFESSOR VAUCHER replied that he could give a long list of important politicians who were perfectly honest. On the other hand, he could also omit a certain number of names. The general condition of French politics was such that undoubtedly some members of Parliament were inclined to use their influence to make money in different ways. The most frequent case was that of the member of Parliament who was also a barrister. This, however, applied much more to politicians of lower rank than to the leaders. There might be a few cases of leaders where one wondered how they got or kept their money, but again one might be surprised because the honest M. Briand had had a very queer way of keeping his money in a drawer instead of in a bank, and drawing it out as he needed it, and when he had died he had left very little. The type of gossip which there had been on the subject had, however, done a great deal of harm.

The history of the Communist Party in France and all their literature led one to disbelieve their sincerity. They seemed to have a way of distorting facts to suit their own case, and the way in which, under the guise of friendship, they had tried to suppress the Socialists had been most suspicious. However, in the speeches of their leaders concerning the Jacobins, and the stand against Fascism and Hitlerism and their support of national defence—in all this they were probably quite genuine. It was a tactical move, which at the same time was probably genuine. It was often difficult to say exactly what, in a situation, was genuine and what was tactics.

THE HON. GEORGE PEEL (in the Chair) said that the lecturer had described with great sympathy the possibilities of a national government in France, while dealing with the difficulties in its way in a most masterly fashion. He would like to raise the question as to whether, in present circumstances, it was not really safer for France to operate

under her present system of government instead of under a system of national government. The cause of the fall of the successive governments since the War had been the economic situation. This situation was now tending to get worse, and therefore if a national government were formed and all the Ministerial eggs were placed in one basket, and then that Government failed, might this not be more dangerous than the present situation? The present Government was very able. It had been given the power to decree laws so as to conduct and restore the finances of France until the end of July.

The national income of France was, according to the official figures, 250 milliards, and the Government had stated that the amount taken from the pockets of the people was 100 milliards—40 per cent. of the total income, an almost impossible amount to ask a nation to pay. The speaker mentioned this in support of his contention that perhaps it was safer for the present for France not to have a national government.

Taking the expenditure of the present Government under three heads, national defence, the civil services and the national debt, how would a national government contract those expenses? It would not contract expenses on armaments. The expenses of the Civil Service might be cut down, but it would be difficult, and would really depress the standard of living of the French people. The national debt could only be dealt with further by either continuing devaluation or cutting down the amount being paid at present, say from 4 per cent. to 2 per cent. Why should a national government be better able to devaluate the franc than the present Government? They had already done it. They were keeping down the interest on the national debt as much as possible. A national government might come in, but it might very quickly be destroyed by the economic forces of the time. Therefore might it not be better for France to remain as she was at present?

Professor Vaucher said that he had been impressed by the accurate and striking description of the financial position given by the Chairman, but he did not quite agree with him on the political issue. It was possible for a government other than a national government to devaluate the franc and even to reduce the interest on the national debt, but it was not so certain that any other type of government would be able to get a profit out of the operation, because devaluation must lead not only to a reduction of the national debt, but also to some kind of re-stimulation in the economic activity of the country, and in this one needed the collaboration of the whole people. Economic reform could only be accomplished with the active collaboration of the whole people in the form of work and sacrifice. Concerning what had been said about putting all the Ministerial eggs in one basket the French Parliament differed from the English Parliament in this respect, that in spite of the many Ministerial changes, they seemed to operate so that often the same man reappeared under another name and in another form, so that through this some way out of the disastrous position which had been foreseen might be found.

A FRENCH VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST[1]

MONSIEUR ETIENNE DENNERY

THE Far Eastern crisis has caused the French people great concern for two reasons: first, France has local interests in that part of the world; and secondly, most French people to-day realise how close is the link between the problems of the Pacific and the problems of Europe—fire may easily spread from one continent to the other. Together with the defence of its local interests, France, like Great Britain, has to deal with the more remote consequences of the present hostilities. The problem is again twofold: there is a regional problem; there is also a wider, more general problem. Though they are in fact closely connected, I shall deal with each aspect separately.

French interests in the Far East are important and numerous. Some are territorial, some are moral, some are economic, some strategic; some concern one of her colonies, some her relations with the two great Far Eastern countries: China and Japan.

At the south-eastern corner of the Asiatic continent, at the border line of two great civilisations, Chinese and Indian, France has a territory of her own, French Indo-China. It is, in point of fact, a rather recent acquisition, for though French missionaries and some agents of the Company of India settled in French Indo-China more than two centuries ago, Indo-China became French only in the second part of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Napoleon III, France acquired the southern part of the peninsula, Cochin-China, and the Protectorate of Cambodia. After the war with China of 1883 to 1885, the Third Republic acquired the Protectorate of Annam and of Tonkin.

The interest of France in this Asiatic colony has developed quickly in the last few years. The conquest of Indo-China was not at the time very popular amongst the French masses. Jules Ferry, the French Prime Minister who gave Tonkin to France, was overthrown by an overwhelming parliamentary majority on receipt of the false news of a military check. Clemen-

[1] Address given at Chatham House on February 10th, 1938; Mr. G. E. Hubbard in the Chair.

sufficiently insist that Germany, by her militarism, was alone responsible for the war and for all the destruction and suffering caused by it. The settlement of Versailles failed because it was too mild and even so inadequately enforced. German militarism was not discredited, but has revived stronger, more barbaric, more dangerous than ever; for the good of Germany and the peace of Europe all civilised Powers must now combine to inflict on the German people such humiliation and suffering as will convince them of the error of their ways and so bring them back to their true, non-Prussian, selves.

The argument is presented so brilliantly and with such a wealth of detail as to be almost convincing. Professor Foerster, in his anxiety to do justice to the pacifism of present-day France, perhaps overlooks some of the French provocations to Germany in past centuries; he sometimes uses sources (such as Eckardstein's Memoirs) which are not altogether reliable, and the broad sweep of his generalisations will leave the workaday historian breathless. But this is a book to be read for its ideas rather than its accuracy. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

28. GERMANY AND MOROCCO BEFORE 1905. By Francis Torrance Williamson. [*The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LV, No. 1.*] 1937. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 8vo. 210 pp. $2.00.)

THIS book provides a very useful background for the Moroccan crisis of 1905. It analyses German expectations from Morocco, the actual value of Morocco to Germany, and the Moroccan policy of the German Government. The older German geographers, who explored Morocco for the sake of science, are contrasted with the geographers of Imperial Germany, whose aim was to add to the glory and size of the German Empire, and who presented Morocco as a commercial Eldorado—the "potential granary of Europe" and a potential market of sixteen million customers (in 1912 the population of Morocco was found to be two and a quarter million). The figures of German trade with Morocco are adequate commentary on these bloated expectations: in German world trade Morocco played an infinitesimal part; the German share of Moroccan trade ranked far behind that of England or France, and was not likely to increase, for Germany could not compete in the main articles of Moroccan demand—tea, textiles, and sugar. Until 1905 the German Government itself held the view that Morocco was of little importance to Germany and its activity was limited to protecting German subjects. Mr. Williamson might have considered at more length the alleged German attempts to acquire a Moroccan port; it is difficult to believe that all the stories were without foundation, though the material is admittedly scanty. However, the port question played little part in 1905; for, as Mr. Williamson decisively shows, German policy in 1905 was not concerned with economic needs, nor indeed with Morocco, but was a policy of prestige, designed to frighten France into accepting German patronage. Morocco was the excuse, but it might just as well have been almost anywhere else, and Mr. Williamson's careful discussion should put an end to the "hard luck" stories about German grievances in Morocco which still circulate. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

29. EINE WELT ZERBRACH. By J. Rosenbauer. 1937. (Berlin: Schönfeld. 8vo. 154 pp. *Rm.* 7.80.)

30*. THE DOOM OF THE HABSBURGS. By Wickham Steed. 1937. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. 96 pp. *2s. 6d.*)

THE first book is a very readable, gossipy account of the matchless drama of the last years of the Habsburg dynasty, the sorrows of Francis Joseph, the character and aims of Francis Ferdinand, the plots which culminated in the murders at Sarajevo; animated by dislike and contempt for the imperial house and its empire. It does not seem to add to the sum of knowledge, unless the account of the Redl affair of 1913 contains new matter. No references are given.

Mr. Wickham Steed's little book, based on lectures delivered at Bristol University, is an authoritative sketch of the errors which in the writer's opinion made the fall of the Habsburg dynasty inevitable. It provides a stimulating introduction to the history of "Austria." Naturally it contains some views which challenge dispute. In so short a work points have to be stated, not argued.

R. G. D. LAFFAN.

31*. GERMANY'S FIRST BID FOR COLONIES, 1884–1885: A Move in Bismarck's European Policy. By A. J. P. Taylor. [*Studies in Modern History.*] 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. v + 103 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

MR. TAYLOR has already won for himself a foremost place amongst the younger diplomatic historians, and in this book he shows a secure mastery of the published German and French, and the unpublished British material. The documents make it clear that Bismarck, even in 1884–5, never deviated in his insistence on the predominance of European questions, and that he raised the colonial question as a move in the game of European power politics. According to Mr. Taylor, the move was an elaborate one. Bismarck wanted an understanding with France, and for this purpose he considered it expedient to make the French believe that he had a real quarrel with England. "The German colonies were the accidental by-product of an abortive Franco-German entente." Perhaps Mr. Taylor under-estimates the strength of the spontaneous movement for colonial expansion amongst the German middle classes. The movement arose naturally enough out of the economic development of Germany as interpreted according to "the national system of political economy." Perhaps, too, Mr. Taylor over-estimates Bismarck's power to ignore public opinion or to evoke at will the manifestations of it which happened to suit him. Examination of non-diplomatic evidence might in some degree modify the emphasis of his thesis. But, generally speaking, the thesis may be accepted as proved. Bismarck, if he did not entirely create the colonial agitation, controlled its rise and fall according to the exigencies of the European diplomatic situation. Mr. Taylor argues in his first chapter that the same thing was true in the period after Bismarck. The reader of this volume is probably expected to conclude that something very similar is true to-day. The book will also suggest that students of world politics should draw for their rules of interpretation rather less on Marx and rather more on Machiavelli. W. K. H.

32*. DEN BRITTISKA FRONTEN. [The British Front.] By Ragnar Svanström. 1937. (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand. 8vo. 220 pp. *Kr.* 7.50; bound, *Kr.* 10.25.)

"THE official documents, together with the memoirs and diaries

published in the course of the years, prove without doubt that one is justified in speaking of an organised opposition to Germany and the Triple Alliance, a 'national front' based on certain ideas and doctrines." This is the conclusion arrived at by the very well-known Swedish author Dr. Svanström, in his interesting but at times very provocative book, which deals with "ideas and figures in English foreign policy during the years 1900–1914."

Dr. Svanström tries to prove his conclusion by giving a number of short sketches of the personalities and activities of some of our leading statesmen, politicians and ambassadors, as well as of members of the Foreign Office before the Great War, who, in his view, played—in some cases somewhat unconsciously—a leading part in bringing about the situation which culminated in Great Britain's declaration of war. He does not include King Edward VII in his review, as in his opinion the part he played in the politics of his time was of far less importance than was then assumed. The Foreign Office, and in it Sir Eyre Crowe, come in for a good deal of adverse comment. Speaking of the latter, Dr. Svanström says, "We can briefly say that he was anti-German . . . and in view of his German relations he was at the Foreign Office regarded as its special expert on German questions." And further, "It is difficult to deny that the declaration of war in 1914 against the background of the activities of the Foreign Office is completely logical. Between the military front which was formed in 1914 and the diplomatic-political one which existed for a decade before there are clear connections."

There are a number of challenges and accusations in this book which should be refuted. A. H. HICKS.

33*. THE TURNING POINT. THREE CRITICAL YEARS, 1904–6. By Maurice Paléologue. Translated from the French by F. Appleby Holt. 1935. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 336 pp. 18*s*.)

THIS is the English edition of M. Paléologue's *Un grand Tournant de la Politique mondiale* (Paris, 1934). M. Paléologue was assistant *Directeur politique* at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time of which he writes, and was closely concerned with French relations with Germany and Great Britain during the Morocco crisis of 1905–6, and particularly in the months preceding Delcassé's fall. There are numerous extracts from his diary, and some from the diplomatic correspondence of the period. Together they provide an interesting running commentary on the events of these years—a lively rather than a scientifically accurate record. The material should be checked and supplemented by the documents published in Volumes VI–VII of the Third Series of the *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1871–1914 (Paris, 1935, 1937), and in Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Volume III (London, 1928). M. Paléologue's account, for example, of the critical Cabinet meeting of June 6th, 1905 (pp. 264–6), should be compared with the record given by M. Delcassé in the Appendix (pp. 601–7) to Volume VI of the French *Documents*. Generally we have here impressions and recollections rather than evidence, and the solution of the historical problems of the period has to be sought in the very full documentary material now available. LILLIAN M. PENSON.

BRITISH EMPIRE

34. THE CHANGING SCENE. By Arthur Calder-Marshall. 1937. (London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. 271 pp. 10s. 6d.)
35. THE CONDITION OF BRITAIN. By G. D. H. and M. I. Cole. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 472 pp. 7s. 6d.)
36. MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION. By Robert and Helen Lynd. 1937. (New York: Harcourt, Brace; London: Constable. 8vo. xviii + 604 pp. 18s.)

THERE are six planes of sociological studies, of ascending degrees of abstraction: the journalistic survey, the political survey, scientific mass survey, scientific planned survey, statistical survey, and study of method. Three of these are illustrated here.

Mr. Calder-Marshall has written several excellent novels. In this essay on social disruption he runs around too much. Everything from films to Indian politics receives a paragraph or two. No clear picture emerges. In political interpretation the influence of Sir Oswald Mosley's late lieutenant, Mr. John Strachey, is much in evidence, but conjoined with odd bursts of leisure-class fastidiousness.

"Kipling's England was a garden. Ours is becoming a garden suburb. His was full of stately ways; ours has by-pass roads down which at week-ends those who live in houses which deface half England rush in their cars to deface the other half with the refuse of their picnic-baskets. . . . The Trade Union Movement under its present leadership has come to stand on the side of the employers rather than on the side of the employees. They form their own plutocracy, the chosen company of those who betrayed their fellows. In U.S.A., where contrasts are more striking, they would be labour racketeers. In England they are the darlings of the *Morning Post*."

I am not concerned to ask whether a libel action could not lie. Mr. Calder-Marshall is suffering from the spiritual gastritis due to excessive consumption of the Left Books prescribed by Messrs. Strachey, Laski *et al.* A hasty book.

"The Condition of England Question" merits the earnest, instant attention of every man of goodwill. The Coles, in masterly style, provide us with a compendium of all that information for which one has been compelled hitherto to look in twenty different places. Here we learn how the common man is born, housed, fed and brings up his children. The narrative is fortified by statistics. It is something more manageable than, *e.g.*, *The New Survey of London Life and Labour*, less technical than the statistical studies of Carr-Saunders and Caradog Jones. It is not a pretty picture that is painted or one that can give any British patriot satisfaction. Here, for example, are the figures that show that the infant mortality rate in industrial Barrow is 98 per thousand, and in genteel Hastings 35. It is not new; but it should be better known. A book that might well be recommended in schools; and which every Member of Parliament who takes his job seriously ought to make his *vade-mecum*.

Mass observation has recently become a vogue in England. It is one of the best fashions that I can recall. It stirs the imagination of the newspaper proprietors; but it also can be of the first value to the politicist and sociologist. It is true that it means using hundreds of untrained observers; but any sociologist worth his salt should be able to allow for the resulting subjectivism. We need to know the

92. EUPHRATES EXILE. By A. D. Macdonald. 1936. (London: Bell. 8vo. 301 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE writer of this book of memoirs, or almost of essays, served for two years as a Special Service Officer on the Euphrates, and apparently from time to time recorded his impressions of various aspects of his employment and surroundings. Some of these impressions are valuable; for instance, the chapter on Jobs. It points out that British officials who depend for existence on retaining their employment cannot give entirely unbiased service, and implies a sad indictment of British administration in Iraq. British prestige as administrators of territories occupied by other than British peoples has been built on an officialdom of high qualifications and an outlook independent of the question of pay and continued employment. The British officials in Iraq, and also in Palestine, were and are not part of the permanent British Civil Service (except by chance in a minority of individual cases). They had not therefore the independence of view that life-employment gives and, in many cases, their intellectual attainments or previous training and experience were inadequate for the responsible (and well-paid) posts in which they found themselves. Such appointments cannot be wise, particularly in legal or financial posts where decisions based on inadequate mental equipment may have far-reaching results. This has, of course, a bearing on recent events in Palestine.

The chapter on "Empire Builders" indirectly reinforces this line of thought. Captain Macdonald is, however, unduly cruel in his description of the practical English official seeking not victory but defeat in his administrative problems.

On the other hand, in his chapters on "Prestige" and "Liaison" the author's picture of the point of view of the R.A.F. officer in Iraq was in many cases true enough. Examples that obtruded themselves used to make one pray for the end of the Mandate and the consequent removal of the "Blimpian" to regions where the satisfaction of their governing instincts would be less injurious to Imperial policy.

The photographs in the book are excellent, and are worthy of a book of more general interest. L. G.

AFRICA

93*. LE CAMÉROUN. By Henri Labouret. [*Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère. Travaux des Groupes d'Études, Publication No.* 6.] 1937. (Paris: Paul Hartmann. 8vo. 259 pp. 20 *frs.*)

THIS is a report on the French Mandate in the Cameroons, made for the International Studies Conference on "Peaceful Change" held in Paris last summer, by Professor Henri Labouret of the Institut International des Langues et Civilisations Africaines, and a leading colonial expert in France. It is based on an extensive and intensive study of the available documentation, including official papers of the old German *Schutzgebiet*, and on a sojourn of six months in the territory itself. The writing is marked by objectivity and scrupulous fairness to the Germans.

Divided up into four main sections—the country, the Native, economics, and European colonisation—it traverses the whole field of government activity. Maps and numerous statistical tables are included.

As several students of British colonial administration have recently had occasion to point out, there is far too much complacency in England

about the quality and uniqueness of our achievements in the colonial field and too little knowledge of the achievements of other countries. Some excellent work has been done in French Equatorial and West Africa during the last decade or so, and none of it has been better than that done in the French Cameroons. Defects there have been, but the drift and the general result of the French effort have been good. This is largely due to the undoubted desire of administering the Mandate "en bons pères de famille," and to continuity in policy (the policy has not been static but continually evolving), and to continuity in personnel (M. Marchand, now a well-known figure in Geneva, where he serves on an I.L.O. Commission, was Governor for about ten years before his retirement in 1932). One steady aim has been the creation of a native peasantry, big concessions not being tolerated, though a limited European colonisation on plantations of moderate size has been allowed; while, as regards Native administration, a system of what is in effect qualified indirect rule has been worked out.

Professor Labouret's wise discussion of Native policy on pp. 15–24 is commended to English students of colonial administration. He concludes:

"En regardant les choses de près et sans idée préconçue, il faut reconnaître qu'entre le système anglais et la politique française il n'y a qu'une différence de nuances. Dans les deux cas, même dans les émirats de la Nigéria septentrionale, il y a, comme l'ont fait remarquer certains auteurs du Royaume Uni, 'Administration directe par des moyens indirects,' seulement le dosage des moyens n'est pas le même."

W. R. Crocker.

94*. Africa and Christianity. By Diedrich Westermann. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. x + 221 pp. 5s.)
95. African Dilemma. By Frank Melland and Cullen Young. 1937. (London: Religious Tract Society. 8vo. 171 pp. 6s.)
96. African Ways and Wisdom. By T. Cullen Young. 1937. (London: Religious Tract Society. 8vo. 144 pp. 5s.)

Of the forces introduced into Africa by Europeans, two of the most powerful are Christianity and English law, and they are by no means unrelated. Yet their effects on the native races have hitherto been studied only rather casually, perhaps because the treatment of the subject demands special qualifications. Many missionaries and others will welcome Dr. Westermann's book as an introduction to some of the problems confronting them in Africa. Their main regret will probably be that within its modest limits the book, which reproduces the substance of the Duff lectures of 1935, refrains from touching a number of topics that occur to the reader's mind. Those who are not themselves in missionary service, but who know how much the social function of the churches has meant in Africa, will wish that the author had related his ideas more consistently to current administrative policies. It should not be forgotten, as indeed he himself recognises, that men like Dr. John Philip and Livingstone crusaded not only for their own creed, but also for its translation into practical and even political terms.

Mr. Melland, who contributes the main chapters on law in *African Dilemma*, is concerned mainly with the administration of British justice. Knowing that African concepts of crime and punishment may differ widely from our own, he is not content to say, with Sir Grattan Bushe and his colleagues, that our ideas must dominate in this field. But

had he probed more deeply into all the issues raised by the conflict of English law and native custom, he might have hesitated to condemn their view as roundly as he does. Incidentally, the conflict in civil law is no less disturbing than in criminal law. When, for instance, an African is married by Christian rites, he is also married by English law, and thereby abandons to an uncertain extent his rights and duties under native law. It would have been instructive if Mr. Cullen Young and Mr. Melland had discussed this dilemma, which is not to be disposed of as readily as those they present. JULIUS LEWIN.

97. RACE ATTITUDES IN SOUTH AFRICA. Historical, Experimental and Psychological Studies. By I. D. MacCrone. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiv + 328 pp. 12s. 6d.)

As the author has stated in his preface, the racial situation in South Africa has become an obsession, both in, and to some extent outside, the Union. A scientific contribution to this very vexed problem is therefore very welcome, and this interesting and very readable book may become a classic on the subject. The author investigates two aspects of this question: What are the views of the community and why? He commences with a very interesting and concise little history of the early settlement at the Cape, which is alone worth reading for its illuminating description of the times. The author's theory is that the eighteenth century was the formative period.

The second part of the book is an endeavour to measure the "attitude" of the white races in the Union to the Native, Indian and coloured races. The method employed is necessarily technical but the results—which are all that the layman need be concerned with—can be easily studied in a series of "tables" and "graphs." These, in the main, seem to confirm what the average person who knows the Union would expect, but they are no less valuable on that account.

The third part of the book is a psycho-analytical study of the causes of the attitudes revealed in the tables. It is again somewhat technical but none the less interesting, instructive and perhaps controversial. The central idea is what the author calls "The Unconscious in Action," *i.e.* the present-day "attitude" of the anti-blacks is largely based, unconsciously, on the attitude formed in earlier days and especially in the Great Trek, and has become a subconscious "anxiety hysteria."

M. HORE-RUTHVEN.

98. A TRIBAL SURVEY OF MONGALLA PROVINCE. Edited by L. F. Nalder. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. 8vo. viii + 232 pp. 15s.)

THIS book has been compiled from accounts of the various tribes of the Mongalla Province of the Sudan, mainly written for the purpose by missionaries and district officers, all qualified by knowledge of the languages of the peoples on whom they have reported. Its aim is to provide "a general description of the people and their principal institutions" for the guidance of newcomers to the province. The present reviewer, as one interested in native administration but almost totally ignorant of the Sudan, is perhaps a fair sample of the public for whom it is intended. The impression produced, then, is that these tribes are characterised by the importance which they attach to rainmakers, who in some cases are chiefs, but in others have rather the character of black magicians, and by the division of the

men into age-grades and age-classes, the distinction between which is nowhere explained, while the significance of these divisions for tribal life is made clear in the case of only one tribe; that clan affiliation must be patrilineal, since if it were matrilineal the fact would presumably be mentioned; that the treatment of twins and the payment of blood-money are subjects to which local European opinion attaches immense importance. The rest is that mental indigestion which supervenes upon the attempt to assimilate a series of disconnected statements of fact.

It is to be presumed that any missionary or district officer who takes his work seriously, will give as much time as he can to the study of the institutions of the people among whom he is working. The value of a handbook is in supplying the essential information concerning matters in which he will be involved at the outset, and on which he may have to take decisions before he has had time to find out for himself what the situation is. The district officer is interested primarily in political and economic organisation and in those aspects of law which may come up to him for judgment—notably the law of marriage and of land tenure. The missionary is interested also in indigenous moral values and the religious beliefs which uphold them. Both are interested in that thorniest of all African problems, the treatment of witchcraft, and need to know the attitude towards the practitioners of magic, black or white, of the people with whom they have to deal.

The form of this book has been dictated by limitations of space; it is clear that in many cases the descriptions of the different tribes have been compressed from much fuller accounts. Why, then, could not the space available have been devoted to a more expanded treatment of these crucial sociological subjects by the elimination of details regarding physical appearance and clothing, which the reader will see for himself when he gets to his place of work, burial customs, which are not likely to concern him closely, and conjectural histories of tribal migrations, which cannot possibly have any bearing on the work he has to do?

The authors of this book do not claim to be experts and their aim is something different from the detailed analysis of a single people which the modern expert takes as his task, and it would be unfair to criticise the result by comparison with the expert study. Yet it is open to question whether such a skeleton key to the understanding of a culture can in fact achieve its purpose. Probably the beginner will always find more help in an expert study of a tribe typical of his area, giving that completeness of detail which alone conveys the picture of a living society, than in any summary, however excellent.

L. P. MAIR.

99. AFRICANS LEARN TO BE FRENCH. By W. B. Mumford and G. St. J. Orde-Browne. 1937. (London: Evans. 8vo. 174 pp. 5s.)

DR. MUMFORD and Major Orde-Browne made an extensive tour of French West Africa in 1930 in order to study the methods of native education followed there, and this book summarises the results. Every student of colonial administration must be struck by the contrast between the French system of clearly defined programmes, drawn up by a single central authority, and the British reliance on the man on the spot to put into practice as seems best to him a policy

of which only the broadest general principles are laid down by the Colonial Office. In the realm of African education this contrast is particularly striking. The British Colonial Office has an advisory committee on education which issues periodical memoranda indicating the general lines which native education should take. Their interpretation in practice represents a compromise, differing in each locality with the strength of various bodies of opinion, between different views as to the content of education, the language in which it should be given, and even its ultimate aim in terms of the life for which it is to be a preparation.

In French colonies all these questions are answered quite clearly. Two complete systems of education are provided: one for the great majority of the population, the other for the élite who are to be associated with the French in the development of the territory, whether as subordinate agents of administration or as technical specialists in engineering, agriculture, medicine and the like. At the present stage of economic development of the territory there is little opportunity for such specialists to earn a living except as government servants; accordingly the numbers trained are limited to those whom the government can employ. Moreover the training given locally qualifies mainly for subordinate posts in the technical service. In marked contrast to British practice, it is free throughout, and pupils at boarding schools receive pocket money.

The programme of "popular" education falls into three stages: two years mainly devoted to the teaching of spoken French, two years of elementary instruction, concentrating on such subjects as hygiene and improved methods of farming, and a final two years in a "Regional" school at the local administrative headquarters, where more "literary" subjects, such as history, geography and arithmetic, are taught together with further courses in agriculture and crafts appropriate to the locality.

The two authors have described the system in operation, with the vividness which comes from direct observation. Their account is illustrated with excellent photographs, documented with translations of some important official pronouncements on the aims of education, and completed by illuminating comparisons of the French and British systems. L. P. MAIR.

100. EDUCATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: Report of the South African Educational Conference held in Capetown and Johannesburg in July 1934 under the auspices of the New Education Fellowship. Ed. by E. G. Malherbe. 1937. (Capetown and Johannesburg: Juta. 8vo. xv + 545 pp. 12s.)

THE delay in publishing this report is readily explicable by the very large mass of material that had to be digested and arranged by the editor and his helpers amidst the preoccupations of other duties. The book has a very wide purview: it deals with the aims, methods, and content of education, with the training of teachers, and with the problems of educational psychology, examinations, vocational guidance, and social work. The point of view is, of course, international. Part III of the report consists of a very interesting discussion of the special problems of education in South Africa.

Among the more general articles Professor John Dewey's, on "The Need for a Philosophy of Education," is particularly noteworthy

for his wise remarks on mental growth considered as interaction between the individual and his environment. He points out that, whereas the old education neglected individual needs and provided merely the fixed environment of the traditional curriculum, the new education tends to fall into the opposite error of leaving the child free to learn anything or nothing as he chooses. The teacher cannot abdicate his responsibility for selecting the material of study: it is his business to seek out and establish a richer and more varied subject-matter clearly related to contemporary life.

As an educational survey the book has the defects inherent in such a compilation. The need for compression considerably reduces the value of some of the chapters. Thus the account of the Dalton Plan leaves unanswered most of the questions which the practising teacher would wish to ask. And the process of summarising has deprived a good deal of the writing of the force of style. The book provides, however, a very valuable conspectus of progressive educational endeavour. M. ALDERTON PINK.

101. LORDS OF THE EQUATOR: An African Journey. By Patrick Balfour. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 366 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

HIS African safari, sometimes by lorry and at other times by air, sea or rail, gave Mr. Patrick Balfour exceptional opportunities of contacts in the raw, not merely with native Africa, but with the European official and non-official. The scope of his observations over a wide and diversified area has not obscured the keenness of his general survey. Opinions expressed to him are vividly recorded and conscientiously reported—they come from many and divergent sources, and consequently are not always complimentary. His book will make really special appeal not only to British readers, but to all European nations interested in Africa, particularly in view of the present controversial political issues. Every chapter presents readable matter in interesting and attractive style, and we all have something to glean from these pages. CONRAD L. WALSH.

102. NIGHT OVER AFRICA. By Foster Windram. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 287 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Here is a book which will appeal more directly to South Africans than to the general public. African folk-lore plays its part, and the mystery surrounding the "Elliptical" Temple of Zimbabwe is charmingly described. The book is richly illustrated, and amusing anecdotes of Cecil Rhodes and his companions are given with zest. The attractions of wild game to the sportsmen are also set out in a very inviting chapter. C. L. W.

UNITED STATES

103. THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON. By Harley Notter. 1937. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. vi + 695 pp. 21*s.*)

THIS substantial volume is a compilation rather than a critical work, but as a compilation it is excellent and thoroughly useful. Its aim is to string together on a thread of narrative all Wilson's important pronouncements and *obiter dicta* about foreign policy, written and oral, down to the time of the United States' entry into the War. A few of these come from unpublished sources. But the greater part are taken from the *Public Papers*, from Wilson's published letters, from R. S. Baker's biography and from the memoirs

of House and other friends. Although nothing particularly novel or unexpected emerges, it is valuable to have this consecutive and well-arranged record of the development of Wilson's thought.

The least familiar and most welcome chapters are those which cover Wilson's earlier career before he aspired to political honours. Mr. Notter rightly emphasises Wilson's debt to English thought. The strongest influences on his political development were probably Bright, Gladstone and Bagehot. (Of the last-named he wrote as a "literary politician," and perhaps thought as his own prototype.) He was too much steeped in English ways of thinking to be altogether detached and impartial where England was concerned; and this affinity unquestionably influenced, though it did not determine, his course of action between 1914 and 1917. It should, however, be remembered that the English ideas which had gone to make Wilson's conceptions of politics were those of the 1860's and 1870's rather than those of the twentieth century; and the "new" gospel which Wilson brought to Europe at the end of the War was in the main a faithful reflexion of mid-Victorian liberalism in its palmiest days. This was especially true of his attitude to the principle of nationality. Wilson hailed nationalism with all the uncritical enthusiasm of those English liberals whose ideas of foreign affairs had been largely imbibed from Mazzini.

The characteristically Victorian mould of Wilson's thought is one of the clearest impressions which emerges from these pages. As Mr. Notter says, he did not distinguish morality from religion. The Bible was "the fixed and eternal standard" of personal and of national ethics. It would be unfair to say that he equally fails to distinguish between "right" and "expediency"; for the antithesis between them is one of his favourite *clichés*. Yet (except in the issue of the Panama Canal dues, which must be named as an honourable exception) Wilson was quite as much prone as other statesmen to identify what is morally right with what is politically expedient. This is curiously revealed in his Declaration of War address to Congress on April 2nd, 1917. He invited the United States to fight because "the right is more precious than peace" and in order "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice." But he also demands war on the ground that the Germans intend "to act against our peace and security" and, still more significantly, adds: "We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights." This confusion between "peace" and "our peace," between "the right" and "our rights," is fundamental in Wilsonian thought, of which Wilson himself is, of course, not the only distinguished exponent.

Mr. Notter has rendered valuable assistance to the student in assembling this rich store of Wilsonian pronouncements on international relations. E. H. CARR.

104*. ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS. [*Information Department Paper No. 22.*] 1938. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 48 pp. 1s.)

THE long process of negotiating a Trade Agreement between Britain and the United States has reached its final stage. The actual date of signature will depend on the political situation in the United States, between now and the November elections. The preparation for the actual negotiations began nearly two years ago, when the two Govern-

ments made their first *informal* exploration of the ground to be covered, and the process entered its first *official* stage on November 18th, 1937, when the administration in Washington announced that they "contemplated" a Trade Agreement with Great Britain. In terms of the American Trade Agreements Act, the American Secretary of State (Mr. Cordell Hull) announced his "intention" to negotiate on January 8th, 1938, and in the spring of this year the British Delegation arrived in Washington where they have been at work for nearly three months.

Following the practice of Chatham House, the Information Department of the Institute has provided the public with a compact handbook of 48 pages which gives the tariff history of both countries during the past seven years and objectively estimates the scope and significance of the forthcoming Agreement. The seven sections of the pamphlet—Recent Changes in British and American Commercial Policy, Significance of Anglo-American Trade, Balance of Payments between the United States and the British Empire, Anglo-American Trade 1929–1937, American Trade with British Colonies, American-Dominion Trade, Possibilities and Limitations of an Anglo-American Agreement—are well conceived and adequate; and the statistical tables, both in the text and in the appendices, greatly add to the value of this publication. A. F. W.

105. THE TWILIGHT OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. By A. S. J. Baster. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. ix + 218 pp. 9*s*.)

106 WORLD FINANCE, 1935–1937. By Paul Einzig. 1937. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 8vo. xvi + 342 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

BOTH these books deal with the inter-relation of finance and politics during the last few years, but while Mr. Einzig's book covers the chief European countries and he deals with American problems only as part of the world problem, Professor Baster's is confined to the United States and his object is described by his sub-title: An Economic Interpretation of the New Deal. He devotes a chapter to the crisis of 1933, and then relates how government intervention and economic planning have affected finance, industry and agriculture. The chapter on "The Political Background" throws much light on the present constitutional difficulties. His conclusion is pessimistic, for he says, "The fatal weakness of the New Deal is not in the vast improbabilities of its plans for 'the more abundant life,' but in the obstacles to such a life which the degeneration of democracy resulting from those plans will entail." Perhaps present conditions may lead to the dawn of a new democracy in the United States, and by the thought of this possibility democrats may escape some of the pessimism from which they might otherwise suffer after a perusal of Professor Baster's book.

Mr. Einzig's views about statesmen generally, and particularly about M. Laval, are also pessimistic, but his book is so entertaining that the reader never suffers from a sense of depression. It is full of the most interesting information concerning the happenings of the financial world during the past two years, but the reader must be on his guard throughout to distinguish—through no fault of Mr. Einzig's—between factual statements and the author's opinions. If this is borne in mind, no reader can fail to obtain enlightenment concerning the fundamental causes of the failure of the policy of deflation

pursued by the gold bloc countries and the reasons which forced them ultimately into a devaluation of their currencies. Mr. Einzig also deals with the position in Danzig and in Germany, the economic consequences of sanctions on Italy, and the Tri-Partite Agreement.

The author is bitterly opposed to the policy of deflation, but it does not seem just to attribute to deflationists the beliefs which Mr. Einzig ascribes to them on page 206. For instance he says that they think that "permanent poverty should be the destiny of mankind in this vale of sorrows in the hope of reward for virtue in the next world." Nor is it fair to say, as he does, that some of the professional deflationists derive a sadistic pleasure from inflicting suffering upon others while they themselves are sheltered by their professorial salaries.

Like all Mr. Einzig's work, the book is highly dramatic and makes finance live. His description of the invasion of London by Frenchmen and Frenchwomen carrying one or two bars of their gold in taxis, or dispatch cases bulging with franc notes, while trying to look as unobtrusive as possible, exhausting the safe-deposit accommodation in London, and hiring even the most old-fashioned safes which could be easily burgled with the aid of a bent hairpin, is worthy of a play. Indeed, one day Mr. Einzig ought to write a financial play for us somewhat on the lines of Emil Ludwig's *Versailles*.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

107. THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By T. V. Smith. 1936. (Chicago and Cambridge University Presses. Medium 8vo. xxix + 308 pp. 11s. 6*d*.)

SENATOR SMITH of Illinois is a political philosopher. He is also a democrat of the best type; for, though he recognises that true democracy can never, in mankind's present condition, be other than an ideal, yet he prefers it to any pinchbeck substitute, and would strive towards the perfecting of it. He regards politics as a moral enterprise, and he writes this book to show what can, as well as what cannot, be done with ideals. He begins by examining in considerable detail the alternatives to democracy. Fascism he condemns; "for its theory of life is a base individualism devoted to power and intent upon maintaining it by coercion." Communism "feeds upon an ideology so grandiose as to obscure from its idealistic heart the grossest immorality of means and from its scientific head the most impossible perfectionism of ends." Finally, he comes to Americanism, defining it as Liberalism of which the fruit is "so to institutionalise the age-old principle of revolution that a nation can swing, peaceably and intelligently, from left to right, from right to left, making thus a virtue of social necessity and a joy of inevitable human variety." Liberalism in its turn is described as "the liberty of each to find happiness in his own way, up to the point where the method of the quest by some foredooms to futility the same quest by others."

No apology is offered for reviewing the book by quotation, for Senator Smith himself summarises in a sentence each stage in his argument as it progresses. He has much which is of special interest at the moment to say about the Supreme Court; he clearly sympathises with President Roosevelt's desire to freshen it up, for it carries an impossible burden of responsibility; secure in power, and subject to review by no authority on earth, "it not only determines policy, but by settling issues it can make and unmake men." There are important

suggestions for a stronger executive, a "genuine merit system of public employment" (civil service), and proportional representation, which Senator Smith definitely favours. A very informative and suggestive treatise. MESTON.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

108*. JAPAN IN CHINA: Her Motives and Aims. By Kiyoshi Kawakami. 1938. (London: Murray. 8vo. xix + 188 pp. 5s.)

THE first four chapters are devoted to Soviet intrigues in China. It is well known that up to 1927 Soviet agents fomented an anti-foreign movement in China, hoping that it might be the beginning of world revolution, and that since 1935 Chinese Communists, under instructions from Moscow, have endeavoured to form a United Front on the basis of antagonism to Japan. Sympathy will therefore be felt for Mr. Kawakami's plea that Japan must defend herself against Communism. He weakens his case, however, by repeating fantastic tales of British intrigues and even military intervention (!) in Sinkiang and Tibet, for it is a fair inference that some at any rate of Japanese fears of Soviet Russia are imaginary. He tells us that from 1927 onwards Chiang Kai Shek "waged a bitter and protracted war" against the Red forces in China, but does not explain why in these circumstances Japan should demand that Chiang Kai Shek should accept Japanese "co-operation" against Communists and treat him as an enemy for refusing. The statement that Chiang Kai Shek capitulated to the Communists after his capture at Sian in December 1936, is contradicted by the known facts of this incident.

The statement of Japanese grievances in Chapters 5 and 6 will also win sympathy, for the Chinese certainly know how to be tiresome and obstructive. It is noticeable, however, that the formidable list of outrages on pages 74 to 78 begins only in 1935. They are of course the direct—and it is fair to say not unnatural—result of the Japanese attempt (not mentioned by Mr. Kawakami) to separate the Five Northern Provinces from China and the campaign of violence, intimidation and organised smuggling initiated in 1935 in pursuit of that policy.

The rest of the book gives the Japanese version of the outbreak of hostilities and Japan's reasons for not going to Geneva and Brussels.

J. T. PRATT.

109*. RELATIONS DE LA CHINE ET DU JAPON. By Roger Lévy. [*Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère*, No. 8.] 1938. (Paris: Paul Hartmann. 8vo. 135 pp. 10 *frs.*)

MR. LÉVY, combining great skill with complete mastery of his subject, has succeeded in selecting the essential factors out of a vast mass of obscure and unfamiliar detail, arranging them with a due sense of perspective and relative values and thus presenting in a little more than 100 pages a faithful and coherent picture of the relations between China and Japan. There are not many points on which criticism can fasten. The eastward advance of Russia to the Pacific in the nineteenth century provided at any rate some moral justification for the policy of expansion which Japan was perhaps in any case already determined to adopt. Later on Mr. Lévy hardly makes it sufficiently clear that it was the discredit into which the Japanese military oligarchy had fallen by 1920 that made possible the Washington

Conference and the conciliatory policy followed for the ensuing ten years. Similarly in 1935 it was the military oligarchy that deliberately smashed the policy that the more reasonable elements in Japan had attempted to follow after the Tongku Truce of May 1933. It was then that Japan deliberately embarked on the aggression against the five Northern Provinces that has now expanded into a war of conquest against all China. A more serious error relates to the Leith-Ross mission. There is no truth in the story that the mission was Great Britain's retort to Japan's refusal to participate in an international loan. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was sent to the East to endeavour to secure international, and particularly Japanese, co-operation in devising some scheme for assisting China out of her currency difficulties. On page 122 Mr. Lévy has forgotten Burma and on page 113 he implies that Japan attacked Shanghai in August 1937 for reasons of higher strategy. The truth probably is that both sides were averse to this fight, but that hostilities were inevitable.

The concluding chapter is an admirable summing up of the whole situation, and the following passage on page 123 is worth pondering :

> C'est qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement du conflit sino-japonais, mais du sort des Blancs en Extrême-Orient. Les Blancs perdent-ils la face, aujourd'hui ? Et demain, que seront, en Chine, leurs intérêts menacés ? On commence à comprendre que, derrière les adversaires, Chinois et Japonais, des influences s'exercent. On prévoit que d'un Japon victorieux et d'une Chine vaincue, ou d'un Japon et d'une Chine réconciliés sur la base d'un imprévisible compromis, il peut naître un " bloc," une coalition de Jaunes.

J. T. PRATT.

110*. JAPAN OVER ASIA. By William Henry Chamberlin. 1938. (London : Duckworth. 8vo. 328 pp. Illustrations and maps. 15s.)

MR. CHAMBERLIN is chief Far Eastern Correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*. As correspondent in Moscow, he published two books of exceptional interest on the Soviet Union. He is a conscientious, non-sensational journalist, observant and thoughtful. His record can be relied on ; his narrative is alive. He is unbiased, but not without sympathies. His sympathies are not with the militarists of Japan. What does Japan want ?

> " There is no visible end to the game of political chess in which are engaged these oriental nations, united by geographical proximity and cultural ties, divided by profound differences of temperament and historical experience. Again and again, events have seemed to point to a settlement of some kind, to a decisive show-down. . . . Then the pattern becomes blurred and misty ; the hard-and-fast alternatives melt away into an inconclusive compromise, which neither side regards as final."

Well, the show-down has come since Mr. Chamberlin wrote the greater part of his book, which, except in the last chapter, does not allude to events later than the Lukowkiao incident. In this last chapter he defines Japan's aims as threefold : (1) to create an entirely subservient régime in North China ; (2) to create a mainly subservient régime in Nanking ; and (3) to create a new " free city " status in Shanghai. He thought that Japan must achieve her victory within six months. " If China after a year still has forces in the field, perhaps armed from Russia, Japan's ultimate victory is likely to prove a Pyrrhic one." He considers that Japan has not sufficient resources of material or of character to survive in the " grim struggle of attrition." He is im-

pressed with Japan's achievements in the past, but still more by her present instability. For this reason it is evident to him that Japan's chances of getting her way are in the long run very doubtful. His book is written from the angle of Tokyo, and deals almost entirely with the Japanese side of the struggle. Over three-quarters of the book are concerned with political matters. The story starts from 1931. There is very little back history or tracing of original causes. There are some interesting pen-portraits of leading personalities, and there are chapters on trade conditions, on Fascism in Japan, on the "split national personality" (half-orient, half-occident, half-ancient, half-modern), and on the "permanent farm crisis." But Mr. Chamberlin is not yet quite adept with his chopsticks, nor wholly at ease in his kimono. He tells us that "the pine-tree stands for life and health, the bamboo for exactness and the plum-blossoms for purity and virtue." This just misses the nuance; for the pine-tree stands for long life and old age, the bamboo for yielding strength, and the plum-blossom for fidelity and courage in adverse circumstances. And, when he tells us that "the worst term of abuse is *bakka hara*, which may be literally translated 'fool snake,'" he has been misled by his interpreter.

P. J.

III. WHERE ARE YOU GOING, JAPAN? By Willard Price. 1938. (London: Heinemann. 8vo. xvii + 369 pp. 15s.)

MR. PRICE has written a book which deserves a more serious title and a more serious style. There is a danger that at first sight many readers will put it down without troubling to read it, for they will think it pro-Japanese propaganda by an American journalist who wishes to continue working in Japan.

It is much more than that: Mr. Price seems to have grasped the inner meaning of "Yamato Damashii," the spirit of devotion to a divine Emperor: he can admire that spirit for the Spartan virtue which it produces, but he also sees clearly that the very spirit which he admires is a real source of danger to the interests, and perhaps, in the future, to the vital interests, of the European powers and particularly to Great Britain.

He devotes a chapter to the Korean question: a problem which has been neglected in many recent books on the Far East, but one which is of very great importance in assessing Japan's abilities as an administrator of colonial territories.

Mr. Price's views on the educational problem in Manchukuo are worthy of serious study by those who are responsible for the education of backward races. He says of Japanese methods in that country:

"An interesting phenomenon this—one of the most literate people in the world approaching the problem of the most illiterate.

"They are choosing a diametrically opposite course to that pursued by Great Britain in India. There the mass is barely touched and a proportionately large few are highly trained. . . . In Manchukuo there are to be few A.B.'s and no jobless."

With regard to the Sino-Japanese question he takes a long view. He by no means under-estimates Japan's immediate difficulties, but he foresees the greatest danger to her power when she has completed her immediate task.

The part of his survey which will be most unpalatable to English readers is his analysis of Japan's naval strength and her dream of southward expansion. There is no doubt that the danger exists and

is coming to be realised, but is any nation, even if imbued with the crusading spirit, capable of dealing with two major problems at the same time? If Mr. Price's views are well founded, the Empire must be prepared for increasing sacrifices to maintain, if need be with the sword, those gifts of civilisation which she has given to the world, gifts which are considered of little account by certain other powers, amongst them the Japanese. E. AINGER.

112*. EEN REISJE NAAR DE GOUDVELDEN IN HET SURINAAMSCHE BINNENLAND: BEZOEK AAN DE PLACERS DER VAN EMDEN GOLDMINES. (Overdruk van artikelen verschenen in "De West." Feb. 1937.)

Report of a visit to the gold fields of the Van Emden Goldmines Ltd. in Surinam (Dutch Guiana), a subsidiary of the Van Emden Dutch Guiana Goldfields, of London.

113*. SOCIALE EN ECONOMISCHE VRAAGSTUKKEN IN SURINAME. By S. Beck. (Overdrukken uit "De West" Oct. 1936 tot Maart 1937.) 1937. (Suriname: Surinaamsche Landbonn Vereeniging. 8vo. 78 pp. 60 cts.)

Series of articles on economic and social problems of Surinam.

114. NATIVE EDUCATION AND CULTURE-CONTACT IN NEW GUINEA. By William C. Groves. [*Australian Council for Educational Research Series*, No. 46.] 1936. (Melbourne University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 179 pp. Bibl. 6s.)

THE author states that he does not "presume to interfere with or offer advice upon existing systems," but this book envisages a "New Deal" for Native education in New Guinea, on the basis laid down in the Memorandum on Education Policy in British Tropical Africa, 1925; especially in relation to those places in New Guinea where European contact has been "over a long period and from many directions."

The author considers the present government educational policy as too centralised, remote and divorced from knowledge of what is being done in other tropical dependencies. Education should fill the cultural void effected by the culture-contact (European-Primitive) situation, and correct the maladjustment which it has caused, whereby large masses of natives, as in New Ireland, are suffering from a mental malaise that deprives them of interest in life. Schools should not be classrooms for formal instruction, but "Institutes" serving as "communal tools for improving life and its local conditions." The village should be the starting point of all educational work, since it is (and will be) the natural life of the native.

Education must be "nativised" (there must be preservation and adaptation) and the author reviews this proposal in its application to hygiene, agriculture, games, text books, religion, languages, etc. He cites an interesting anecdote of how the people of Sio Island have adapted Christianity. He advocates the Institution of a Programme of Anthropological-Education Research, and throughout the book stresses the need of a close alliance between these two:

"So important in the scheme of educational adaptation does this suggested research by specialists appear, that the writer believes it would be worth while suspending part of the present government educational programme in New Guinea, and using the money thus saved, to the research purpose."

In conclusion the author sums up the educational work done by the Government, and outlines a scheme with its personnel for the new type

of education, in which Government and Missions are to be allied. It is an application to New Guinea needs of principles enunciated in the White Paper mentioned, and also in the writings of such men as Mumford, Huxley, Rivers-Smith, E. Smith, etc. The author realises that his scheme is dependent on money, men and time: "native education must be regarded for a long time as a laboratory, in which the course of the experiments being carried out may be changed." It is certain, however, that his conceptions of education, rather than those at present in force in New Guinea, would lead to fulfilment of Lord Lugard's desire that the relations between the white and coloured peoples of the Empire should be "in matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his inherited traditions . . . equality in things spiritual, agreed difference in the physical and material."

There is a bibliography, a map, and a questionnaire employed in educational inquiries in New Guinea. JEAN GARLICK.

115*. NIEUW-GUINEE ALS KOLONISATIEGEBIED VOOR EUROPEANEN EN VAN INDO-EUROPEANEN. By Dr. J. Winsemius. 1936. (Purmerend: J. Muusses. 8vo. 380 pp. *Fl.* 4.75.)

DR. WINSEMIUS originally undertook this thesis, he says, in the hope of discovering in Dutch New Guinea a "New Netherlands." Certainly the wealth of propaganda which has been diffused in Holland on behalf of the least explored, least exploited of all her colonial possessions, especially during the economic disturbances of the past few years, might have been thought to indicate that there were good grounds for optimism. His studies, however, prosecuted over a wide comparative field, and with scientific detachment, have brought him to a very different conclusion.

The first chapters are devoted to an analysis of the psychological and sociological factors involved in colonisation generally, and of the physical and geographical conditions of colonisation in the tropics. Then follows an examination of successfully established European settlements in other parts of the tropics, including Central and South America, Africa and Queensland, the results of which, incidentally, are usefully tabulated. Then a more detailed geographical survey of those areas in the Netherlands Indies best suited for agricultural development.

In the second part of the book Dr. Winsemius takes two recent attempts to settle agricultural communities on the north coast of New Guinea—at Manokwari and Hollandia—and reviews the degree of success they have achieved. Despite the enthusiasm and considerable practical aid furnished by two interested Associations, the "Vereeniging Kolonisatie Nieuw-Guinee" ("K. N. G.") and its offshoot, the "Stichting Immigratie Kolonisatie Nieuw-Guinee" ("Sikng"), operating in Hollandia and Manokwari respectively, the results have been such, in the author's view, as to prove even within the short period of six years that real success is impossible with the type of Indo-European colonist that at present predominates. The essence of his contention is that New Guinea may be altogether ruled out as offering the Dutch, through agricultural development, a ready solution of the unemployment problems of their empire. The fostered belief that it does so, widely held both in Holland and Java, and allied with the belief that modern colonisation is anyway only a matter of "technique," has become a kind of sentimental cult in which economic reason has no part. ANTHONY GISHFORD.

116*. WHEN JAPAN FIGHTS. By Percy Noel. 1937. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press; London Agents: E. C. Allen and Son. 8vo. x + 249 pp. 6s. 6d.)

CLAIMING "complete freedom to set down what I have observed and considered, uninfluenced by contrary views of other observers or by what editors expect to receive," Mr. Noel is frankly partisan, and makes no attempt to conceal the fact. His book is not likely, therefore, to commend itself to those who hold strong views adverse to Japan. Even those who are favourably disposed towards her will find it difficult to agree wholly with the author's interpretation of all that has happened since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese dispute. Nevertheless, in spite of a tendency towards over-statement and a somewhat irritating style, there is much in these pages to merit attention. This applies in particular to his observations on the Japanese Army and Air Force, and to his philosophisings on such matters as "atrocity" propaganda and press distortions.

The pity is that, in standing up for Japan, he has, to no small extent, nullified the good effect of some very shrewd comments by carrying his arguments too far and by levelling unsubstantiated charges against other countries. What, for instance, can be thought of his statement (p. 113) that "Japan and its possessions are watched enviously by those who command a billion people on the mainland, and Britain views her with such concern that she recently encouraged half these hordes to combat Japan"? That such a belief is current in Japan is, unfortunately, true; but it has no foundation in fact.

M. D. KENNEDY.

117*. JAPAN IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. By Dr. Eleanor Tupper and G. McReynolds. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xix + 465 pp. Bibl. 16s.)

ONE of the silliest pages in the history of diplomacy is a description given to the story of U.S.–Japanese relations of the past thirty years. This conscientious study seems to bear out that verdict.

The attitude of the various sections of the American public towards Japan is followed step by step, from the sentimental approval of 1904 to the general reprobation of 1937. The authors' use of sources other than press comment as a guide to "public opinion," or rather opinions, is to be commended.

For a British reader the story is interesting also as showing the peculiar difficulties of the Federal Government, liable as it is to have its foreign relations bedevilled by the antics of State legislatures. The part played by Californian politicians in needlessly embittering Japanese feeling is well brought out.

Another lesson is the need of democratic statesmen for courage to defy sectional interests or popular clamour for precipitate action. If Coolidge had shown the same firmness in dealing with the hysteria of Congress in 1924 as did "Teddy" Roosevelt and Taft in previous anti-Japanese outbursts, the record would have been happier.

It is ironical that as America's moral disapproval of Japanese policy has widened, so has her inclination to "do anything about it" declined. The impotent petulance of the State Department since 1931 has failed signally to check Japanese aggression in China—a striking contrast to the vigorous intervention of Washington twelve years earlier. Despite the exhortations of Mr. Hull, it looks as if the American people has decided that China and the Philippines are not worth the bones of a single "doughboy."

A. P. PERRY.

118. DIE VOLKSPOLITISCHE LAGE DES DEUTSCHTUMS IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL. By Dr. Karlheinrich Oberacker. 1936. (Jena: Gustav Fischer. vii + 101 pp. 4 maps.)

THIS is one of a series of works intended to stimulate the interest of Reich Germans in their countrymen overseas. It suffers, as the author admits, from being based only on material available in Germany. The writer reaches the interesting conclusion that the Brazilian Integralist movement, though Fascist and anti-Communist, is inimical to National Socialism. All the more regrettable is it therefore that almost 55 per cent. of the Integralist leaders in Rio Grande do Sul should be of German origin. The author fears that Integralism will destroy *Deutschtum* in Brazil. A. J. H.

119*. CHINA IN KAMPF. Der Krieg im Fernen Osten. Hrsg. von G. Friedrich und F. Lang. 1938. (Strasbourg: Editions Promethée. 8vo. 190 pp. 10 *frs.*)

This book is a collective work describing the Japanese imperialistic aims in China. It also gives a careful survey of the geographical, political and social background in China and Japan. It is issued by German emigrés in Strasbourg.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

SIR,

At page 380 of your May–June issue General Aspinall Oglander is reported to have said that in the week ending March 19th, 1938, the number of Regular Army recruits was no more than 137—a figure on which he made some rather scathing comments. But 137 is the figure for the London area only. For the same week the total number of Regular Army recruits for the whole country was 679 (see *The Times*, March 24th, 1938).

Yours obediently,
LEONARD STEIN.

2, *Pump Court,*
Temple, E.C. 4.
16th May, 1938.

Brigadier-General Aspinall Oglander writes in reply to the above letter :—

SIR,

I am shocked to learn from Mr. Stein's letter that in my reference to the "record" figure of 137 recruits in a week, as published so prominently in *The Times* of March 23rd, 1938, I did not make it sufficiently clear that the figure referred to the London area alone and not to the whole country. The announcement in *The Times* of the following day—the day of my speech—to which Mr. Stein refers, wherein it was stated that the total for the whole country that week had been 679, was not so prominently displayed, and I happened to miss it, or I should certainly have cited it with even greater emphasis. For may I suggest that Mr. Stein's letter really only stresses the point which I made when speaking of the Army's unequal competition with the

superior attractions of the Unemployment benefit? The Regular Army needs a total of some 30,000 recruits a year, or an average of some 600 a week, to replace the men who annually pass to the Reserve. But in March last the Army was, in addition, 22,000 men short of its peace establishment. Therefore, of the 679 men of whom Mr. Stein speaks, 600 would be required to replace normal wastage, and only 79 would go towards making up that deficiency of 22,000. At this rate of recruitment, it would take nearly five and a half years, or till the autumn of 1943, to restore the Army to its authorised peace establishment.

Happily, in the last two months further great improvements have been reported in the weekly numbers of recruits, but considering the decrease in the required standard of physique, the extension of the age limit, and the unparalleled improvements in the lot of the soldier which the Government has recently sanctioned, the situation would still appear to offer little cause for complacency. According to *The Times* of June 16th, 1938, the number of recruits during the previous week, for the whole country, was 719.

Your obedient servant,

C. F. ASPINALL OGLANDER.

Brigadier-General.

Nunwell,
17th June, 1938.

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

MISS CURREY ON MARSHAL DE BONO.

DEAR SIR,

Like General Temperley, I was profoundly startled by Miss Currey's view that Marshal de Bono's book " is a reply to those who declare that the Italo-Abyssinian war was the outcome of a long-laid plot," as I had myself regarded it as a conclusive vindication of their attitude. Her reply to General Temperley is ingenious, but it really will not do. What Marshal de Bono's book discloses has nothing in common with the plans made by General Staffs to meet possible eventualities. It tells of a concrete scheme for an attack on Abyssinia, for which preparations had to be completed by a definite date. After recording his private conversation with Signor Mussolini in the autumn of 1933, the author goes on : " Fin d'allora il Duce si era fatta la chiara idea che la questione doveva risolversi non oltri il 1936 " (p. 8), or, in the English translation (p. 13)—" From this moment the Duce was definitely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no later than 1936." On p. 10 (original—p. 17 translation), he speaks with pride of all that was done in the Ministry of the Colonies in the years 1933–34 in preparation. On the next page (both editions), he refers to " the date fixed by the Duce, *which I always regarded as irrevocable.*" He proceeded at once to propose the fostering of internal rebellion, which might give a chance to intervene (original p. 9, translation pp. 13–14). This was done so successfully that " from the very outset of the campaign there were signs of the results of this disintegrating political action, and that it deprived the enemy of at least 200,000 men " (translation p. 54). After referring frequently to the failure to induce the Abyssinians to assume the offensive, Marshal de Bono states (opening

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1938

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THE REFUGEE PROBLEM[1]

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON, K.B.E., C.I.E.

REFUGEES are no new problem. We have known them ourselves during and since the War, and there were refugee movements long before that. We all remember Isabella of Spain and the expulsion of the Jews. We remember the Huguenots after the Edict of Nantes. We remember the Pilgrim Fathers and the United Empire Loyalists. The problem is no new problem, but it is a more severe problem in the modern world than it ever was in the world before the War. Before the War refugee problems were avoided because frontiers were open. There was none of the political, economic and racial nationalism that we have today. From Eastern Europe alone in the twenty years before the War millions of people who might otherwise have been refugees got away to the new lands across the ocean, new lands that wanted a new labour supply, that wanted people to develop them.

The War, however, made a difference. I travelled a great deal before the War, all over the world, and I never needed a passport. But since the War frontiers have been closed and nobody can cross them, not only without a passport, but without a visa on the passport from the representative of the country to which the traveller wishes to go. Thus movements of population have been checked.

Three definite refugee movements after the War were quickly settled : the Greek refugees who came into Greece; the Bulgarian refugees who came into Bulgaria; and the Turkish refugees who came back into Turkey. But those were movements of a particular kind, movements of people to their own countries. It is true that the Greeks of Asia Minor were not citizens of European Greece, but their affinities were with European Greece. And so when they went to Greece it was both a refugee movement and a movement of sons of the soil coming back to the soil to which they really belonged. The Greek Settlement was organised by the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, and was quite a success. About a million people were settled in

[1] Address given at a meeting at Chatham House on June 28th, 1938; Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, K.C.B., D.S.O., in the Chair.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON has during the past year been directing, under the auspices of Chatham House, a survey of the Refugee Problem. A preliminary report, entitled *Refugees: Preliminary Report of a Survey* was published on July 27th, 1938; the full results of his inquiry will appear in October 1938 under the title *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey.* Sir John was Vice-President of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, 1926–30; a member of the Special Mission appointed to investigate settlement possibilities in Palestine, 1930; Director-General of the National Flood Relief Commission in China, 1931–33; Commissioner for Natural Resources in Newfoundland, 1934–36.

MR. E. A. CH.-WALDEN has recently returned from the Far East where he has been making a special study of the financial and economic situation.

MR. H. WICKHAM STEED is Lecturer on Central European History (with especial reference to Roumania and the Near East) at King's College, London. He was Acting-Correspondent of *The Times* at Berlin, 1896; Correspondent of *The Times* at Rome, 1897–1902; at Vienna, 1902–13; Foreign Editor of *The Times*, 1914–19; Editor, Feb. 1919–Nov. 1922.

DR. GERHART LUETKENS, who is of German nationality, has resided for several years in Roumania.

Greece, about six hundred and fifty thousand of them on the land. The Bulgarian Settlement was in charge of M. René Charron under the League, and he settled some two or three hundred thousand people in Bulgaria. The Turks have settled their own people without help from the League or from outside, and it appears that their settlement also is quite a success. They had ample land left by the Greeks on which to settle their people, and there were the Greek farms and farmsteads and houses for them, so that they were supplied with residences when they arrived. That immigration is still going on; every year about thirty thousand Turks come into Turkey. At present the immigrants are Turkish Moslems from the Dobruja of Roumania; and it is planned that in ten years the whole Moslem population of Roumania will have passed over into Turkey. Those three groups now present no problem. Their position has changed from that of refugees to that of citizens of the countries in which they settled. I only mention these as examples of the way in which settlements can be made.

For a settlement of any kind, however, there are certain essential conditions. You have doubtless heard people talking of the wide open spaces of the British Empire. Why do we not throw them open to the refugees from all over the world? It sounds very attractive but you cannot settle people in mass unless, first of all, you make careful preparations beforehand; secondly, you must have ample finance; thirdly you must have technical supervision when the refugees get there; and, fourthly, you must have certain amenities in the place in which you are going to settle them. You must have, for instance, communications and social amenities if your settlement is to be a success. In the three settlements I have mentioned those conditions were fulfilled and so the settlements were successful.

Before we start to discuss other classes of refugees we should know what a refugee is. There have been certain legal definitions of a refugee. For instance, in 1926 there was an inter-Governmental conference which defined a Russian refugee as "any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the U.S.S.R. and has not acquired another nationality." The case of the German refugee was defined by the Convention of 1938 at Geneva as—

"Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy in law or in fact the protection of the German Government, and stateless persons not governed by previous Conventions or Agreements

who have left German territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy in law or in fact the protection of the German Government."

That is a very difficult definition. So far as I can see it covers the people in the concentration camps inside Germany. They do not enjoy in fact the protection of the German Government.

These legal definitions do not, however, give us a true idea of what a refugee is. The essential quality of the refugee is that he has been forced to seek in some other territory refuge from his own country, that life to him is impossible or intolerable in the country to which he belongs, that, if he is outside, political conditions have arisen in his absence which prevent him going back. The last class is also refugee. It is composed of the political refugees with whom we are concerned at the present time. They may or may not be stateless persons. All refugees are not stateless by any means. None of the Italian refugees are stateless. The great majority of the German refugees are not stateless. Some have had their nationality taken away from them—some very distinguished people, Einstein, for instance, and Thomas Mann, have definitely been deprived of their nationality by the German Government—but the great mass of the German refugees are not stateless people. The Russian refugees are stateless because the Russian Government in 1921 passed a decree withdrawing nationality from all those Russians who had been absent from the country for five years and had not registered with the Russian Consul. Subsequently they passed laws denationalising other people. Apart from refugees there are large numbers of other stateless people in the world, who are not being looked after by anybody. I suppose in Europe to-day there are perhaps two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand stateless people, with no nationality, who are not looked after or protected by the League of Nations.

The group of refugees with whom we are dealing to-day falls into three categories. First of all there are those who are looked after by the Nansen International Office, of which Judge Michael Hansson is the head : they are the Russians, the Armenians, the Saarlanders, a certain number of Kurds, Turks and Georgians and one important group, the Assyrians, who are directly under the League of Nations. Secondly, there are the refugees from Germany and Austria arising out of National Socialist policy. Thirdly, there are small groups of refugees for whom there is apparently no international concern.

The Russian refugees became refugees after the Russian revolution. As you know, with the help of the British and other Governments, a civil war was waged against the Bolsheviks, and the armies that were defeated by the Bolsheviks were driven out of Russia, and with them a large number of the anti-Bolshevik population, who became the Russian refugees. There was a great concentration of them in Constantinople, and it was there that Dr. Nansen first began his work among refugees. He and also Sir Samuel Hoare, who is now our Home Secretary, were responsible for the dispersal of the Russian refugees from Constantinople. The Russian dispersion is a great story, an epic, which has never been written up. It would repay study by someone who knows how to write, for there is a really good story to be told of the dispersion of the Russian refugees from Russia and from Constantinople. They are now found all over the world. The largest groups of them are in France and in Poland; some thousands are in Germany, and there are large groups in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Sin-Kiang, Manchuria and China proper.

Nansen's first task was to provide these people with some element of nationality. They were stateless people, and the first necessity was a passport so that they could travel from country to country. In 1922 he got an Agreement to which fifty-three Governments adhered, providing that a document which is now known as the Nansen passport, a stateless identity and travel document, should be accepted by those nations and so enable the Russian refugees to travel. That passport is still current among refugees. But more was wanted than a passport, as these people had no rights of any kind, and as his next step Nansen secured the arrangement of 1928 which gave them certain elementary rights of the kind that nationals usually possess. After Nansen's death those were strengthened and constituted definite rights by the Convention of 1933, a Geneva Convention by which the States which acceded to it agreed to certain elements of nationality for these refugees. Under this Convention, which is now the Charter of Liberty for the Nansen refugees, the Nansen representative issues identity certificates, attests documents, character and professional qualifications. He recommends for visas, for residence permits, and admission to schools and libraries. The Convention also makes provision for certain elements of juridical status, for help in obtaining labour, for relief, for education and for certain fiscal benefits. It does not make a man a national, but it does give him certain of the elements of nationality. But that

Convention would not have been of much use if it had not been for the liberal attitude of the Governments which adhered to it.

Certain Governments have been extraordinarily liberal to refugees. Amongst them I cannot count the British Government. In the time of President Masaryk Czechoslovakia had an organisation which they called *Action Russe.* The Czechoslovak Government invited large numbers of Russian professors and thousands of Russian students to come to Czechoslovakia. They organised a Russian university, a Ukrainian university, Russian primary schools, secondary schools, high schools, technical schools. They invited two thousand Cossack agriculturists, and brought all these people into Czechoslovakia, trained them and maintained them at the expense of the Czechoslovak Government. That action was taken by President Masaryk because he thought, as everybody thought in those days, that the Bolshevik Government was not going to last. He planned to prepare a personnel of young educated technical people who could go into Russia when the Bolshevik Government fell and use what they had gained in Czechoslovakia for the benefit of Russia. That was a magnificent gesture on the part of Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia they treated them even better than the Yugoslavs. They welcomed them and gave them every facility. They gave pensions to the wounded officers and soldiers. They provided them with work. They allowed them to enter the Civil Service and to plead in the courts and gave them all the rights of the ordinary citizen. And still to-day they are helping with pensions those mutilated in the War, and the invalids. They are still treating them as if they were honoured guests, although they have been there for nearly twenty years. In Bulgaria also they treated them extraordinarily well. France has been marvellous in her treatment of refugees, not only Russian refugees, but refugees of every kind. This year in France, in fact in May, a decree law was passed which lays down that if any person arrives on the French frontier and alleges that he is escaping from political or religious persecution, the case shall be examined and if it is found true he shall be admitted. That is perhaps a typical example of the French treatment of refugees.

The French naturalise a great many of these refugees, particularly Russians. It is reckoned that a quarter of all the Russian refugees entering the country are now naturalised, and all the children are French citizens by birth unless they opt out by the age of twenty-one. As they have no other nationality into which to opt, it is clear that they will remain French citizens.

In Yugoslavia the people were so comfortable that they did not think it necessary to naturalise as Yugoslav citizens, and during the years when it would have been easy for them to do so they did not. Now it is more difficult; since 1933 there has been a slackening in the naturalisation of foreigners. In Yugoslavia, however, though the refugees are finding it more difficult to naturalise, they are being absorbed, and are certain to be absorbed entirely in the end, because every child born on Yugoslav soil is automatically a Yugoslav national. The same is the case in Bulgaria. In those countries, therefore, the problem of the refugee will be solved at least in the next generation. In Czechoslovakia it is different. There the children do not automatically obtain Czech nationality at birth. That fact leads to one great difficulty. As I mentioned earlier, two thousand Cossacks were invited into Czechoslovakia. They have settled down amongst the Czech peasants and they have married Czech women. In Czech law when a woman marries a stateless man she becomes stateless. She becomes a possible refugee, and the children are stateless. As a result, instead of marrying, a lot of these people are living in free unions, so that the children are born Czechs, though illegitimate Czechs. They think it is preferable to be an illegitimate Czech rather than a stateless person. A very small amendment of the local law would put that right.

The Russian problem, so far as Europe is concerned, is by way of being settled, and will disappear in the course of the next few years. I know that a great many people would not agree with that view, but in my opinion it is indisputable. Let me give a few figures. In 1922, according to the best estimates, prepared by Professor Izjumov after an examination of the Russian archives in Prague, seven hundred and twenty-five thousand Russian refugees were in Europe. In 1930 a census was taken by the Sub-committee of the private organisations and the number had fallen to five hundred and eleven thousand. In 1936 and 1937 the Nansen office made a return and they reported three hundred and sixty-two thousand Russian refugees, a fall of 50 per cent. in fifteen years. There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that within the next few years this Russian refugee problem will be settled by absorption in Europe and the Near East. It is true that the humanitarian problem remains. Large numbers of the refugees are old and invalid. They have got to be looked after. That is the duty of the governments and of the humanitarians in the nations in which they live and of their own fellow-countrymen. In most countries they enjoy the

benefits of the national social services. In France they are entitled to all the social services, including unemployment benefit.

There is, however, the problem of the Russians in the Far East. There are a hundred thousand of them, thirty thousand of whom are living in Harbin, in the most abject misery. Before the Japanese invasion those people were really quite comfortably off. A large number of them were employed on the Chinese Eastern railway. Others had businesses and shops in Harbin and a Russian clientèle with which they dealt. In addition, there are ten thousand Russians settled in agricultural settlements in the North of Manchuria on a tributary of the Amur on the Soviet border. Now they have to compete against Japanese and Chinese. Japanese shops are being supported, of course, by Japanese and the Russian shops are dying out. The Chinese Eastern railway has been sold and the Russians have lost their jobs and been replaced by others. There is now no opening in the towns of Manchukuo for Russian refugees. That is a dreadful problem which can only be solved by international action, and by international finance, because it will be an expensive thing to get the Russians away from Manchuria.

In China there are about thirty-three thousand Russian refugees, of whom twenty-seven thousand are in Shanghai. They were doing very well. Our investigator in China told us that three-quarters of them were making good. In Shanghai the whole of the Avenue Joffre, which is one of the great avenues, a mile long, was full of Russian shops, and the Chinese who wanted to compete with the Russians had to put up Russian signs. The Russians really were succeeding in Shanghai. Now the Japanese have come. A lot of the Russian businesses in Wayside and Hongkew, that part of the town where the Japanese prevail, have been destroyed, and unemployment among the Russians has increased seriously; more than 50 per cent. are unemployed in Shanghai. If the Japanese stay there, the Russians in Shanghai are going to be in the same position as the Russians in Harbin. One objectionable feature is the fact that the Japanese are trying to make the White Russians fight the Chinese. Of course, once they start fighting the Chinese it will be impossible for them to live comfortably in China. This problem of the Russians in the Far East is the only serious Russian problem left; and they must be got out in one way or another.

The Armenians are the next group of refugees with whom we are concerned. As you know, they lived in the territory of the

Ottoman Empire, and long before the War they were subjected to massacre and every kind of torture that the Turks could devise. During the War also there were appalling massacres. Doctor Lepsius, who was a German doctor in Asia Minor during the War, and who tried to use his influence with the German Government to prevent the massacres, said in his report that a million Armenians had been killed in these massacres and that two hundred thousand had been converted to Islam or had been compelled to enter Turkish homes. During the War as many escaped as could. After the War came the Greek war against the Turks in 1921 and 1922, which was encouraged, I am afraid, by the British, and when the Greeks were beaten the Armenians were swept away with them. A large number got away to Erivan, but there are still two hundred and twelve thousand Armenian refugees, a hundred thousand in Syria and the Lebanon, sixty-three thousand in France, again the country that helps the refugees, and twenty-five thousand in Greece. The people in Syria and the Lebanon have become citizens of that country. They are now definitely established. The Nansen office has done a great deal for them; it has made urban settlements and agricultural settlements. But they are subject to a very grave danger. In the Lebanon the Armenian refugees added to the other Christians make a very small Christian majority. The Moslems in the Lebanon are actually a large minority. In Syria the Christians, including the Armenians, are only one in ten of the population, and they are extremely anxious as to what is going to happen to them when the French withdraw, as they will in 1940, from the Mandated territories. During the recent reports of trouble in Alexandretta between the Turks and the French I saw a statement in the *Daily Telegraph* that the Armenians in the settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta had fled. That is a symptom of what will happen unless there is protection of the Armenian minority in Syria and the Lebanon after the Mandate is withdrawn. It is a political problem.

There is one small problem connected with the Armenians in Greece. The Greeks are also very good to refugees, and they passed a law in 1927 that all the Armenians under the age of twenty-two might be naturalised as Greek citizens. Then they made an arrangement with the Soviet Government under which the Armenians were to be returned to Erivan, and in the light of that prospective transportation and repatriation of Armenians the Greek Government suspended the law under which they were naturalising them. Now Russia will not take any of them; she

will not take anybody from anywhere. I was talking recently to a Jewish lady in Prague about this reluctance. Czechoslovakia has about eight hundred German communist refugees, who are not very comfortable in Czechoslovakia, and I do not think the Czechs want them very much. So this lady wrote to Litvinov and said : " I have got here eight hundred perfectly good Communists. Will you let them come into Russia ? " And he wrote back and said : " No, you keep them there. They will teach the other people the right way of living." Russia will not now allow immigration of any kind. So the Armenians remain in Greece, and they are not being naturalised, and constitute a refugee problem. If only the Greek Government would make a small gesture and would allow the naturalisation law to be re-enacted, these refugees would be naturalised and the problem would disappear.

The Assyrians are known as the Assyrians of Iraq, and we British have got nine thousand of them on our hands, although we do not admit it. We are responsible for them. It was the British Government that used the Assyrians after the War to help them keep the peace in Iraq. Nine thousand of those people settled on the Khabur temporarily. The Khabur is a river in Upper Syria, and the French Government, the Mandatory Power, planned to drain a great marsh, the Gháb marsh, to settle the Assyrians there. When the French resolved to give up the Mandate they thought the Gháb would not be safe and so kept them on the Khabur, and are looking after them. The latest report is that the Assyrians are getting on very well, and there is no doubt that that problem is settled, if only the change in the Government does not militate against their safety, as it is possibly going to militate against the safety of the Armenians in Syria and the Lebanon.

The last group of Nansen refugees to be considered is that of the Saarlanders. There are only about eight thousand of them, and they are definitely settled. A few of them went out to Paraguay through the Nansen office, but the majority are in France, have settled down quite comfortably and constitute no further problem. So that, with the exception of the German and Austrian refugees, the only post-War refugee problems left are (i) the problem of the Russians in the Far East, which is a real problem, (ii) the political problem of the Armenians and Assyrians in Syria and the Lebanon, and (iii) the small problem of the Armenians in Greece.

The assumption of power by the National-Socialists in the early months of 1933 introduced new elements of domestic and

international policy in Germany. The particular matter with which we are concerned is the treatment of the Jews, of those whom they term non-Aryans and of the political antagonists of the Nazi Party. The domestic policy which they have adopted is to render impossible any decent life for these people in Germany. They persecute them spiritually and physically. They treat them in a way no self-respecting person can support, and in practice they compel those who can do so to escape from the country, while at the same time they take steps to see that they do not take any property with them. In effect what they are saying to the rest of the world is this: "We do not like these people. We are going to render their life intolerable if they remain in the country. We are willing that you should take them, but without their property. If, in these circumstances, you are unwilling to take them, we shall keep them and treat them in any way that we think fit." In other words, the German Government is placing the other governments of the world in a dilemma. Either they have got to open their doors to hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken Jews, non-Aryans and political refugees, or they have got to close their doors and to share the responsibility, as they undoubtedly will feel they do, with the German Government for the way these people are treated in Germany. That is not a fair dilemma in which to place the world. As a result of this National-Socialist policy there has been an exodus of about a hundred and fifty thousand refugees. Of these the great majority are Jews. It is reported that about fifteen thousand are not Jews, but non-Aryans or political refugees. That number may be too few; it has been represented to us that the numbers are actually considerably greater, possibly twenty thousand. But this persecution is still going on. We now have Austria on top of Germany, and we have not yet got to the stage at which the Germans know how many are those whom they describe as non-Aryans. Nobody knows how many there are. They talk about millions. There may be that number; I do not know. But we are liable to have a far greater efflux of refugees from Germany than we have had hitherto. The President of the Council of the League appointed a High Commissioner to look after the refugees, Jewish and others, coming from Germany, and the first High Commissioner was an American subject, Mr. James G. Macdonald. He worked for two years, but found that as an autonomous authority he could not do his work effectively. In December 1935 he wrote a letter, a very noble letter and a very pathetic letter, to the League of Nations and resigned his appointment.

He said that the work was impossible in the circumstances in which he was placed. The position of the High Commissioner was changed, and our chairman, who is now High Commissioner, is definitely, if I may so say, an agent of the League of Nations. His efforts have been chiefly directed towards securing for German refugees the same modicum of juridical protection and status as was secured by the 1933 Convention for the Nansen refugees, and he has been successful. He secured an Arrangement in 1936, and this year in February he has secured the Convention under which the German refugees are practically in the same juridical position in their countries of refuge as are the Nansen refugees. Seven States have adhered to that Convention, and one hopes that other States will adhere. Apart from that, he has been engaged in co-ordinating private efforts to help the German and Austrian refugees and has also, I believe, been engaged on individual hard cases, doing what he could to help them out.

This German efflux has been met almost entirely by the efforts of the Jewish organisations, and those efforts have been beyond all praise. I do not think in the history of the world there has ever been such well-organised co-ordinated effort for a humanitarian purpose as has been shown by the Jewish organisations in this crisis. The problem of the Jews from Germany really was by way of being solved by them. I think that, if the Jews in Austria had not unexpectedly been added, the Jewish organisations would have had a plan for dealing with all the refugees from Germany. But of course Austria makes the problem twice as grave, and it now is greater than private organisations can be called upon to deal with. Of course other organisations have helped. We all know the Friends, and help has been given by a Catholic organisation, other Christian organisations, Communist organisations, etc. The Matteotti Fund has looked after the Social Democrats, and a great many other organisations have helped, but the outstanding effort, as was to be expected, has been the Jewish effort. They have not confined themselves to helping Jews. It is probably true to say that more Jewish money than Christian money has gone to help Christian refugees. The Christian effort has unfortunately been anything but adequate for the work that should be done for the Christians.

After the first wild rush in 1933 emigration really was planned. The Jews have even planned where a prospective refugee was going to settle before he left Germany. Palestine has been a help, but it has not been as great a help as perhaps was hoped, because, for political reasons, the emigration to Palestine has

been reduced during the last year, and is going to be at the lower rate for the next five years.

This problem is one which demands international action, and it was to consider what this international action should be that the Evian Conference was convened. Not only is the German and Austrian problem a tremendous problem that affects the whole world, but farther East is a prospective problem that may be three, four, five, ten times as great as the German and Austrian problem. In Poland and in Roumania the Governments have officially said that they want to get rid of their Jews. There are in Poland three and a half million, in Roumania eight hundred thousand Jews. If these Governments see that the German Government is successful and gets away with impunity with the treatment which is resulting in the exodus of the Jews, naturally those Governments might say: "Why should not we follow suit? This is the way to do it." Roumania might have done it the other day, but political pressure on Goga, perhaps on the King, resulted in stopping the expulsion of the Jews that was expected at that time.

Apart from this appalling Jewish problem which is the great problem to-day, there are certain other groups of refugees who seem to be no one's concern. There are the Italians. There are ten thousand political Italian refugees in France alone, and the French Trade Union, the Confédération Générale du Travail, has moved the French Government to help these people. I may say that the Trade Unions are helping the Russian refugees also. There is a Russian branch of the French Confédération Générale du Travail. They allow Russians to join and they have organised a Russian section. They look upon the matter entirely differently from the way we regard it in England. The ten thousand political refugees are not the only Italian refugees. There was a meeting in Lyons last year at which they started an organisation called the Unione Popolare Italiana to combine the efforts of the Italian political refugees and the anti-Fascists. Three months ago we had a report saying that there were over forty thousand in that organisation. Thus the number of refugees, in the sense of people who cannot go back to their own countries, is far greater than ten thousand. They are looking after themselves: the Italians look after the Italians, and wherever an Italian goes he finds some friend or somebody interested in him and so they present no problem.

Then there is another group of whom we know something, the

Spaniards. For them, again, France has provided a home. France has returned to Spain all the able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five, but has kept twenty-five thousand adult refugees, and in addition has ten thousand Spanish children refugees. Those are looked after by an organisation called the Comité d'Accueil which is organised by the French Trade Unions. They have boarded them out in individual families all over the South of France, and when I was inquiring into this movement in Paris the other day I found that not only were the people who had these children delighted to have them, but that there was a waiting list of fifteen hundred people who wanted to have Spanish children to look after. The Trade Unions pay for their medical attendance and for their clothing, but the people who put them up board them and feed them without charge of any kind. That is another instance of the way in which France behaves.

There is a small group of two thousand Portuguese political refugees who are not looked after by anyone; of these five hundred are in Brazil, fifteen hundred in France.

Had there been no Nazi persecution, the world would not have been worried with a refugee problem much longer. But there is the Nazi persecution, and that problem is complicated by increasing anti-Semitism. It is a very sad thing that wherever you go you find it, and that not only in the dictator countries. In fact, I think there is probably less anti-Semitism in Italy than there is, say, in France or Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia it is a new thing. In France they are much afraid of it. In the United States it exists, and even in Great Britain I see the symptoms of anti-Semitism. It is a dreadful malady, and is making things more difficult, because, not only have you got to get the people out of Germany, but you have got to find some place in which to put them. With this anti-Semitic feeling it is most difficult to find a country which will accept them. One wonders what the reason for it is, and I think there is one reason from which doubtless my Jewish friends will dissent, that is the existence of Zionism. I do not mean for a moment to say that Zionism is a bad thing. I think it has done marvellous work. It has been a renaissance. It has revived the Hebrew language and revived the self-respect of the Jews. But it has also had another result: it has impressed on all the nations of the world that the Jews are a people apart. In Poland to-day people are saying: "You are a son of Zion. Go to Zion." Not only that, it has impressed on the Jew his apartness. There must be hundreds of thousands,

perhaps millions, of hearts to-day which are beating with the hope that they will go to Palestine; and of them a very small minority will ever beat in Palestine. The work of the Jewish Agency, with its agents all over the world, has brought this Zionist policy to the knowledge of the Jew, and the fact that he has a right in Palestine. And it is, so to speak, detaching him from his local loyalty. I feel that has been one effect. It does not justify anti-Semitism, but I think it is some explanation of the rapid increase of anti-Semitism. It does not excuse anything, and we have got to see to it that anti-Semitic propaganda is stopped.

Anti-Semitic propaganda has another objective. Anti-Semitism is the thin edge of the Nazi wedge. If you can get people thinking in terms of anti-Semitism, which is identified with the Nazi doctrine, there is likely to be a sympathy with Nazism which otherwise would not exist. I have no doubt whatever that anti-Semitism is now being used deliberately as an instrument of political propaganda, and I think we have got to do what we can to counteract that propaganda.

Before I close there is just one more thing I want to say. I come up against the doctrine of the lump of labour all the time. When one asks : " Why do we not open the door to the refugees like France does? " Everyone says : " But look we have nearly two million unemployed," suggesting that if you bring in a new man, the amount of labour that is available will be reduced by the amount that that new man would take. That doctrine seems to me to be fallacious. We have been trying to find out about this aspect, and it is reported that in Belgium there are three thousand Belgian citizens employed by refugees, and in Holland there are twelve thousand Dutch citizens employed by three thousand German refugees. We have not been able to get figures for Great Britain. It is very difficult to isolate the effect of refugee immigration in this respect, but we do know for a fact that the fur trade from Leipzig has largely been transferred to London. I am satisfied that history will repeat itself if we will be liberal in our treatment of refugees. When you think of the past, never has Great Britain suffered through the influx of refugees. On the contrary, we have gained every time. And now, when, according to Professor Carr-Saunders, we may look forward to a somewhat rapid decline in our population, surely the time has come to welcome those who will counteract this fall in the population and at the same time bring to us gifts and abilities which perhaps we do not possess.

Summary of Discussion.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEILL MALCOLM (in the Chair) said that he hoped the discussion would help towards if not a solution, at least a mitigation of what was not only a terrible Jewish problem, but also a non-Aryan and political problem. He would like to draw attention to the comparison made by the lecturer between the activity of the Jewish organisations in this matter and that of the Christian organisations. A national Christian appeal had been launched, but much of the money which it had collected had come from the Jews.

LORD MARLEY said that with regard to the Russians in the Far East, the speaker believed that a considerable number from Harbin had been received back again over the Amur river into the Far Eastern territory of the Soviet Union and, according to reports which he had received from people in Manchukuo, a good many thousands of them had made good and were in employment there. The reports sent back to Manchukuo showed that there had been a good deal of propaganda amongst the Russians as to the conditions they would find if they did return to Russia. The press had been full of reports of how the Russians were eating babies for breakfast, even eating each other, and how whole villages had been wiped out, and how if they did go back to Russia from Manchukuo they would probably be eaten alive. It had been a great surprise to these Russians to learn that this was not the case and that work could even be obtained at a reasonable, if low, wage.

The settlement in Erivan had been a great success, and even as late as two years ago some two or three thousand had left France and gone to Russia, where they had been received into the Armenian area around Erivan. The tragedy was that the political troubles in Russia had closed this source of supply. However, the speaker did not believe that this state of affairs was permanent because, when he had been in Moscow two years ago consulting with the Russian Government on the subject of the possibility of their receiving German refugees, he had found nothing but sympathy both on the part of Governmental officials and on the part of the ordinary people themselves on the collective farms and in the factories. Therefore it was to be hoped that eventually the refugees from Germany, Poland and farther south might be received into Russia.

The speaker said that he would like to suggest a new method of dealing with the refugee problem : that was, preventing people from becoming refugees. There was going on in Europe to-day a gradual development of industrialisation in the backward agricultural countries such as Roumania and Poland. If it were possible to secure by industrial training the development of industries which would demand skilled and trained workers, it might be possible to secure among the frightened Jewish inhabitants the beginnings of a new life in which they would not only become self-respecting citizens earning their own living, but citizens of value to the country in which they found them-

selves. This would preclude the possibility of their being thrown out as useless refugees, but would, on the contrary, raise their status and that of other Jews as valuable contributors to the increase of wealth in their country. This work was already being done on a small scale by an organisation supported in Great Britain and other countries known as the ORT, which had some hundreds of schools containing many thousands of young Jewish men and women, who were being trained so that they might not become refugees; and it was to the honour of the Jews in Great Britain that they had become responsible for an ORT School in Berlin in which one hundred and twenty-five young Jewish boys were also being trained.

PROFESSOR NORMAN BENTWICH said that the strongest impression he had gained from the address was that the refugee problem was manageable. The problem of the post-War refugees, except for those now persecuted in Germany and Austria, had been settled, and in numbers it had constituted a very much bigger task than that which remained from Germany and Austria. This latter problem had been on the way to being managed until the events of the last two months. Since 1933 there had been an emigration from Germany of a hundred and fifty thousand persons, most of them Jews, who had been settled in countries over-seas, and the Jewish organisations were carrying out a plan for an emigration of twenty-five thousand a year. Had this been executed, nearly all the younger Jewish generation would have been got out of Germany in three years time. There remained in Germany, apart from Austria, about a hundred thousand Jews under forty. The age-level was rapidly getting higher as the younger people left. The emigration of a hundred thousand was a manageable problem. In Austria there were probably about one hundred and eighty thousand Jews and as many non-Aryans, altogether some three hundred and fifty thousand persons; and those under forty would not number more than two hundred thousand.

Another impression he had was the contrast between the tightness and timidity of governments since the War and the pertinacity and philanthropy of voluntary organisations. It was not an enormous burden for the nations of the world to find a place for two or three hundred thousand persons of intelligence, energy, capacity and discipline. Before the War in one year there had gone to America alone over one hundred thousand Jews from Eastern Europe, and they had been assimilated without great difficulty. It was the extraordinary exclusiveness in the world since the War which had turned this movement of peoples fleeing from persecution into an international problem.

The lecturer had mentioned countries which in the past years had received tens of thousands of refugees. Amongst them he had not included the British Dominions which tended to keep their doors closed to those not of British birth and nationality. It was to be hoped that this policy would change in the face of the new refugee problem before the world. What made the solution of the problem

particularly difficult was the ruthless spoliation of these people by the National-Socialist Government which, having blackmailed the Jewish organisations of the world, was now seeking to blackmail the conscience of humanity. They put the liberal nations in the dilemma of having to admit refugees without money or, as it were, becoming accessories to the persecution in Germany. It was to be hoped that as a result of the Evian Conference it would be possible to get the combination, which was necessary, of government facilities with voluntary endeavour. If the governments of the world would open their doors a little wider than they had done during the last few years, and actively help the work done by voluntary organisations, a settlement could be found.

About the danger of the problem spreading to Central and Eastern Europe, the speaker urged that the Jews should be prevented from becoming refugees by economic reconstruction inside those countries. This work would need to be on a large scale, and to have the support both of governments and private organisations. The problem of the millions of Jews in Eastern Europe could not be solved by emigration.

The lecturer had spoken of Zionism as being one of the causes of anti-Semitism. This argument was used by anti-Semites, who would use anything, and Zionism did give the Jews of Eastern Europe the feeling of being a nation with an attachment to their National Home; but it had nothing to do with the National-Socialist persecution in Germany, which was the root of the growth of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe. The main charge of the Nazis against the Jews was that they had been too fully assimilated in Germany and played too large a part in the life of the nation. On the other hand without the Jewish National Home in Palestine the speaker did not believe that the Jewish people could have kept their spirit and their hope as they had done in these years of stress. The fact that forty thousand Jews from Germany had a home in Palestine, and many were settled there on the land, was not only a great thing in itself, but had given hope and strength to four hundred thousand Jews who remained in Germany and to millions of Jews to-day in Poland and Eastern Europe.

Mrs. Ormerod said that the shame which was attached to Great Britain through her refusal to offer an asylum to refugees of recent years might be removed if it were possible to restore the rights which had been enjoyed by political refugees under the Act of 1905, which had been withdrawn in the first year of the War. There were two problems to be faced in Great Britain. It was necessary, firstly, to get the Government to put on the Statute book this limited right that a person fleeing for his life might be admitted to the country pending investigation and, secondly, it was necessary to remove from people's minds this idea of the fixed mass of labour. The speaker had no doubt been taught economics in a very old-fashioned way, but she had been always taught to believe that a human being produced a demand for his own labour.

MRS. J. B. HOBMAN said that the lecturer had spoken of Zionism as having created anti-Semitism. She would have thought that, on the contrary, it was a reply to that very old phenomenon anti-Semitism. She believed that the movement had originated with Herzl, the Viennese Press correspondent at the time of the Dreyfus trial, who had believed that unless some movement of this kind was started, there would never be any safeguard for the Jewish people. Unhappily anti-Semitism was a good deal older than Zionism.

One thing which possibly Governments could do with regard to the present refugees from Germany and Austria would be to bring pressure to bear on the National-Socialist Government to force it to allow the Jews and non-Aryans to take with them some at least, if not all their property when leaving the country. Twice, quite recently, such pressure had been applied, both times successfully. Once at the time of the seizure of Austria the Germans had tried to apply the same passport rules to all Jews irrespective of their nationality, and Great Britain had instantly retaliated by saying that British Jews must enjoy all the rights of other British citizens, whereupon Hitler had immediately climbed down. Then again there had been a move to deal with the property of British and American Jews in Germany, and both those Governments had intervened quite successfully.

LADY STEWART said that it was true that the average man in the street in Great Britain, as well as many M.P.s, often expressed fear of increasing unemployment in this country, but she agreed with the lecturer that that fear was without economic foundation. She believed that members of the Government, particularly the Home Secretary, were sympathetic on the question, and that it was simply a question of making public opinion felt on the subject of admitting refugees and of helping them to find work or to obtain permits to work. Those who had had experience in trying to obtain these permits knew how very difficult it was. It was the duty of everyone to enlighten public opinion, and so bring pressure to bear on the Government to follow the policy of France in this direction.

MR. RENNIE SMITH said that he experienced some misgivings on hearing Zionism referred to as a possible cause of the present anti-Semitic feeling in Europe. All his own observation of Europe during the last few years led him to believe that it was the positive doctrines of National-Socialism and their application which were more responsible for the present situation. It was a matter of a religious attitude towards life, an anti-Christian religious attitude working out in terms also of anti-Semitism. The British nation and people had not yet come to a full realisation of the nature of this growing problem in all its aspects. If this aspect of anti-Semitism were allowed to grow, it would spread from Germany throughout Eastern Europe, and would even affect Great Britain and the United States. Therefore over and above what the voluntary organisations could do (and in this connec-

tion the speaker deeply deplored the lack of activity among the Christian organisations in Great Britain, which was similarly to be found in the United States and which was a sign that Christianity was really lacking in vitality in the present generation), there should be a chance to make a new beginning. It was significant that the United States was, through the Evian Conference, taking an interest both from the voluntary organisations side and the Government side.

This refugee problem might become not only a matter for the Evian Conference, but also for the next Imperial Conference. The speaker would like to suggest the matter in terms of a definite colonial policy in relation to Germany. Germany did not require colonies for the export of human beings, but for raw materials. There would be the deepest possible opposition to giving back any colonies to the present Germany, but there would probably be the very largest measure of unity if a proposal were made to use the colonies through a special effort to accommodate as many as possible of these dispossessed Germans. In this connection it might be a good policy to give preference to places like Tanganyika and German East Africa, which formerly had been German. Such an attitude Great Britain owed to herself, and in the deepest sense to the German nation.

MRS. HAROLD WILLIAMS asked what was to be the future of the Nansen Committee. She could not agree with the optimism of the lecturer, and did not feel that the refugee question could be settled until the people possessing Nansen passports had the right to travel and to work. At present they had no right to work. The speaker knew of a girl living *au pair* in Great Britain at present (*au pair* was a kind of sweating system), who had to work very hard for five shillings a week with no hope of getting other work because she had no permit. The same applied in France. There the refugees certainly enjoyed the social services, but they were handicapped by the difficulties of getting a *permis de travailler*. Until the elementary right of labour was granted, the question could not be said to be settled. The position in the Far East, as had been indicated, was dreadful, especially for women and children and small girls, who were sold as white slaves in China and Japan. Protests about this had been made for years, but as yet there had been no improvement in the situation.

A GUEST said that she could not understand the lecturer referring to the settlement in the Near East as successful. Those people had died at the rate of five hundred a week, and of every possible disease and misery except old age. If this were a successful solution of the problem, it could be solved entirely in this way sooner or later.

MR. ISRAEL COHEN said that the Jewish refugee problem was only one aspect, although a very serious one, of the Nazi problem. Had it not been for the Nazis, there would be no Jewish refugees, but as long as they continued their activities, there would be a continuing Jewish

refugee problem. In five years a hundred and fifty thousand Jewish and other refugees had left Germany without any serious molestation or complete spoliation by the German Government, such as was now being applied to those who wished to leave either Germany or Austria. Since it had been announced that the Evian Conference would take place, the Nazi Government had actually intensified the persecution of the Jews, instead of alleviating it. From one point of view that Conference had played into their hands. There had been a time when Governments had the courage to express their opinion of such persecution. In 1892, when only a few thousand Jews had been obliged to flee from Roumania, the United States Government had issued a strong Note of protest to the Roumanian Government; but German persecution had gone on month after month and year after year with no comment on the part of civilised governments. Naturally the Nazi Government was taking advantage of this fact.

The lecturer had also referred to the spread of anti-Semitism in other parts of the world, apparently finding its cause in the Zionist Movement. A previous speaker had pointed out that anti-Semitism had existed in a flagrant form before the word Zionism had ever been heard. The lecturer had apparently not realised that the increase of anti-Semitism in all parts of the world was due to the same force which was responsible for the exodus of Jewish refugees from Germany, the Nazi Government itself, which was spreading anti-Semitism in all parts of the world not merely by propaganda within Germany, but by its colossal apparatus, which was spread throughout the world, and mainly by the Foreign Organisation of the National-Socialist Party. The Nazi Government subsidised a few hundred German newspapers in many different parts of the world, in Europe, North and South America and South Africa, and its propagandists were busy even in the Far East.

Concerning the part that Palestine might play in the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, the lecturer had made a survey of the absorptive capacity of that country several years ago, but since that time a few hundred thousand Jews had entered the country. A far larger number, however, could be admitted to that country than were allowed under the restrictions now enforced by the unwise policy of the British Government. Therefore, it was to be hoped that pressure would be brought to bear upon His Majesty's Government to implement their declared policy in Palestine, not only because it was necessary to carry out the terms of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate, but also because of the pressing demands of the hour.

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON said that concerning the repatriation of Russian refugees from Manchukuo and the Far East, in the early days the Chinese Government had repatriated six or seven thousand refugees, and since then, after the sale of the Chinese Eastern railway, a number of Russians had returned to Soviet Russia, and even to-day there was a small stream of Russians from Manchukuo and Sin-Kiang back to

Russia; but at the same time there was the corresponding stream from Russia into Sin-Kiang. Most of the Russians in China and Manchukuo did not want to return to the Soviet Union. They hoped to get away from China, but not to go back to Soviet Russia. They wanted to go to the British Empire if possible.

He agreed entirely with the second speaker as to the desirability of preventing people from becoming refugees. Prophylactic treatment was needed in Poland and the application of enormous sums of capital. If refugees were to be prevented in this way, someone had got to pay the bill. The ORT had undoubtedly done marvellous work, which was all of a piece with the work of the Jewish organisations.

The third speaker had thought the problem manageable, and that all the Jews under forty could be got out of Germany within the next few years. This was so if the problem could be confined to its original size but, if the problem were doubled or trebled, double the time and organisation and money would be needed to deal with it. The lecturer agreed that this work could not be left to private organisations. Far too much already had been left to private organisations. It was time for the governments to do something. The present spoliation naturally made the problem much more difficult.

The lecturer had not meant to say that anti-Semitism had been caused by Zionism, but to point out that Zionism had brought to the notice of both the Jew and the non-Jew, that the Jew had the right to be regarded as a person apart. On the other hand, the lecturer agreed with the last speaker that anti-Semitism was being caused throughout Europe by deliberate propaganda on the part of the Nazi Government.

The fourth speaker had mentioned the repeal of the 1905 Act, which had allowed asylum to political refugees. It was a matter for the M.P.s. If they felt that their constituents really wanted that Act re-introduced, then doubtless they would do it.

The fifth speaker had stated that Zionism was a reply to anti-Semitism. This might be so. She had also spoken of pressure being applied to the German Government to oblige them to allow refugees to take their property with them. He hoped that such pressure would be successful.

The seventh speaker had mentioned the relationship between the anti-Christian and anti-Semitic attitude of the Nazi doctrine. This was undoubtedly so. His suggestion that the ex-German colonies should be used for German refugees was very constructive. In this way the Germans would get back their colonies, but the Nazi Government would not receive them.

In reply to the eighth speaker, the present position of the Nansen Office was that the Committee of Three, consisting of Bolivia, France and Great Britain, had made a recommendation to the Council which had now been recommended to the Assembly that the Nansen Office and the office of the High Commissioner for German refugees be replaced by one office, so that the League proposed to continue with the juridical and political protection of refugees. The same speaker

had mentioned the right to work. This was a very difficult problem. It was quite true that when there was a shortage of work in a country the first to lose it were the aliens. But in many countries the refugees had now the same rights as the nationals. For instance, in Czechoslovakia a man who had lived there since January 1923 had exactly the same rights of work as an ordinary Czech citizen. In France the aliens had not the same rights as the nationals, but the refugee in France could become a national if he chose to do so. There had been a law of expulsion in the case of lack of money, but this had been put right by the law passed on May 2nd, 1938. The question of the women and girls in the Far East was very terrible. In Shanghai 22 per cent. of the Russian women and girls lived by prostitution, or as dance hostesses or what were called housekeepers. It was a serious problem, but there were indications that matters were improving. A Commission had been sent out by the League to inquire into the position three or four years ago.

The lecturer did not understand the ninth speaker's remark about the settlement in the Near East. It had worked extraordinarily well, and by un-mixing the populations might be said to have avoided the wars to which the Balkans used to look forward every spring.

The last speaker had been right when he had said that the Jewish refugee problem would continue as long as the Nazi Government continued. It was necessary that a real effort should be made to put things right. If this were done, there was reason to hope that some solution of the problem might be found.

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE OPEN DOOR[1]

E. A. CH.-WALDEN.

JAPAN is a country of contradictions. They dominate her relations with the outer world, and bewilder friends and enemies alike. Her modern history is full of them, the last and greatest finding expression in her invasion of China. She needs industrial expansion—and is destroying her most important market. She fears the rise of China as an industrial Power—and has herself conferred on China unity and the foundations of political and economic strength. She fears Communism and its spread in the Far East—and is driving China into the arms of Russia.

Only fear seems to reconcile these inconsistencies: a fear arising from her volcanic island homeland. She felt it in face of the black ships of Commander Perry after an isolation lasting two hundred years, and it has actuated her foreign policy ever since.

However high the proportion of realism in the psychological make-up of Japan, and however keen her political astuteness, there will always remain a residue of motives which are rooted in a highly neurotic condition. For the Japanese are a neurotic nation, and have, like many neurotic, fear-driven individuals, a mystical belief in the omnipotence of their will. This belief, with Japan's other traits of ambition and hyper-sensitiveness, springs from her fundamental pessimism, her fear that to-morrow it may be too late, that China, Russia, Great Britain, may crush her into submission with their tremendous superiority in numbers and resources. Experience has served to deepen that fear: the unequal treaties of the 1890's, the frustration from 1894 to 1922 of her military victories, and racial discrimination in the United States.

And her fear has stimulated the forces she is afraid of—a united China, a Russian Far Eastern Army, a huge American Navy and a certain alertness in the British Empire.

Fear has driven forward her industrial development with no

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 23rd, 1938.

pause for adjusting economic facts with the ancient feudal structure of her society. Fear is at the root of her social disequilibrium. It compelled her to arm. The cost was paid by the peasant, as is only natural in a feudal society. That led to discontent, which led in turn to the rise to power of the Army—an army of peasants clamouring for relief.

Japan, when she indulges in these neurotic day-dreams, so oddly contrasting with her realism, is unable to understand that times have changed, that the world is no longer as it was a century ago, that East and West are one, that wars of conquest no longer solve a nation's internal problems, that only social and economic unity within, and solidarity with the rest of the world, can bring salvation to each independent national unit.

Japan's tragedy lies in her growing fear of failure. The fear is making the failure probable, but with it a salutary re-adjustment within and without.

The strategic position of Japan is very strong. Her limitations, however, are equally great.

The maintenance of the principle of the Open Door, and the preservation of British vested and potential interests in China, are, however, mainly a political problem. For the time being Japan's naval supremacy in Far Eastern waters is established, and gives her the security she needs for continental expansion. There is no evidence that this supremacy is likely to be challenged for the present by either Great Britain or the United States. As to Soviet Russia, her internal weakness and the present tension in Europe make it doubtful whether she would intervene.

The principle of the Open Door has had a very varied career. It was first put forward in 1899 by Secretary Hay of the United States, and accepted by all the " China Powers " excepting Russia. Its diplomatic and legal base to-day is the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of 1922.

This Treaty was violated by Japan in 1931. Japan then assured the world, as she does at present, that she had no territorial designs, and that she would continue the policy of the Open Door. That statement was soon to be falsified. First came the establishment of Manchukuo, then Meng Chiang, the new Mongol State in Inner Mongolia, followed by the East Hopei Autonomous Council. The Provisional Government in Peiping, and the " Renovation Government " in Nanking, are more recent attempts to establish Puppet Governments.

Mr. Hirota, the former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared on May 15th, 1938, to Reuter's correspondent :

"It is the fundamental policy of the Japanese Government to continue the policy of the Open Door in the occupied territory in China. In fact, she has long been striving to get this principle put into practice by the Nationalist Government of China, which, contrary to their Treaty obligations, resorted to various methods of discrimination against Japan. Other Powers will continue to enjoy an equal right to trade in, and develop the natural resources of, the occupied territory, for the economic development of which the investment of foreign capital is very desirable. The new régimes set up in Peiping and Nanking will, I believe, take all appropriate measures for the protection and smooth development of foreign economic interests in their territories."

With this one may, however, contrast other statements which appear almost daily in the Japanese press. Thus Admiral Suetsugu, Minister of the Interior, has declared that the coloured races must be freed from the bondage of the white, and that the peace-stabilising mission of Japan would imply the ejection of the White races from Eastern Asia.

What is the British stake in China? It represents investments of about three hundred million pounds sterling in Chinese Government loans and loans to railways, in trading concerns, shipping, banking, manufacturing and mining, real estate and public utilities. British imports to China amounted to only nine million pounds in 1936, but imports from the British Empire were substantial, and the trade between China and the Empire amounted in 1936 to about thirty million pounds.

Next comes the element of potentiality. Hopes centred in China were rapidly developing into possibilities from the point of view of investments and capital goods imports. Japan and Great Britain have radically different attitudes towards these prospects. Britain seeks friendly and peaceful co-operation; Japan is out for stern colonial exploitation.

Of no less importance to Great Britain is China's export trade, to a large extent handled by old-established British firms. British shipping interests are also large; 40 per cent. of all vessels entering and leaving Chinese ports carry the British flag.

The income from investments, trade and shipping may amount to some fifteen million pounds a year, yet more is involved than these ostensible components.

Thirteen thousand British subjects earn their living in China, besides those who depend on income from trade, insurance and banking. Modern China, now threatened with destruction by Japan, is to some degree the creation of British enterprise, the fruit of a hundred years of co-operation.

The application of the Open Door in Manchukuo provides a partial answer to what is in store for North and Central China. For foreign interests in Manchukuo the Open Door has been for one-way traffic—outward. Foreign trade, commercial enterprise and investments other than Japanese have been substantially reduced. The foreigner has been ousted by two methods: the first consisted in a State-socialistic, monopolistic domination of all key industries—that is, all vital points in the economic life of the country. Railways, utilities, mining and heavy industries were under the control of the Kwantung Army and South Manchurian Railway, whose activities range from coal-mining to hotel enterprise. Most purchases were made in Japan. Most minor enterprises in Manchukuo were, in one way or another, suppliers of these Japanese companies, and obviously the foreigner was not admitted except where considerations of credit were involved, or when machinery or raw materials had to be bought which could only be obtained outside Japan. Even in these latter transactions a Japanese intermediary was advisable; a normal state of affairs from a Japanese national point of view, but hardly in harmony with the spirit of the Open Door. The second method was police or political pressure on the buyer, or non-interference with law-breaking activities of Japanese subjects.

Since the beginning of the present incident, however, all pretences and technicalities have been dropped so far as the Open Door in Manchukuo is concerned. The Manchukuo Exchange Control Law enacted last October imposes foreign exchange restrictions similar to those prevailing in Japan, with one important distinction, however—these restrictions apply to all foreign countries except Japan. In November last Manchukuo issued a trade control law which required permits for all imports. Some imports are prohibited, including: wheat flour, except from Japan; rice, except from Japan and Siam; sugar, except from Japan. A leading British firm lost its trade almost over-night, having been engaged for over fifty years in refining sugar and selling it to Manchukuo. The trade was large, and after 1931, in face of Japanese competition, the firm was able to maintain and even improve its market position in Manchukuo. Now its officials have been told in Hsinking that no import permits will be issued. Protests in Tokyo were met with denials and suggestions that the matter should be referred to Hsinking, where consular intervention was ineffectual, however, as Manchukuo has not been recognised by the British Government. Japanese sugar is being imported without difficulty.

The strain of a war which was expected to last three months and is now in its twelfth month, with no end in sight, has forced the Japanese to change their tactics. The Door is being closed without much regard to Tokyo declarations. British export and import trade, British shipping, British-owned industries and banks, are being forced out of business by currency manipulations, tariff revisions, smuggling and plunder.

An important measure, as far as immediate effects are concerned, is the establishment of the Federal Reserve Bank for North China. This new currency, called yuan, stands at parity with the yen, and is backed with a credit of a hundred million yen by several Japanese banks. It is an effective bar against non-Japanese imports. No foreign exchange is being sold against the new currency; firstly because the bank has none to sell; secondly, because it forces the Chinese merchant to buy Japanese goods. As there are for the time being no exchange regulations in North China, the foreign exporter is allowed to retain proceeds

This new currency provides a loophole allowing Japanese nationals to export capital. Yen are interchangeable against yuan, and Chinese merchandise might be bought and exported abroad against foreign exchange, which for the present is left with the exporter. It has been noticed that export bills do not find their way to banks, but are being negotiated privately at a premium. Immediately after the establishment of the new currency, yen notes were smuggled to Shanghai and exchanged there against Chinese dollars at a profit of about 6 per cent. to 7 per cent., and at the time the London–Tokyo cross rate in Shanghai fell to 1s., compared with the official rate of 1s. 2*d.*

Unless Japan abolishes extra-territorial rights in North China, and until she can establish some kind of administration and control there, full exchange restrictions can be of no use. Yet the creation of this new currency has brought about chaotic conditions, and represents an effective weapon for the destruction of established foreign business interests.

In the meantime the North China Customs tariff has been revised by the Provisional Government in Peiping. It reduces substantially import rates on commodities usually sold by Japan, and export rates on what Japan buys in China. Though most of Japan's imports do not compete with foreign-made goods, they are in direct competition with local industries, both Chinese- and British-owned. The revised tariff threatens British manufacturing interests in China and, if maintained, could dislocate

Central China's trade via Shanghai and divert both exports and imports to Tientsin.

Another interesting case is that of the import of Japanese goods into Shanghai. According to *The Times* of February 16th, 1938:

" All the wharves at Shanghai except the few in the French concession lie in the area occupied by the Japanese, and since the outbreak of hostilities Japanese Customs officers only have been admitted even on foreign-owned wharves and ships. No Customs control of any sort has been allowed to operate on any Japanese wharf, or on board any Japanese merchant ship. The wharves have been ostensibly taken over for naval and military use, and the ships are all designated ' transports.' No ships' manifests are presented by Japanese shipping. Duty has sometimes been paid on cargoes carried on Japanese ships, if consigned to a foreigner, but never if consigned to a Japanese. Hardware, provisions, paper, sugar, rayon and other commodities are being sold in Shanghai at prices so low that no duty can have been paid on them."

A report reached this country recently dealing with another aspect of the Open Door, and incidentally of Japanese business principles. It concerns the attitude of the Japanese cotton-mill owners and the Japanese military authorities towards Chinese cotton-mills in the Shanghai area. The Japanese first made the following suggestions to some Chinese mill-owners: that existing mills should be repaired by the Chinese and then operated jointly by Chinese and Japanese. In return for protection and technical assistance, the Japanese were to receive 51 per cent. of the profits. These would remain in the concern and be used to acquire a 51 per cent. holding in the company. The Chinese, not unnaturally, were not attracted. The Japanese mill-owners then petitioned their military authorities for the privilege of operating the mills. A list has been printed in one of the Chinese papers of all the Chinese mills in the occupied area, with the names of Japanese granted the right to run them.

The plans concerning the economic exploitation of North China are the most definite and important potential threat to British interests. These plans are of old standing, based partly on the fact that Japan occupied Shantung for the eight years 1914–1922, and partly on her efforts to penetrate North China since she established Manchukuo, especially since the limitations and difficulties of the " paradise land " became clear.

It is not known whether these plans will follow the Manchukuo pattern or whether they will be on liberal lines, with a free hand for Japan's big business and an eye on the participation of foreign

capital. Both directions lead to monopolies in fact, and both are an application of the economic structure prevailing in Japan. The North China Industrial Company, with a capital of three hundred and fifty million yen, is about to act as a holding and organising company on lines similar to the South Manchurian Railway. Iron-ore and coal-mines are already being exploited, and in future this company will have sole rights to engage in railway construction, public utilities and heavy industries.

For the time being they remain in the planning stage, and all that has been done is to take over some of the existing Chinese enterprises and exploit such resources as will not require large investments. Japan is not at present in control of North China, and is not in a position to invest over a hundred million pounds.

Of the greatest significance are, to my mind, the developments in North China, so far as purchasing monopolies are concerned. The North China Raw Cotton Company has recently been established for the export of cotton to Japan, and every effort is being made to make the cotton-farmers entirely dependent on trade with Japanese concerns. North China is a rather important producer of wool. Tientsin had an annual trade of about one and a half million pounds sterling in native wool, suitable for carpets and exported mainly to the United States. The trade was entirely in the hands of foreign merchants. Several months ago, on the occupation of Paotou by the Japanese, all Chinese merchants were ordered to register their stocks of wool with the Japanese, and their warehouses were sealed. Some time later the Japanese bought the wool, paying for it in Meng Chiang notes. The transaction was said to be made on behalf of the Kwantung Army, and the wool was transported to Manchukuo by rail, probably to be sold against foreign exchange in the United States. This is a clear case of an administrative monopoly, as any purchaser of wool has to register with the authorities, and has to obtain a permit to ship it from Paotou. Transport facilities are available only to the Japanese, and no foreign merchant is in a position to compete. The hemp trade in Shansi has been dealt with in exactly the same way.

Legally, of course, there is no monopoly. It exists in fact, and is a clear breach of the principle of the Open Door.

To conjecture the future we must look back into the past. The bomb which burst in September 1931, and marked the beginning of the present war, released forces which have proved intractable. Japan has no choice in the occupied provinces of China. She finds herself obliged to pursue a policy of monopolistic exploitation,

and if she tolerates foreign interests, will do so only on her own conditions. It must be remembered that Japan made her entrance on the international stage as a country essentially lacking the foundations for industrial power, yet forced by external circumstances to equip herself with means of maintaining her national independence. She achieved her end, but the development was not and could not be harmonious and organic. Feudal in her social structure, oriental in her social habits, Japan, in spite of her phenomenal industrial development, remains, as she has been throughout her modern industry, a poor country.

Another and greater enemy than poverty has also confronted her—time. She started her economic rise too late, with no time to adjust her industrialisation to her traditional and essentially feudal social structure. The ratio of time to resources frustrated Japan's expansion throughout her history, and, if my reading of the situation is correct, may frustrate her struggle for supremacy in Eastern Asia.

This frustration can already be observed, in fact, in Manchukuo, where her experience has proved the rule that political domination in itself does not guarantee an improvement of the economic strength of the dominating country.

Her investment in Manchukuo between 1932 and 1937 amounted to thirteen hundred million yen. Her military expenditure there amounted to about a thousand million yen. Her balance of trade has been considerably weakened by the unfavourable balance of Manchukuo, and she has but a small return from her investments.

Before 1931 30 per cent. of all her industrial raw material had to be procured from abroad. Now, after seven years of strenuous effort to develop the resources of her empire, about 35 per cent. of raw material has to be imported. This is obviously a result of the first six years of the war in China, which has imposed on Japan the necessity for a manifold increased production of capital goods.

Three factors seem likely to determine the consequences of Japan's economic thrust on the continent of Asia. She is still far from self-sufficiency in raw materials, her balance of payments is in a precarious state, and her financial position is weak.

First as to raw materials. We may visualise Japan as a central reservoir. The inflow consists mostly of raw materials and such capital goods as are not yet produced in Japan. Some are re-exported as payment for imports, transformed by Japanese labour into manufactured goods. Some are kept at home for

consumption. Some are invested at home in the development of heavy industries and in Manchukuo for the intensification of raw material production. The balance goes to China for the conduct of the war.

The operations of Japan in China may be described as export of capital for long-term investment. That operation falls into two stages: the promotion stage, that is actual war expenditure for political conquest, and the investment stage proper for the development of China's natural resources.

It must be noted that Japan cannot for the present hope to conduct the war at China's expense. Both Chinese and Japanese have ravaged the occupied territory. Trade is almost at a standstill, and what revenue there is from Customs, salt, taxation and narcotics will not go far towards her military expenses. In many districts farmers have left their land, and famine is threatening North China.

Is Japan in a position to export capital abroad and invest it on very long term? Has she sufficient reserves for this purpose in foreign exchange and easily saleable foreign investments? Are her reserves of essential raw materials sufficient not only to enlarge her productive capacity and that of her dominions, but also to invest several hundred million pounds for the conquest of China; to spend as much again on the reorganisation and administrative rehabilitation of that vast territory, and finally to invest considerable sums of money in mining, transportation, public utilities, commerce and shipping, as she must to obtain a return of investments on the continent of Asia which will have amounted, between 1931 and the end of 1938, to about five hundred million pounds sterling?

Her resources consist of stores of arms and raw material for war purposes; gold reserves and balances in foreign banks; increase of production of war material at the expense of the production of export and consumers' goods and restriction of home consumption in order to increase war material available.

Japan did not expect a prolonged war. Her purchasing power in 1936 was already limited, and according to my information she can scarcely have accumulated more than six months' stores. This is confirmed by an analysis of both cotton and oil purchases. Her visible gold reserves at the outset of the war amounted to about eighty million pounds. It is doubtful whether she has important foreign balances or secret gold reserves. Most of her foreign revolving credits have been cut down considerably, as have her limits for the placing of export and

import paper. Her standard of living being so low already, restriction of home consumption cannot go far, and the production of substitutes requires both time and capital.

An answer to the questions formulated above is furnished in Sir George Sansom's last economic report on Japan:

"At present Japan's exports of merchandise, combined with her earnings from shipping and insurance, are only just sufficient to pay for her imports, and consequently if the returns of trade show no improvement her international financial position is likely to deteriorate. Or, to put the matter in the most favourable light, she will be short of funds for overseas investment if not for the support of her foreign exchange. Apart from an improvement in export values, it would seem that the only ways in which the unfavourable position in international account can be remedied, are either to diminish overseas investments and expenditure or to ensure that such investment and expenditure is productive within a short space of time. For the latter alternative prospects are not very bright at present, because Japan's foreign investment has been confined chiefly to investment in Manchuria and immediate returns are not to be expected. It is likely that the financing of the Manchurian enterprise is proving a strain upon Japan's resources. It is therefore better," Sir George concludes, "not to prophesy but to confine oneself to pointing out that the present margin of safety is rather small." [1]

Japan's invisible income has suffered considerably as a result of the war. A recent message from Tokio states that her income from tourist traffic is down to 5 per cent. of what it used to be a year ago. Her shipping has been diverted to a large extent to war purposes. Her gold reserve is shrinking, and I understand from well-informed quarters that at present her exports of gold are larger than her gold production, which is estimated at about fifteen million pounds a year.

We have reached the second of our three factors, Japan's balance of payment and trade, which I regard as her essential problem, more so than the dangers of inflation.

This balance presents a truly depressing picture. Japanese official trade returns for the first quarter of 1938, as compared with the same period for 1937, show a decrease of about 20 per cent. on the export side and of about 30 per cent. on the import side, leaving an unfavourable balance of trade of sixty-five million yen. Former speculative imports, as Japanese official publications have it, might be thought to account for the decrease in imports, while the decrease of exports corresponds to the general decrease of international trade since last year.

[1] Great Britain: Department of Overseas Trade: *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Japan, No. 653, June 1936*, by Sir G. B. Sansom.

New light, however, is shed on these returns by a decree issued by the Tokyo Government on June 16th, 1938, by whose terms exports of cotton yarn and piece-goods to China are to be restricted. The Government does not consider Japan's balance of trade to be improved by the export to countries of the Japanese currency bloc of goods for which raw materials have to be imported. If we accept the view of the Japanese Government, we must conclude that the unfavourable balance of trade for the first quarter of 1938 was not sixty-five but a hundred and forty million yen. In this figure are not, of course, included such invisible though highly tangible commodities as the bombs, tanks and military supplies poured into China, but it does cover other significant exports to that country, among them the following:

Saké and other alcoholic beverages, up 300 per cent.; cigarettes, up 2000 per cent.; and beer, up from eighty-five thousand yen in 1937 to one million two hundred thousand in 1938.

There is a decrease in cotton textile exports to all countries except Manchukuo and Kwantung. Silk tissues are in general down 25 per cent., but to the United States down 50 per cent. Exports of iron manufactured goods are down only 10 per cent., but this is made up by an increase of 100 per cent. to Manchukuo, while exports to the Dutch East Indies are down 75 per cent., to British India 40 per cent., to the Philippines 50 per cent. Exports of tea are down 40 per cent., but the principal markets show a decrease of 75 per cent. to Canada and 50 per cent. to the United States. There is a very considerable increase of machinery exports, like telegraphic instruments, up 400 per cent., photographic instruments, up 500 per cent., and steam vessels, up 400 per cent.—all, of course, for military purposes. But cycles, a proverbial export article of Japan, are down 60 per cent.

If we analyse the exports by countries, we find that those to Asiatic markets controlled by Chinese merchants (the Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Malay States) are down 55 per cent. Exports to the United States are down 45 per cent., but up 40 per cent. to the slow-paying and partly blocked South American markets.

If one considers Japan's exports as a means for payment for imports, she is down at least 35 per cent. as compared with 1937.

Turning to her import trade, which is down 30 per cent. we see a marked increase of imports of ores and metals, machinery and pulp, while raw cotton and wool are down 75 per cent. and 90 per cent. respectively. It is argued that Japan's decrease in cotton imports is due to over-stocking. This assumption is incorrect. Taking cotton imports in 1934 and 1935 as an average, there is an increase in 1936 and 1937 of, together, two hundred

and sixty million yen, which corresponds approximately to the decrease of cotton imports in the first quarter of 1938. Cotton bought in 1936 and 1937 was paid for at much higher rates than the present market price. Cotton is being used not only for re-export, but also for military purposes. It is therefore clear that existing stocks of raw cotton are insufficient. It is certainly possible that the Japanese Government will, in time, cause the complete replacement of cotton goods for internal consumption by silk and rayon, but this will take time and result in partial unemployment, as about 40 per cent. of Japan's cotton production is for domestic use. It must also be remembered that in 1937 cotton goods represented one-third of Japan's exports and gave employment to about 40 per cent. of her industrial population.

One of the most important features of Japan's foreign trade, according to the D.O.T. Report, is that the terms of trade have become progressively unfavourable to her. This is clearly demonstrated by a table issued by the Yokohama Specie Bank: while in 1928 Japan was able to obtain for a hundred units of exports one hundred units of imported goods, by 1935 she could obtain only seventy-one units of import commodities for a given value of exports; in other words, the volume of exports required to obtain a given volume of imports, if we take 1931 as 100, has risen by 35 to 140, while in this country the same index has risen only to 107. Taking cotton goods, we see that for import of a given quantity of raw cotton Japan had to export, in 1935, 63 per cent. more cotton goods than in 1931. If we compare wheat against wheat flour, the increase is 30 per cent., rayon against imported pulp 119 per cent. While these figures do not show that trade is conducted at a loss, they are evidence that before the war Japan's foreign trade was already being conducted on progressively unfavourable terms.

That was written about two years ago. In 1937 Japan's unfavourable balance of trade amounted to about thirty-six million pounds. Developments since have rather accentuated her difficulties, and reduced rather than increased her capacity to pay, while increasing enormously the pressure to buy and to invest proceeds in China. It seems to me that Japan's ability to win both war and peace, her financial structure, and her very fate as a Great Power, depend on the development of her balance of trade, and the figures quoted show that balance deteriorating more rapidly than the most pessimistic could have anticipated.

As to the financial position of Japan, her national debt in 1931 amounted to about six thousand million yen. It rose to

ten and a half million yen at the end of June 1937. Bond emissions authorised for 1937 and 1938 amounted to three thousand four hundred million yen, and for the budget year 1938–1939 they will amount to an additional five thousand one hundred million yen, so that at the end of the present fiscal year, provided the bond issues are placed in the market, Japan's national debt will amount to about nineteen thousand million yen—that is, three times as much as in 1931.

For the present her financial structure is being maintained, and experts differ as to whether and when inflationary forces will destroy her precarious equilibrium, maintained through a nation-wide plan of production and consumption, control of prices and investment, of export and import. My personal opinion, however, is that Japan's financial structure is governed by her balance of payments. The economy of Japan remains a foreign trade economy; her huge bond emissions, no matter how well absorbed and managed, entail additional purchasing power for both capital and consumers' goods. The increase of productive capacity within the Empire will necessitate increasing remittances abroad for important capital goods.

Hence the truth of the famous statement of the late Minister Takahashi: If Japan wants to avoid financial shipwreck, it can permit itself no external or internal national emergency. Helfferich, late German Minister of Finance, said in his book, *Money in the Russo-Japanese War*,

"Witte, Russia's delegate, was quoted as having said after the peace negotiations that on no other occasion has he felt so strongly the superiority of the pen over the sword. Had he not been too modest a financier, or too proud a diplomat, he might have added that on this occasion gold proved to be heavier than iron."

The fact remains that wholesale prices in Japan have increased since 1931 from an index figure of 120 to 240 early this year. This is due mostly to the increased cost of imported goods, and to the scarcity of raw materials. Home-produced consumers' goods are moving much more slowly. So is the cost of living. Yet they are moving up. In spite of an elaborate price-control and far-reaching restrictions, prices of steel plate moved during twelve months starting March 1937 from 195 yen per unit to 405 yen; pig iron from 63 yen to 88 yen; coal from 146 yen to 229 yen; and coke from 132 yen to 220 yen.

In time additional purchasing power will percolate into wages and affect consumers' goods. It is difficult to predict when and how this will take place; considering that Japan can hardly afford

to devalue the yen, the forces at work are bound to diminish her export capacity considerably. Economic laws do not work so quickly and so dramatically as we used to believe, but they do work.

But let the Japanese speak for themselves. The *Oriental Economist* of April last expresses the following opinion:

"A fact which should not be overlooked is that the movement of prices before July 1937 was influenced by the world price trend at the tine. After the outbreak of the China conflict the index-numbers for Japan, converted into dollar values, and compared with the American price-index numbers on the basis of 100 for 1913 began to occupy a higher position, until there was a divergency of 40 per cent. at the end of the year. Prices in Japan followed an independent course as a logical outcome of the decrease in supplies of commodities owing to restrictions of imports, and the stubborn growth of demand for war material, together with the expansion of purchasing power caused by fiscal operations. Although it is likely that prices abroad will become stabilised at present level, prices in Japan will continue to move upwards steadily. This is inevitable in view of the additional budgetary estimate for the financing of the China incident."

Being mostly concerned in this paper with Japan's balance of trade, and the resultant effects on her economic policy in China, I will not go further into the question of her financial situation.

A no less important point is Japan's industrial structure. Since 1931 investment in, and production of, mining, steel, chemical and machinery industries have increased at a remarkable pace. Yet the unexpectedly long and expensive war with China has forced Japan to take over for war purposes much of the plant and equipment devoted to export industries. In 1937 complaints arose in Japan that the accelerated diversion of labour and capital towards heavy industries would result in a shortage of productive capacity in consumers' goods industries, with the inevitable result of rising internal prices and loss of export markets.

No statistical data have been available since July 1937 concerning her heavy industries. But the movement of labour indicates that while in the textile and other light industries the number of employed is either stationary or gives signs of falling off, the employment in armaments and capital goods industries shows a continuous expansion, to such an extent that shortage of skilled labour is one of Japan's major problems at present.

Mr. Ishibashi, editor of the *Oriental Economist*, expressed the following opinion in a recent book:

"Since the domestic supply of raw materials is limited, and a large increase of imports is out of the question for various reasons, he thinks

it will be impossible to expand production for the strengthening of armaments as quickly as the military authorities apparently desire. Even if enormous arms appropriations are made, they cannot all be spent, because of the actual lack of materials and productive capacity."

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Japan succeeded in establishing a line reaching from Seiuyan down through Hankow and to the northern borders of Fukien, a huge territory, with a population of about a hundred and eighty million. This territory would have to be manned by a large army for protection from without on a front of fourteen hundred miles and also from guerilla bands within. Even to-day, occupying only principal cities and corridors about twenty-five miles wide along China's few railway lines, they have an army estimated at about twenty-five war strength divisions, that is, seven hundred thousand men, in addition to forces protecting Manchukuo against Russia.

Reorganisation of transport, new roads and railways, pacification of a dense and at present intensely hostile population, the creation of administrations in the new Puppet States, will exert a great strain on Japan's economic structure. A China devastated by war, with tracts of land laid waste, her population dispersed, with banditry and disorder prevalent, is facing one of the greatest national calamities in her history: the Yellow River and perhaps even Yangtze floods. Famine and pestilence will soon surround the invaders.

China as a net importer is lost to Japan's foreign trade, and will remain lost for some time to come. The section of China eventually dominated by Japanese will require an enormous outlay before it is fit for productive investment. China beyond the bayonets of Japan, whether still united and resisting or in chaos, will at best be a dumping-ground for bombs and shells.

It is axiomatic, I think, that only complete conquest of China could give security to an invading Japan. Yet the war is in its twelfth month, and its end, with China unified and determined, cannot be close at hand. Japan's economic structure, devoid of reserves, is constantly losing substance. Granting that raw materials in Japan could be diverted from export industries and civilian needs to munition uses and equipment for the occupied areas, remembering that substitutes might be brought into use, and assuming that her present food supplies are adequate, even so, one conclusion seems inescapable: Japan will be forced in North and Central China to exploit all available natural resources at any cost and in any way she can. Her policy there is no longer

a matter of free choice, but the inevitable result of circumstances of her own creation.

She must and will endeavour, as the war goes on, to stimulate, first of all, exports from occupied China : partly to replace foreign imports and partly to relieve her deteriorating balance of payments. Hence the conclusion that she will try to buy at the cheapest price and eliminate foreign competition in the market : either by applying foreign exchange restrictions to China like those introduced in Manchukuo last October, or by setting up trade monopolies. She will also, presumably, try to eliminate foreign-controlled export channels as far as possible.

This is the first step towards closing the Open Door. Japan will have to pay for her exports from China by importing into China consumers' goods. She cannot therefore tolerate foreign competition in the import trades, and will admit only capital goods on long-term credits. Shipping, banking and insurance will pass into Japanese hands. Finally, as her new Customs tariff for North China shows, Japan aims at the lowering of the protection of local industries in order to compete successfully in the markets. Japanese imports into China will be the only means available to pay for China's exports both to Japan and to international markets, and such foreign exchange as accrues for these exports will be kept by Japan.

In spite of General Ugaki's friendly statements a short time ago, it seems that British interests in the occupied areas will face the greatest difficulties.

Only one consideration could stop Japan half-way. Japan, it is clear, now fears the consequences of probable failure to secure credits not less than she did the consequences of economic sanctions. She needs short-term credits, to finance purchases of raw material. She needs discount facilities to finance her export trade. Such credits, however, could only be of minor importance, for her China operations represent long-term investments financed from current valuta income from her international trade, including exports of gold.

Japan, whether victorious or defeated, could not, in the long run, isolate herself from international markets. Unless she endeavours to apply the Schacht technique—and she is not well equipped for it—she will have to reorganise her financial system after the war. An international loan will be essential, and it will be worth her while to offer concessions to China in return. Such a loan would have a political character, and it is highly improbable that it could be granted to Japan.

Failing this she will need medium- and long-term credits for the equipment of China and for the reorganisation of her own industries, which, when hostilties are over, will be in need of modernisation and adjustment. Such credits would provide a basis for bargaining for an armistice with foreign interests, by which Japan would respect those existing in China and admit foreign capital on a footing of equality.

A danger exists that such credits may come from Germany. Otto Wolff recently entered into an agreement with Manchukuo for the supply of two million pounds' worth of machinery, and equipment for the Showa steelworks. This was to be on credit for six years, repayable in half-yearly instalments until 1944. Since their *rapprochements* of 1936, trade between Germany and Japan has steadily increased. Japan's trade with Germany in 1937 amounted to over two hundred million yen, leaving Germany a favourable balance of a hundred and thirty-three million yen, diminished, of course, by her unfavourable balance with Manchukuo. It is conceivable that Germany might extend to Japan, for both political and commercial considerations, medium-term credits for capital equipment against gradual repayment by Chinese commodities.

In general Germany is in a position to supply Japan with machinery and specialised technical equipment, as well as with her extensive experience in developing new technological means of overcoming deficiency in natural resources.

To conclude, as a result of this war, which is equivalent to heavy export of Japanese capital to China, Japan, failing support by foreign credit, will be forced to relieve pressure by exploiting to the very limit the resources of the newly-occupied territory, since her balance of payments and her competitive position in international markets are deteriorating rapidly. But the conquest of China would not and could not solve the problem of Japan. It would be beyond her psychological, mental and economic capacity.

For the same reasons that I doubt if Japan could win the peace, I also doubt if she could win the war. I incline to believe that she has already lost it: at least she has been robbed of her original objectives by the unfavourable ratio of time to resources.

Japan's failure, of course, is China's gain. It is difficult to believe that China can attain victory, not only because of her military and industrial inferiority, but also because of the orienta genius for compromise. In Chinese eyes victory is a rather adolescent and youthful concept; if she can, China will save the face

of Japan. It is quite conceivable that peace may be reached at the expense of extra-territoriality and the treaty-port system. Whatever happens, the Open Door seems to be closing, the epoch it stood for to be nearing its end. But dealing with the practical and realistic Chinese, with their adult mentality, seems to me more promising than with the Japanese, so often actuated irrationally and governed by the neurosis I have described.

Summary of Discussion.

A MEMBER said that during the last winter he had considered that it was necessary to be careful not to do anything which might provoke the Japanese to an incident which would force Great Britain to declare war. People better informed on the subject had always held that no such danger existed and now the speaker was certain that it did not. The speaker understood that the Chinese Government was very grateful for British Relief Funds and the undoubted pro-Chinese sentiment in Great Britain, but the time was coming when something a little more tangible would be needed, especially if Hankow fell. A concrete example would be for the British to help the Chinese with their roads in the South-West, along the Burmese frontier, for instance. A mission in plain clothes might be sent to study the Chinese guerilla tactics, also their Air Force, which was well worth studying. Then financial help might be given through export credits. It was especially important at the moment to give China some more tangible aid.

A GUEST said that he was in fundamental agreement with the lecturer's main conclusion, that Japanese domination would mean the closing of the Open Door. But he did think that there was great danger in stressing too much the economic argument. Japan was having a very hard time, but her internal debt, on Mr. Walden's figures, was about nineteen hundred million yen, about a hundred and fifty million pounds sterling, not a vast sum when considered in comparison with the vast figures to which we have become accustomed since 1914. The speaker had passed through Japan a month ago, having been there in July last year also, and he had not observed any crack at the nerve-centre, or any real restiveness among the people as a whole; but in fact Japan was much more solid than she had been in July of last year, when she was starting off on this adventure. He did not feel that there was any chance of an internal collapse in Japan within the next year. The people were too well disciplined for there to be a chance of the internal revolution for which the Chinese hope. It was therefore especially important to keep the Chinese resistance going, to make them feel that they were not entirely friendless, and to help them to hold on until such time as intervention by Great Britain, and possibly the United States, would become feasible. There would be a grave danger of collapse when Hankow fell, and the

speaker felt that it must fall soon. Then the spirits of the Chinese might descend to the depths and those elements which had for many years criticised the Soong dynasty would become inclined to be more articulate than they had been hitherto. If it were a fact that China was already a united country, then guerilla warfare might go on for years, and Japan had in fact lost the war, but the speaker was very doubtful whether the Chinese had yet learned the lesson of patriotism, and he feared that the strain of the present situation might result in certain of the leading Chinese who commanded respect being prepared to work with Japan. This was exactly what the Japanese wanted. The answer to this question was unresolved. It was always particularly difficult to know the moment in which a nation had found itself. It might have happened to the Chinese during the last year. In any case it would be very necessary when the Chinese Government was driven out of Hankow and had to seek a new headquarters somewhere farther west to stiffen their resistance and give them courage and confidence in themselves. This was one of the most important questions which His Majesty's Government had to face.

Mr. Walden said that he had not over-estimated the question of inflation—he had not, in fact, mentioned it—but he believed the conquest of China to be first and last a question of money. It was not sufficient for Japan to occupy half of China's territory unless she were in a position not only to exploit China, but to build up a new administration. The expense would be enormous in a country which depended very largely on foreign supplies of raw materials. The Manchukuo experience had already cost Japan a great deal. It was true that the Japanese were a very highly disciplined people, and the question was really not so much one of inflation as of the conscription of national wealth. It was a question whether Japan had the natural resources to keep China going even if the Hankow Government failed completely. So although it was necessary to strengthen the Chinese for their own sake and for the sake of British trade, the lecturer feared that the Japanese Army had already destroyed Japan.

Colonel Steward felt that Japan would be able to hold out against China. He had met a number of Japanese Generals whose aim it had been to reduce the standard of living in Japan. The question was not so much of Japan outlasting China, but of her eventual position in relation to the pressure of a great Power. After all, arms backed diplomacy. Japan had laid in vast stores of arms for a major war, and it was unlikely that she regarded the present struggle as a major war. Even if after a long war she succeeded in China, she would then be in no state to face a great Power who might choose to bring pressure to bear upon her.

The balance of power in the Far East was just as important as the balance of power in Europe. In fact they interacted, and it would pay Great Britain to negotiate a peace which would neither leave

Japan too weak nor China entirely weak. If Japan were allowed to collapse, there would only be fresh trouble from Russia. It was therefore to the interest of Great Britain to secure a compromise before China and Japan had both become too weak to count in Far Eastern politics.

MR. C. G. HANCOCK asked whether the Japanese idea of the Open Door in China was that foreign capital should be allowed to invest in concerns in China. Secondly, did the lecturer think that the Japanese Government aimed at eliminating foreign exchange banks from China?

MR. WALDEN said that the Japanese would naturally do all they could to encourage the purchase of debentures and minority interests in Japanese concerns. In this connection she had a very good record, and certainly she would accept and encourage all such investment. It was very doubtful whether she would accept majority interest in any enterprise organised within the jurisdiction of Tokyo.

The question concerning foreign exchange banks was rather complicated. In Manchukuo there was a new foreign exchange law under which all foreign banks would come. In North China there were to date no restrictions with regard to exports, except, of course, so far as there was a question of establishing a new currency; and, in view of these facts, China provided to-day a new area for the export of capital from Japan. The lecturer understood that bills of export were not negotiated so much to-day with existing foreign British banks, but privately in North China, and sold at a premium to those requiring foreign currency. Therefore, obviously an extension of the yen bloc into China must in due course eliminate the activities of foreign banks. The Yokohama Specie Bank has now taken over Customs deposits within the Japanese occupied area. This business was done until recently by foreign banks.

MR. BARNARD ELLINGER said that it must be taken for granted that it was unlikely that economic or financial factors would bring about the termination of the war within the year. On the other hand, he felt that the effect of the economic situation in Japan was apt to be under-estimated. It was necessary to distinguish between the financial and the economic situation. There was no reason why financial factors should bring the war to an early end. The theory of the Japanese Government was that as long as she spent all the money that she borrowed, it returned to the people in the form of wages, and the savings could be re-invested in further Government loans, and the circle could continue for a very long time. Every time the circle was completed it brought with it a greater degree of inflation, as happened in the Great War, when we brought up the national debt to seven thousand million pounds.

Economically, however, Japan was in a very weak position. This year she was budgeting to spend, including the money needed for

industrial expansion for armaments, as much as we had spent during the first year of the Great War; but the present wealth, and the potentialities for creating wealth in the country, were only perhaps one-quarter or one-fifth of the potentialities of the United Kingdom during the Great War and, therefore, the economic burden on the country was probably already as great as ours at the termination of the War. It might be, as had been said, the deliberate policy of the Japanese Government to reduce the standard of living of her people, but what brought all wars to an end, unless terminated by a decisive military victory, was the breaking-point being reached at which people could no longer suffer any further reduction in their standard of living, either because their capacity for production had become so diminished through the reduction of their standard of living that they could not go on producing all the armaments necessary to continue the war, or because their suffering could no longer be endured. Germany to-day said that she preferred guns to butter. If butter was the only commodity lacking, it would be possible to go on for a very long time. She had gone on during the Great War for four years, but had been gradually brought to her knees through a shortage of food, particularly fats, essential to the life of her people. When, however, it was not a question of butter, but of rice or bread, the danger-point was very much nearer. In Great Britain to-day the cry of the unemployed was that they had not sufficient money to buy the variety of food needed to keep them in good health, but the speaker was old enough to remember times of unemployment when it had been bread which could not be obtained. It is at the stage when rice or bread or other real necessities became unobtainable that rioting began in the streets, and that war was brought to an end by economic forces, even if the military forces were not defeated.

MR. HUBBARD said that he would speak about the exploitation and the development of North China.

There would seem to be four possible alternatives in regard to the future of North China from an economic point of view. There might be a complete Japanese victory, which would enable Japan to do what she liked with that area north of the Yang-Tze which her armies "occupied" at the present time. In that case, as the lecturer had said, Japan would be under the strongest possible urge to make trade and economic development in this area a Japanese monopoly, in so far as she could. Mr. Walden had, however, himself pointed out that while Japan would wish to keep the resources of North China so far as possible entirely in her own hands, she would also have a great need, as soon as the war was over, to develop her own heavy industries, and would need capital for that purpose. It was impossible to develop the mineral resources, particularly of a relatively undeveloped area like North China, without the importation of a very large quantity of capital goods in the shape of machinery, etc., precisely those capital goods which Japan would not herself be in a position to supply, and it was

impossible to see how she would get the exploitation going unless she did open the door, and open it very wide, to the inflow of capital goods from other countries.

In the second alternative there might be such a breakdown of Japan that the whole power in North China would revert to the Chinese, and they would be in the position—so far as external relations were concerned—which they had occupied at the start of the outbreak.

A third possibility was that the whole of this area would remain for many years to come undeveloped and untouched, and in fact lie fallow, because there would be such a state of tension and so little orderly government that nobody could undertake it.

The last alternative, which seemed the most probable, was that such a compromise would be reached as had been mentioned by the lecturer. This was the type of thing that all those who had lived in and knew this part of the world could reasonably expect, and it would mean that there would be in a few years a Chinese Government of a sort operating in North China under a considerable degree of Japanese influence, though not by any means under complete Japanese domination.

What would be the British position in each of these four cases? The speaker agreed with the third speaker that the question of greatest importance from a British point of view was the political problem of the balance of power in the Far East. The second British consideration, of course, would be protection of British commercial and trading interests. Under the first alternative—*i.e.*, complete Japanese domination—Japan would, one must expect, only admit Great Britain where she was absolutely forced to do so. She would be forced to open the door in some cases, but she would leave open only the smallest possible crack. If the North China area remained fallow, Great Britain, of course, could do nothing. There remained the question of complete Chinese control or a type of regional government, not exactly puppet government, but some sort of compromise with Japanese influence behind it. In either case it would probably be the Chinese who would have the greatest say in the development of those very large resources which had hardly been touched up to the present. Therefore, as the first speaker had pointed out, from the British point of view it was of the utmost importance that she should not lose any of the goodwill which she might at present possess in China. Chinese goodwill might, when all is over, count for a very great deal. China's feeling towards us would be all the more important, as her relations with Russia would doubtless grow closer as a result of the present struggle. To quote a man who had just come back from North China and who had been in very close touch with the situation, there had been a very strong revulsion of feeling in the whole of North China when the Customs Agreement between Great Britain and Japan had been signed a few weeks ago. The British Government's action had been misrepresented and distorted in the Chinese press, but this made it no better and the whole situation would need very careful handling from the point of view of Sino-British relations.

MR. GULL said that he disagreed entirely with those who thought that there was very much likelihood, even after the fall of Hankow—if that occurred—of the Chinese "ratting" against one another. To hold this view was meeting trouble half-way, while there were plenty of troubles already on hand with which to deal. Moreover, it partook of the philosophy of the Treaty Port. In 1935 it had been the opinion in the Treaty Ports that the possibility of the Chinese resisting the Japanese was not to be entertained for a moment. The speaker had discussed the question, after a visit of some nine months, with a great variety of people and he found himself almost alone in opinion that a war between China and Japan had become inevitable. He mentioned this not by way of patting himself on the back, but because it was of importance when considering the future. There had been an enormous change in China. The Chinese had resisted the Japanese to an extent which had astonished everybody. The second speaker had wondered if the Chinese had learned the lesson of patriotism. What further evidence could any people give of patriotism than the Chinese were giving at the present time?

The speaker could not agree with the lecturer that the main psychological factor behind the Japanese was fear. The memoirs of Count Hayashi, for instance, revealed not so much fear as ambition. At the moment most leading Japanese entertained a degree of ambition entirely in keeping with their present policy and action. The whole story of Japanese activity in the Far East from the earliest times was a very connected one, and the fears which seemed so apparent to-day were of comparatively recent development. They had not given the original spur to Japan's present policy, the one which she had developed subsequent to her defeat of Russia.

Concerning the financial and economic side of the question, the speaker agreed that should the Japanese become dominant they would exclude the British from China as far as possible.

SIR JOHN PRATT said that he did not think that Japan would crack either financially or economically, at least for a very considerable time. One factor which had perhaps been overlooked was that Japan could feed herself. She had no need to import any food. As long as she could do this, the Japanese were so accustomed to tightening their belts and to a low standard of living that they would be able to go on for very much longer than a European people in a similar plight. On the other hand, the speaker could not see how the Japanese could defeat the Chinese. On the Chinese side he did not see either how the Chinese could defeat the Japanese. Even when the Chinese had been defeated in the field, driven out of Hankow and scattered, he did not think that they would collapse. The whole matter would take a very long time to resolve itself.

The Chinese had a great capacity for local village self-government. If the Chinese Central Government disappeared, it did not follow that the result would be the same as if this happened in a European country.

China might easily revert to the state in which she had been before the recent period of international relations. It had only been when the Chinese had formed relations with foreign Powers, and had found that the latter expected them to have a Central Government to implement the treaties which they had signed, that they had set up such a Central Government. Before that they had had a collection of village republics, and if Japan now smashed that which China had built up in the last fifty years, they might easily revert to this form of government, and in this way resistance to Japan might go on indefinitely, especially as a real and undying flame of hatred had been lit by the Japanese in the whole of the Chinese people. They had the means to manufacture rifles and rifle ammunition within the country. At the moment the Japanese occupied the railways in North China and certain parts of the country. Between these areas the Chinese were living peaceably and in an orderly manner, except when they went and raided the Japanese. If the Chinese Government were driven farther into the interior, the importance of building the roads in the south, referred to by the first speaker, would become intensified, because their main line of communication with the outer world would be through Burma. There was an extremely good case for assisting the Chinese to build a Burma–Yunnan road and perhaps even a railway. Unfortunately, apart from this it would be difficult for the British to give the Chinese real assistance. Any real substantial assistance would have to be given in the form of a Government Loan. China had no security with which to raise loans in the City. It was doubtful whether the Government would feel able to make such an obviously anti-Japanese move. The first speaker had suggested that Chinese resistance should be kept alive until such time as intervention might take place. This was a dangerous suggestion, because there was not the slightest chance of foreign intervention taking place within any measurable time. The United States were certainly not going to intervene. It was extremely doubtful whether Great Britain would do so, in fact most unlikely, in view of the present European situation. To try to keep the Chinese going until some foreign intervention would be possible might very well, in the circumstances, earn their distrust rather than their goodwill, and might create trouble for Great Britain in the future in that part of the world.

ADMIRAL TAYLOR said that although for many years Japan had been self-supporting in the matter of food, he believed that since 1931 and the Manchurian incident she had been importing rice. He had recently seen figures corroborating this fact with the explanation that as Japanese man-power became more and more employed in China and Manchuria, the amount of rice which they could produce at home was diminishing. As an earlier speaker had pointed out a fall in the standard of living on top of the diversion of man-power would be bound to cause a doubled slackening of production at home. This was where it seemed that Japan might crack, if she did crack.

A MEMBER said that in considering Japan a mistake would be made if allowance were not made in the fullest measure for the spirit of discipline of the Japanese people. Because of this discipline things could be done in Japan in the way of control which would not be possible in any European country. It was only eighty years since she had opened up after two hundred years of very strict feudal discipline and isolation. Her rapid adoption of Western material civilisation and industry was misleading in this respect. The Member recalled a story of how an Ambassador to Japan in the early days had found himself faced by such a dense crowd in one of the villages that he did not think that he would be able to get through, but at a word of command from a guard they had immediately fallen to the ground, their faces to the earth, leaving a passage quite free. The Ambassador had gone on to say that traffic in London could be much improved by such methods but that the psychology of the London mob would not admit of such a thing.

MR. WALDEN said that concerning the psychological element he disagreed with the seventh speaker, maintaining his own thesis about the question of fear. The Russo-Japanese War had been actuated by fear. In the present case there had been fear of the rise of China as an industrial Power and fear of a conflict with Russia in the future, which had made it necessary to secure a favourable strategical position in China, particularly with regard to the Trans-Siberian railway.

The discipline of the Japanese people was undeniable but the lecturer would like to call attention to the event of February 26th, the murder of the chief of the Military Education Department, also to the lack of unity in Japanese foreign policy which was probably one of the reasons why she had been unable to establish full domination in North China in 1933 and 1934 when the possibilities had been so much stronger than they were to-day. The lecturer would like again to stress the importance of the balance of trade and to connect it with the most lucid exposition of the sixth speaker. The latter had said that in the event of a Japanese victory she would have to invest certain sums of money in capital goods from abroad in order to develop North China. The lecturer did not think that Japan would exploit China in an organised way but in a way of piracy. She would not obtain foreign credit in order to repeat the experience of Manchuria while her own two thousand million yen were waiting to be invested in railways, mining, etc. If China were to win there would certainly be very fruitful possibilities for foreign investment. But the lecturer agreed that the probable result would be a No-Man's-Land. Concerning the question of a Chinese façade government, not exactly a puppet government, the essential point was: to what extent would Chinese local governments co-operate with Japan unless Japan were able to offer something in the form of capital goods involving financial support?

The question of rice production was very important. Japan had had a deficit in her rice consumption, including Korea and Formosa,

of about two and a half per cent. It was a question whether the diminution of the agricultural population would have an effect on production. It had a very important effect on consumption. The army was consuming much more rice than the farmer, who had been able to live on next to nothing. There were not only the million men in China but the army of seven hundred and fifty thousand men in Japan itself. Then the munitions worker with his wages would consume more rice than he had done as a farmer. Forty per cent. of the industrial population in Japan were employed in the textile industries. Amongst these were women and some children who formed a resistant element from the social point of view. The end of the war, therefore, would not come through any of the forces mentioned in the discussion, through the weakening of the discipline in Japan, but through the balance of trade. Japan would become in a lesser and lesser degree able to buy raw materials. As her ability to buy decreased she would become unable to maintain her present production which would cause unemployment. Then she would be unable to maintain indefinitely the huge expenditure on munitions on the continent of Asia. Thirdly, in the territory which she had conquered she would be faced with the choice of either increasing her army considerably or investing a considerable amount of money in building railroads in the two provinces and other communications in China. Therefore as time went on, apart from all other questions, Japan would simply lack the material with which to stay in China. At a suitable moment she would be forced to retire from the Yangtze and from North China and at this moment Chiang-Kai-shek and the Central Government would be in a position to return to Nanking and Hankow and the war would end.

FROM FREDERICK THE GREAT TO HITLER: THE CONSISTENCY OF GERMAN AIMS [1]

MR. H. WICKHAM STEED

I CANNOT remember a moment when it was more important that we in Great Britain should make an effort to grasp the nature and the meaning of German aims. I say "make an effort"; for without an effort to see things from a German standpoint, to understand German concepts and even German words, we shall not succeed. I myself have been engaged upon the task for some thirty-six years. But it is only recently that the full meaning of German claims and aims, and a sense of their historical and philosophical continuity, have been borne in upon me. How this came about I will briefly relate.

In 1892 and 1893 I studied philosophy at the University of Berlin. This study, and some observation of German political tendencies at that time, inclined me to take a favourable view of German ways of life and thought—with the exception of the political thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, the eloquent German historian whose public lectures I attended. Then, after some three years spent in the study of history, including German history, at Paris University, I returned to Berlin in the spring of 1896 as the acting correspondent of *The Times*. It was a troubled year. At the end of 1895 the German Emperor had sent his famous telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal on the occasion of the Jameson Raid, and German oversea ambitions were being somewhat truculently expressed in an anti-British tone.

Thus for the first time I came into contact with what were afterwards called pan-German aims. This experience failed to shake my liking for Germany and the Germans. I felt there were at least two sorts of Germans—the kindly intellectual folk of Germany I had known before, and the aggressive adepts of pan-Germanism with its hard core of Prussianism—and I was not yet certain that the latter truly represented the German

[1] **Address given at Chatham House on May 10th, 1938, with Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, M.C., in the Chair.**

people. So in Rome, where I lived and worked from the beginning of 1899 until nearly the end of 1902, and afterwards in Vienna up to the spring of 1905, when the German Emperor paid his spectacular visit to Tangier, my personal relations with Germans of all kinds, and my views of German policy, were by no means unsympathetic.

Among my more intimate friends was Herr von Jagow (afterwards Foreign Secretary of Germany at the outbreak of the Great War), who was then a secretary of the German Embassy in Rome. In 1901 he helped, inadvertently, to open my eyes. In an outburst of anger he denounced a book which a Frenchman, M. André Chéradame, had just published entitled *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au seuil du vingtième siècle.* I got the book and read it. It was a reasoned analysis of pan-German policy in the light of German documents and statements, and of maps contained in pan-German publications. Among those maps was one printed in a pamphlet entitled *Grossdeutschland* (Great Germany) in 1899, with a red line marking the boundaries of Great Germany and Central Europe as they would be round about the year 1950. Alsace and Lorraine, then annexed to Germany, were naturally included within the line. Less natural, it seemed to me, was the inclusion of Dunkirk, Flemish Belgium, the Netherlands, Southern Denmark, German Switzerland, North-Eastern Italy with Trieste and Istria, Hungary, Slovakia, Bohemia, a larger part of Poland than Germany then held, and a portion of Lithuania with Memel.

After I had read the book I began to understand Herr von Jagow's annoyance, but I was far from understanding how deeply the pan-German aims which the map foreshadowed were embedded in German political and philosophical thought.

I ought to have understood it because I had seen, soon after its publication in 1899, Houston Stewart Chamberlain's work, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.* In Vienna, from 1903 onwards, I noticed the influence of this work upon the Germans of Austria, though its strong anti-Catholic tendency estranged many of them. The Austrian pan-Germans took it, however, as their Bible. They came, partly for this reason, into conflict with the Christian Social Anti-Semitic Party of Dr. Lueger, the famous Burgomaster of Vienna. Readers of Herr Hitler's *Mein Kampf* will be familiar with his account of the atmosphere then prevailing in Austria and with his comparison of the rival claims of Austrian pan-Germanism and of Lueger's Christian Social anti-Semitism. I breathed that atmosphere for several

years. The memory of it enabled me to read Hitler's book with more insight than I should otherwise have had; and after Hitler had come into power in Germany the same memory led me back to Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations*, to his predecessor, Gobineau, and to a number of the earlier pan-German philosophers and writers whose works I had not before studied.

One result of this reading was a series of lectures at King's College in the autumn of 1933 upon the origins of Hitlerism. When these had been published, a young German in London asked me if I had ever seen the correspondence between the Emperor William II and Houston Stewart Chamberlain during the years 1901 to 1923. I had not; and he kindly sent me the volume containing it. I read it with an amazement due to ignorance, for I did not realise that Houston Stewart Chamberlain was reproducing almost textually in his letters to the Emperor the arguments of the German philosopher, Fichte, in the famous fourteen "Speeches to the German Nation"[1] which were delivered in 1808. During my student days in Berlin I had read those speeches and had failed to grasp their significance. Having re-read them and refreshed my knowledge of the political philosophy of Fichte's successor, Hegel, I began to see more clearly the consistency of German thought and the persistence of German political aims with the disciplined power of Prussia and the Prussian State behind them.

A comprehensive review of present German aims and of their inspiration would have to begin with Charlemagne. For practical purposes it may, however, begin with the ascendancy of Prussia under Frederick the Great. He was not the founder of the Prussian State, though in some ways he was its chief architect. The territory of Prussia, originally inhabited by Slavs and by tribes of Lithuanian stock, was first conquered by the Teutonic Order of German Knights in the thirteenth century, and long remained a fief of the Order. In the fourteenth century the Order was a school of Northern chivalry to which men came from all over Europe to win their spurs by helping to extend Christendom against the heathen Lithuanians. King John of Bohemia fought for the Order on the Vistula before being killed and yielding up his ostrich feathers to Edward the Black Prince at Crécy. Henry of Bolingbroke was also a Knight of the Order; and Chaucer's "Perfect Knight" had travelled in "Pruce and Lettowe," that is to say, in Prussia and Livonia.

But in the fifteenth century ruin fell upon the Order. A

[1] *Reden an die deutsche Nation.*

Slav reaction against it dealt it heavy blows; and the teaching of John Wyclif in England had fired John Hus of Bohemia with reforming zeal. Both before and after the martyrdom of Hus in 1415 the Hussite movement became an expression of Czech nationality. The Hussite movement coincided with the loss of German supremacy in Prussia, a loss which the raids of the Hussite forces from Bohemia as far north as the mouth of the Elbe did something to hasten. German students made their exodus from the Bohemian capital of Prague a year before the Slavs of the north-east, led by the Poles and helped by the Lithuanians, crushed the Teutonic Order at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410.

By 1440 a Prussian League was formed among the native nobles and towns to defend their rights against the Teutonic Order. In 1454 an embassy from the Prussian League offered Prussia to the King of Poland; and twelve years later the Order itself became a vassal of Poland. But presently the German Master of the Teutonic Order—as distinguished from its Grand Master—broke away; and even the Teutonic Knights of East Prussia, who remained vassals of Poland under the Grand Master, chose German Princes to be Grand Masters of the Order and ended by selecting Albert Hohenzollern of Brandenburg in 1511.

By this time Luther's Reformation had established itself in Saxony, whence it spread to Prussia. Under the influence of Luther, Albert of Hohenzollern turned Protestant, secularised his territories and in 1526 transformed them into a somewhat heterogeneous Duchy. Like other German Princes, he "received" Roman Law in place of German Common Law and of the more humane Canon Law, and made of himself a little pontiff as well as a prince. The deification of the Prussian State—for which Hegel was afterwards to find pseudo-philosophic warrant—had begun.

But it was not until after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 had closed the era of devastation known as the Thirty Years' War that Prussia could make her weight felt. In 1611 the Hohenzollern Duchy of Prussia fell by inheritance to a ruler of Brandenburg who belonged to the College of Electors which chose the Holy Roman Emperors of Germany, and was therefore known as the Elector of Brandenburg. Frederick William of Brandenburg, the "Great Elector," proved himself a remarkable man. He declared his independence of Poland, defeated the Swedes in 1675, and, out of an unpromising and divided inheritance, fashioned the embryo of a modern State. He made

Prussia by giving her an army, a navy, a civil service, a postal system and a graduated income tax. His son, Frederick I, father of Frederick the Great, discarded the title of Elector and, with the assent of the Emperor, crowned himself King in the Cathedral of Königsberg. He gave cohesion to his mongrel people, among whom the Great Elector had encouraged all kinds of foreigners to settle, including a large number of industrious and intelligent Huguenots whom the revocation of the Edict of Nantes compelled to leave France after 1685.

He kept up a large, well-trained army, a centralised administration, good popular schools and a full treasury. He had the mind of a drill-sergeant, the manners of a boor and the moods of a savage. He filled his army with giants by the methods of a slave-raider. His violent temper, tinged with insanity, wrecked the happiness of his domestic life; and having quarrelled with his son, afterwards Frederick the Great, he condemned him to witness, as one of many penalties, the beheading of a cherished friend.

The tradition thus established has never been lost in Prussia —the tradition of making Berlin a martial capital, with industries subservient to military needs, and with a doctrine (presently to be immortalised by the East Prussian philosopher, Immanuel Kant, as the "Categorical Imperative") of duty for duty's sake in the service of the Prussian State.

When Frederick II succeeded his father in 1740, he soon showed his quality. Contesting the claims of the Austrian Empress, Maria Theresa, to the province of Silesia, he invaded and took Silesia before she could act. (Hitler could not have done better.) In this way he thrust a wedge into the Austrian dominions, and presently fought the Seven Years' War in order to keep what he had taken. In 1772 he induced Maria Theresa and Catherine of Russia to join him in partitioning Poland, an iniquitous operation by which he gained the Polish region known as West Prussia, and staked out his claims to further expansion. Under him, the final struggle between Prussia and Austria for mastery in Central Europe was foreshadowed.

Readers of Carlyle's *Frederick the Great* will be familiar with all that can be said in favour of him. Carlyle's work, with its merits and demerits, is a monumental piece of pro-Prussian propaganda. The more interesting is it, therefore, to read a first-hand English account of Frederick the Great in the form of a letter, dated Berlin, March 18th, 1776, to the Earl of Suffolk from Mr. James Harris, afterwards the first Earl of Malmesbury.

It is published in the first volume of his *Diaries and Correspondence*, and I am indebted to Dr. Delisle Burns for having reminded me of its existence. It runs :—

" The basis of his Prussian Majesty's conduct, from the time he mounted the throne to this day, seems to have been the considering of mankind in general, and particularly those over whom he was destined to reign, as beings created merely to be subservient to his will, and conducive to the carrying into execution whatever might tend to augment his power and extend his dominions. Proceeding on these grounds, he has all along been guided by his own judgement alone, without ever consulting any of his Ministers or Superior Officers; not so much from the low opinion he entertains of their abilities, as from a conviction from his own feelings that if he employed them otherwise than as simple instruments they would, in time, assume a will of their own; and instead of remaining accessories endeavour to become principals. To persevere in this system it was necessary for him to divest himself of compassion and remorse, and of course of religion and morality. In the room of the first he has substituted superstition; in the place of the latter what is called in France *sentiment*, and from hence we may, in some measure, account for that motley composition of barbarity and humanity which so strongly marks his character. . . . Thus never losing sight of his object he lays aside all feelings the moment that is concerned; and, although as an individual he often appears and really is humane, benevolent and friendly, yet the instant he acts in his Royal capacity these attributes forsake him and he carries with him desolation, misery, and persecution wherever he goes. . . . If he has failed in small points, resolution and cunning, employed as the occasion required, and always supported by great abilities, have carried him with success through almost every important undertaking he has attempted. . . . He undoubtedly owes this, in great measure, to his superior talents; yet I think we may find another cause in the character and position of his subjects; in general they are poor, vain, ignorant and destitute of principle; had they been rich, his nobility could never have been brought to serve as subaltern officers with zeal and ardour. Their vanity makes them think they see their own greatness in the greatness of their monarch. Their ignorance stifles in them every notion of liberty and opposition, and their want of principle makes them ready instruments to execute any orders they may receive, without considering whether they are founded on equity or not. . . . Having said this much it is perhaps less wonderful than it generally appears that such a sovereign, governing such a people, should have raised to so great a pitch of glory a country which, from its geographical position, its climate and its soil, seems to have been calculated to act a very secondary part amongst the European powers; and it is not very difficult to foresee, on its exchanging masters, that its preponderance will greatly sink; and, as this event is certainly not very distant, I hope I shall not trespass on your Lordship's time

in turning my thoughts for a moment to the future state of these dominions."

Mr. James Harris wrote this in March 1776. Thirty years later Prussia lay smashed and helpless at the feet of Napoleon. But what he said of the effect of Frederick's influence upon the vanity of Prussians was equally true of Germans outside Prussia. For the first time since the Thirty Years' War, Germans felt that they might again aspire to a commanding place in the world. Even before the Seven Years' War there were signs that they were tiring of incessant imitation of the French and of the civilising influences which, emanating from the England of John Locke, had inspired the movement known as "Encyclopædism" in France and as "New Humanism" in Germany. In any event, Frederick's exploits elated them beyond measure. It is a psychological question of some interest whether the alternation of German minds between depression and elation is entirely due to the impact of circumstances upon them, or whether it connotes some inherent lack of stability. I can think of no other people which has swung so often from what modern jargon calls an "inferiority complex" to a "superiority complex," that is to say, from subservient self-depreciation to arrogance and self-assurance.

Towards the middle of last century a German writer, Julius Fröbel, asked in an essay upon "German Emigration and its Natural and Historical Significance" [1] whether there were any other people which felt so constantly as the Germans the need to affirm its own special character, as though it wanted to convince itself that it really has a special character. He wrote :—

"Where is there another people that uses equivalents for 'German strength,' 'German true-heartedness,' 'German love,' 'German earnestness,' 'German thoroughness,' 'German diligence,' 'German women,' 'German maidens,' or 'German men'? . . . A German demands from himself as something extraordinary that he shall be German, as though he would otherwise be free to get out of his own skin—just as he insists that his men shall be 'manly' and his women 'womanly,' his children 'childlike' and his maidens 'maidenly.' The German spirit is always, so to speak, standing before the mirror and looking at itself. And when it has seen itself a hundred times and has convinced itself of its perfections, a hidden doubt in which dwells the innermost secret of vanity drives it again to stand before the mirror."

With Julius Fröbel's analysis it is interesting to compare Nietzsche's account of the Germans in his work, *Jenseits von*

[1] *Die deutsche Auswanderung und ihre kulturhistorische Bedeutung* (1858).

Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil), which appeared in 1885:—

"As a people of the most monstrous mixture and mingling together of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of pre-Aryan elements, as a middle-people in every respect, the Germans are more comprehensive, more elusive, fuller of contradictions, less known, more incalculable, more surprising and more terrifying to themselves than other peoples are; they defy definition and, if only for this reason, they are the despair of the French. It is characteristic of the Germans that among them the question: 'What is German?' is never settled."

With Nietzsche, in his turn, we may compare no less an authority than Adolf Hitler, who, on pages 437–438 of his book *Mein Kampf*, says:—

"The German people lack that infallible herd-instinct which comes from unity of blood and, especially in moments of danger, saves nations from destruction in so far as it enables them to rise above petty inner differences and to show the firm front of a united herd to a common foe. What we call super-individualism comes from the presence (in our people) of unassimilated heterogeneous race elements side by side with each other. In times of peace this state of things may even be of some service, but, taken as a whole, it cost us the mastery of the world. If, in its historical development, the German people had possessed the same herd-unity that stood other peoples in good stead, the German Empire would to-day be master of the globe. History would have taken another course; and who can say if this course would not have led to what so many purblind pacifists hope to get by whining and whimpering—a peace not supported by the tearful pacifist lamentations of palm-waving females but founded upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*."

To the German conception of *Kultur* I shall return. It has little or nothing in common with our conception of "culture," though we have taken from it our horrible modern expression "cultural." For the sake of continuity we must, however, revert to Frederick the Great and to the history of Prussia. Frederick the Great died in 1786, three years before the outbreak of the French Revolution. His successor, Frederick William II, decided in 1792 to support by arms the cause of Louis XVI of France against the French Revolution and what we should to-day call its "ideology" of human freedom and free nationality. This decision plunged Europe into a conflict which cost millions of lives, overthrew the entire political system of the European continent and brought humiliation and suffering upon Germany, a conflict in which the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation"

came to an end; and after Frederick William III of Prussia had renewed his father's blunder and declared war on Napoleonic France, the Prussian army was crushed at the battle of Jena in October 1806, and its military renown shattered. By the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807, the King of Prussia was stripped of the best part of his dominions and of more than half his subjects. Once again the Prussians and, with them, the Germans in general were downcast and depressed.

But Napoleon blundered in his turn. The humiliation and the "blood-tax" which he inflicted on Prussia and Germany reacted against him. The Germans who had preened themselves under Frederick II, and were justly proud of their great writers like Schiller and Goethe, Klopstock, Wieland and Herder (to say nothing of supreme musicians like Bach, Mozart and Beethoven), felt it intolerable that, in politics, they should do the bidding of an arrogant foreign master. Indirectly the Germans owed to Napoleon the impulse that found expression in the great Prussian reforms of Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst. Directly they owed him still more. His government in Germany was harsh but salutary. It cleared away much rubbish, spread many useful ideas, and, by sweeping away the Holy Roman Empire and suppressing 120 small States, made Germany less unmanageable and far easier to unite. Especially did it foster a spirit to which the philosopher Fichte was to give full expression in 1808, a year after the Treaty of Tilsit, in his fourteen "Speeches to the German Nation." From these Speeches a direct line runs through German philosophical and political thought during the nineteenth century up to Houston Stewart Chamberlain at the end of that century and to Adolf Hitler in the twentieth.

If Fichte was not the first to give a metaphysical and quasi-religious sanction to German pride of race and yearning for political dominion, he was the first to affirm it comprehensively. He may have caught the idea from earlier philosophers, notably from Herder and Kant, and from an unfinished poem, entitled "German Greatness," which Schiller wrote in 1801. Herder had maintained that the German people alone are initiated into the secrets of philosophical thought and give them real existence by German forms of law and by German national existence. The whole sense of history and of the world, Herder maintained, would be meaningless were they not to lead to the triumph of the German people. Schiller, for his part, declared that the Germans had been despoiled as much by English maritime supremacy as by the deeds of Napoleon. English force and

French brilliance, he declared, are aspects of a materialist outlook, whereas the moral dignity of Germany proceeds from her *Kultur* and from the character of her people, which do not depend upon her political position. Only the German spirit can apprehend sacred things, since it alone communes with the spirit of the Universe which has chosen it to work at the timeless task of human *Kultur*. It must carry forward what the Lutheran Reformation began, and by long endeavour cull for itself alone the fruit of being allied with the truth. When her day has dawned, Germany will reap the harvest of all past centuries. On that day the image of mankind will appear to the world with an integral German visage.

In his fourteen " Speeches " Fichte conceived Germanism as the supreme possession of mankind. Though military force must be its instrument, it would prevail because of its own intrinsic superiority over all other forms of civilisation. This superiority exists independently of the military weapon which ensures its triumph. It is rooted in the eternal order of things.

Saying that he would speak to Germans, and to Germans alone, upon their way of being and thinking, Fichte told them that the essential difference between them and other peoples is reflected above all in their language, and in the fact that this language had been spoken from time immemorial by the same stock on the same primeval soil as an expression of the inmost character of the German folk itself. Unlike other peoples who had learned to speak strange tongues devoid of originality and composed of words without immediate reference to the objects or ideas they were supposed to represent, the German tongue had kept its quality of immediacy, and was therefore living and life-giving. Nay, more; the Germans enjoy the inestimable boon of speaking the living, primeval tongue of the primeval German race which guards and preserves the pricess treasure of its speech. This is the main distinction between Germans and other peoples of Germanic origin. In Fichte's actual words :—

" This distinction arose on the first splitting of the primeval common stock, and consists in the fact that the German speaks a tongue derived from the first outpouring of the vital power of Nature, whereas the other Germanic peoples speak only tongues of which the surface moves while their roots are dead. In this circumstance alone, in vitality and in death, we see the difference. Between life and death there is no comparison, for life has infinite worth. Therefore all comparisons between the German and Latinised languages are worthless, inasmuch as those languages speak of things that are not worth speaking

of. If there be talk of the inner value of the German tongue, let it at least be compared with one of equal rank. It must be measured with a language equally primordial, for instance, ancient Greek."

Summing up his linguistic doctrine, Fichte affirmed that (1) among a people with a living tongue the formation of the mind proceeds from life itself, whereas among people with other tongues, life and the formation of the spirit tread separate paths; (2) for the same reason, a people with a living tongue is truly earnest about the formation of the mind, and wishes it to come from life, whereas with other peoples the formation of the mind is a genial game, nothing more. The latter have wit. The Germans have both wit and soulfulness; (3) among the Germans the whole people is susceptible of formation, and those who do the formative work use the folk, the people itself, as the touchstone of their discoveries; whereas among other nations the educated classes hold aloof from the people and treat the people as blind instruments of their planning.

That is why the Germans were foremost in the shaping of the human race in a new world. Though foreigners had suggested a reform of the Roman Church, the Germans did it. It was through Martin Luther, a German man, who turned to the people and spoke his thoughts to them. They received his words with enthusiasm. This is proof of the special quality of the Germans. By enthusiasm they can be raised to enthusiasm and to exalted clearness of vision. This era was the only one in which the German people, holding the rank which is their due as the primeval human stock, stood forth before the world. Yet their achievements were destroyed by the selfishness of princes until Germany sank low and Europe with her. For when the Germans sink, the rest of Europe sinks with them.

The fundamental character of the Germans as a primeval folk gives them the right to call themselves simply "The People," so that the name "German" can be seen in its true significance. Not otherwise is it in the domain of statecraft. Here, too, the German people are supreme. The determining factor is whether there is something absolutely primordial and original in a people so that it is capable of freedom, of infinite improvement. Such a people is, simply expressed, "German." It is capable of patriotism in the highest sense of the term, of belief in immortality in the form of its own eternal existence as a people, that is to say, the embodiment of the Divine. In this sense people and Fatherland are the bearers and the pledge of eternity, an eternity that goes far beyond the State, in the usual meaning of

the word, because the State itself must limit its work to the choice of the best means of reaching its immediate goal of internal peace. To reach this goal many limitations must be placed upon the natural freedom of individuals. So true patriotism must lie in the conception of the German people as eternal, of the Germans as citizens of their own eternal city, and in stamping this conception deep and indelibly upon all German souls by a new education.

Without political independence even the German language and literature could not save the Germans. They must be free within their own boundaries. These boundaries are, first of all, the inner boundaries, which include all who speak the German tongue. No people of other descent and language can be suffered to dwell within them. A people that has remained true to Nature can, if it finds its own homeland too small, extend it by the conquest of neighbouring territories so as to gain more space, and will drive out the former inhabitants of such territories. It may wish to exchange a rough and barren land for one more blessed; and in this case also it will drive out the earlier inhabitants. Or it can raid neighbouring territories, taking from them everything worth having or bringing back their inhabitants as slaves to be distributed among its own people without allowing the slaves to become elements of its own State. Some people talked, indeed, of a balance of power in Europe as the only means of keeping peace. But how can this empty notion be transformed into a real thing? Only by having in the centre of Europe an overwhelmingly powerful German nation, pure and uncontaminated, animated by a common will and united in a common strength against which the other Europeans would strive in vain.

The thoroughness, earnestness and weight of German thought will, if only Germans grasp them, break through into German life. Let Germans cease to flatter the foreigner. Let them spurn foreign ideas, and foreign words which soil the tongue of truth. Let the thought of generations yet unborn inspire their resolve. Is there in the whole world another people like this primordial German folk? Any man who seeks to answer this question, not merely with enthusiasm but in the light of deep thought, must answer: "No!" If the Germans go down, the whole of mankind goes down without hope of revival.

If Fichte's doctrine sounds to us fantastic, the product of an over-heated imagination in an hour of national disaster, we must remember that it has run through German political thought ever since, and is to be found under various guises in the writings of

Hegel, Goerres and Schlegel, in the operas of Richard Wagner, and particularly in the writings of Friedrich Ratzel and Arthur Dix, the apostles of German "geographical predestination," as well as in Treitschke, Nietzsche, Lamprecht, and a host of minor personages down to the renegade Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain. With Chamberlain's anti-Semitic "Nordic Evangel," as preached in his *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, I must presume that you are familiar. He, after Gobineau, popularised the "Aryan" myth. But you are probably less familiar with the letters which Chamberlain wrote to the Emperor William II between 1901 and 1923. I will claim your attention for one of them, which was written in November 1901, after Chamberlain had met the German Emperor at Liebenberg in East Prussia and again at the new Palace at Potsdam. There Chamberlain asked leave to express his thanks in writing to the Emperor—and did so to the tune of nine and a half closely-printed pages. Here is an extract from his epistle :—

"Your Majesty and your subjects have been born in a holy shrine. Most of them do not dream that this is so, just as one does not notice what happens daily, like the rays of the life-giving sun. But I had to tread a long and weary way before I could even see the shrine from afar, and then it cost me years of ardent labour before I could set foot upon its steps. Therefore I look back upon my past with terror. For though I had what must be called a happy childhood, there could be no true joy for me outside Germanism, and I tremble when I think how late I came in touch with the German language and that to learn it was by no means easy. It is my inmost conviction—gained through years of study, gained in those solemn hours when the soul wrestles for knowledge with the Divine, like Jacob with the Angel —that the moral and spiritual salvation of mankind depends upon what we can call German. In that "moral order of the world" of which Your Majesty often spoke at Liebenberg, the German element is now the corner-stone; it is the central pivot. It is the language that convinces us irrefutably of this; for Science, Philosophy and Religion can to-day take no onward step save in the German tongue. And the existence of this tongue teaches us something which we might not learn from the phenomena of daily life : that in the German people the highest capacities are united, more highly than elsewhere. The tongue and the people's soul condition each other reciprocally. Each grows out of the other. Here further growth and blossoming are possible as long as both live and penetrate each other. Among the Latin peoples both are dead; among the other Germans (I am thinking especially of England) cleavage had long since begun, a cleavage in which the language gradually becomes dumb (that is to say a mere medium of intercourse, not an element out of which new forms can

be coined) and consequently the soul loses her wings little by little and only crawls like a worm on its belly. And because the German soul is indissolubly linked with the German tongue, the higher development of mankind is bound up with Germany, a mighty Germany spreading far across the earth the sacred heritage of her language, affirming herself everywhere and imposing herself on others. In my eyes, at least, the positive *Realpolitik* of the German Empire—a policy that cannot be too sober and matter-of-fact—has therefore a significance other than that of the policies of other countries. Viewed from the standpoint of a moral world-order, the Anglo-Saxons have forfeited their inheritance—I am not speaking of to-day but looking forward into the centuries. The Russians are only the newest embodiment of the eternal realm of Tamerlane; if their German Imperial House be taken from them only disintegrating raw material is left. God builds to-day upon the Germans alone. This is the knowledge, the certain truth, that has filled my soul for years; to the service of this truth I have sacrificed my repose; for it I will live and die."

In his reply the Emperor thanked Chamberlain for "the priceless jewel" he had sent him, and said the Germans needed a liberator like Chamberlain who would give them access to Indo-Aryan sources of knowledge. He went on :—

"You sing the High Song of the German, and, above all, of our glorious tongue, and pregnantly summon the Germans to leave their petty quarrels, to take up the task of being God's instrument for the spreading of His *Kultur*, of His teachings, and therefore to deepen, to raise up, to cherish their language and through it Science, Enlightenment and Faith! This was redemption. . . .

And now I invoke God's blessing and our Saviour's strengthening upon my comrade and ally in the fight for Germans against Rome, Jerusalem, etc., in the New Year 1902. The feeling that one strives for an absolutely good, Divine cause holds the pledge of victory! You swing your pen, I my tongue. I grasp my guardsman's blade and say, despite all attacks and carpings: I stand my ground!"

In February 1903 Chamberlain wrote the Emperor what he called a "birthday letter," which fills 21 printed pages, upon his love for Germany, the faults of Englishmen and Americans and the mission of kings. He suggested that the finest title which had ever adorned a monarch might be "William the German." The Emperor answered promptly, calling Chamberlain a "saviour in the hour of need," whose letter had come to him in the midst of "birth pangs" which had accompanied the writing of some lines of recognition upon the work of Professor Delitzsch, "Bible and Babel." The Emperor added that, after reading Chamberlain's letter, he had brought forth his literary child in four hours; and went on: "I shall allow myself to lay

my child also at your feet—you who are my spiritual midwife. In so doing I must ask your forgiveness if, in reading it, you should hear tones that seem familiar to you ! "

So the correspondence went on up to and during the Great War, when Chamberlain wrote "spiritual bombs" against England, took German nationality and was created a Knight of the Iron Cross. Even after the War the correspondence continued up to 1923. It contained the ex-Kaiser's confession of faith, which included the statement : "In my opinion Christ was by descent a Galilean, therefore no Jew," and ended with the lines, "This conception can extinguish all religious strife and put an end to all differences of creed. Upon it a union of all Christian Churches can be built up. Our Church must become German, Germanic ! "

But by the autumn of 1923 Chamberlain had transferred his allegiance from the ex-Kaiser to Adolf Hitler, to whom he wrote on October 7th, 1923, a flattering epistle hailing him as the Saviour of Germany. One passage ran :—

"You have mighty things to do; but in spite of your will-power I do not take you for a violent man. You know Goethe's distinction between violence and violence. There is a violence that comes out of and leads back to chaos, and there is a violence whose nature it is to form a cosmos. Of this violence Goethe says : 'It builds up every form with ruling hand, and even at its greatest it is not violence.'

It is in this cosmos-building sense that I wish to count you among the up-building, not among the violent men.

Ever and again I ask myself whether the lack of political instinct for which the Germans are so generally blamed is not a symptom of a much deeper State-building disposition. German talent for organisation is unsurpassed. And German capacity for science is unequalled. . . . The ideal of politics would be to have no politics. But this non-politics would have to be frankly professed and imposed upon the world by force. Nothing can be done as long as the Parliamentary system rules; God knows that the Germans have no spark of talent for this system. Its prevalence I regard as the greatest misfortune, for it can only lead again and again into a morass and bring to nought all plans for restoring the Fatherland to health and lifting it up. . . .

My faith in Germanism has not wavered an instant, though my hope—I confess it—was at a low ebb. With one stroke you have transformed the state of my soul. That in the hour of her deepest need Germany gives birth to a Hitler proves her vitality; as do the influences that emanate from him; for these two things—personality and its influence—belong together . . . May God protect you ! "

Like William II, Hitler had taken his "Aryan" Nordic ideas mainly from Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.*

His Germanic anti-Semitism came partly from the same sourc and partly from the Austrian pan-German leaders, Schoenere and Wolf, with a dash of Lueger's Christian Social anti-Semitisi thrown in. The excitement and bitterness which Schoenerer anti-Semitic pan-Germanism and Lueger's Christian ant Semitism brought into Austrian political life can hardly b conceived by those who never experienced it. Hitler's ow biography *Mein Kampf* makes it clear that he is a product c this atmosphere of intense strife; and after he had gone fror Vienna to Munich in 1912 he may well have read—as I read i Vienna—a book entitled *If I were Kaiser* that appeared in 191: It ran through a dozen editions in a few weeks. It proposed th expulsion from Germany of all Jews not possessing German citizen ship; the degradation to the position of tolerated aliens of al Jews, whether of pure or of mixed blood, who possessed citizen ship and were registered as Jews in 1870; the exclusion of Jews baptised and unbaptised, from all public offices, from service i the Army and Navy, from the Bar, from the franchise and fron eligibility to Parliament, from the directorship of banks an theatres, from the ownership of newspapers and from journalisn in general. The Jews should also, this writer urged, be deprive of the right to own land, or to lend money on landed mortgages and should be required, as aliens, to pay double taxation. It i a question, he added, of "saving the German soul."

At all events, it is upon these lines that Hitler has acte against the Jews in Germany, and is now acting in Austria and it is significant that in the recent proposals of Herr Henlein Hitler's lieutenant in Czechoslovakia, the introduction of th notorious "Aryan Paragraph" should be demanded. One i tempted to wonder whether this demand is among those whicl the British and French Ministers at Prague lately urged th Czechoslovak Government to accept by way of going to th utmost limit in the effort to remove Henlein's and Hitler' "grievances"! For it must be clearly understood that Germa aims, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, are all of one piece Fichte's primeval people, or *Urvolk*, speaking the primeva tongue, or *Ursprache*, through which it maintains contact witl and draws strength from the forces of Nature, cannot allow th expansion of its God-given *Kultur* to be hindered by the machina tions of inferior races who do not even recognise Christ as a German!

If, among those inferior races, the British hold a place mucl lower than that of the German angels, they are not so vile as ar

the French and the Slavs at whose expense Hitler's ideal of building up a German nation of 250 millions in Europe, with adequate "*Lebensraum*," or living space, is to be realised. In this respect Hitler expresses the views of the "geo-political" school to which his deputy, Herr Hess, belongs and of which the present chief is General von Haushofer. It is the lineal descendant of the school of pan-German thought which Friedrich Ratzel, with his doctrine of "anthropo-geographical predestination," and Arthur Dix, with his "geographical predestination," founded in the nineteenth century under the influence of Fichte and Hegel. Our amiable friend, Professor Banse, who gloats over the invasion and subjugation of England, is one, but only one, of the exponents of these ideas. His book *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg* (1932) [1] will repay careful study, not because it is an isolated product of "political geography," but because it is typical. It is enlightening to compare Banse's definition of "the proper territory of a true Third Reich," having a present population of 92 millions, with the pan-German map of 1899:—

(*a*) Purely German States: the German Empire; Austria; Danzig; Luxemburg; Holland and her East-Indian colonies; Liechtenstein.

(*b*) The German portions of other countries: German Belgium (Flanders, Brabant, Eupen, Malmedy); German Switzerland; German France (Flanders, Alsace and Lorraine); German Italy (especially the Southern Tyrol); German Yugoslavia (Southern Styria); German Czechoslovakia (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia); German Poland (West Prussia, Posen, Upper Silesia); German Lithuania (the Memel territory); German Denmark.

This was written in 1933. If we compare it further with some well-known passages in the second volume of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (which was written in 1927, two years after Locarno, with the help of various "geo-political" advisers), we may see how consistent is this line of German thought. From it Hitler has never departed save in so far as he has extended it by demanding the return to Germany of her former oversea colonies and has restricted it, more recently, by renouncing—perhaps conditionally—the Southern Tyrol.

On page 757 of *Mein Kampf* he writes:—

"The future orientation of our foreign policy must be neither to the West nor to the East, but an eastern policy in the sense of gaining

[1] The English version is entitled *Germany Prepares for War.*

the necessary soil for our German people. Since, for this, one needs strength, and France, the mortal enemy of our people, strangles us pitilessly and robs us of power, we must take upon ourselves every sacrifice of which the effects are calculated to contribute to a destruction of French endeavours to hold mastery in Europe. Any and every power is to-day our natural ally who, like us, feels the French lust of domination on the continent to be intolerable. No approach to such a power must seem to us too hard and no renunciation unspeakable, if its final result offers even the possibility of crushing our grimmest hater. The healing of smaller wounds we can then leave to the softening influences of time if we can cauterise and heal up the biggest wounds."

And again, on pages 766 and 767 :—

" Only when this has been completely understood in Germany, so that the will to live of the German nation no longer decays in merely passive defence but pulls itself together for an active final settlement with France and throws itself, with the greatest ultimate aims on the German side, into a last decisive struggle—only then will one be able to bring the eternal and, in itself, so barren contest between us and France to an end; though then only on the assumption that Germany will really see in the annihilation of France merely a means, not an end, so that thereafter our people will at last be able to attain its possible expansion in another quarter. To-day we number 80 million Germans in Europe! And our foreign policy will be recognised as right only when, in hardly a century, 250 million Germans will live upon this continent, not crammed together as factory coolies but as peasants and workmen whose labour will reciprocally vouchsafe life to each other."

Let us note the words that no renunciation is unspeakable and no approach too hard to any power that will help Germany to crush France as a means of the expansion of German territory elsewhere. Recently we heard Hitler declare the Alpine frontier of Italy inviolable and announce the abandonment of the Germans in the Italian Tyrol as his " political testament " to the German people—perhaps as a means of keeping his hold on Italy in view of the final struggle with France. This " approach " to Italy must have been the harder for him in view of the passionate pages on which he denounces, in *Mein Kampf*, all those Germans who " betrayed " Southern Tyrol to the Italians. Perhaps, too, he may have thought that when the " major wound " of France shall have been cauterised, or, to use Hitler's own expression, " burnt out," the minor wound may yield to healing treatment. In any event, he himself has taught us what his chief aims are.

And we, in this country, can fall into no greater error than

to think these aims a peculiar and perhaps evanescent outcome of Nazi " blood and soil," " blood and race," " folkish " ideology. They run with remarkable consistency through the whole of German political philosophy since Herder—who was a contemporary of Frederick the Great—and especially since Fichte. From Fichte to Hitler the line is straight. It led to the Great War, which Germany waged for the mastery of Europe and, indeed, of the world; and it is a line that will again lead to war if the direction in which it runs be not understood, and blocked, in time. War is the natural agency of those who follow it, however ready they may be to reap preliminary advantages by threat of war without actual fighting. We must not forget that Hegel defined war as " eternal and moral," or that Fichte declared, in his " Doctrine of State," that " between States there is neither law nor right unless it be the right of the strongest," and added that " the people metaphysically predestined has the moral right to fulfil its destiny by every means of cunning and force."

We are in the presence of a body of teaching to which Hitler has succeeded in giving the quality of a quasi-religious frenzy, a crusading intensity under the sign of a hooked cross which the Pope denounced the other day as having no place in Christendom. Behind it lies the dynamic and explosive concept of *Kultur*, a concept which no German has yet succeeded in defining comprehensively, despite many efforts. As I have said, it has nothing in common with our concepts of " culture " or " civilisation." The nearest approach to a satisfactory definition was given two years ago by the leading Germanist of Paris University, Professor Vermeil, who explained it by drawing attention to the external conditions which have affected German thought, in so far as that thought has dwelt upon the destiny of the German nation. The soil of Germany, he said, comprises the northern plain which is without natural limits on the east and west, and the southern highlands which give access to the south-west towards the Rhine and to the south-east along the Danube. The northern plain is not naturally fertile. It is rather a region of passage than a fixed abode for its population. Across it Germany, who is far from being an ethnical unit, felt the thrust of the northern tribes which plunged like a wedge between the Celtic or Latin masses on the west and the Slavs on the east. If the western border stabilised itself little by little, the eternal contest between Germans and Slavs fretted out, in flat country on the east, a zigzag frontier which is, so to speak, pregnant with perpetual conflict. To the south the Italians and the Magyars mount guard against German

expansiveness and oppose to it barriers apparently insuperable. In order to triumph, German expansion needs to overcome all these barriers so as to escape from territorial limitations and to gain greater relative unity. Professor Vermeil continued:—

"This explains the meaning which German thought gives to *Kultur*. Here, *Kultur* means mastery, effort ceaselessly renewed, constant struggle without final satisfaction in principle. By "civilisation" the West understands the sum total of the institutions which came at once out of Antiquity and Christianity, the acknowledged sources of Western thought and of Western universalism. But Germany only learned late, and indirectly, the thought of Antiquity. Nor was she so strongly impregnated by Christianity as were the other peoples of Western and Southern Europe; and, perhaps for this reason, she has preserved her original traits. It is, above all, this double tardiness which leads her to set up the concept of *Kultur* against the concept of 'civilisation' and, not without disdain, to throw back the latter concept on to the West."

Are not we, whose fate is bound up with "the West"; we whose institutions are based upon an ideal of individual human freedom; who hold liberty of thought, speech and action to be our greatest political good—are we not compelled to reflect upon the dimensions of the contest which may be forced upon us? We may be living on the eve of one of the decisive moments in human history. Either our forefathers, who strove and fought for freedom, were wrong or the Germans are right. We look upon civilisation as a system of ideas, aspirations and ways of behaviour which are humane and susceptible of becoming universal, as an approach to a rich and solid order of things wherein mankind may dwell. The Germans, on the contrary, understand by *Kultur* an intimate union between themselves and the natural forces of the Universe whose action they alone intuitively apprehend, and a human discipline designed to utilise those forces. This is why Germans feel that they are closer than other peoples to the primitive world, and return to it more easily as to the fount of their own genius.

Hence the remarkable consistency of German ideas and aims since Fichte assured his fellow-countrymen that they are the original human stock speaking an original tongue which gives them access to the forces of nature and makes of them "The People" who are entitled to rule the earth. And it was to this fundamental divergence between the aims of the West and the aims of German *Kultur* that the wisest statesman of modern Europe, the late President Masaryk, alluded when he adjured

his own people to make "Jesus, not Cæsar" their exemplar and to choose the ideal of humaneness rather than the ideal of domination.

Summary of Discussion.

DR. GOOCH said that, like the lecturer, he had given over half his life to the study of German history and ideas. He agreed with the lecturer's underlying assumption that the Germans were a very great and a very formidable race who might be liked or disliked but could never be ignored. The historical importance of Frederick the Great had been rightly emphasised. He had put Prussia "on the map." Lord Rosebery had called him the patron saint of Germany. The lecturer had rightly pointed out that the governing principle of the whole of the forty-six years of the reign of Frederick the Great had been *raison d'état*. The man who had begun with the rape of Silesia and followed this up by the partition of Poland stood as a very master of the Macchiavellian art. There had seemed to be, however, a slight suggestion in the address that this principle of *raison d'état*, if not confined to Prussia, was at any rate more effectively and intensively practised there. That there was something almost uniquely realistic and ruthless in the long tradition of Frederician and post-Frederician diplomacy was a matter of fact. But *raison d'état* had been the religion of statesmen since the coming of the modern State round about 1500, and ruthless and realistic as Frederick the Great had been, he had been no more so than Richelieu, who as a Cardinal of the Roman Church had supported the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years' War. Cavour had said: "What rascals we should be if we did for ourselves what we do for our country's sake."

There was one consideration of governing significance when an attempt was being made to understand the mentality of the men who had made Prussia and through Prussia Germany, namely that, unlike Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, all of whom in different degrees had had the inestimable blessing of what the French called natural frontiers, Germany had had nothing of the sort. If they were ever to form a nation State, which had not occurred until 1870, this could only come into existence and remain in existence on the basis of a very strong and rigid and centralised rule. Although the speaker detested the Potsdam spirit, without it there would have been no modern Prussia, no modern Germany, and although those who were not citizens of that country might consider that this would indeed have been a mercy, they should remember when trying to understand the German mentality that to the Germans the matter did not look the same.

The lecturer had been right in emphasising not the novelty but the relative antiquity not only of the racial superiority complex but also of the pan-German doctrine. There was, however, a very great difference between the ideology of dreamers and writers from Fichte onwards to Chamberlain and the official acceptance and application of such doctrines by the people in power. The first ruler of Germany ever to

defend pan-Germanism was Hitler. Pan-Germanism had been contained in books and in the press, and had been voiced on platforms, but there had never been a pan-German at the helm before to-day.

The speaker had been a little surprised not to hear more about Bismarck. He had been ruthless and realistic, and had never pretended to be anything else; but it would be impossible really to understand his greatness unless it were realised that this great man of war, after he had reached his goal, became and remained a great man of peace. When he had got what he wanted he had stopped. He had preached and practised the doctrine of limited liability, thereby showing that he was great in victory and accomplishment as well as great in endeavour and aspiration. The Kaiser had never been a pan-German. What made Hitler so much more dangerous than anybody who had ever had German power concentrated in their hands—and power was in his hands to-day to a greater extent than it had been in the hands of Frederick the Great, who, though also head of the State, the Government and the Army, had been the ruler of only six million Germans, whereas Hitler was the ruler of seventy-three millions—was that he was the first man on the German throne really to believe in pan-Germanism with all the fanatical intensity of one whose sincerity was not doubted even by his greatest opponent.

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE said that the lecturer had brilliantly proved that the Germans were the silliest nation in Europe, but to be silly was not to differ from any of the other nations. The last speaker had pointed out that *raison d'état* had by no means been invented by Frederick the Great, and surely the present nationalism in Germany was neither peculiar to the Germans nor their invention. Probably the English and the French had had a great deal more to do with it than the Germans, and, as the lecturer had pointed out, an Englishman had invented the particularly pernicious form of racial nationalism from which they were now suffering. Germany was rather like the type of convex mirror which distorted the features and showed the caricaturist how to get to work. For instance, there were discreet English and American expressions for some of the very foolish German thoughts mentioned during the address. "Geopolitical predestination" had been called by the Americans "the manifest destiny" of the American people to be the master nation of the whole of the New World, and "Aryan superiority" was called "the white man's burden" by the English.

The last speaker had pointed out the comforting fact that there had been famous German statesmen in modern history who had had limited aims. Frederick's aims had been limited. He had been determined to raise his State to the position of a great Power, but there he had stopped. More than a hundred years lay between the end of the Seven Years' War and the beginning of the first of Bismarck's wars. And Bismarck's aims, too, had certainly been limited. Bismarck's greatness had consisted in his knowing exactly what he wanted, in

getting it and then in stopping instead of trying to grasp more. During about two-thirds of his political career he had simply been defending what he had previously conquered. His aim had been to unite with Prussia the mosaic of small States in the south and south-west of Germany which had been left by the peace settlement of 1815, and thereby to create a limited German national State. So moderate had been his aims that he had deliberately left out Austria, not wishing to attempt the task of breaking up another great Power. Down to 1870, if anyone had been asked which was the really ambitious national State constituting a threat to the liberties of Europe, they would have mentioned, not the Prussians, but the French. The speaker possessed a map published by an English newspaper at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, on which the anticipated war area had been printed in red and the rest in black; and this red patch covered, not the French territory on which the fighting afterwards took place, but the Prussian Rhineland and the Bavarian Palatinate, because it had been assumed that France would fight her war on German soil as she had done in the past almost invariably for two centuries. It had never been thought that the French would give up the idea of domination; and yet, to do them justice, they had given it up after 1870. Therefore it was not impossible that the Germans in their turn, might give up their dreams of world conquest.

Finally, what had given Bismarck his chance had been a geographical vacuum created by the previous general peace settlement. Between 1815 and the eighteen-sixties the great vacuum in Europe had been in Western Germany and in Italy. To-day the vacuum had shifted eastwards, and it now lay between Germany on the one side and Russia on the other. This vacuum did give Hitler, on a much larger scale, the sort of opportunity which Bismarck had had in the middle of the last century. The danger was that if Germany did expand into the vacuum, as Bismarck had done on a smaller scale, then, after this second expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, she would be a Power vastly greater than any other single Power in Europe and would be equal to at least two of the largest Powers together. This would completely upset the balance of power in Europe, and would upset it at a time when the world was most desperately in need of order through some kind of unification, and had apparently made a failure of the attempt to get this through the League of Nations by agreement between sovereign States. This had created a formidable political vacuum to match the geographical vacuum in Eastern Europe. The need for unification was so desperate that Hitler's antique plan of unifying the world by force had a chance of fulfilling, in a very crude way, the present crying need of the world. If the unification of the world could not be brought about by agreement, Hitler would have a very good chance of realising it through force.

Colonel G. F. B. Turner said that he had followed with complete agreement the lecturer's address. He was not anti-German or pro-

French but pro-British. From January 1920 to December 1925 he had been a member of the Military Inter-Ally Commission of Control in East Prussia and during the six years he had spent in Königsberg had had many opportunities of studying the mentality of the German people. As the lecturer had indicated there had been no change in their mentality for the last two hundred years. It was very necessary that that mentality should be understood. The speaker was appalled by the pro-German feeling in Great Britain due to lack of understanding. People were ready to make excuses for German breaches of the Peace Treaties, German rearmament, etc., and recently the London Press had been flooded with appreciations of what was, in the speaker's opinion, a most dangerous book written by a servant of the Government, Major-General Temperley, who for ten years had been Military Adviser at Geneva. In this book General Temperley, after saying that he had done all in his power to suppress the production of the French Secret Dossier, had then thrown on the French the whole blame for the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the subsequent rearmament of Germany. The Secret Dossier was a statement compiled by the French giving instances of the German breaches of the Peace Treaty and was, in General Temperley's own words, "undoubtedly a very complete indictment of German good faith."

In 1923 the speaker when revising and bringing up to date the report of the Commission in East Prussia had come across a passage written by his predecessor which he transcribed, and which stated that "the greatest difficulty which the Commission had had to face had been the obstinacy and bad faith of the East Prussian coupled with the fact that apparently all German officers were prepared to tell deliberate untruths for the good of the Fatherland." This statement was thoroughly justified. The fatal mistake made by the British Government throughout had been in placing any reliance on the word of Germany. He agreed with General Temperley that if the Germans could not be trusted it made negotiations very difficult if not impossible, but the fact was that the Germans could *not* be trusted. Hitler would keep his word until it suited him to break it. The French knew this and acted accordingly. We knew it, but pretended otherwise.

In February 1925 the speaker had been one of three thousand people listening to Dr. Eckener's description of his first flight to America. The thunderous applause which had greeted statements by subsequent speakers that Germany's future was in the air; that it was in and through the air that she was going to win back all that she had lost; and that it was the duty of everyone in Germany to make himself or herself air-minded, had orientated his thoughts in a direction he had never had reason to alter. What was the meaning of British endeavours to strengthen her Air Force, her Air Raid Precautions and the strengthening of her defences generally? Was she afraid of attack from Switzerland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium or France or even Italy? His audience knew perfectly well that there was only one country which could contemplate with any prospect of success an

attack on Great Britain, and that was the country which was trying to lull us into a state of complacency. Bismarck had said that there was no country so easy to deceive as England. Lord Roberts had said thirty years ago that Germany would strike when Germany's hour had struck. Germany could not be trusted. When she had consolidated her position in Central Europe and started to press her claim to the colonies we should stand fast and make no concessions of any sort. For that way would lie our ruin.

MR. RENNIE SMITH said that the lecture was the fifth in a series which had a particular bearing on British foreign policy.[1] It could be linked up with the first lecture of the series. It had been a lecture of fact-finding. The first of the series had been in part historical, but mainly concerned with the contemporary European map and some anticipation of the future. In the fact-finding of the present address was a deep underpinning with regard to the character of contemporary Germany from history. After devoting four and a half years exclusively to the study of the character of the new Germany and trying to provide a documentation which might be of some small service in the education of the British nation, the speaker had a deep sense of how necessary it was for Great Britain to make up her mind in the light of the facts as to the real situation. What was the nature of the problem? There was nothing in the present conduct of foreign affairs to show that the Government were even grounded on the matter.

The statement by Dr. Gooch concerning Bismarck and the Emperor did not undermine any of the substance of the lecturer's address. If Bismarck had not been a pan-German it had been for reasons of statesmanship. He had been quiet from 1878 until 1890 for reasons of satiation, but had then given a lead for an overseas empire. If the Kaiser had not been a pan-German he had been surrounded by and saturated with immensely powerful forces working for pan-Germanism.

It was necessary to realise in view of the facts presented by the lecturer that the aspirations and the psychological position of the Germans had not been born or created with the coming of Adolf Hitler. If this could be agreed upon, the audience, as a microcosm of the nation, would have made an immense step forward. The British Cabinet was deeply divided, so was the Government and so was the nation, because they were not agreed with regard to the facts, and for this reason the speaker wished to express his admiration and gratitude to the lecturer for the factualness of his address.

MR. W. J. ROSE recalled Burke's famous statement: "You cannot bring an indictment against a whole nation." He had been a student in Leipzig at the time when the notorious pan-German historian, Lamprecht was teaching. But there had been another historian,

[1] See the paper on "The Issues in British Foreign Policy" published in the May–June 1938 number of the *Journal*.

Brandenburg, who had hated Lamprecht and all his works. The tragedy of the present situation was that the power which had passed into Hitler's hands was so great that all those more liberal lines through German thought were unable to make themselves felt.

The speaker did not think it was quite true to say that Bismarck had stopped his aggression in 1871. In his war on the Catholic Church he had tried to do what Hitler had now taken on and what, through the conditions prevailing to-day, he looked as if he might carry through. Bismarck had failed. In the 'sixties he had achieved everything which he had set out to do. In the 'seventies and 'eighties, however, he had failed in almost everything which he had set out to do. Two and a half million Polish Catholics in Pomerania and Poznania had been a sort of nightmare to him from 1863 onwards. Bismarck had never got over his fear of the Poles in Prussia as the spearhead of another faith, viz. of Catholicism. Perhaps fear of this sort was unjustified, but one saw something very like it in the Nazi campaign against the Church to-day.

MISS NESTI SANDERS said that she entirely agreed with the lecturer's address. The other day a German had been speaking on German aims in Europe. Apparently, according to the agreement made with Mussolini in Rome, Hitler was to have a free hand right down the Danube Basin to the Black Sea which would mean his taking the Roumanian oil-fields and then the Ukraine, the granary of Europe. This would give Germany a complete hegemony in Europe and she would probably extend her power to Asia. In such a case the other European nations would be in such an inferior position that life would be unbearable.

MR. GATHORNE-HARDY (in the Chair) said that the historical aspect of the lecture was of great importance because there were two schools of thought in Great Britain on the subject of Germany. One attributed the rise of Hitler and his present attitude to the Peace Treaties and considered that when these grievances were settled Germany would be perfectly amenable. The other school of thought, in the words of a recent book by Mr. F. A. Voigt,[1] considered that only the shallowest understanding would see the National Socialist Revolution as a result of Versailles. It was the nightmare of German genius come true in which Versailles had been but an incident, the War but an episode. The historical survey given by the lecturer would agree with the second thesis.

MR. WICKHAM STEED, in reply to the first speaker, said he had been trying to explain the consistency of German aims throughout a certain period; naturally, it had been impossible to give a complete analysis of German history in the time. He had not wished to imply that the Germans alone practised the *raison d'état*. Most other States had

[1] *Unto Cæsar*, by F. A. Voigt. (London, 1938.)

practised it, but there was not another people who had produced philosophers of the first rank, of the eminence of Fichte and Hegel, who had provided philosophical justification for the *raison d'état* and taught it to their peoples.

The lecturer agreed with the fifth speaker that there was another Germany. The whole tragedy of Germany had been that the Liberal feeling which had started the movement for German unity which led up to the Parliament of Frankfurt, had been fruitless until it had been translated into blood and iron by Bismarck with the enthusiastic support of the German people. Therefore when speaking of Germany it was necessary to consider the effective tendencies which dominated the State. Bismarck had not been a pan-German in the ordinary sense of the word. He had not joined the Austrian pan-Germans for the reason that he needed Austria-Hungary as an ally. When Austria-Hungary had begun to break up it had been another matter. Bismarck had not always been consistent. He had opposed Liberalism and Parliamentary ideas as long as he was Chancellor. But after his fall in 1890 the lecturer had heard him speak in impassioned tones of the necessity for parliamentary means of curbing the power of the Crown. Concerning William II, the lecturer advised the audience to get the volume of correspondence between William II and Houston Chamberlain, where they would see the approval and affirmation by the former of the latter's pan-German fanaticism. It was, however, true that one could not bring an indictment against a whole people. The lecturer believed that to-day, in spite of the *Anschluss*, more than half the German people were opposed to Hitler, but they dared not and could not say one word. Great Britain would help that better part of the German people by refusing resolutely to be bamboozled or hoodwinked by Hitler, and by upholding the principles which were the very foundations of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was true that many eminent people, Germans among them, had severely criticised the doctrines of Fichte and Hegel; but it should be remembered that these were the doctrines and the policy of the present German Government, and they were in the hands of the man who, the first speaker had rightly said, held more power than any German since Frederick the Great. The lecturer considered the situation really dangerous. He did not yet consider it hopeless, but it would become so unless the British people tried to ally their own minds with the truth, historical and philosophical, about Germany and her aims, and refused to be misled by propaganda of any kind. Great Britain was to-day almost the only active warden and trustee of the future of Western civilisation.

ROUMANIA TO-DAY[1]

DR. GERHART LUETKENS

ROUMANIA is mainly an agricultural country, and she is a country and a nation in the making. Three-quarters of the population are agricultural; 84 per cent. of the farmers, about three million and a quarter small peasants, have holdings of less than eleven acres and on the average of about four acres and a half. Agricultural technique is rather primitive, and the average yield per hectare is very low. Often enough the peasants do not even possess animals. In 1935 a survey covering a hundred and fifty thousand peasant holdings showed that more than one third owned no cow, 37 per cent. no draught animal, and nearly half of them either no sheep or a single pig. No wonder, then, that in many villages, even large ones, you do not even find a small general store. The peasants cannot afford to have bread regularly; meat is a rare dish on their table and often enough the ordinary diet of *mamaliga*, a sort of maize-grits, is broken only at Easter time. In the wide, treeless plains of Bessarabia, the Dobruja and other sections of the country, the peasants, even the less primitive Germans and Bulgarians, burn dung to heat their homes in winter time, and fertilising is generally unknown except in the districts formerly belonging to the Habsburg Monarchy. In the outskirts of the towns, the markets of which bring some ready money into the pockets of the peasants, one is constantly accosted for a *Kibrit*, a match, for even this is a luxury, and in many villages women still use flint to light the fire. The long and bitterly cold winter months are passed with little to do except to sit in the "pubs" or do needlework.

Pellagra, tuberculosis and dipsomania are widespread. And even such diseases as leprosy and trachoma are endemic in some parts of the country. As a Roumanian likes to look clean and tidy, this is clearly a symptom of poverty and lack of medical attendance. Their traditional artistic skill is well known from the beautifully embroidered garments made, even by men, during

[1] This paper was delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on February 14th, 1938, with Sir Andrew McFadyean in the Chair. The author has since revised it for publication in this issue by eliminating allusions which were topical when the meeting was held.

the long months of winter leisure. Considerable differences, of course, prevail between the sections of the country, but on the whole it may safely be said that a considerable part of the agrarian population lives near starvation level.

The Roumanian peasant is a peaceful and honest man. One is constantly struck by his tranquillity. Even when dancing the *Hora*, the slow-moving dance found everywhere on the Balkan peninsula, there is something subdued about the people, and the long centuries of serfdom and warfare seem still to be fresh in their memories. Fear of the police and the tax-collector is much alive in them. I shall never forget the expression of despair and the plea for clemency in the eyes of the whole group of peasants who had damaged my car when I uttered the word "Jendarm."

It is, then, not astonishing that the urban upper classes are afraid that the country may be drifting towards an explosion. Peasant revolts have been rare in Roumanian history, they have never resorted to violence except when driven to despair. But recently antagonism between town and countryside has become one of the main social and economic issues. Moreover, the peasants' demand for "Law and Order" amounts to nothing less than a revolution against the customary administrative practices. So far the interests of the rural population have been utterly neglected. The Agrarian Reform, it is true, distributed the land in order to appease the social unrest after the War, but very little has been done since then to raise the standard of the new owners.

One of the political concepts is that every effort should be directed towards developing agriculture on modern lines. This would include tasks so primitive as the institution of a land register or the consolidation of the holdings, the creation of proper credit facilities, and the change from cereal-growing to diversified crops and live-stock raising. Those who advocate such a course are of opinion that industry could not solve the fundamental problems of the country, namely the misery of the peasantry and the agrarian overpopulation. As to industry, they hold that only such branches should be developed as can be supplied with the necessary raw materials in the country. Protective tariffs and monopolies they regard as economically unsound, because they would lower still further the standard of life of the peasants. Foreign capital, they think, should be raised, but only for profitable investment, and not to cover budgetary deficits. Before the new Constitution was proclaimed at the end of February 1938 and all political parties were dissolved,

this policy was advocated by the National Peasant Party which had come into being through a combination of the peasants of old Roumania and the Roumanian Nationalist Party of Transylvania. Maniu was their leader. The Transylvanian wing consisted mainly of peasants, but all strata of the population, townspeople and intellectuals, were represented in it. It was ideally designed as a nucleus aiming at the emancipation of the Roumanian people, which in the Old Kingdom had been ruthlessly ruled by an oligarchy of *boiars* and politicians. The tradition of the Transylvanian party leaders and, to a large extent, of the whole Transylvanian population is of Western origin. By gathering the peasants of the Regat and of Bessarabia into their political organisation, the National Peasant Party and their Western ideas gained a platform from which they had a chance to enter Roumania's political life from within.

Western Liberalism was the driving-force within the cultured class of the country from the time of the struggle for independence. Yet Roumania could hardly be considered as a country of what we might call "European type." When people there talk of Europe, they still have the feeling that they are speaking of another part of the world, actually the part lying beyond Budapest. With respect to political life, Western ideas would presuppose some underlying spiritual unity of the population at large. Such is hardly to be expected with peasants who but a short time ago were still semi-serfs, held together by the State and the Orthodox Church. Where was a new denominator, so indispensable for the formation of a modern state, to be found, when such large and different sections were added to the territory of old Roumania as former Russian Bessarabia, former Austrian Bucovina, former Bulgarian Dobruja, former Hungarian Transylvania and Banat? The Orthodox Church could not be of much help. The Church, it is true, has been in all Eastern States the last protection of the nation and of its civilisation. Under modern conditions, however, its organisation is badly adapted to such a task, because the "Black" clergy, *i.e.*, the lower clergy, who come into personal contact with the laity, are generally little educated, and in the villages not much above peasant standard. They are prepared to appeal more to superstitious than to moral intellectual impulses.

When Transylvania became united with old Roumania, even the relative religious unity of the country as a whole came to an end. In the past there were Jews in Roumania and some smaller religious communities. Now about one-third of the

population belongs to other denominations than the Orthodox Church, such as the Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, etc., mostly living in the newly acquired territories. At the same time, Roumania has become a country with strong national minorities, part of which had already a definite national consciousness. I shall give a rapid survey of this problem, which may become of still greater political importance than it has been up to the present.

More than one quarter of the population belongs to national minorities. There are about 1,400,000 Hungarians, 750,000 Germans, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Russians, etc., and about 800,000 Jews, half a million of whom live in the new parts of the country. The status of the Jews has been of international concern since Roumania became independent. All European Powers repeatedly insisted that full citizenship should be given to them. Roumania, however, always evaded the fulfilment of her pledges. The Jews settle mainly in the northern districts of Roumania, namely in Bessarabia, Bucovina, Moldavia, the Maramures region of Transylvania and on the Roumanian–Hungarian border in the towns of Oradia, Arad and Timesoara. As they were not entitled to hold rural property until the end of the World War, the Jews are mainly occupied in small trades and crafts, industry and banking and in the professions. I have, however, seen Jewish peasants in Bessarabia. As small money-lenders to the peasantry they are easily made the object of hostility.

The Treaties of 1919 seemed definitely to settle this vexatious question. They stipulated full equality of political and civil rights for all citizens of the new State without distinction of race, language and religion. Furthermore, it was expressly said in another article that all persons born on Roumanian territory should *ipso facto* become Roumanian citizens, and that all Jews inhabitating any Roumanian territory should be naturalised, if they had no other citizenship.

The strongest minority of German stock are the so-called Saxons of Transylvania; brought into the country by Hungarian kings in the twelfth century, they are now peasants and burghers of the towns. On the whole the Saxons are a prosperous people, interested in manufacture and trade, of a rather high cultural standard, and strongly rooted in their national and religious tradition. The so-called Swabians in the Banat around Timesoara are equally a prosperous community, of Catholic faith and preponderantly agricultural occupation. Although up to the War they were not too conscious of their nationality and were notice-

ably absorbed by the Magyars, they are now opposed to becoming Roumanised. The other Swabian groups in Bessarabia and the Dobruja, brought there by the Russian Czar to open the plains shortly after 1800, are of more primitive standing both economically and culturally.

The largest minority is the Hungarian. The Szekler community, about half a million people, are an agricultural group settled on the Western slopes of the Carpathian mountains as a defence force. They are strongly rooted in Hungarian tradition as you see from their beautiful handicraft in embroidery and wood-carving. Their more urban co-nationals live near the Hungarian border in and around the towns of Cluj, Oradea, Arad and Timesoara. The many Transylvanian Jews mostly consider themselves to be Hungarians. The Hungarian minority strongly adheres to its nationality: the fact that it is impossible for even a Saxon of the upper classes to join a Hungarian club in those towns, to say nothing of a Roumanian, provides an illustration of this.

Apart from the Orthodox Church and the State organisation itself, there was in old Roumania another tendency which aimed at giving the country spiritual unity. Professor Jorga, the eminent Roumanian historian, tried to show that the Roumanians, if not of pure Roman origin, were so strongly rooted in Latin tradition that they could be regarded as a neo-Latin nation, *i.e.*, a nation of Western European tradition and make-up. Actually, the Roumanian intelligentsia was swept by Western Liberalism of French origin in the nineteenth century. The Roumanian language, with a considerable admixture of Slav, Thracian and Turk words, originates in the main from Latin, namely, the so-called *latinum castrense*. Roumanian Law, as conceived along the lines of the Code Napoleon, and literature and art were in constant contact with the West. Roumanians of the middle-classes went to study in Paris and went into the civil service or the professions on their return. Professor Jorga's conception provided a real opportunity of moulding the national and social consciousness of the nation, but unfortunately the middle-classes were not able to fulfil in Roumania the task they have accomplished in other countries, because, as a French writer recently put it, there has been for a long time "une sorte de dévaluation morale trop évidente de la classe dirigeante." Professor Jorga himself, who, by the way, was tutor to the present King, was forced to realise this after the War. When his short premiership came to an end he confessed that he

had not known how politics were carried on in his country. Jorga, then, has gradually shifted towards regarding Italian Fascism as the re-birth of Latinism and the conception his own country should imitate.

The Roumanian middle-class rose as a nationalist opposition to foreign domination. Independence being gained, they were bent on organising not a new economic system in industry or agriculture, but a political one. They required an easy flow of revenue by and from the State. With regard to public administration, the spoils system was the result to be expected, and graft its natural consequence. Politics in Roumania are regarded as *the* business by the middle-classes and the political *élite*. In post-War times, the Liberal Party is, I think, a typical expression of this attitude.

One should not judge the position too much from a Western point of view such as was implied, for instance, in Bismarck's remark that those Roumanians wearing their shirt outside their trousers were honest, and those wearing it tucked inside were not, alluding to the old-fashioned Roumanian attire. Corruption, though a legal offence, is not too strongly condemned in the eastern parts of the country, where many people take it casually and as a matter-of-fact. It is strongly objected to in Transylvania, where it is in striking contrast with the former administration of the Hapsburgs.

Whereas the Roumanian middle-classes crowd into politics and public positions, the economic sphere proper has been left to foreigners and to the minorities, namely Greeks, Armenians, Austrians, Germans, Jews and the Saxons and Hungarians. The Roumanians never looked with favour upon this situation, and when public services and the professions could no longer absorb the younger generation, xenophobia increased considerably. Under the pressure of the intellectual proletariat a law was passed that business undertakings must not employ more than a certain proportion of people of non-Roumanian blood, and a short time ago it was decreed that not more than 10 per cent. of the employees may be non-Roumanians.

The traditional Roumanian middle class was, it appears, not very well fitted to become the rallying-point of a nation. Many of them, therefore, conceived the idea of building the country and the nation from the bottom, from the peasants. Their Western minds realised that democratic government, honest administration and respect for the minorities would have to be the aims they stood for.

Working along democratic Western lines through education and agricultural reform can only be conceived as a slow process. There are, however, people who want quick results, and the King is one of them. By many the King is considered as one of the most able politicians of the country. For him the making of the nation seems to be a task that must be tackled in an urgent and direct way. A strong administration and a strong army, in other words an autocratic régime, are to solve the fundamental problem of uniting the country. Would it solve also the problem of making a united nation?

Here, however, another factor enters the scene. In the wake of the recent world economic crisis Roumania turned to industry. It is very difficult to get an exact idea of the extent to which industrialisation has so far been successful, and how far in more normal circumstances it will continue to be so. Statistics reveal that the index of industrial production rose from 100 to 135 between 1928 and 1934. In the latter year the value of industrial production, not taking into account mining and oil, amounted almost to 40 milliards, and last year it had already risen by more than 50 per cent. to 62 milliards. Industrialisation, therefore, seems to have made considerable progress. The iron and metallurgical industry, and to a lesser degree the textile and chemical industries, are outstanding. In spite of this, however, the number of people industrially employed does not amount to much more than two hundred thousand.

Industrialisation, of course, had far-reaching effects on the whole social and emotional life of the population at large. Taxes had to be increased. For instance, during the last three years, new taxes and fees have been raised to the amount of 23 milliards in the ordinary budget, not taking into account the manifold special funds which produce income of their own. Of these 23 milliards more than 20 milliards came from indirect taxation.

Industrialisation had, for a long time, the support of the Liberal Party, which, like all political parties, has now been dissolved. Their position, however, was paradoxical in a certain degree. They were traditionally in favour of high protective tariffs, monopolies, foreign loans to cover the deficits of the budget. Manufacturing had, originally, no specific appeal to the kind of bourgeoisie which they traditionally represented. Simultaneously with industry, however, a Roumanian middle-class proper, of the manufacturing type, was forging ahead, and they won a foothold within the Liberal Party, thereby loosening its coherence. Smaller groups, a little more to the Right, came

into existence. The common outlook and political contact existing between all such groups and the King, between their interests in promoting industry and the King's desire for administrative reorganisation of the country, is obvious. With the King the importance is stressed by his wish to strengthen the military power of the country. As it seems to me, one of the fundamental facts moulding present-day Roumania is this new sociological phenomenon. The most interesting expression this new bourgeoisie has so far found in Roumanian politics seems to be the so-called "Court clique."

Everybody agrees that King Carol wants to play an active and, if possible, decisive rôle in politics. To achieve his aims he had to have recourse to politicians who had already gained prestige, had been affiliated with parties and party politics, even if of the special Roumanian brand, and who were willing to work with him. They constitute the so-called Camarilla, a set of politicians, generals and industrialists, eager to assist the King, bent on developing a domestic industry and on the unification of the country. Tatarescu, the last Premier of the Liberal Party; Vaida-Voevod, leader of the "Roumanian Front" who formerly split from the Peasant Party; Goga; Professor Jorga, former tutor of the King; all of them friends of the King and on the best personal terms with the Camarilla.

The social, economic and political tension gave rise to a new movement: the Iron Guard led by Codreanu. He is of Polish stock, a former student, and a pupil of Professor Cuza, the old anti-Jewish leader. Codreanu used to ride on a white horse and in national costume through the villages to appeal to the imagination and the superstition of the peasants. He did not meet with much success then. Later, however, the Iron Guard was able to win a larger adherence. When the feeling of at least a certain social security was destroyed by the impact of the agricultural crisis and industrialisation, the intellectual proletariat and some of the small peasants began to rally around Codreanu's leadership. His propaganda made the Court clique and corruption the main target of his attack. The Iron Guard was definitely anti-Parliamentarian and Fascist. They wanted, on the other hand, to usurp the privileges and prerogatives held by the Crown. No wonder that the Iron Guard was disbanded soon after King Carol's new Constitution had been proclaimed in February last.

Recent events are not quite so dramatic as they appear to be. King Carol has actually ruled the country for years. The con-

stitutional régime has been shifting towards a royal dictatorship for a long time, and the break in foreign policy occurred in 1936, when M. Titulescu had to give up the Foreign Ministry. According to the former Roumanian Constitution, the Chamber had to meet automatically on a certain date; the Budget had to be voted, and executive orders to be confirmed. On the other hand, the King appointed and dismissed the Ministers, dissolved and prorogued the Chambers, could sanction or reject a Bill and had legislative initiative. In Roumania elections were generally manipulated by the Government in power. Furthermore, the electoral law of 1926 actually gave a premium of about 30 per cent. of the seats to that party which had secured 40 per cent. of the votes. As the King had the right to nominate and to dismiss the Prime Minister, and as a Premier who had successfully carried an election could practically not be defeated in the Chamber, the King appears to have been constitutionally not too far from a semi-dictatorship. The judgment and calculations of the Crown always decided to a considerable extent who was to be in power.

After the War the Liberals, led by the Bratianu family, for all practical purposes ruled the country until 1928. Then the Peasant Party came into power. They won in the general election, the first and last free election ever held in Roumania, about 75 per cent. of the votes. There are good reasons to believe that ever since then the Peasant Party was sure of the support of the majority of the people. This is a point which seems to me of some importance. If that is true, there would have been no alternative government as long as the people had the chance of expressing their views in any democratic way.

In 1925 the Liberals and the Bratianu family forced the then Crown Prince Carol to renounce the throne and to leave the country, because they were afraid that he might challenge their unrestricted party régime. When the Peasant Party came into power their leader, Maniu, soon brought Carol back to the throne. Maniu knew that there could not be a better future for the country as long as the continuous rule of the Bratianus was not broken. The King agreed with Maniu in this respect, only to disagree on the constitutional question. Whereas Maniu wanted to arrive at a democratic and parliamentarian form of government, the King strove for an unrestricted autocratic régime on the Yugoslavian pattern. Maniu had to resign. The King succeeded in finding a successor within Maniu's own Party, Vaida-Voevod, who then founded the "Roumanian Front." Later on,

the Liberal Party experienced the same trouble when the King successfully set his nominee, Premier Tatarescu, against the party leader, Dinu Bratianu.

During the last few years new movements on the Right have sprung up, viewed with favour by the King, who hoped to get their assistance.

Maniu had opposed the Court clique because it blocked the way towards what he considered to be necessary for the country. Codreanu took the same line of attack against the Court clique, obviously with a view to appealing to the peasants and to the anti-Jewish tendencies in the country. Threatened by these two forces, by the democrat Maniu and by the Fascist Codreanu, the King made up his mind to block the way for either of them, and to establish definitely the position he had been striving for since he came to the throne. The King suspended the Constitution and had the election called off. When, finally, the new Constitution was adopted on February 24th, it was, in my opinion, just the consequence that was logically to be expected from what had happened before.

What social forces are behind the King? The Orthodox Church, the Army and those groups which have long supported the King's policy. The future will have to show whether the people will definitely rally around the new Government and that section of the bourgeoisie which up to now has found its political expression in the Camarilla.

In conclusion I shall try to give an outline of the basic problems of Roumania's foreign policy. The bad economic situation of the peasants and the social tension resulting therefrom keep the urban strata of the population apprehensive lest the peasants might revolt. In foreign policy this apprehension is transformed into fear of Russia. This apprehension is felt by those who formerly belonged to the Parties on the Right and, partly, to the Liberals; the Peasants and a section of the former Liberals do not share it, but desire normal relations with their northern neighbours.

Secondly, as the country needs foreign capital for the development of its agriculture, for industrialisation or armaments, or for covering its budgetary deficits, co-operation with France and Great Britain is looked for, since the Western European States are the only countries in a position to provide it.

Thirdly, Roumania has a considerable surplus production of cereals, and, like all the Danubian States, she has for years met with difficulties in its disposal. In the last few years Roumania has become to a certain extent economically dependent on foreign

trade with Germany, which relieved her of the surplus by buying considerable quantities of grain.

Finally, Roumanian foreign policy has so far not shown much disposition to come to an agreement with Hungary with respect to the minority in Transylvania.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. R. J. E. HUMPHREYS said that he had lived twelve years in Roumania, and had lately come from that country. He, himself, had found the Roumanian peasants a rather happy folk. Roumania, although regarded by some as a small country, was somewhat larger than Great Britain and Ireland, with 18 million inhabitants, and contained wonderful agricultural riches, abundant fish in the Danube, mineral wealth, oil, etc. The real trouble about Roumania was that she was only sixty years old. She was judged by the standards of Great Britain and France, for example, and her politicians were expected to be as honest as theirs, but it should be remembered that a hundred years ago there had been corruption even in the British Parliament. Now the King had taken the power into his own hands, but whether he would be able to make things work remained to be seen. A German diplomat had told the speaker frankly that Roumania was a very wealthy country which Germany would like to have, and ought to have, and was going to have. Probably he had been speaking from an economic standpoint. A lady whom the speaker had questioned on the subject had said that she did not think that the Roumanians would mind German rule. The really interesting question was: What was Germany going to do with Roumania?

DR. LUETKENS replied that, looking at the map, he could not find any direct connection between Germany and Roumania, because between Germany and Roumania lay at least two if not three other countries.[1]

MR. HENRY ARMITSTEAD said that the condition of Roumania to-day seemed to be somewhat similar to the condition of Russia before the War. He believed that the peasantry in Russia formed about 80 per cent. of the population, and also that the bourgeoisie in Russia formed a very small percentage of the population, just as in Roumania. The third similarity in the present position was the continued tendency of the Czar to obtain supreme control and suppress the Duma.

DR. LUETKENS replied that the important difference between Russia in 1917 and Roumania to-day was that in the former country the peasants had not had their own land, whereas in Roumania, after the World War, the land had been distributed, so that the peasants now owned their own property. For this reason there were no signs that they had communistic tendencies.

[1] A trade agreement was signed between Roumania and Germany on June 21st, 1938, settling trade questions which had arisen since the *Anschluss*.

A MEMBER said that he felt the lecturer had left an impression that the ordinary Roumanian priest was rather less educated than he really was. The clergy of Transylvania were by no means so uneducated as those whom he had described, and the Primate, who had, unwisely, the speaker thought, accepted the position of Prime Minister, could not in any way be regarded as uneducated. Thirty years ago he had enjoyed the confidence of Franz Ferdinand, and he was cultured and had considerable ability. There were many members of the Orthodox Church, particularly Hungarians, who were very well-educated. They had a tradition of democracy combined with Calvinistic influences which had come to them from Hungary, the tradition of the election of the priests by the people, of the Bishops by the priests, and a national Synod and Assembly. There was a considerable section of the laity concerned with the affairs of the Church, and the result was an altogether healthy combination of democracy and careful control of dogma by the Episcopate and the high authorities, one of the most interesting experiments in Church government in Europe.

DR. LUETKENS replied that in speaking of the Church he had only been referring to the Black clergy, as opposed to the White clergy, the Bishops and monks. He had wished to point out the difference between them, and the importance of the fact that it was the Black clergy who were in touch with the people.

MR. ISRAEL COHEN said he was sorry that the lecturer had not dwelt a little more on that aspect of the Roumanian question which had bulked more largely in the public eye recently, namely the Jewish question. The attitude of M. Goga's Government in this connection was an illustration of the national custom of corruption to which reference had been made. Those familiar with Roumanian history would remember the important part played by Bismarck and Disraeli at the Congress of 1878 in trying to obtain the emancipation of the Jews in Roumania. They would also know that until the outbreak of the War in 1914 not more than about three hundred Jews altogether, natives of Roumania, had obtained naturalisation. At the time of the Goga Government a great deal had been heard about the mass invasion of so-called undesirable immigrants into Roumania. M. Goga had magnified the number of Jews in the country up to 1,500,000. The lecturer had correctly stated that there were not more than 800,000 Jews altogether in Roumania. According to the Census taken in 1930, they did not form more than 4·2 per cent. of the total population, for, that population being 18 million, the Jews would be no more than 756,000 altogether. In view of these facts it was all the more deplorable that the politicians of that country had dealt with the Jewish question in the sinister and mischievous way which they had pursued since the end of the War. The Jews had been repeatedly blamed for all the evils which had come upon the country.

The lecturer had been asked what Germany intended to do with

Roumania. He might have described what Germany had already done in that country. The Nazification of Roumania had been going on ever since 1933. The Swastika had been adopted by the National Christian Party even before the War, but latterly there had been a considerable dissemination of the Nazi doctrines and the establishment of a large number of anti-Semitic newspapers, about a hundred in all, twelve of which appeared in Bucarest alone.

MR. C. A. MACARTNEY said that he did hope that Great Britain was not going to repeat the error she had made when King Alexander had set up a dictatorship, by saying that King Carol was doing the best for his country. It was absolutely true that there was one Party in Roumania who enjoyed the support of the majority of the country; the National Peasant Party could have set up a perfectly stable government and governed Roumania very respectably if the King had supported them loyally with the forces at his disposal. He had deliberately prevented this from happening, and so brought about the dissolution of political life in his country, in order to place himself in an autocratic position. Incidentally up till a few years ago he had been responsible for the rise of the Iron Guard, until he had found that Codreanu was getting into a rival position as popular dictator.

The first speaker had said that the difficulty was that Roumania was only sixty years old, but in the eyes of the greater part of the younger generation, not only the violent section but the idealists also, Roumania as a country had not yet been born. Before the War it had had half a century of nominal political independence, but in fact the wealth and power of the country, except that in the hands of the landowners, had been very largely controlled either by the foreign capitalists who owned the oil wells, or else by the Jews, who Roumania, rightly or wrongly, could not regard as part of herself. Then after the War had come a great increase of territory, and the Roumanians had found themselves everywhere in a slight numerical majority, but in the position of an economic and social proletariat. The moneyed, landowning, intellectual class had been the Magyars, the Russians, the Germans or the Jews. Ever since the War there had been, parallel with other political happenings, a movement of revolt amongst the Roumanians against such a state of affairs. It had taken a twofold form: that of the somewhat mystical semi-lunatic anti-Semitism run by Codreanu, who, in spite of this being the most popular part of his programme, had a certain amount of idealism in his ideas of appealing to the younger generation of Roumanians to unite to wipe out the regional differences, abolish corruption in the country and make themselves worthy of the position which they ought to hold in the State. The other movement, which was not directed solely against the Jews but just as much against the Magyars, the Germans, etc., was a more general anti-minority spirit represented by M. Vaida-Voevod of the Roumanian Front. Those feelings were ones which no government could ignore. King Carol was not, even now, ignoring them. In the

programme issued on February 10th, 1938, after the fall of the Goga Cabinet, could be found both the Codreanu-Goga idea and the special programme for making the Roumanians fit to occupy in the State the position which was rightfully theirs. Obviously this would mean reducing the share of the minorities in the economic life of the country.

Incidentally Roumania had put herself, in this way, into an extremely difficult position, because although the Codreanu slogan was extremely popular with both Italy and Germany, and indeed designed to gain their favour, on the other hand the policy was largely directed against the Magyars, Italy's special friends, and against the very wealthy German population in the country. The idea of putting a certain proportion of Roumanians into every business hit the Germans harder than any other minority, because they had always worked on the system of building up a purely national business entirely for themselves, distributing the profits amongst the German institutions. If one of those business were forced to employ 80 per cent. of Roumanians and only 20 per cent. of Germans, the whole economic, cultural and social life of the Swabians and of the Saxons would be destroyed. What did Germany, and Italy too, think of this combination of an anti-Jewish policy on the one hand allied to an anti-German policy at the same time?

DR. LUETKENS replied that everything depended upon the manner in which the principles were brought into practice.[1]

QUESTION: What effect, if any, would recent developments in Roumania be likely to have upon Roumania's relations with the Little Entente?

DR. LUETKENS replied that he thought that the relations between Roumania and the other countries of the Little Entente would remain as they were as far as the question of Hungary was concerned. The object of the Little Entente had always been to deal with the Hungarian question. In all other political issues it had never been able to take a definite stand.

SIR ANDREW MCFADYEAN (in the Chair) said that he was grateful to the last speaker for his question, because in their preoccupation with the very interesting internal situation in Roumania he felt that they might overlook a question of perhaps wider interest, Roumania's relations with the Little Entente. From information received during the last year, the speaker thought that there was distinct readiness towards more cordial co-operation amongst the States in that part of Europe, for which an essential requisite would be a real understanding with Hungary, particularly on the part of Czechoslovakia.

[1] On August 4th, 1938, was published a Nationalities Statute containing liberal provisions regarding the rights of minority groups in Roumania in education, religion, and cultural affairs, in employment and in legal matters.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1. WAR AND DEMOCRACY. By Various Writers, edited by E. F. M. Durbin and George Catlin. 1938. (London: Kegan Paul. 8vo. viii + 360 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS is a symposium by a group of Labour Party intellectuals on the causes and cure of war. It should not, however, be dismissed as a piece of party propaganda. Nearly all the writers have maintained a scientific approach; and the volume, though it reaches no very definite conclusions, should help both to stimulate and to clarify thought. The writers show a healthy and refreshing willingness to disagree with one another and with other members of the Party.

The most substantial contribution is a joint one by Mr. Durbin and Dr. Bowlby on the psychological aspect of War. How far is War attributable to man's natural pugnacity? Dr. Bowlby in an appendix collects ample material from the study of anthropoids, children and primitive man to prove that this pugnacity exists, and the main article carefully analyses the conditions in which it is provoked. There is much here to throw light on contemporary politics. Germans, having been bullied by the Allies, bully Jews; Italians and Japanese, feeling themselves slighted by the other Great Powers, work off the pugnacity thus aroused against Ethiopians and Chinese. Such reactions assume more sinister forms when they find expression not in individual, but in group, action: we readily do things for the sake of our group which we should consider criminal if we did them for ourselves. But this does not mean that nationalism is in itself either good or bad.

> "War is due to nationalism, not because the nation state is either a peace-making or war-mongering form of organisation in itself . . . but because the triumph of aggressive impulses will always manifest itself in a group form, and the great group organisation of the age is the nation state."

Encouragement may be found in the fact that "general desire for the common good" is just as strong and natural as pugnacity, and that this desire is generally effective for far longer periods than the desire to fight. The article ends curiously with a plea for collective security, which comes in rather like Cato's *ceterum censeo*, and has little to do with what has gone before. The need for discipline is admitted. Because you are afraid of creating dangerous repressions, you cannot allow either child or adult simply to run amok. But the conclusion that the way to discipline the dissatisfied Powers with the least risk of aggravating their repressions is for all the satisfied Powers to band together against them, is not one which will suggest itself to most thoughtful readers of the article.

Mr. Ivor Thomas examines the causes of wars between 1815 and

1914. He believes that the causes were extremely varied, and that few if any of the important wars of the period had a specifically economic origin. He regards the Crimean War as the turning-point of the century. The breach between Austria and Russia opened the way for German expansion and the whole subsequent train of events. His judgment on Britain's participation in the Crimean War is somewhat remarkable :

It was the people of England who wanted the Crimean War. . . . Burke has declared that he knew not how to bring an indictment against a whole people. In the case of England, in the year before the Crimean War, it is difficult to know how to avoid doing so.

This passage gives him an uncomfortable twinge when he comes to record the conclusion that " democracy is certainly one of the greatest safeguards of peace." But, once more, the conclusions are in the nature of Party sugar to coat the less palatable medicine of the article itself. In fact, democracy, like nationalism, is in this respect neither good nor bad. There are peaceful and warlike democracies just as there are peaceful and warlike autocracies.

Mr. Jay also rejects the view that the causes of war are exclusively and directly economic. But he soon becomes engrossed in the pastime of knocking down his pet Aunt Sallies. It is not true that rearmament is the only form of public works adopted by the Fascist States; it is not clear that President Roosevelt has really cured the slump " by the simple process of printing dollars and putting them—by relief works of innumerable kinds—into the hands of those who had none "; and it does not promote objective thinking to call the kind of nationalism you like " patriotism " and then slang the other kind. The next contributor, Mr. Fraser, has an easy wicket in attacking pacifism, and need not have over-stated his case. It is, for instance, not improbable that Haile Selassie would still be Emperor of Abyssinia if he had been a pacifist.

Mr. Crossman is, as usual, provoking. He exaggerates wildly (" the British capitalist fears above all else the end of the present régimes in Germany, Italy and Japan "), and sometimes writes without thinking (Snowden's " easy victory " over the French at The Hague in 1929 played into no German hands at all or, if into any, into those of Stresemann). But he has thought more deeply not only about fundamentals, but also about Party tactics, than any other contributor to the volume; and, if his essay is indicative of future trends within the Labour Party, it is of considerable importance. He sees the futility of an " anti-Fascist front," of constant invocations of a manifestly impotent League, or of " pledging ourselves to defend Austria and Czechoslovakia."

The difference between our policy and that of the Government is not that the one is rigid and doctrinaire while the other is opportunist. Both must be opportunist, but we should seize every opportunity to strengthen democracy in Europe, while they seek desperately to make gentlemen's agreements with our enemies at the cost of our friends.

When he comes to analyse the ways in which we can " strengthen democracy " abroad, Mr. Crossman's main conclusion (apart from some unconvincing suggestions about propaganda) is that we must do so by example. " The first thing Labour must do is to prove its capacity in domestic issues." Other voices have recently been raised in Labour circles against the Party's exclusive absorption in international politics; and if these voices are heard, the Labour Party may find its way back, not only to the hearts of the electorate, but to a saner and more practical view of foreign policy.

Mr. Catlin sums up rather abstrusely. The most interesting part of his article is a polemic against Professor Laski's argument of the "inevitability" of war under capitalism. Inevitability, he writes, "is not a concept congenial to the English tradition, whether in philosophy or in politics." In adding his voice to that of Mr. Crossman in a protest against a doctrinaire attitude to foreign affairs, Mr. Catlin does good service. E. H. CARR.

2. PEACE WITH THE DICTATORS? By Sir Norman Angell. 1938. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 328 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE first part of this book, which occupies about two-thirds of it, is couched in the form of an imaginary symposium, in which a German, an Italian, and a number of Englishmen discuss the problems of the current international situation. The pretence is, perhaps, not very convincing, and breaks down altogether when one of the debaters is allowed to quote nine printed pages from a book written by Sir Norman in 1918. The advantages of the method are, indeed, not altogether apparent. The exponents of views opposed to the author's can readily repudiate the arguments of the puppet chosen to represent them, and the sparkling and pellucid stream of Sir Norman's reasoning is glimpsed fragmentarily through an intervening screen of artificial trees. The final part, in which the author directly examines the pacifist position and summarises his conclusions, is much the most satisfactory. He deals here with peculiar effectiveness with the contention of Mr. Gerald Heard and Mr. Aldous Huxley, that non-resistance would not be exploited and constitutes the best defence.

As all who know his writings would expect, Sir Norman has no difficulty in making a theoretically impregnable case for collective security as the best of all possible alternatives. Every nation would probably prefer to throw the burden of its defence on a mutual insurance corporation, rather than be forced to rely on its own expensive armaments. Within a special area, too, there may no doubt be a clear common interest to nip war in the bud, and in a selected club of nations, whose contribution to defence is approximately equal, it may be to the interest of each member to come to the rescue, in the hope of a similar service when he needs it. But, if ethical considerations are ignored, and the case built simply on interest, it looks very different in practice when the mutual insurance corporation includes hopeless weaklings and redoubtable fighters, and the members are called on to forfeit the support of the latter by helping the former. In a concrete case, moreover, it may be, for each nation, no longer a question of *his* defence at all. His defence is only immediately endangered if he implements his obligations: if he stands out, he remains at peace. There seems, in fact, no common interest except a desire for peace in the abstract, and this desire in itself militates against the fulfilment of an obligation to go to war. May not the solution be to restrict the scope and select the membership of the insurance society? We hope Sir Norman, in his next book, will deal with these practical aspects of the problem. G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY.

3. THE WORLD'S DESIGN. By Salvador de Madariaga. 1938. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xx + 291 pp. 10s. 6d.)

SEÑOR DE MADARIAGA'S book begins with "The Present Chaos" and ends with "The New Covenant." His qualifications for the dis-

cussion of such a theme are of course unique. He has served as a Director in the Secretariat of the League; he has been an Ambassador in two great capitals; he has represented his country as a delegate at the Assembly; and he was an active member of the Council during a critical period of the League's existence. This personal experience must necessarily lend weight to all he writes on international, or, as he would prefer to call them, world problems, even though he makes no direct appeal to it. His approach to his subject is both wider and deeper. His central theme is that world unity already exists in a much greater degree than is consciously perceived, and that what is required is to promote man's awareness of it. If this could be achieved, and he suggests for the purpose " a world association for the advancement of World Citizenship," many of our problems would solve themselves, or at all events intelligent agreement leading to their solution would be easy. A living sense of world unity, he asserts, would manifest itself naturally by creating world institutions. The author seems, however, to ignore an important problem when he suggests that the invention of the necessary institutions may be left to the politicians who may be trusted " to create as many as may be necessary, and a few more." Engine-drivers are not generally capable of designing locomotives, and the design of machinery for a real world order requires other qualities than those of the politician, whatever his experience in working or wangling such machinery as happens to have been within his control.

Although Señor de Madariaga's approach is perhaps best described as philosophical, his book is by no means abstract. He develops his theme with a wealth of comment, often highly topical, that runs over, never irrelevantly, into innumerable fields of immediate interest. The reasoning is closely knit, but never wearisome. Before ever that danger threatens he has the gift of floodlighting his argument with an illuminating phrase which makes a complicated proposition as convincing as an axiom.

No brief review can give an adequate account of a volume so rich in content. All that can be said is that it is a noteworthy contribution to the study of world affairs which the general reader can enjoy and which no student should ignore. E. F.

4*. UNTO CÆSAR. By F. A. Voigt. 1938. (London: Constable. 8vo. viii + 359 pp. 10s.)

MR. VOIGT has written a baffling and rather disappointing book. It falls into two parts, which overlap here and there. The first is a denunciation of Communism and National Socialism, the second an examination of the basis of British foreign policy with special reference to the League of Nations.

The first part has solid merits. Mr. Voigt, instead of belabouring Communism for the benefit of Fascism, or Fascism for the benefit of Communism (the latter game has become, as he says, a " ramp " in this country), impartially attacks them both. But having said this, and having paid tribute to Mr. Voigt's sincerity, one must record that more heat than light is generated in the attack. Mr. Voigt is scathing in denunciation. But he makes no inquiry into the reasons (in particular, the economic reasons) for the growth of the totalitarian régimes. In the case of Germany, he seems content with the verdict that Germans always were like that, which comes perilously near to acceptance of the racial theory of history. On the other side, Mr. Voigt has surprisingly

failed to grasp the immense influence which Marx has exercised during the past twenty years on every branch of political and social thought ("Marxism," he thinks, "would be a phenomenon of little more than historical interest . . . were it not so closely akin to National Socialism," though this hardly tallies with the remark that "his [Marx's] voice will never be silenced anywhere throughout the world"), and he attributes to Lenin "complete incapacity for philosophical or scientific thought." It is, moreover, distressing to find that he has convinced himself that the Versailles Treaty erred on the side of generosity rather than of harshness. On this point, one need only appeal from a Mr. Voigt intoxicated with hatred of Nazism to the sober Mr. Voigt of the pre-Nazi period.

The second part opens with a pronouncement which is as sound as it is provocative, and which was well worth making:

> "To legislate against war between nations is as vain as to legislate against revolution. Laws against revolution are a threat of class-war and are themselves, therefore, revolutionary. International laws against war are themselves threats of war."

He totally rejects League sanctions. "To erect the 'punishment of the aggressor' into a general system would be to concentrate immense power into a few hands and establish an abominable and universal tyranny." He equally rejects pacifism, and is prepared to justify "preventive war." Yet "no Government in the world has the right to declare war for a principle," and Sir Samuel Hoare's famous Assembly speech of September 1935 was (quite apart from the fact that we failed to implement it) "a masterly statement of everything British foreign policy ought *never* to be."

What, then, is the conclusion? Having swept Marx, Lenin, Hitler and Mussolini off the board in the name of the highest moral principles, must we admit that our own principles reduce themselves in the last analysis to the good four-square gospel of British imperialism? It looks like it. Mr. Voigt revives our old friend the "Pax Britannica, with which a beneficent Providence has associated the Pax Americana and the Pax Gallica." (May I, in passing, suggest that this phenomenon is attributable less to "a beneficent Providence" than to the coincidence that Great Britain, France and the United States won the last war, and carved up the world pretty much in a manner agreeable to themselves?) Democracy may be a better form of government than Fascism or Communism; and the foreign policy commended by Mr. Voigt can be defended on "realistic" grounds. But, believing this, one may still cavil at the identification of the cause of democracy and the cause of British (or Anglo-Franco-American) supremacy with the principles of morality. It is all too reminiscent of the war-hysteria of 1914–18, and it involves the acceptance of another of those "secular religions" which Mr. Voigt, in other contexts, so much deplores.

E. H. CARR.

5*. THE LETTERS OF JOHN DOVE. Edited by R. H. Brand. 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 352 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

JOHN DOVE possessed a most valuable gift for a letter-writer: that of being able at once to gain people's confidence. The most perfect example of this, and perhaps the best letter in the book, is his account of the day he spent in the company of a little Italian soldier whom he casually met, and with whom he had no means of

communication beyond the one word "bene." This gift made him highly sensitive and understanding in forming his impressions of people and their opinions, and enabled him, in his accounts of Germany after the War, for example, to note and appraise the subtlest changes of opinion between his frequent visits. This part is particularly interesting, written as it was before the Nazi régime secured control. Dove's gift of harmony with others was all the more remarkable in that his own life was a constant struggle against ill-health. The letters only show this indirectly, or they just mention it in passing. It is never dwelt on nor allowed to interfere with his vivid descriptions of places and persons. These also gain much from his store of experience accumulated in different parts of the Empire, from his retentive memory and from his wide reading, all of which are always at hand to enliven and clarify his impressions. We may quote as an example the contrast he notes between the Indians he found living in the slums of Fort St. George and Africans in similar circumstances—

"Another thing that strikes me is the melancholy in these street faces. It is not the unconscious kind one catches on the features of a Kaffir in repose. That changes in a minute to the opposite extreme. Here it is a set expression, the effect perhaps of climate on a race that thousands of years ago came from the north. The squalor, too, in the great cities! And the poverty! It hits a newcomer in the eyes. Such arms and legs and chests I never came across anywhere else; and such crowds. The slums give me exactly the feeling that the rabbit country did in Australia: stunted life all round; only here it is human."

Apart also from their engrossing political interest, these letters possess a special charm through their spontaneity. Dove never wrote for the sake of writing. He wrote only when the spirit moved him and without any preconceived plan of what he was going to say. Hence his descriptions of scenery and people are all the more lively and convincing, being struck off without labour or artificiality. He wrote whatever came into his mind, and whatever did come in was worth writing down. H. A. WYNDHAM.

6. GENEVA AND THE DRIFT TO WAR: Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August 1937. [*Problems of Peace, Twelfth Series.*] 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin, for the Committee of the Geneva Institute. 8vo. xiii + 234 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS volume, the twelfth in the annual series, contains the papers read last August at the Geneva Institute of International Relations.

The most conspicuous international event of the year 1936–37 was the Spanish Civil War; and the most solid contribution to the volume is appropriately Mr. Edgar Mowrer's paper on it. Few achieve impartiality on this theme. Mr. Mowrer's sympathies are wholeheartedly with the Republican Government. But subject to this, his statement is on the whole fair and well-balanced. Three comments may be offered. In the first place, Mr. Mowrer writes as if the Republican Government's record from 1931 to 1936 had been one of peace and order, and as if the elections of 1936 had been conducted in a perfectly regular way. This is far from the truth. Through the fault of both (or rather, all) parties, democracy in Spain had become a disorderly farce even before the Civil War broke out. Secondly, Mr. Mowrer's estimates of the cost of the war to Germany and Italy are pure guess-work, and improbable guesses at that; and he makes no

corresponding attempt to assess what has been spent on the other side. Thirdly, in writing of the British attitude, Mr. Mowrer exaggerates the amount of sympathy for General Franco in Great Britain, and under-estimates the weight of sheer desire to keep out of the mess at almost any cost. Dr. Condliffe makes many valuable points in his review of the economic year, but wrote before the "recession" in the United States had turned into a "depression" and threatened to extend its malign influence to Europe. Other good papers are Mr. Goodrich's sketch of the New Deal and Dr. Mackenzie's review of the health activities of the League.

The remaining articles tread well-worn ground. Dr. Gooch reviews the stages of the decline and fall of collective security. Sir Norman Angell, in spite of his title, does not really explain "how League principles may be made practical realities." M. Jacques Kayser re-states the French case for "regional security," Mr. Rothstein the Soviet case for "strengthening" the Covenant. Mr. Malcolm Davis discusses the problem of "peaceful change." E. H. CARR.

7*. THE FAMILY OF NATIONS: ITS NEEDS AND ITS PROBLEMS. By Nicholas Murray Butler. 1938. (New York and London: Scribners. 8vo. 400 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

THIS is a collection of what the author in his Introduction describes as "appeals to public opinion" made over a period of four years to audiences of almost every kind on both sides of the Atlantic. Professor Butler feels that the burning question before mankind is "Can the fatally destructive movements and tendencies of to-day be checked before it is too late?" He is convinced that there is no real answer to arguments for international understanding and international co-operation; in his view the self-interest of every individual nation is too closely bound up with them. But his appeal never has been, and is not now, to self-interest; it is an appeal to the English-speaking peoples to maintain their traditions of liberty and to show that these traditions can be adapted to the needs of the twentieth century, that freedom and representative institutions are not incompatible with efficiency and with that "passionate desire of the youth of to-day to 'get something done'." H. G. L.

8. INSANITY FAIR. By Douglas Reed. 1938. (London: Cape. 8vo. 383 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

MR. REED'S book is in a style rather common to-day; partly autobiography, partly contemporary history as seen by a journalist, partly reflection and exhortation. All are well done. The author's early life—struggling childhood, War service, post-War struggles, including a personal post with Lord Northcliffe—is most vividly and entertainingly told. Of the historical chapters, by far the most valuable are those on Berlin, where Mr. Reed worked as a journalist for some years. These give a full and very interesting account of the confused last years of the Weimar Republic, told with an abundance of inside information and of biting comment. The chapters on other European scenes, although always well written and well informed, are slight by comparison. Mr. Reed is deeply convinced of the reality and also the imminence of the German danger; his comments are the better worth reading because he appreciates many of Germany's achievements, and shares some of her dislikes. C. A. MACARTNEY.

9. British Consul: Memories of Thirty Years' Service in Europe and Brazil. By Ernest Hambloch. 1938. (London: Harrap. 8vo. 290 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

Mr. Hambloch's account of his thirty years' service as British Consul is a straightforward, agreeable piece of work, nowhere either sensational or brilliant, but well above the average of its kind both in matter and style. Part of Mr. Hambloch's service was spent in the Balkans, and he has glimpses of Belgrade after the murder of Alexander and Draga, and of Ragusa at the outbreak of the War. Most of the book, however, is devoted to Brazil, and includes, besides its account of Brazilian life and conditions, some interesting sidelights on Sir Roger Casement. There are many light touches, including some superb letters from "distressed British seamen."

C. A. Macartney.

10. Foreign Affairs, 1919 to 1937. By E. L. Hasluck. 1938. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xvii + 347 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

This is a compact historical handbook of all the countries of the world since the War, excluding the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire. It deals, country by country, with both internal and external affairs, and concludes with a short chapter on the League of Nations. It is too closely packed with facts to be read with pleasure, though it will be a useful book for handy reference. Every reader will detect bias here and there, according to his own particular predilections. But there is no consistent partiality for any general attitude towards international politics and no special pleading.

These are substantial merits. In detail, a good many holes could be picked in some of the chapters. The section on the United States is superficial and poor. Although the section occupies some thirty pages, the Tennessee Valley experiment is dismissed in one inadequate and misleading sentence, and there seems to be no mention at all of the recent neutrality legislation. Nor is it correct that the default on War-debts was in any way responsible for "the sudden refusal of the United States to continue its participation" (incidentally, there was no such "refusal") in the World Economic Conference. There are so many facts in the book, however, that it is not surprising that a few should have gone astray here and there. The final settlement of the Bürgenland was hardly a "concession" to Austria, since she was to have had the whole of it under the treaty. Latvia and Estonia did not conclude a customs union in 1923, but only an agreement to conclude one (which was never carried out). The percentage of Germans in the population in Czechoslovakia is minimised, the percentage of Magyars exaggerated; the statement that the Ruhr occupation was justified by the Versailles Treaty is highly disputable; and if Mr. Hasluck knows that Herr Hitler obtained Signor Mussolini's consent before taking over Austria, many people would like to share his sources of information.

E. H. Carr.

11*. The Annual Register: a review of public events at home and abroad. For the year 1937. Edited by F. Epstein. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 488 pp. 30*s*.)

The *Annual Register* for 1937 makes no innovations and maintains its usual high level. The various chapters in the section headed "Foreign History" are largely by the same hands, and Mr. Gedye's contribution on Germany-Austria is once again among the most interesting and informative. There are a few minor inaccuracies in the chapter which

deals with Spain, and that on Palestine makes no attempt to disguise an unsatisfactory and gloomy situation. The "public documents" printed are the Constitution of Eire, the United States Neutrality Act, the non-aggression treaty between the U.S.S.R. and China and the Convention abolishing the Capitulations in Egypt. H. G. L.

12*. BRIEF GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS. By F. R. Cowell. 1938. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 8vo. 44 pp. 3*d.*)

This extremely useful little publication describes briefly under subject headings—Agriculture, Defence, History, Legal, Medicine, Science and Industry, etc.—the many and varied types of publication issued by H.M. Stationery Office and available to the general public.

13*. DEMOCRACY AT WORK: The Machinery of Parliament Hill and the Civil Service. By D'Arcy Marsh. (*Canadian Broadcasting Publications.*) 1938. (Toronto and London: Macmillan. 8vo. 100 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

A series of broadcast talks on the various departments of the Federal Government in Canada, their functions and the scope of their activities.

14*. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON COMMUNISM. By J. R. Campbell. 1938. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 95 pp. 6*d.*)

This book touches on international affairs in a few points only. One section considers war and peace—whether war is inevitable, why capitalism cannot keep the peace, war against Fascism and the Soviet peace policy. At the end of the last section the Soviet trials, and the Soviet Union and its connection with Spain, are discussed.

15. THROUGH TURBULENT YEARS. By Vernon McKenzie. 1938. (London: Geoffrey Bles. 8vo. ix + 309 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Vernon McKenzie, who is Director of the School of Journalism at the University of Washington, has travelled in Europe during the post-War years, talking to politicians, business men and journalists about the state of European affairs. In this book he blends his personal experiences and impressions with a little history and tells a number of anecdotes about eminent personalities. His most interesting chapters are those dealing with propaganda. He gives examples of the material put out in the Bari broadcasts, and reprints his letter on this subject to the *Sunday Times* of June 20th, 1937, which resulted in questions being asked in the House. A. J. H.

16*. THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Salvador de Madariaga. [*William J. Cooper Foundation Lectures*, 1937.] 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 105 pp. 6*s.*)

This little book consists of a series of popular lectures delivered by the author in the United States in 1937. It provides an unusually lucid and well-arranged exposition of the forces working for and against the ideal of an organic world commonwealth. Those familiar with the principles of Genevan internationalism will find nothing new in substance in this re-statement of them, though Señor de Madariaga never fails to be novel and stimulating in the manner of his exposition and the incidentals with which he decorates his theme. D. A. ROUTH.

17*. SCHOOL HISTORIES AT WAR: A study of the treatment of our wars in the Secondary School history books of the United States and in those of its former enemies. By Arthur Walworth. With an introduction by Arthur M. Schlesiger. 1938. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. 92 pp. Bibl. $1.25.)

It is the aim of this interesting little book, by contrasting parallel treatments of past wars in history text-books, to direct lay and professional attention to the extremes of national prejudice to which the youth of the world are being exposed at the present time. Passages are given

dealing with the Wars of American Independence, of 1812 in Texas and Mexico, the Spanish-American struggle in the New World and the Great War. A good many of the passages quoted perhaps merely serve to emphasise that there are, inevitably, " two sides to every story ": but others show a distortion of fact so grotesque as to be laughable were it not for the menace they imply to international understanding and good will. H. G. L.

18*. LIBERALITY AND CIVILISATION. Lectures given at the invitation of the Hibbert Trustees in the Universities of Bristol, Glasgow and Birmingham in October and November, 1937. By Gilbert Murray. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. Sm. 8vo. 94 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

19*. REFUGEES: PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SURVEY. By Sir John Hope Simpson, K.B.E., C.I.E. 1938. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 229 pp. Maps. 3*s.* 6*d.*; to members of the R.I.I.A., 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a preliminary and provisional report of a survey of the Refugee Problem which will be published in the autumn of 1938. It is a compact statement of the origins and present situation of post-War refugee movements; the main survey will give in full the evidence on which these conclusions are based.

20*. THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT. By Norman Macmillan. 1938. (London: Bodley Head. 8vo. 168 pp. 5*s.*)

21*. VOM LUFTKRIEGE: Gedanken über Führung und Einsatz moderner Luftwaffen. Von Herhudt von Rodhen. 1938. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. 58 pp. *Rm.* 1.80.)

Mr. Macmillan's book is a plea for " isolation " and a " united empire defence policy " to combat the dangers to Great Britain implicit in the development of the air weapon in modern warfare, which he describes in a vivid and forceful manner.

The German pamphlet is not likewise designed to make the German people " air-minded," but is a scientific treatise on the air weapon, the part it will play in the next war, the strategy of its use, and its objectives and limitations.

22*. CIVILISATION: an Essay. By Clive Bell. 1938. (London: Penguin Books Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 216 pp. 6*d.*)

23*. RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM. By R. H. Tawney. 1938. (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 8vo. 309 pp. 6*d.*)

Penguin Books Ltd. is doing a great service in extending its venture to the production, in unabridged form at sixpence each, of such works as these—works too well known to require any comment beyond the hope that in this new guise they will reach an even wider public.

24*. RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPIRE. By Earl Baldwin of Bewdley, Lord Snell and others. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. Sm. 8vo. 85 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

A series of Broadcast talks on the Empire given during the " Coronation " Summer of 1937 by representative statesmen of Great Britain and most of the Dominions.

25*. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR-MONGERING. By Gerald Vann. 1938. (London: Sands. 8vo. 20 pp. 4*d.*)

A stimulating short discussion of the causes producing " war-mentality " to-day. The author believes that Puritanism, the Industrial Revolution and the Treaty of Versailles are the most important historical factors. He refuses, however, to accept the validity of such " short-cuts " to permanent peace as revolution or " the war to end war." A rational education, the restoration of private property and creative work (and thus of economic and political freedom) alone can produce peace-minded

individuals. Finally, the author pleads for a recognition of Christian values—of the importance, psychologically as well as theologically, of prayer, and of the possession of " a quiet mind."

26*. KLEINE WEHRGEOGRAPHIE DES WELTMEERES. Von Th. Arps, R. Gadow, H. Heye und O. Ritter von Niedermeyer. Hrsg. im Auftrage des Instituts für Meereskunde zu Berlin. 1938. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. vii + 136 pp. *Rm.* 4.80.)

The four contributors to this book are all German naval officers, either retired or on active service. It is divided into five parts, giving detailed descriptions of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans, and the Mediterranean, North and Baltic Seas in relation to defence. There are twenty-three maps and photographs of various warships and aircraft.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

27. TARIFF-LEVELS AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF EUROPE. By H. Liepmann. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 424 pp. 21s.)

THE construction of index numbers to measure variations in the height of tariff levels raises for the statistician difficulties, both practical and theoretical, of the most formidable kind. There is perhaps no ultimate logical answer to all the questions which arise. Nevertheless, provided that the limitations are clearly realised, there may be considerable practical value in such efforts as Dr. Liepmann, with enormous industry, has made to solve this insoluble problem. He has first calculated a series of " potential " tariff levels for most of the countries of Europe between 1913 and 1931, the duties taken into consideration including only those imposed upon goods of European origin. The " potential " tariff-level is the unweighted arithmetic average of the rates of import duty imposed upon a representative list of 144 commodities. Because an arithmetic average loses significance if its elements are not fairly homogeneous, it is thought that countries which at any time had a long free list plus a few high duties on certain special imports are unsuitable for the application of this technique, and Great Britain, Denmark, Norway and Holland are therefore excluded.

To meet the objection that these indices may be unduly influenced by the inclusion of commodities which, for one reason or another, do not figure at all as imports in certain countries, there is a further complicated calculation of " actual " tariff levels, based in each case upon the duties imposed upon the more important commodities actually imported from other countries. But this second instrument appears less useful than the other, and in fact actual tariff-levels are published only for Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Spain. The somewhat bewildering array of percentages which is the result of all this laborious work is then used as an introduction to a more detailed study of changes in European trading relations. Such technical studies are unlikely to have much attraction for the reader in search of a comfortable method of passing an idle hour, and Dr. Liepmann's book is no exception to this rule. But even if, in the nature of things, the material to which he has accumulated is not easy to digest, and despite the fact which he himself refers, that in view of the rapid extension of other methods for blocking normal trade channels the labour involved in continuing the calculations beyond 1931 would not be worth while, the book includes much of great value for the student of post-War European economic trends.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

28. THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. 2 Vols. Issued by the International Labour Office. [*Studies and Reports, Series B* (*Social and Economic Conditions*), No. 27.] 1937. (London: P. S. King, for the I.L.O. 8vo. viii + 354, vi + 288 pp. 8*s*. each volume.)

THESE two volumes comprise the final report on the questions which were discussed at the Tripartite Technical Conference on the Textile Industry which was held in Washington in April 1937.

Although each section of the textile industry has its own problems, for many purposes they can be regarded as a unified entity. "They serve," says the report, "substantially the same groups of economic wants: of individuals and families for articles of clothing; of households for furnishing; of industrial and agricultural enterprises for semi-finished and finished fabrics."

The second volume is entirely devoted to statistical tables, but it is pointed out that while international statistics are fairly complete as regards production and trade, information on the question of hours of work and earnings is deplorably inadequate even in some of the most advanced industrial countries.

Some of the most interesting statistics relate to the production of textile fibres. There are tables which show the relative value of the production of textile fibres to that of all primary commodities; the rise or fall in the production of the various fibres compared with the average production of 1925–29; and the chief producing countries for all the individual fibres. There is much in these tables which has a bearing on the question of the world distribution of raw materials. Practically all the textile fibres are produced in self-governing countries, while in the case of many of the most important manufacturing countries, raw materials for their textile manufacture have to be imported.

While these two volumes contain a mass of useful information, they reveal the necessity for much more intensive research in many directions if the international problems of the textile industry are to be properly understood. BARNARD ELLINGER.

29. MONETARY NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. By Professor F. A. von Hayek. [*Publication of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, No.* 18.] 1937. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 8vo. xv + 94 pp. 5*s*.)

30. INTERNATIONAL SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS. By C. P. Kindleberger. 1937. (Columbia University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 262 pp. 15*s*.)

PROFESSOR VON HAYEK, in his most interesting and timely work, voices his objection to monetary nationalism—the system of monetary control which endeavours to direct a country's currency policy towards stability without regard to happenings abroad, and therefore in disregard of fluctuations in exchange rates. If we may describe the Monetary Nationalists as being of the Left in the Economic Parliament, Professor von Hayek would be of the extreme Right, for he would not be satisfied with the gold-standard solution of the Centre, but would prefer, if it were possible, a system of "homogeneous currencies" under which all transactions throughout the world would be carried out in terms of coins of one metal (whether gold or silver) or in terms of warehouse receipts of that metal. He realises, however, that with the present world stock of gold this would imply an impossibly severe

deflation. The Professor points out that, within a country, a falling off in demand for any article affects only the producers of that article and their business associates. Under a homogeneous currency this would be true also across national boundaries. Under a gold standard of the pre-War type, an undue reduction of exports and an undue expansion of imports (whether of goods, services or securities) call for a restriction of credit, and so tend to produce deflation.

Monetary nationalism attempts to avoid the evils of deflation (or the excesses of inflation) by substituting a depreciation (or an appreciation) of the currency and fluctuating exchange rates. The resulting uncertainty brings about a restriction of international trade, and international lending becomes impossible. The drying up of long-term international investment is calculated to produce much wider differences in standards of life and to increase very materially the risk of war.

While Professor von Hayek's book deals with the long-term policy of a central bank, Dr. Kindleberger's book is concerned chiefly with its day-to-day problems, with special reference to short-term capital movements.

Dr. Kindleberger contends that Britain's gold-standard experiment of 1925–31 was shipwrecked by the failure of the British authorities to take sufficient account of the growth of short-term liabilities; he recommends that central bankers should frame their policies in the light of the net movement of gold plus short-term capital. He also deals at length with foreign exchange problems, including a most useful chapter on stabilisation fund technique.

In dealing with progressive depreciation of the currency, one feels that he might have placed more emphasis upon the effect of unbalanced budgets in forcing inflation and an ultimate collapse of the currency—especially in view of the risks inherent in the present situation both in France and America.

Neither writer suggests a solution of the problem of carrying out a world policy of deflation in view of the rigid costs of the modern world. If deflation is to be avoided, the preceding inflation must be prevented. The inflation of the years 1915–20 led ineluctably to the deflation of the years 1921–33; and if we are to avoid a subsequent deflation, we must see to it that the present combination of a high price of gold and low commodity prices does not lead to a serious inflation over the next ten years or so. A solution of this problem presupposes an intensive study of the root causes of price movements in terms of gold, including the long-term interactions of gold output and commodity prices.

J. F. L. Bray.

31. Die Grosse Krise. By Adolf Sturmthal. 1937. (Zürich: Oprecht und Helbling. 8vo. 371 pp.)

This book is concerned chiefly to trace the origin of the crisis of 1931, to describe the events of that year, and to follow the course and phases of the subsequent depression and recovery. In this, it covers no ground which has not already been ploughed by economists in all countries; but the story is well told, and suitable to the general reader with little specialised economic knowledge. The writer gives a clear and non-technical (if sometimes over-simplified) account of the events of the period and their causes, and he is particularly useful when he discusses the changes wrought by depression upon the position of government in society.

In fact the book is primarily a study of the rise of governmen intervention and the decline of liberalism and *laisser-faire*, and th later sections which deal with this problem are the most interesting The author's study of the decline of free competition in various countries and the corresponding increase in State regulation an control seems to lead him to the conclusion that this change is permanent one; that we are unlikely ever again to see a return t *laisser-faire* conditions; and that such a development is desirabl and may tend to mitigate future depressions.

A word of praise is, finally, due to the printer, who has produce a paper-bound volume, printed in very readable type, and which doe not involve the reader in the use of a paper knife. J. F. CAHAN.

32. IS THERE ENOUGH GOLD? By Charles O. Hardy. 193 (London: Faber and Faber; Washington: Brookings Institu tion. 8vo. x + 212 pp. 6*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS publication of the Brookings Institution falls into two part In the first Mr. Hardy discusses the monetary aspects of the gol situation; in the second he republishes his critique of the Warren Pearson price theory which played so considerable a part in influencin American monetary policy during the early days of the Rooseve Administration. The weakness of the Warren-Pearson case generally recognised, and it is unlikely to reappear as an effectiv factor in monetary policy.

In his discussion of the question "Is there enough gold?", M Hardy reaches the same conclusion as Mr. R. H. Brand—that ther is too much, rather than too little, gold available for monetar purposes at the present time. He urges that a real problem has bee created by the great increase in the world's monetary stock of gol since 1929. A general credit expansion corresponding to this increas would be highly undesirable. It is therefore necessary to sterilis part of the existing stocks. He discusses different methods of dealin with this surplus, and favours a scheme for the segregation of a larg part of the existing world gold stock into extraordinary reserve His constructive proposals are, not unnaturally, rather nebulous, bu his memorandum should help to set students discussing an investigating along the right lines. G. C. R. ELEY.

33*. MONEY AND BANKING, 1937–38. 2 vols. [1938. II.A. 3 I/II Volume I: Monetary Review. Volume II: Commercial an Central Banks. 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations, Informa tion Section; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 165, 214 pp 5*s*., 6*s*.)

THE League brings together in this annual series informatio about currency and banking all over the world. The development of the last three or four years up to February 1938 are reviewed i the first volume and the facts and figures for forty-nine countries, o which the review is based, are given in the second. This year th complete balance sheets—with explanatory notes—for each of th forty-four Central Banks of the world are added; and the revie contains a study dealing with the status of Central Banks, the increasing control over the private banks and the money market, an how they have been affected by the expenditure and borrowing c Governments and by State control.

34*. THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RAW MATERIALS. By Herman Kranold. 1938. (London: George Routledge. 8vo. xxiv + 269 pp. 15s.)

THE first eighty pages of Mr. Kranold's book are devoted to a description of internationally interesting raw materials. It is perhaps ill-balanced. Forty pages deal with metals, while coal, oil, fertilisers, cereals, timber and textile fibres are dismissed in twenty-four pages. The author devotes nearly double the space to aluminium to that which he gives to timber, while flax, hemp, silk, and jute are dealt with in ten lines. The author finishes his book with a large number of useful statistical tables.

Mr. Kranold points out that the whole question of the importance of any raw material is subject to change, and gives an example of the increased use of wood as the raw material for the manufacture of artificial silk, and of shellac for making gramophones. He might have laid greater emphasis on the decline in the use of natural raw materials brought about by the modern extension of chemical science. Synthetic indigo long ago replaced natural indigo, and we may yet see natural rubber replaced by a synthetic product.

He deals with the claim of the dissatisfied nations that they must have territory in which they can buy their raw materials with their own currency, and says, "We may confidently say that short of annexing half the world, not one of the 'dissatisfied' nations would be able to bring into her currency territory all those sources of raw material after which they hanker," and points out that in the pursuance of such a policy the three chief dissatisfied Powers would have to decide between themselves in respect of many a raw material, which of them should get it, and which go without.

Mr. Kranold has adopted a novel method of giving weighted marks to individual nations according to the raw materials which they possess, and maintains that by this method it becomes evident that nations cannot be divided into "have" and "have-not" classes.

The book is a useful contribution to the existing literature on the subject. BARNARD ELLINGER.

LAW

35. NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1936. Edited by Quincy Wright. 1936. (The University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xviii + 277 pp. 11s. 6d.)

THIS is a series of lectures under the auspices of the Harris Foundation at the University of Chicago. The letter of gift establishing the Foundation stipulates that "the aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion." It must remain an open question how far the subject of Neutrality and Collective Security makes possible or desirable such separation of functions. But it is clear that this collection of lectures is an illuminating and interesting contribution to the subject. Professor Dickinson's paper, entitled "The United States and Collective Security," is a weighty attempt to put the present and future policy of the United States in the matter of collective security in terms of an attitude not inconsistent with intelligent co-operation with the rest of the world in the maintenance of international order. But, notwithstanding the restraint with which Professor Dickinson approaches the problem, there will be many who will ask whether he

does not under-estimate the essential unhelpfulness of the contribution of the United States in the past decade, or whether he has not drawn too optimistic a picture of the benefits of a contribution of that nature in the future. He regards as constant and immutable, "for this generation at least," the decision of the United States not to enter into agreements committing it to any future course of action or which call for the use of force for the preservation of peace. But there is room for the view that such assurance is justified only if we are certain that the extent of potential external danger confronting the United States will not increase.

Mr. Charles Warren discusses the recent neutrality legislation of the United States. He has many sound observations to offer on some of the traditional notions of international law in the sphere of maritime warfare as related to neutral rights (although one wonders in which textbooks of international law he found expressed the view that "citizens of a neutral country may not furnish arms and ammunition to a belligerent" (p. 115)—the rule as universally stated is that the neutral is under no duty to prevent its subjects from selling, at their own risk, munitions of war to either belligerent). Mr. Warren does not believe that the neutrality legislation is a perfect guarantee of safety of the United States. "So long as we refuse to co-operate with other nations in trying to prevent the happening of a war, we are going to remain in a distinctly uncomfortable and precarious condition" (p. 153). And yet it is in neutrality that Mr. Warren appears to see the backbone of the future policy of the United States. For he regards an agreement between Great Britain and the United States calculated to safeguard the interests of the United States as a neutral as the essential condition of the co-operation between the two nations.

The longest and by no means the least interesting contribution is that by Sir Alfred Zimmern on "The Problem of Collective Security." It requires careful reading, for, notwithstanding Sir Alfred's customary clarity of expression, it is not quite certain that he has succeeded in giving a consistent account of his views. The reader is often in danger of being confused by an excess of simplification: for instance, when he is told that the main cause of the present desperate position of the world is nothing else than "muddled thinking" (p. 8), or the circumstance that governments did not satisfactorily explain to their peoples the nature of the new obligations undertaken in the Covenant of the League (p. 25). But Sir Alfred soon abandons this somewhat tautologous argument in order to expound his main theme. He believes that universal collective security can exist only within a "realm of law"—the reader, it must be said, is left without guidance as to whether the essence of the "realm of law" is the existence of a "law-abiding group" (p. 13) or of a "society with overriding rules" (p. 15)—; that such a universal realm of law does not exist in the world either because of the differences in civilisation or because in some of the civilised, but totalitarian States the notion of law as generally understood no longer exists; that the rule of international law "which does not constitute a system of true obligations for the peoples of the world, but embodies something which can be better described as a code of etiquette for the governments of the various states" (p. 21) offers no solution of the difficulty; and that the next stage of the advance is through the co-operation of such States as are "realms of law," *i.e.*, democratic or, as Sir Alfred calls them, "welfare" States.

The reader is thus led by an able, although not uncontroversial, argument to expect a plea for the existence of a realm of law, as expressed in the fundamental conception of collective security, as between the "law-abiding" States. But here Sir Alfred's sense of realities and of immediate possibilities—the lectures were delivered in the United States—asserts itself. There is no necessity, he says, among the "welfare" States for a realm of law conceived as an overriding obligation for the reciprocal preservation of security. Consultation, based on mutual confidence, is enough; rigid obligations are undesirable. "As between the free peoples, looser and more flexible arrangements are much to be preferred" (p. 73). This conclusion will leave the reader somewhat bewildered. If the "realm of law," in the sense of universal obligations of mutual security, is, in one case, impossible and, in the other case, unnecessary, then what is the purpose of the dialectical skill expended on the elaboration of the basis of the "realm of law"? The reader is not helped in his difficulty by comparing what Sir Alfred says on p. 28 on the subject of world-citizenship with his view expressed at the very end of the lectures. On the former, in elaborating the non-existence of a universal world-order, he asks us to "discard once and for all [*sic*] the notion of world-citizenship." But at the end the spirit of internationalism, which Sir Alfred Zimmern has done so much to foster in this country and abroad, seems to assert itself eloquently and emphatically. He admits that our material civilisation is world-wide, and he urges that "there must be a sufficient number of men who comprehend our world-wide civilisation and who hold it, so to speak, in their minds" (p. 87). However, it is probably true to say that it is not the final peroration which expresses the author's present views on the subject.

These criticisms are submitted by a reviewer who has always had a sincere admiration for Professor Zimmern's work as a scientific expounder of the ideas of enlightened internationalism. But he believes that it would be nothing short of a tragedy if intellectual leadership were to succumb to the temptation of generalising what, on any rational postulate and on any long view, must be regarded as a transient period of retrogression in the history of the world. The man in the street may fall a prey to despair or impatience, or to the complacent claim of an exclusive sense of realities, or to opportunism bent on producing speedy results. But there ought to remain some who keep alive the impressive lesson of historical experience, and for whom the effective rule of law based on the ultimate universality of mankind is not a makeshift to be discarded once and for all in deference to the passing triumph of force, but an unshakeable principle of ethics and of reason.

H. LAUTERPACHT.

36*. NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION. By Dr. D. Goedhuis. 1937. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 8vo. 348 pp. *Gld.* 7.50.)

DR. GOEDHUIS published in 1933 a book in French on the Warsaw Convention, and he has now supplemented it by the present one, in English, relating the Convention to the national laws of a large number of States upon the subject of air-carriers' liability. His knowledge is encyclopædic. From the Argentine to Yugoslavia he runs, alphabetically, through the legislation of thirty-nine countries, and

his information, so far as the reviewer can check it, is correct and up to date.

The Warsaw Convention, which was signed in 1929, lays down uniform rules for international carriage by air; it provides for delivery of certain documents of carriage, imposes a presumptive but rebuttable liability upon air-carriers, and limits their liability to maxima of 125,000 gold francs for injury or death of a passenger and of 250 gold francs per kilogram for damage to or loss of goods. The Convention applies only to international carriage as defined in Article 1, and Dr. Goedhuis's purpose is to urge an extension of the Warsaw rules to internal carriage in the various States. The advantage of uniformity in this respect is obvious.

The Carriage by Air Act, 1932, passed before the Convention was ratified by this country in 1933, contains a provision enabling the terms of the Convention to be applied by Order-in-Council to non-international carriage. Advantage has not as yet been taken of this power.

Dr. Goedhuis's book is a very valuable addition to the literature of private air law. J. M. SPAIGHT.

37. THE LAW OF NATIONS: Cases—Documents—Notes. Edited by Herbert W. Briggs. 1938. (London: Harrap. 8vo. xxviii + 984 pp. 21s.)

CASE-BOOKS of international law have been increasingly numerous in recent years, particularly in the United States, and this is a welcome development. International law being so largely the result of history and practice, the case-book method is eminently appropriate, and it is often more stimulating than the treatise form, as it brings vividly before the reader concrete cases which are usually interesting and sometimes exciting. The present work is a very good example of its kind. The cases and the documents (mostly "law-making" treaties) have been judiciously selected, and cover most of the law of nations. Among the cases there is a good sprinkling of international awards, but the majority are decisions of English and American courts and these constitute an impressive record of the contribution made to the subject by English and American judges. Whatever shortcomings municipal decisions may occasionally show in the matter of scientific accuracy, they usually make the more interesting reading, and frequently throw a more vivid light upon questions of international law. From the nature of things, judges of international tribunals are bound to weigh their words with meticulous care, and their approach tends to be so impersonal that international decisions are, from a literary point of view, apt to be somewhat colourless.

The Editor's notes are, on the whole, admirable. They show scholarship, a wide range of reading and a clear grasp of principles. There are, however, one or two points where it is not possible to see eye to eye with him. One of the most interesting sections of the book at the present time is naturally that dealing with civil war and insurgency in general, and the Spanish conflict in particular. In the notes on this subject the usual clarity seems to be lacking. In particular, the suggestion that insurgents who have not been recognised as belligerents are not "pirates" at international law, is, with respect, untenable. Again, the Editor does scant justice to the decisions of the Privy Council in cases, such as *The Stigstad*, relating

to the rights of neutrals in the Great War, and in his note on the *Lusitania* case before the U.S. District Court he shows a disposition to find extenuation for the crime on grounds which cannot be supported. The charge that the *Lusitania* was carrying munitions has never been proved, but even if it were true, it would have afforded no justification whatever for the German action.

One of the most interesting cases reported is that of the two German submarine officers condemned as war criminals by the Reichsgericht at Leipzig in July 1921. The high judicial qualities of this Court impressed those who attended the trials at the time, and they are strikingly illustrated in this case. A. FACHIRI.

WAR 1914–1918 AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

38*. CHINA AND THE WORLD WAR. By Thomas Edward La Fargue. [*Hoover War Library Publications, No.* 127.] 1937. (Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. x + 278 pp. 15*s*.)

IN compiling this account of "the main events that occurred in China because of the War" Mr. La Fargue has relied almost entirely on the official correspondence of the United States Government, and this has accentuated a tendency to ignore the wider background of Sino-Japanese relations and view these events from the particular angle of America. The Shantung question, in Mr. La Fargue's opinion, only assumes any importance at all in world affairs because it was one of the reasons for the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, however, the ultimate fate of China was at stake and the Twenty-one Demands, out of which the Shantung question arose, were another step in Japan's march towards an Asiatic Empire as envisaged by Hideyoshi in the time of our Tudors. It was long before the war with Russia that Japan planned the seizure of Manchuria and the domination of China, but this might perhaps have been clearer had Mr. La Fargue written just after instead of just before the events of last summer.

Mr. La Fargue shows a certain sympathy towards both the objects of Japan's policy and her methods of attaining them, and is inclined to accept Japanese statements at their face value. The capture of Tsingtao, to take a simple example, cost Japan not 2,000 but a little over 200 lives. He conveys nevertheless the impression that China received a raw deal all round. While none of the Powers emerges with credit, Mr. La Fargue is highly critical of the policy and diplomacy of the United States. Between 1905 and 1914 America did everything in her power to block Japan in South Manchuria. Yet in March 1915, after Japan had presented the Twenty-one Demands relating to Shantung, South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, America "frankly recognised that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts." This, as Mr. La Fargue points out, greatly encouraged Japan in the policy on which she had embarked and paved the way for a similar success for Japan in the Lansing–Ishii notes of 1917. The negotiations of 1917 were kept secret from the American Minister in Peking, who was allowed to learn the *fait accompli* from his Japanese colleague. Dr. Reinsch, the American Minister, pursued throughout the period a foreign policy of his own in Peking completely at variance with the policy of Washington. The chief sufferer was

China, who was encouraged to incur the wrath of Japan in expectation of American support that was not forthcoming.

Mr. La Fargue has written an interesting and readable book which, within the limitations indicated above, is also to be commended as a careful and scholarly piece of research. J. T. PRATT.

39. LA QUESTION DE L'ADRIATIQUE (1914–1918) : Recueil de Documents. By Paul-Henri Michel. [*Publications de la Société de l'Histoire de la guerre.*] 1938. (Paris : Alfred Costes. lxxxiv+ 296 pp.)

AT a moment when there are indications of a weakening of Italo-German friendship, it is instructive to recall the pre-War hostility of Italy to German penetration in South-Eastern Europe, and the tension between Italy on the one side, and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the other, which finally brought Italy over to the Allied cause. Pan-Germanism aimed at expansion on to the Adriatic, an aim hostile to the interests of both Italy and the Yugoslavs. While the War was in progress both Adriatic states had a common interest in the defeat of the Central Powers; their own dispute did not arrive till the War was over. It is difficult to see in the Third Reich's claims to sovereignty over all the Germans of Europe anything but a refurbishing of the old Pan-German aims. Now, as in the past, Italy and South-Eastern Europe seem bound to oppose those aims.

This useful collection of 282 documents covers the War years only, and provides official and unofficial material for the study of Italy's negotiations with the Allies and with Austria-Hungary, and of Italo-Yugoslav relations. Particularly useful are the documents translated from Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian sources which are somewhat inaccessible to the ordinary reader. The texts themselves are preceded by an eighty-page historical survey of the period covered. A. J. H.

40. THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN NORTH RUSSIA (1918). By Leonid I. Strakhovsky. 1937. (Princeton University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 140 pp. Bibl. 9*s*.)

PROFESSOR STRAKHOVSKY has done useful work in writing this concise and clear diplomatic history connected with a very complicated and generally little-known series of events that took place in the far northern regions of Russia at a time when the world's attention was riveted to the battlefields of the Great War elsewhere. It is a most welcome contribution for a better understanding of these events.

The author, who has made a careful study of all the available sources of information, shows how complicated a tangle it was, and incidentally how every party concerned attempted to outwit the other. Chicherin's double-faced policy tried to play off the Allies against the Germans and the Germans against the Allies; the latter protected the railway and endeavoured to form an eastern front again; and the Germans, whilst exploiting Russia's resources, were helping the Finns to attack the Murmansk railway and take Karelia.

Professor Strakhovsky's conclusion is that the American participation in this intervention, which (it must not be forgotten) was started following an invitation on the part of the Soviet Government to land troops in Murmansk for the protection of Russian soil, considerably benefited the Soviet Government in the end. W. J. OUDENDYK.

41*. Die Kämpfe im Baltikum nach der zweiten Einnahme von Riga. Hrsg. von der Forschungsanstalt für Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte. [*Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps, Bd. III.*] 1938. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. xii + 208 pp. Maps, plates.)

The third volume of the *Nachkriegskämpfe deutscher Truppen* is the most interesting of the three. It describes not only the military operations in 1919 in the Baltic provinces then occupied by German forces, but also gives an account of the very complicated political situation arising from the efforts of the nationalist parties in these countries to rid themselves of Russian menaces, both "red" and "white," on the one side and German domination on the other. The editors declare that they have adopted an impartial attitude in dealing with the refusal of the German troops to obey the evacuation orders of their Government, which was acting under pressure from the Allied Powers; it is still not clear what official encouragement both officers and men had in this, though it is evident that colonisation claims and efforts to keep the door to the East open for Germany had much sympathy in the higher ranks. The establishment of Bermondt's Russian force from German resources is given more or less in detail. England comes in for much abuse, owing to the assistance given by her to the nationalist parties. H. F. P. Percival.

42*. At the Paris Peace Conference. By James T. Shotwell. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 444 pp. 17s.)

In the early part of 1916 the belligerent Powers woke up to the fact that the War must end some day and it was time they studied the arts of negotiation, so each of them set bodies to inquire into past peace treaties from remote times, and Professor Shotwell's book is an account of "The Inquiry" in the United States. It was so called in an attempt to keep its objects secret, and although the fact of its existence soon leaked out, a reasonable amount of secrecy was maintained. It is not easy to say anything new of the Peace Treaty now, and the main interest of the book lies in the details of the various inquiries. The author pays a generous, though at times critical tribute to the completeness and efficiency of the British experts. It is noteworthy that nearly all the writers on the Peace Conference condemn it, and this is not wisdom after the event, for it was the common remark in Paris in 1919 that the "old men" had gone mad. The real trouble was that only Clemenceau knew what he wanted. Orlando did not count, and although Lloyd George saw clearly enough that things were wrong, he was hamstrung by having won an election by promising to squeeze Germany till the pips squeaked—surely the most costly vulgarism in the history of the world—while Wilson was full of ideals, but had few ideas, and indeed was unreceptive to them from others. Incidentally we are told that the quarrel between Wilson and House arose over Fiume, and Professor Shotwell poses the insoluble question of what might have happened had House not been dismissed. The tragedy of the Treaty lies in the fact that Clemenceau could only think in terms of 1871.

The author gives a very good account of the beginnings of the International Labour Office, and is right in claiming that the looser form which the United States successfully forced on the committee

was better than the more rigid form proposed by the British, which would have made the I.L.O. an industrial parliament and created many difficulties for all Governments.

The book is well indexed and contains a useful chart.

G. H. STUART-BUNNING.

43*. ALLA DIFESA DELL'ITALIA IN GUERRA E A VERSAILLES. By Silvio Crespi. 1937. (Milan: Mondadori. 8vo. xxiv + 844 pp. *Lire* 30.)

THIS is a book of first-rate importance for the history of the latter part of the War and of the Peace Conference. Signor Crespi was one of the two Italian members of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, and afterwards a member of the Italian Delegation at the Peace Conference, being left in charge during the brief but momentous period from April 25th to May 7th, when his chiefs withdrew. During the whole of this time he kept a diary, and this is textually reproduced, together with a number of documents mostly covering the period April 25th to May 7th, 1919. The chief impression that the diary leaves on the mind is one of regret that so little effort was made, especially on the British and American side, to get into personal touch with the Italians. One can watch in these pages the growing estrangement between the delegations as the Peace Conference proceeded: a great part of it was due to misunderstandings which could have been removed by frank and friendly discussion. There is a statement on February 1st, 1919, about the decontrol of British shipping which is directly contrary to the documented account in Sir Arthur Salter's book. Still more remarkable is it that the author heard nothing of the British scheme, adopted by the Supreme War Council, but later vetoed by the United States, for transforming the blockade machinery into an agency of economic reconstruction. The diary records that the author awoke on the morning of November 12th, 1918, with this bright new idea dominating his mind. That was the very date of the Washington cable which gave the *coup de grâce* to the scheme.

A. Z.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

44. A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By John I. Knudson. 1938. (Atlanta, Georgia: Turner E. Smith. 8vo. vi + 445 pp. $3.00).

THIS book is not, strictly speaking, a history of the League of Nations so much as an account of the organisation and functioning of the various international institutions set up in connection with the League Covenant. It is intended by its author "for use in academic circles, clubs, forums and for general readers." It provides a straightforward factual account of the material, which would be of more value for the purpose it is intended to serve if its author had not, like many of his colleagues across the Atlantic, overrated the ability of mere facts to speak for themselves. Moreover, the simplicity of his style is at times apt to lapse into such misleading *naivetés* as the statement that "the United States had no self-seeking interest to serve" at the Peace Conference. It is doubtful whether this book adds anything of value to the voluminous material already existing on the subject.

D. A. ROUTH.

45*. WHAT THE LEAGUE HAS DONE, 1920–38. By Maurice Fanshawe. [*League of Nations Publication No.* 195, *11th edition, April* 1938.] 1938. (London: League of Nations Union. Sm. 8vo. 118 pp. 1*s.*)

An informative booklet describing the activities of the League during 1920–1938 in terms which would appeal to the average reader. The treatment is particularly relevant to the political situation at the present time.

46*. THE LEAGUE FROM YEAR TO YEAR. Prepared by the Information Section of the League. 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 246 pp. 1*s.*)

The most compact short review published on the work of the League, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the International Labour Office during 1937. The major issues, such as the situation in Spain and China, the question of Alexandretta, and the proposed division of Palestine, are adequately dealt with. Other questions, including the work of the Technical Organisations, are briefly described. L. V. D.

47*. INTERNATIONAL TRAMPS: From Chaos to Permanent World Peace. By T. F. Johnson. 1938. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 399 pp. Illus. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This book deals with the Refugee question. It is largely autobiographical, the author being a former Secretary-General of the Nansen International Office for Refugees, and having been connected with the Refugee Organisation of the League of Nations for fifteen years.

ZIONISM AND THE JEWS

48*. DIE ZIONISTISCHE BEWEGUNG. II. Band, 1918–1925. By Adolf Böhm. 1937. (Jerusalem: Hozaah Ivrith. 8vo. 682 pp.)

HERR BÖHM'S second volume carries on the story of the Zionist Movement from 1918 to 1925. Like its predecessor, it is planned on a generous scale. There is the same meticulous—perhaps too meticulous—attention to detail, with the result that the narrative flows somewhat sluggishly, and is from time to time interrupted by an elaborate excursus on some rather narrow point of special interest to the author. The period covered by this volume is one of critical importance, including as it does the framing and confirmation of the Palestine Mandate, the attempt at a definition of British policy in the White Paper of 1922, and the transition from a military to a civil administration in Palestine. In the internal history of Zionism it stands out as a period of rather difficult adjustment to the requirements of the practical work now to be undertaken in Palestine on a different scale and, indeed, on a different plane from the modest pre-War activities of the Zionist Organisation. Much the most valuable chapters of this volume are those in which Herr Böhm describes the difficulties with which the movement had to contend in adapting itself to the new situation, the means by which they were at least partially overcome, and the bitter controversies within the Zionist ranks which more than once looked like splitting the organisation, but left it in the end substantially intact. So far as the present reviewer is aware, the scattered material relating to these matters has nowhere else been assembled in the form of a consecutive narrative. In his handling of the political background Herr Böhm does not show an equally intimate acquaintance with his subject, and fails to give the same impression of first-hand knowledge. This is true, for example, of his discussion of the Mandate, which, though elaborate, is incomplete. But con-

sidering the scale on which his book is planned, it would be unreasonable to expect Herr Böhm to maintain throughout the same level of excellence. Taken all in all, his *Zionistische Bewegung* is a solid and scholarly piece of work which commands genuine respect. LEONARD STEIN.

49. INSULTED AND EXILED. By Arnold Zweig. 1937. (London John Miles. 8vo. xviii + 255 pp. 10s. 6d.)

50. THE JEWS. By Hilaire Belloc. 1937. (London: Constable. 8vo. lv + 308 pp. 7s. 6d.)

JUDGED by the standards set by their authors' names, both these books are disappointing. Neither Herr Zweig nor Mr. Belloc is capable of producing a really bad book, but in this case both leave the reader with a faintly resentful feeling that after a long and rather tedious journey he has arrived nowhere in particular. Herr Zweig's book was originally published in German in 1934, and is his indignant protest against the Nazi declaration of war on the Jews. As such, it commands sympathy—the more so because of the personal anguish of which it is so plainly the expression. It is, unfortunately, padded out with a mass of philosophical or pseudo-philosophical speculation on things in general, with a liberal garnishing of psycho-analytical jargon. For these chapters, which form the backbone of the work, it is impossible, with the best will in the world, to feel much enthusiasm. It may be that they have suffered in translation. What, for example, is to be made of such a sentence as: "Mankind needs the Jews; it needs us if only to abreact on us its evil affects (*sic*)."

Mr. Belloc's contribution to the study of the Jews is a new edition of a work originally published in 1922. It is now enriched by an introductory chapter designed to show that the "Jewish Question" has, for a number of reasons, become more urgent than ever, the first reason being the war in Spain, which, as the publisher explains, "in Mr. Belloc's view arose from a deliberate attempt on the part of the Jewish Communism (directed from Moscow) to destroy the Christian religion in Spain." This profound observation is the starting-point for an elaborate discussion of Jewish characteristics, which are analysed in detail with the same objectivity. Mr. Belloc denies—and there is no reason to question his sincerity—that he is just an ordinary anti-Semite. Unlike the Nazis, he does not hold that the Jews are sub-human. He allows them certain virtues, merely pointing out that even these are somehow different from the same virtues as exhibited by the rest of mankind. Mr. Belloc's tone is quietly persuasive, though behind his friendly representations is sometimes audible a faint suggestion of an ultimatum. His formula of the *cordon sanitaire* has—on paper at least—the merit of simplicity; it may be permissible humbly to question whether it has any other merits.

LEONARD STEIN.

51. THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILISATION. By Dr. Cecil Roth. 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xvi + 357 pp. 7s. 6d.)

"QUI S'EXCUSE S'ACCUSE" is not always true. For this book, which is a defence of the existence of the Jewish people in European society, is unanswerable. It is inevitably a compilation from innumerable sources, and a testimony to the industry rather than the originality of the author. Yet the author is deserving of congratula-

tion for the general tone of moderation and the general avoidance of malice or exaggeration which he has displayed. It will serve as a valuable handbook for those who are interested to know what part individual Jews and Jewish communities have played in the creation of the amalgam which makes up European civilisation.

As one would expect with the contribution of a people which has never been numerous, and which to-day numbers only some sixteen or seventeen million in the whole world, there are few stars of the first magnitude, but there is a consistently high level of general contribution to almost every side of life. Those who think of the Jews as an exclusively commercial people will be fascinated by the sections on Jewish map-makers, doctors, philosophers, writers, artists, critics and philanthropists. In dealing with modern times the general reader will be continually astonished at the discovery that such an individual or such an activity is Jewish. To take a mixed bag, the R.S.P.C.A., the International Institute of Agriculture, the use of the handkerchief and the discovery of Salvarsan are shown by Dr. Roth to be debts we owe to the Jews.

In view of the current importance of the subject it is fortunate that the chapter on the Jews in economic life is particularly good. That on Jews in political life, while generally sound, is more in the nature of apologetics, though, let me hasten to add, good apologetics. But there is more to be said on the part of the Jews in Left Wing politics than Dr. Roth suggests. J. W. PARKES.

52. DIE JUDENFRAGE IN DER DEUTSCHEN GESCHICHTE. By Wilhelm Grau. 2. Aufl. 1937. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. 32 pp. 90 *pf.*)

This is a diabolically wicked book, because almost every fact which it mentions is, in itself, unobjectionable; but the whole is skilfully put together in such a way as to give a totally false impression to the average reader who is in no position to apply an independent judgment to the use which the author makes of his sources. To pay it further attention is to pay the author a compliment which he does not merit. J. W. PARKES.

GREAT BRITAIN

53*. BRITAIN AND THE DICTATORS: a Survey of post-War British Policy. By R. W. Seton-Watson. 1938. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xviii + 460 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

DR. SETON-WATSON'S book stands out among scores of works dealing with a rapidly-changing international situation. The author has lived through, and thought deeply about, the events he describes. He does not write to attract attention to himself or to exploit for journalistic ends a dramatic and exciting state of affairs. He writes as a British citizen far more informed than most, and filled with a sense of responsibility for his knowledge. It is his duty to leave for the moment the pursuit of science as an end in itself, and to use his knowledge in making it clear to us how we can save ourselves, and in saving ourselves, how we can save Europe.

A book of this kind, containing the most careful and balanced survey of facts, many of them taken from sources beyond the range of the average educated reader, is one which no student can venture to neglect. It is obvious that, here and there, and at times on large issues, one may disagree with Dr. Seton-Watson but occasional disagreement does not invalidate a general assent to this analysis of

European history in recent years, and to the line of conduct which Dr. Seton-Watson thinks we should adopt if we would save European civilisation from a night as long and as dark as the night which followed the sunset of the Roman Empire of the west. It is impossible in short compass to discuss the immense problems raised by Dr. Seton-Watson. The book begins with a summary of British policy before and during the War and an account of the treaty settlement. It is high time that we should be reminded of the real nature of this settlement and that we should understand exactly why it has failed in its purpose. British opinion, for reasons which are not always intellectually or even morally creditable to ourselves, has long accepted almost at its face value a view of the settlement which German propagandists have wanted us to accept; some of our own politicians have been hardly less anxious to confuse the issues. It is hard to over-estimate the harm done, particularly in matters affecting American collaboration with the European democracies, by our indolence and our indifference to our own good name.

After a clear and just appreciation of the background, Dr. Seton-Watson turns to the dictatorships in Russia, Italy, and Germany. He brings out the important point that our position is difficult and dangerous because we are fighting not merely for ourselves, but for the cause of decent men in every country, including the countries controlled by the dictators, and we are debarred from using the instruments which dictators use without scruple. We do not think that war is beautiful; we know it to be so evil a thing that we must make sacrifices to avoid it. Our policy would be far simpler if we could neglect, as the dictators neglect, all those moral values which give civilisation a meaning to civilised men. If we rated human beings as low as they are rated in the pages of *Mein Kampf* or in the speeches and acts of Mussolini, we could win far more immediate success in the brute struggle for power, but we know that success at this price would be a betrayal of our cause.

In this dilemma it is necessary above all things that we should consider two things: our relations with the United States and our relations with the smaller European Powers. Dr. Seton-Watson does not deal with the former of these problems at length, but he gives most important data for the elucidation of the second problem—a problem which, inevitably includes the treatment of minorities. Here again a reader will find the facts which he needs to know, and upon which he can test the validity of Dr. Seton-Watson's judgments. Dr. Seton-Watson finished his book in February of this year. He has added an epilogue dealing with the German invasion of Austria. This epilogue is sombre reading; it justifies to some extent a phrase in which Dr. Seton-Watson sums up the present time as "the hateful and degenerate age in which we live." Yet, against a verdict of this kind, Dr. Seton-Watson's own book may be taken as evidence that, if the condition of a great part of the civilised world is horrible beyond the worst forebodings of those who lived through the years 1914–18, there still exists in our own country a reserve of energy which has not been drained away by wealth or comfort or sentimentalism. Words are not deeds, but, in the last resort, a student of history would forecast that strength in action and ultimate survival are likely to go to a people whose thought is expressed by writers like Dr. Seton-Watson rather than to those nations which have acclaimed the besotted and evil arguments that nothing matters in this world except brute force. E. L. WOODWARD.

54*. A HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Ian C. Hannah. 1938. (London: Nicholson and Watson. Sm. 8vo. 228 pp. 4s. 6d.)

55*. BRITAIN AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 1783–1936. By R. M. Rayner and W. G. T. Airey. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xvi + 447–787 pp. 3s. 6d.)

IN Mr. Hannah's book, issued in the University Extension Library, the last three chapters, which cover the period since 1914, read more as a very much compressed account of world affairs than of British foreign policy, the guiding principles and chief moves of which do not seem to be defined with sufficient clarity and precision to be of real value to the readers for whom the book is intended. There are some rather startling passages about the League of Nations, including a comparison between it and the Crusades and the causes of their respective failures. The League of Nations may, in truth, be "the conception of a great world ideal," but that ideal is surely based on co-operation between nations in world affairs, and not merely in restraint of members suspected of being potential aggressors. Such a dangerous confusion of thought reveals only too clearly, one may believe, a cause of the "failure" of the League.

Rayner's Concise History of Britain, 1783–1934 (intended for use in School Certificate forms) is here reprinted with a supplement on Great Britain and World Affairs, 1789–1936, by Mr. W. G. T. Airey. In less than a hundred pages, Mr. Airey gives a clear and balanced outline of major tendencies and movements which manages to avoid the dullness and sweeping generalisations such compression is apt to produce. It would be possible to criticise the selection of subjects for the "notes" at the end of the book, amplifying the main text, were it not that an examination syllabus is obviously the main consideration here, and such criticism must therefore be directed against School Certificate examiners rather than against the authors.

H. G. L.

56. BRITAIN LOOKS AT GERMANY. By Sir Edward Grigg, M.P. 1938. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. xxii + 296 pp. 5s.)

SIR EDWARD GRIGG is impressed by the parallel between to-day and 1914, and sees the greatest danger to peace in the possibility that Germany may, once more, mistake the temper of Great Britain. As he very rightly points out, Germany does not want war: but she is constantly using the threat of force to induce other countries to comply with her demands. In the last resort, the issue of peace or war depends on the German estimate of the probable action of Great Britain.

He would have us increase our preparedness as the only means of demonstrating that we are in earnest. And he considers that nothing short of some measure of universal citizen training will have the desired effect. A Register of Citizens should be drawn up without delay, on the lines of the Parliamentary Register, to enable citizens to be classified for various categories of home defence duty. He would also introduce a period of three months' training in camp for all young men, irrespective of class, between the ages of 18 and 21. Only those who volunteered for military training should receive it, and these would constitute a Second Line Army more on the lines of the Swiss Militia than those of our present Territorial Army. In view of the

need for overseas garrisons he would leave the Regular Army much as it is to-day; but its duties should be confined to the internal security and external defence of overseas territories, leaving home defence to the Second Line.

There is much to be said for his proposals. But he does not underestimate the difficulties in the way of getting them agreed to by many sections of his countrymen, whose objections he states fairly. He quotes Jaurès with considerable effect in proof of the fundamentally democratic nature of compulsory service, and also cites the success of the Civilian Conservation Corps in the United States.

Judging by some of the correspondence that he quotes, including "Yaffle's" letter in the *New Statesman*, it would appear that Sir Edward Grigg's appeal has not as yet met with a satisfactory response. But it is certain that we have not heard the last of this subject.

B. T. REYNOLDS.

57. GLASS HOUSES AND MODERN WAR. By Jonathan Griffin. 1938. (London: Chatto and Windus. 8vo. 187 pp. 3s. 6*d*.)

"THOSE who live in glass houses," says Mr. Griffin, "should not throw—should not even brandish or collect—stones until they have converted the glass into Triplex." Read bombs for stones and cities for houses, remember that London is a veritable Crystal Palace, and his conclusion is logical enough that it would be to our advantage if a system of "mainly non-menacing defence," and not counter-bombing, were the main reliance of the glass-house dwellers. What we need is not a huge force of bombers, but "home-front defence" in the shape of anti-aircraft artillery, balloon barrages, interceptor fighters, storage of food, oil, etc., and a thoroughly efficient system of A.R.P.

He admits that we must have bombers so long as others have them, but, because our capital is more exposed than any other, he would have us give a lead in putting reduction of vulnerability more prominently into the picture than the multiplying of "unproductive, useless, provocative and swiftly obsolescent bombers."

The argument assumes that the bombers of the attacked State are an instrument of reprisal and nothing more. They are, however, a defensive force as well, in that they can strike at the enemy bombers in their lair. General Trenchard's Independent Force of 1918 dropped nearly as great a weight of bombs on aerodromes as on all other objectives. Certainly we should try to reduce our vulnerability in every possible way, but it would be very unwise to scrap our bombers unless other countries did it simultaneously.

J. M. SPAIGHT.

58. WHY BRITAIN PROSPERS. By William Teeling. 1938. (London: John Gifford. 8vo. 287 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

IT is unfortunate that Mr. Teeling could not decide whether this volume should be a serious study of the social problems on which he has so much of value to say or a somewhat inaccurate handbook for rather callow Tory candidates. But the reader should not be deterred by the poor stuff from getting at the really valuable information which Mr. Teeling has to give and at his thoughtful suggestions. The British Empire, as he rightly points out, has been built up on toleration, trade and vitality. No Empire can live without toleration and vitality. The present German régime lacks the former. Do the British people still retain the latter? Mr. Teeling is excellent on Germany and the German spirit—on the German labour camps, and English efforts for

training unemployed youth—their virtues and the dangers of allowing young men and women to grow up in idleness and want. It is, as he says, possible that the Labour Camps of Great Britain could take a leaf out of the German " book " without losing any form of toleration. It would add to the value of his study if he had added a word about the Civilian Conservation Corps in the United States, which in method and achievement lies in some respects half way between the German and the English system. Mr. Teeling touches on the need for filling the empty spaces of the Dominions. But political prejudice rather blurs his vision. He would no doubt be surprised to learn that more to fill these spaces from the United Kingdom was done under the Liberal Government of 1905–14 than in any period in the last fifty years. Similarly he fails to realise that the crisis of 1931 was as much due to the fatal return to the Gold Standard in 1925 as to anything which was done between 1929 and 1931.

The chapters on propaganda make some good points. Mr. Teeling underrates the value of the large circulation of good English books and of the lecturers of progressive thought in the United States.

C. WALEY COHEN.

59. ENGLAND: A Speech by the Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., at the Festival Banquet of the Royal Society of St. George, April 26th, 1938. 1938. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 14 pp. 1s.)

Mr. Eden here stresses the need for " the same passionate fervour and immense effort as has been made by autocratic States in the last few years, if the British heritage of freedom, of a " well-ordered State . . . guaranteeing full individual liberty and undoubted equality before the law " is to be preserved, and the rule of law between nations is acknowledged. But if we wish to restore this rule of law, " a condition of civilized life between countries," we must also readily accept " the world's view of understanding, of toleration and of generosity."

EUROPE

60*. GERMANY SPEAKS. By 21 Leading Members of Party and State. With a Preface by Joachim von Ribbentrop. 1938. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 407 pp. 10s. 6d.)

61. JUST BACK FROM GERMANY. By J. A. Cole. 1938. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 333 pp. 8s. 6d.)

Germany Speaks, a collection of twenty-one essays by prominent German statesmen, is written with the express purpose of convincing the English reader of the greatness and the peaceful intentions of National-Socialism. A lot of it is propaganda of a somewhat obvious type, and the reader may well tire of the endless repetition of the theme of " national solidarity " which permeates every chapter. There are, moreover, one or two subjects which are rather pointedly omitted or slurred over, notably the religious problem and the question of the Jews; but the book, taken as a whole, is a fair and straightforward apologia for the present régime, and provides a very valuable insight into the Nazi mentality. The reader should bear in mind, firstly, that a revolution is still in progress in Germany, and that as a consequence things are not yet normal; and secondly, that, as Dr. Frick points out in the opening chapter, " Germany has been centuries behind Great Britain and France in achieving her national consolidation," and that now that she has finally achieved it, she is going to take every possible step to ensure that she does not lose it. The last essay, by

Freiherr von Rheinbaben, is a particularly lucid exposition of Anglo-German relations as seen from the German side. The plea that Germany should be allowed to manage her internal affairs without the interference of foreign Powers cannot be too strongly endorsed; but the assumption made is that Germany alone is qualified to decide what constitutes an " internal " concern. The writer further stresses the point that an Anglo-German Entente is prevented by the fact that the English are so much divided in their attitude towards Germany that the Government is unable to frame any definite policy.

Just back from Germany is the work of a man who set out to visit Germany with the purpose of writing an entirely non-political account of what he saw and experienced there during a stay of some six months. He begins by describing his impressions of restaurants, towns, buildings and other sights, and recounts conversations with chance acquaintances, hosts or guides. In all he tries to remain as open-minded as possible, praising freely and often contrasting England very unfavourably with Germany. But as he proceeds, Mr. Cole gradually realises that to avoid introducing the subject of politics is impossible, for in the Germany of to-day politics have penetrated everywhere and the National-Socialist outlook imposes itself upon everything. After describing the Winter Help organisation, a typical Labour Camp and the " Strength through Joy " scheme, the author deals with the Jewish question in greater detail. By the end of six months, he admits, the endless reiteration of stock phrases, slogans and propaganda had so worn him down that he was no longer capable of clear thought.

G. A. Rowan-Robinson.

62*. The Third Reich. By Professor Henri Lichtenberger. Translated from the French and edited by Koppel S. Pinson. 1938. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. xi + 392 pp. 18s.)

63. Germany: World Empire or World Revolution. By G. Reimann. 1938. (London: Secker and Warburg. 8vo. xviii + 302 pp.)

These two books present an interesting contrast both of method and outlook. Professor Lichtenberger writes as a well-known academic authority on German affairs, whose pre-War studies in German political and social thought have already established his position in this field. His book appeared in French under the title *L'Allemagne nouvelle*, and has now been translated into English. The editor of the English edition has added to its usefulness by printing a series of translations of fundamental documents of National-Socialism—the Party programme, the Horst-Wessel Song, the major legislation, including the Nuremberg laws, and a variety of other documents of much interest on religious and racial policy.

Professor Lichtenberger's work is admirably judicial and, up to the end of 1936, remarkably complete. He sketches the rise of the National-Socialist movement, the seizure of power, the foreign policy of the régime, and deals with racial, religious and economic questions in turn. It is not to be expected that there should be much that is new to those who have read the ever-increasing literature which has covered the same ground, but for those who have not, no single book has given a more complete or clearer picture. It is, however, the last section—" A Frenchman Looks at Nazi Germany "—which is most interesting to English readers, the more so that the author's view is

so closely akin to the opinions of instructed Englishmen. One quotation may serve as illustration:

The terrorism *en acte* which the Nazis perpetrate against their enemies repels us. . . . The French instinctively retreat from a régime which employs such drastic measures. They feel unresponsive to a country which submits in silence, without protest, and without revolt, to the treatment which the Nazis inflict upon their vanquished enemies. . . .

Mr. Reimann makes no pretence at the judicial calm of Professor Lichtenberger. His thesis is "that bourgeois democracy can never be revived in Germany," and the only solution for Germany lies, therefore, either in "World Empire" or "World Revolution." For the meaning of the Nazi triumph is, for Mr. Reimann, to be found in the attempt of German finance capital to save itself from ruin, and the effect of Nazi economic policy is to render all but the big capitalists discontented The evidence of this discontent is marshalled with considerable skill, but in the nature of the case is neither very weighty nor wholly convincing. Whether the author's main argument is accepted or not, however, Mr. Reimann's book is worth reading for the analysis of National-Socialist economic policy and practice contained in Part II.

E. J. PASSANT.

64. PEASANTRY AND CRISIS IN FRANCE. By Neil Hunter. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 287 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THE persistent depletion of the rural population of France and a corresponding increase in town-dwellers have now been accentuated by the added attraction lent to industrial employment by the social legislation of recent Front Populaire governments. Although in the course of the last ten years the rural inhabitants have consequently ceased to be predominant, they nevertheless still constitute nearly half of the total population and their evolution is therefore of great importance for the future of France. Major Neil Hunter's book helps to a comprehension of this important aspect of French life. Those who wish to understand something of its problems, the conditions of production, the different systems of land tenure, the varying types of farms stretching from the minute holding of working peasants to the great farms of Northern France and the manner of rural life generally, with its variations from region to region, will find in it much useful information. The author inevitably dwells upon the hard life of the French peasant, with his long hours of work, poor housing, and few of the amenities to which the countryman in England is accustomed. To many Englishmen it will be a surprise to learn that out of seven and a half million people actively engaged in agriculture in France, two million own no land at all. Major Hunter's analysis of the situation shows that in the rural life of France many problems are awaiting solution, and in looking into the future he has some doubts whether in solving them it is possible to expect the maintenance of the much-vaunted stability of the French peasantry.

D. H. LOCH.

65. SPAIN'S ORDEAL. A Documented Survey of Recent Events. By Robert Sencourt. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 8vo. x + 320 pp. 9 Maps. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

66. THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN. By Frank Jellinek. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 637 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

67*. SEARCHLIGHT ON SPAIN. A Penguin Special. By the Duchess of Atholl. 1938. (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 16mo. xiv + 346 pp. Maps. 6*d.*)

As the author of *Spain's Uncertain Crown*, Mr. Sencourt won for himself the right to give an exposition of the facts and forces conducting to the present conflict. The first part of his present volume is a general survey of events demonstrating that the war had become inevitable. The second part deals with the war itself, and brings us down to April of this year. It is very doubtful whether it is yet possible " to separate truth and falsehood," as is claimed in the note on the dust-cover, for there is still considerable divergence of opinion on many of the facts adduced. There is too ready an acceptance of the printed word—the author's sources are almost wholly English and French—and one is sorry to see presented, as accepted truths, statements which are unsupported and have already failed to withstand investigation. The terms in which the author describes the conduct of the men on *Miguel de Cervantes* and *Mendez Nuñez* scarcely substantiate his claim that the book is objective, and his use of such words as " loyal " and " mutinous " is arbitrary and equivocal. If the introduction is ignored, the work may be accepted as an admirable presentation of the Right-wing point of view, a beautifully-phrased *aide-mémoire* rather than a scholarly and impartial analysis. Mr. Sencourt's description of naval manœuvres is more complete than has hitherto appeared in English, and his account of the military operations up to the investment of Madrid provides a useful complement to *The Tree of Gernika*, although he does not accept Mr. Steer's version of the bombing. There are nine excellent sketch-maps.

" For an adequate history of the Spanish Civil War, its background its immediate and remoter causes and results, one may have to wait half a century," but it is safe to assert that when that history is written, Mr. Jellinek's book will be among those consulted for a presentation of the Left-wing point of view down to August 1937. This is indeed a work of permanence rather than of direction. The author almost wholly ignores books on Spain and on the Civil War, and relies on his own intimate knowledge of the country, on which his journalistic experience and professional resources for collecting information enable him to write with first-hand authority. Mr. Jellinek freely admits that, having viewed the war from a particular angle—*i.e.*, from Barcelona—he cannot assess it completely, and he therefore sets out to give not " one more statement of opinion," but " the actual data for forming a judgment." From this point of view his work is valuable, especially for its clear discrimination between the various parties and for its detailed account of their ideological internecine disputes. He distinguishes carefully between Soviet and Spanish Communism, and shows that while bombs were falling, the " new State " was actually set up. He rather surprisingly argues that " Spaniards, perhaps more than any other people, possess the high art of living in a community," and, claiming that collectivisation and communal farming in Estremadura and Andalusia were instinctive, attempts to prove that Spaniards prefer to work in the group rather than as individuals. That " everything in Spain is unpredictable," however, rings true enough, and Mr. Jellinek limits himself to prophesying that though the rebels may win the war, they cannot win the peace.

The author claims that her book is " an attempt to give the main

facts leading up to the war from the fall of the Monarchy in 1931, and to examine as objectively as possible the main points in the war itself around which controversy has gathered." It must be admitted that, within the limits necessarily imposed by her known sympathies for the Government cause, she has succeeded. This book, which is an extraordinary publishing feat in that 360 pages of a new work are presented to the public for sixpence, is not merely an account of what the author saw on her visit to Spain a year ago. She has read widely in the literature of both sides, and the result is a fully documented study. It includes a full translation of the insurgent orders advocating "frightfulness," and also of the *procès-verbal* of the interview of Signor Mussolini with Spanish Monarchist leaders in March 1934, demonstrating that Italian help for a rising had been promised more than two years before the actual outbreak of hostilities. Of special interest is her chapter, "What it Means to Us," though not all of her surmises are plausible. Her assertion that, if Spain were in hostile hands, "there would then be no secure naval base between this country and Alexandria," ignores the facilities offered by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. And it is strange that her searchlight should have missed the significance of the Military Mission to Portugal. S. GEORGE WEST.

68. HOMAGE TO CATALONIA. By George Orwell. 1938. (London: Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 314 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. ORWELL went to Spain in December 1936, and served in the P.O.U.M. (dissident Communist) militia on the Aragon front. He was badly wounded, and was nearly arrested for his connection with the P.O.U.M. before he left Spain six months later.

As his earlier book, *The Road to Wigan Pier*, showed, Mr. Orwell has little patience with theories or theorists, and he is not unnaturally bitter at the effect of the conflict of ideologies behind the lines during the time he was in Spain. He is concerned in *Homage to Catalonia* with making us understand the point of view of the men at the front, and particularly of the P.O.U.M. militiamen and the English I.L.P. volunteers. He is convinced, from his own experiences during the fighting between the P.O.U.M., Anarchists, Socialists and Communists in Barcelona in May 1937, that the P.O.U.M. and the Anarchist rank and file did not fight the Socialists and Communists because they were less eager to fight Fascism than the Communists. There is no reason to think he is wrong about this, but neither Mr. Orwell nor anyone else has as yet explained satisfactorily what was in the minds of the leaders of the different parties.

Mr. Orwell believes that the Spanish Government and the Socialist and Communist Parties have lost more than they have gained by their attempt to placate bourgeois opinion at home and abroad. Time alone can show whether he or they are right.

Mr. Orwell makes it clear that the resistance of the Spanish people is not due to propaganda alone—Communist or otherwise—but to a sense of injustice and a desire to change their former conditions that have spontaneously inspired the politically uneducated as well as the politically conscious. *Homage to Catalonia* is a salutary reminder that working people in Spain—as indeed in other countries—feel an impatience with the present social order that goes deeper than political theories. This is an important and beautifully-written book, and both its merits and defects are due to the author's close contact with the events and people he describes. HELEN F. GRANT.

69. FOREIGN JOURNALISTS UNDER FRANCO'S TERROR. By a Journalist. 1938. (London: United Editorial, Ltd. 8vo. 32 pp. 2*d*.)

A pamphlet by an anonymous journalist giving examples of the difficulties and dangers encountered by correspondents of European, American and British papers in insurgent territory. H. F. G.

70. INSURANCE AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN ITALY. By Muriel Currey. 1938. (London: Printed privately. Sm. 8vo. 36 pp.)

A pamphlet describing the various insurance and social welfare organisations in Italy. The first half of the pamphlet tells the story of a hypothetical Italian workman who encountered various misfortunes, and describes how these misfortunes were dealt with by the social organisations in question.

71. BLOODLESS INVASION. By Paul Einzig. 1938. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 119 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

GERMAN economic policy in South-Eastern Europe has aroused increasing interest during the last year or two, but Dr. Einzig believes that its true significance is still insufficiently appreciated, and accordingly has written a brief popular account of what he calls "the new menace of German economic and political penetration." In Dr. Einzig's hands the story loses nothing of its dramatic character, and to suggest that it would be more effective if it were more adequately documented would, no doubt, merely be a complaint that he had not written a different book for a different set of readers. As it stands, indeed, the book has great value, both for the general student of current international problems and for the research worker who may be contemplating a more intensive study of this question. It is a matter of some doubt whether the problems discussed are peculiar to South-Eastern Europe. The whole question of barter or quasi-barter agreements in international trade between countries with different degrees of intensity in their desires either to get rid of exports, or to buy imports for particular purposes, is a highly important one to which more attention will have to be paid in the near future, and Dr. Einzig's book helps to build up the background within which the problem must be discussed.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

72. CZECHS AND GERMANS: A STUDY OF THE STRUGGLE IN THE HISTORIC PROVINCES OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. 1938. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. ix + 299 pp. Maps, bibl. 12*s*. 6*d*.; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 10*s*. 6*d*.)

MISS WISKEMANN'S book is an indispensable introduction to the closer study of the problem of Czechoslovakia, and its appearance at the present juncture testifies to the prescience of the Publications Committee of Chatham House. Her seventeen chapters take the reader from the days "before the White Mountain" (1620) down to the *Anschluss* crisis of last March, stopping by the way to make a geographical excursion through the German areas and to discuss the economic and cultural aspects of the subject. The author has evidently warmed to her theme, and her pen has a living touch which can convey to the reader her feeling for "the fairy-tale landscape" of the northern borderlands with their "steep hills and pine forests and delighting villages" and "that lovely Elbe valley." One understands how it is

that "young Sudeten Germans who are all for Hitler and hate the Czechs will sometimes tell you that they could have kissed the Czech officials at the frontier all the same, when they came home last time." This intense love of country common to both parties in a struggle extending over many centuries is, as the author rightly brings out, a powerful factor under the surface of the present controversy. It recalls Ireland.

The only criticism that one is inclined to make of the book is that it might well have been longer. The author has collected so much material and has so thoroughly lived herself into her subject that she might well have allowed herself (or been allowed) a little more air and space. One feels this particularly as regards her account of the administrative system of the country. This has a most important bearing on the grievances of the German minority, as the author recognises, but it is nowhere given full-dress treatment. Is it too much to hope for a second edition in which the author would not only bring the book up to date with the most recent events, but also be allowed to range over the whole without any cramping of her style?

A. Z.

73. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: KEYSTONE OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY. By Lt.-Commander Edgar P. Young. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 400 pp. Maps. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

COMMANDER YOUNG has given a comprehensive account of the Czechoslovak Republic with a great deal of useful statistical information attached to it. One of the most illuminating tables of figures which he supplies is that showing the tremendous increase of Czechoslovak trade via the Polish port of Gdynia in the years 1931–35 inclusive. This is of particular interest in relation to the possibility of difficulties which may arise for Czechoslovakia with regard to her use of Hamburg and Trieste. In quite a different way the last Appendix to the book is of particular interest. It relates to a journey undertaken by the widely-respected Czech deputy, Dr. Neuman, who was invited by the Henleinist deputy, Herr Frank, to accompany him to the distressed areas of the Sudeten German districts. Dr. Neuman's account should provide a warning to all those who accept propaganda without verification.

While very frequently giving Czechoslovakia the benefit of the doubt, Commander Young perhaps under-estimates her economic difficulties—*i.e.*, her tremendous dependence upon export which has so disastrously affected her German districts since 1931. Further, he appears to be unduly optimistic from a Czechoslovak point of view with regard, for instance, to the readiness of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia to be reconciled with the Republic, or again with regard to the public opinion of Roumania. The latter he regards as essentially anti-German and pro-Czech; is not this to ignore perhaps too completely the successes of the pro-German and anti-Czech Iron Guard in the last elections?

There is one rather misleading statement which should not pass without comment. Commander Young writes, "All local government bodies are elected in a similar manner to Parliament." One of the most serious complaints of the minorities has been that, since the law of 1927, one third of the Provincial Assemblies has been nominated in Prague, whereas both Senate and Chamber are wholly elective.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

74. Farewell, Austria. By Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg. 1938. (London: Cassell. 8vo. xi + 328 pp. 10s. 6d.)

75. Austria and After. By Franz Borkenau. 1938. (London: Faber and Faber. 1938. 8vo. 335 pp. 8s. 6d.)

Natural respect for a man who rose to the position of political leader of his country, blended with natural sympathy for his misfortunes, predisposes the reader in favour of ex-Chancellor Schuschnigg's book. They cannot, however, banish the knowledge that it is extremely dull; and for a man in Schuschnigg's position to have written a dull book about the last days of independent Austria is something of a feat. The fact, however, remains that his pages are undramatic to the point of frigidity, and not even well written. Part of the blame for the result may fall on the translators—for, unfortunate in so many things, Schuschnigg has been not least unlucky in his translators who are, we are told, numerous, but uniformly bad. Part, however, certainly falls on the ex-Chancellor himself, who is anything but successful either in arranging or expounding his subject-matter. The book does not, of course, lack historic interest, but even this is less than was to be hoped. There are few new facts; and the consistent unfairness towards the Social Democrats is a serious and pervading blemish. It will have to be used by future historians, but it will never be one of their major sources.

Herr Borkenau's book is infinitely better reading, and, although in the main entering less into historical detail than the ex-Chancellor's, gives a far better idea of the reasons why Austria failed to maintain her "independence." The main question which he sets himself to answer is how far the *Anschluss* was natural, and how far it expressed the will of the people. This involves consideration of how far Austria really occupied, or felt that she occupied, a special position in the German community. The sketch of Austrian historical and social problems on which the answers to this question are based seems in places unduly favourable to Austria, which is more than once credited with a "democratic" past for which it would be difficult to find much real evidence. But it is illuminatingly and often brilliantly written, and the sketches of the main currents of political thought before the War are first-rate. The analysis of post-War developments is equally good. It holds the balance very fairly, and provides, in particular, a most necessary corrective to Schuschnigg's account of Seipel. The picture of the development and transformation of village thought is quite new, and very convincing. The last pages pose the question of the future, and both those to whom the future constitutes the main interest, as well as those who seek chiefly an explanation of the past, would do well to read this little work attentively. C. A. Macartney.

76. The Mission of Austria. By Edward Quinn. 1938. (London: Paladin Press. 8vo. 141 pp. 5s.)

To-day there is discernible in European Catholicism a difference of outlook between Catholics who live in countries where—as in Spain, Italy, Hungary and Austria—the *form* of a Catholic past has been preserved, and those who inhabit countries—such as France or Great Britain—in which the traditional forms have almost completely disappeared. The former tend to believe that there is still a specifically Christian European civilisation which must be defended at all costs. The latter argue that one hundred years of industrial and national

revolution and over three hundred years of progressive secularisation have so totally undermined the old conceptions of Christendom that the spirit has vanished and all that is left is a shell. Europe must be reconverted, and the task of Catholicism is not to bolster up old forms, but to create a new order.

According to this view the preservation of the old forms is not only useless, but positively dangerous, for they have come to cover a social order, and above all an economic system, totally opposed to the spirit of Christ. The Church in fighting for " Christian civilisation " may perhaps find herself in uneasy alliance with monied interests fighting for *laissez-faire*, for example, or absentee landlords interested in the preservation of feudal conditions.

Father Quinn's book brings home the delicacy of the problem. His underlying contention is the Catholicism of Austria; he quotes with approval Abbot Mager's belief that " Austria has its justification in the last resort from the fact that it is the ultimate element of Christendom in the world." But it may be argued that the Catholicism of Austria is a form, not a spirit; an inheritance, not a living reality. Except among a small minority, there is no vivid acceptance of the Catholic faith. This fact accounted for the artificiality of Austria's " Christian corporate State." BARBARA WARD.

77. PACHITCH ET L'UNION DES YOUGOSLAVES. By Count Sforza. 1938. (Paris: Gallimard. 8vo. 253 pp. 20 *frs.*)

THE reviewer, who knew both the biographer and the subject of his biography, can testify to the accuracy of this admirable sketch. The former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs was at Corfu in constant communication with Pašić—to give the Yugoslav Premier the correct spelling of the text—and that reserved and undemonstrative politician, an engineer, not an advertiser, spoke freely to the Italian diplomatist who was a friend of Yugoslavia. Count Sforza truly says that, if Bissolati, whom those who knew him considered one of the noblest of Europeans, had been Foreign Minister, instead of the honest but short-sighted Sonnino, who "like Shylock, demanded his pound of flesh" in the shape of the " secret " treaty of London, regardless of the fact that Wilson never recognised, and was not bound by, it, Italo-Yugoslav relations would have been different. Sonnino and, on the other side, the Croat, Trumbić, looked at the letter rather than the spirit, judged as jurists not as statesmen. San Giuliano's prophecy, made twenty-three years before the *Anschluss*, possesses special interest to-day: " Quant à Trieste, son acquisition par l'Italie détruira les aspirations adriatiques du pangermanisme et constituera à l'avenir une cause de friction entre l'Allemagne et l'Italie." For a similar reason Bissolati wanted to put the Italian frontier not at the Brenner but at the natural *Sprachgrenze*, the gorge of Salurn. It is more surprising to find Marshal Diaz admitting to the author " that, if Italy had received Dalmatia, the Italian General-Staff would have been obliged to evacuate it at the first alarm of war." Even Zara is a hostage to fortune, for its water-supply and cherry orchards, the source of its maraschino, are in Yugoslavia. WILLIAM MILLER.

78. Χρονικὰ τοῦ "Ο.Λ.Π." Ὁ Λιμὴν τοῦ Πειραιῶς. [Chronicles of the Organisation of the harbour of the Piraeus. The harbour of the Piraeus.] By the Organisation. 1937. (Athens. 8vo. 283 pp.)

THIS official account of the development of the port of Athens between 1827, when it consisted of a monastery, a Turkish customs'

official, the Frenchman, Quayrac, and his daughter, 12 persons altogether, and 1937, when it had 350,000 inhabitants and was the third harbour of the Mediterranean, might have been called "the Miracle of the Piraeus." The reconstruction of Porto Leone, as it was called in Turkish times from the statue of a lion which used to stand at the entrance but is now in front of the arsenal at Venice, whither Morosini carried it in 1687, began with Otho's decree of 1836. This imposed a tithe on imports for building a mole and draining the pestilential swamps, which caused the deaths of the two British captains in 1685, whose monument is in the English church at Athens. The stages of the harbour's modern development were the transference of the capital from Nauplia in 1834 with the influx of Chiotes and Hydriotes; the opening of the railway, subsequently electrified, to Athens in 1869; the decline of its rival, Constantinople, since the removal of the Turkish capital to Angora; the creation of the present organisation in 1930 with the anchorage of steamers alongside the quays, and the establishment of a free zone in 1932 on the principle of the medieval concessions to Venetians, Genoese and Amalfitans at Constantinople and the modern "Serbian zone" at Salonika. An Englishman, Abney Hastings, whose heart is buried in the wall of the English church, brought the first steamer into the Piraeus in 1827; in 1927 there steamed into it 8,195. The volume omits to state that from 1838 to 1921 the British consulate was there, not at Athens. It contains, besides the history, the topography and administrative system of the port, illustrated by four maps and many pictures. A recent contribution to its welfare is the drinking-fountain for animals, presented by Dr. C. M. Knight in the name of the University of London.

WILLIAM MILLER.

79. LE RAPPROCHEMENT ECONOMIQUE DES PAYS DANUBIENS. By Dr. Douchan Karlikovitch. 1938. (Paris: Libraire Technique et Economique. 8vo. 220 pp.)

THIS book, which went to press before the occupation of Austria, is an examination of the various attempts made since the War to attain a greater degree of economic co-operation between the states of the Danube basin. After a brief introduction, the author gives a rapid sketch of the economic structure of the six Danubian states—Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and Yugoslavia. This is followed by a short chapter dealing with pre-War ideas on the subject, particularly the teaching of List and the growth of the conception of *Mitteleuropa*. The rest of the book, except for a chapter sketching the more important effects on this area of the crisis of 1929–1932 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the initiatives taken by various governments in recent years, such as the proposed Austro-German Customs Union, the Tardieu plan, the work of the Little Entente in the economic sphere, the Rome protocols, and the Hodza plan. These accounts are fully illustrated by statistical material, not always as up-to-date as might be expected for a book published in 1938; and a number of relevant texts are given as annexes. Though there are occasional slips—(*e.g.*, it is incorrect to say that there has been no agrarian reform in Hungary)—the book will be a useful guide to students of this subject. It should be noted, however, that no detailed account is given of the increase of German economic penetration in this district during the last few years.

D. B. B.

80. THE BALKANS AND EUROPE: A Study of Peace and the Forces of War. By Doros Alastos. 1937. (London: John Lane. 8vo. 276 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

THE object of this book is to set forth and explain the chief problems with which the Foreign Offices of the Balkan States have been faced during the past few years. After a brief sketch of international relations and the attempt to achieve a wider understanding between the Balkan States since the Balkan League of 1912, the author proceeds to describe in greater detail the events leading up to the conclusion, in 1934, of the Balkan Entente between Greece, Roumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. This is followed by an account of the results achieved by the pact, and the remarkable success of Italy, and still more of Germany, in increasing their influence throughout this area by the use of political and economic weapons. To this is appended a fairly detailed description of the breakdown of democratic institutions, such as they were, and of the spread of Fascism and nationalism in the Balkans during recent years, the anti-Fascist case being forcefully argued.

The author states that it is "perhaps the most startling political development of our time that the Balkans, long known as the powder magazine of Europe, have become, at least on the surface, the most peaceful . . . part of the world," and is apparently prepared to attribute this development, in part at least, to the Balkan Entente. However, he points out that "in its three years of existence the Entente did not do anything to remove the principal threat of foreign influence," which "shows that the agreement is not complete." A few inaccuracies should be corrected. Albania has not received £6,660,000 from Italy under the agreement of 1931 (p. 105); the Italo-Albanian *rapprochement* began before 1926 (p. 104); Turkey certainly is "included in the German barter system" (p. 138). And might not a sketch of Turkey's economic position have been included with that of the five Balkan countries proper?

D. B. B.

81. L'INTESA BALTICA. By Angelo Tamborra. 1937. (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. 94 pp. *Lire* 6.)

THIS is an attempt to describe in an objective manner the foreign policy of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with particular reference to their nearest neighbours. The description, which is well documented, is divided into four parts. The first deals with the problems relating to the formation of the Baltic States, the second with their efforts, in the first few years after the War, to secure the means of consolidating their internal and international position, whilst the third gives an account of the diplomatic activity leading up to the conclusion, in September 1934, of the Baltic Entente, the text of which is given in an appendix. In a final section the author examines the subsequent foreign policy of the three States, particularly in regard to their relations with Germany and Russia. He concludes that, though the Entente of 1934 is an important achievement, the problems created by the existence of the Memel and Vilna questions constitute a fundamental weakness.

D. B. B.

U.S.S.R.

82. SOVIET COMMUNISM: A New Civilisation. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 2 vols. 2nd edition revised and enlarged. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 8vo. 1290 pp. 35*s*.)

THIS is the second edition of the most encyclopædic and controversial of all the works on Soviet Russia published abroad. Protagonists

of the Soviet system regard it as their classic text-book. To all and sundry it is a monument of industrious compilation, though the more critically minded must be antagonised and disappointed to find special pleading and research so inextricably mixed in a work by two most reputable and veteran scholars. The second edition of *Soviet Communism* is enlarged by a Postscript in which the changes which have taken place in the U.S.S.R. since 1934–35 are surveyed and a new section on Soviet currency added. All the statistical tables are brought up to date. For the rest, the main body of the original text is reprinted almost word for word. This being so, the present reviewer's task is lightened by the very able review of the first edition by Professor J. B. Condliffe, which appeared in this *Journal*[1] and to which attention is now recalled.

It only remains to comment on the new Postscript—a minor task which I approach with considerable trepidation, since I disagree on many points with its authors. Some of the most important and sensational developments in Russia since the Revolution took place during the couple of years covered by the Postscript (1934–35 to 1937). The new Constitution, the Treason Trials, the rise of the Stakhanov movement, the consolidation of Soviet agriculture, the striking differentiation in incomes and the growth of Soviet bureaucracy, are all the fruit of these years. To the Webbs, it seems, the Soviet Government can do no wrong. They show the most amazing dexterity in floodlighting Soviet achievements while obscuring the more unseemly developments in Russia. Three-fourths of this Postscript consists of an enthusiastic write-up of the official Soviet point of view. The result is a great mass of information filtered so thoroughly as to be almost wholly free of the homely tang of reality.

It would take much more space than is at my disposal to show in detail how far this is so. A few instances must suffice. There is first the account of the new Constitution. The text is praised, and rightly so, as a political masterpiece. Then follows a eulogistic account of the "nation-wide discussion, unparalleled in scope and range" of the draft text . . . a democratic proceeding *in excelsis*. Not a word of comment is made on the arbitrary handling of the 150,000 suggestions and criticisms of this draft text received from the people, of which only half a dozen were finally recommended to the Congress of Soviets for acceptance. In describing the secret ballot introduced by the new Constitution, the Webbs declare that it "may be found in the circumstances of the U.S.S.R., where the personal tyranny of the landlord and the capitalist is unknown, to make little change." The domination of the Communist Party is, however, not unknown in the U.S.S.R. (as the uniformity of nominations at the recent Soviet elections once more clearly proved), but it is not mentioned. The same refusal to take stock of the Communist Party as a power beyond the law destroys the value of section after section of this work.

The discussion of the Soviet Treason Trials soon develops into an indictment of British rules of evidence, on the assumption that the Soviet prisoners are (on their own confession) always guilty, and that defence under these circumstances (such as is encouraged in England) is only degrading. The Webbs support the thesis that "Russian prisoners simply behave naturally and sensibly." They put forward an interesting "pattern-of-behaviour" explanation for the whole proceedings. The psychology of the present Soviet Government, as of their alleged opponents among the old Bolsheviki, was moulded under

[1] Vol. XV, no. 3, May–June 1936, pp. 464–7.

very peculiar conditions of exile and imprisonment which has made them incurably suspicious of the loyalty of their colleagues. And so any form of criticism or opposition may be regarded as incipient rebellion, and ruthlessly suppressed as such. This is all very true, but it is difficult to square such admissions with the eulogy of Soviet democracy " broadening into even wider circles and still rising towards its prime," which welled up at the end of the preceding section.

If the success of socialism ultimately depends, as Stalin has many times asserted, on the power to produce more than capitalistic society, Alexei Stakhanov's emergence as a champion coal-cutter and initiator of a Union-wide increased production movement in 1935 was unusually opportune. It was time to speed up in Russian factories, as labour standards under the first five-year plan were unusually low. Some of these Stakhanovists have made world records in their jobs, others have greatly improved the technique formerly employed in Russia, others have merely started doing things as they would be done in any properly organised business abroad, like the shop-assistant who bethought him of providing small change in advance for his customers, and was also dubbed Stakhanovist. The idyllic picture of Stakhanov working conditions given in *Soviet Communism* seems much overdrawn. Many of the workers bitterly resisted the new speeding-up at the beginning, and Stakhanov organisers were frequently killed by enraged fellow-workers. Piece-work rates were cut all-round in accordance with the output of the best workers (though the Webbs do not admit this). The result in many cases was that the lazy or the weak were badly hit. This, of course, is inevitable in any competitive piece-work system, but it is no less a fact because it is necessary or that it occurs in Russia. Another point on which I do not see eye to eye with the Webbs in connection with the Stakhanovist movement is their belief that it has largely killed the monotony of the ordinary automatic factory operations. The ostensible reason for this is that the leader of the team and all the subordinate workers share alike in the decision as to how the work should be done. But in practice the limits to this kind of cooperation are obvious, if the leader knows his job. It is true that even the humblest workers in the U.S.S.R. are encouraged to study the general processes of the industry in which they are employed. But whatever their mentality, it is hard to believe that " continuance at the same task led to a particular rhythm which was less fatiguing because less worrying than distracted and irregular operations."

There are many signs in the Russian countryside that both the people and the land are rapidly recuperating from the ghastly scenes which initiated collective agriculture. The position, both in regard to livestock, grain cultivation and the amenities of life for the peasants, is annually improving. Nevertheless, from my own experience of the Russian country life last year, I very much doubt that the " villagers are everywhere buying not only boots and clothes and unaccustomed household furniture, but also . . . photographic cameras, musical instruments, wireless sets and expensive luxuries." There are still many peasants living near Moscow, and to be seen daily in the Moscow market, who certainly know nothing about luxuries of any kind and have scarcely a boot or stocking on their feet. The general improvement in agricultural conditions has been accompanied by a similar improvement in the retailing of all commodities, especially food, throughout the Soviet Union. However, it is still much too soon to talk about

" fleets of motor delivery lorries taking goods to the customer's home, in Moscow and Leningrad . . . " cities where neither milk nor bread (among common necessities) are yet delivered to the ordinary citizen, unless by private peasants hawking their own goods. Having praised Soviet distribution and price-fixing, the authors blandly tell us that the system will eventually satisfy every proper desire of the customer but " never the yearning of the unregenerate man or woman for a ' cut price ' ! " How remote these authors are from the basic " unregenerate " stuff of human nature !

In view of the wholesale abuses of abortion in the U.S.S.R. since the Revolution, the anti-abortion law of 1936 seemed wholly justified, but it is hard to understand how it can be regarded as " neither dictatorial in form or method " (*cf.* page 1205), since the draft law raised a storm of protest from women all over the country. The charges of inequality of incomes, bureaucracy and the repression of individual freedom in the U.S.S.R. are deemed sufficiently weighty for examination in a special section of this book. In defence of the unequal incomes it is pointed out that the Soviet Government is now aiming at social rather than material equality, but in their searching analysis of the difficulties in the way of establishing a Utopian system of equal sharing, the Webbs *virtually admit its practical impossibility.* Still, it is not so much the inequalities of income that many find incompatible with socialism, at any stage, in Russia as the persistence of extreme poverty and discomfort side by side with easy living. This anomaly is not touched on in this section. The charges of exaggerated bureaucracy are also loftily dismissed as being " in part . . . no more than the average sensual man's impatience of the unavoidable apparatus of any highly industrialised community . . . essentially anarchist in derivation." Anybody who has had to cope with the nightmare of Soviet officialdom in any matter, if only the dispatch of an urgent telegram, will writhe at this superior indifference to the daily hardships and inconveniences inflicted on millions of long suffering Russians.

In analysing the repression of independent thinking in the U.S.S.R., a note of genuine concern that all is not well creeps for the first time into the text. The Webbs admit a real danger to culture and progress in the present suffocation of new ideas on any fundamental social issue in Russia. Then the momentary depression lifts, and the section characteristically closes on a note of hope that as the danger of " counter-revolution and foreign aggression fades away in the U.S.S.R., the discouragement of independent thinking will be silently discontinued." Counter-revolution is a poor scapegoat for what is willy-nilly an integral part of the Marxist dictatorship. Finally, in a trenchant summary of the vital differences in Soviet life caused by the elimination of private profit-making and private ownership of the means of production, the authors explain their conviction that Soviet communism is a new civilisation. On the economic side their argument is strong. But civilisation is not entirely a matter of economics. Until Soviet Russia has evolved a general pattern of culture as distinct and characteristic in itself as that of any great civilisation, should it not rather be regarded as an epoch-making social-industrial revolution than a new civilisation? Soviet Russia seems half astride a new civilisation born of materialism and the new social-economic order, but it seems premature to hail it as a fact. The eulogy of the new Soviet citizen, to whom " the secular and the religious are one," and of the new Soviet ethical code, with which the Postscript closes, is

turgid and unreal. The driving force of this pseudo-mystical rhapsody undoubtedly is the authors' bitterly anti-religious attitude. Atheistic man in Soviet Russia, *qua* atheistic and little else, is invested with a glamour of virtue and vision which removes him from the ranks of common humanity altogether. This creature of solely virtuous reflexes is not to be compounded of flesh and blood anywhere. The best commentary on this Postscript is Eugene Lyons' *Assignment in Utopia*, a masterpiece of realistic analysis, in which the dream of *Soviet Communism* recedes further and further into the background of hard conflicting facts. VIOLET CONOLLY.

83. MICHAEL BAKUNIN. By E. H. Carr. [*Studies in Modern History.*] 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. x + 500 pp. 25s.)

THE psychology of the complete revolutionary may be very well studied in the life of Michael Bakunin which Professor Carr has admirably recorded in his new book. The book is an interesting and vivid account of the prophet of Anarchism, who is still regarded with reverence by some groups in Spain, and is sometimes contrasted with Karl Marx as Anarchism is contrasted with Communism or Socialism. But Professor Carr does not discuss in detail the controversy between Marx and Bakunin except in one short chapter, and even there does not attempt to analyse the fundamental issues. He says that "an ingenious political theorist might trace a curious affinity between the Fascist State" and a dictatorship advocated by Bakunin, "and argue that the modern clash of proletarian and Fascist dictatorships is the latest expression of the historical struggle between Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin." But if a political theorist did so argue, he would have been misled by superficial similarities. The interest in Bakunin's emotional impulse to upset any régime is more psychological than political: for although reactionaries do sometimes make the mistake of calling any advocate of reform an "agitator," there is a type of personality which is happy only in agitating. Bakunin seems to have been of that type. It is a useful type in a world in which most men are only too easily satisfied; and it is no more laughable than the type of the perfect official. Professor Carr, perhaps unintentionally, makes Bakunin seem to be somewhat absurd—always borrowing money, always forming secret societies to overwhelm kingdoms with five men, always believing that the new era had begun when barricades were erected. But the ruling princes and their officials in Bakunin's time were certainly not less laughable. And, after all, there *was* oppression of the poor, injustice and futile power. Bakunin felt deeply; but he does not seem ever to have thought clearly. He knew that any organisation, even one designed to destroy "the State," would inevitably develop the same sort of irresponsible leadership which had made "the State" an oppressive system. But both Bakunin and Marx had imbibed Hegel's dialectic—a dangerous drug for anyone who has to face the future. Revolution may be part of a dialectic movement; but Bakunin seems to have felt that it was the dialectic itself, whereas Marx inconsistently believed that "the State" would fade away when his followers controlled "the State." Bakunin, as Professor Carr points out, has had less influence than Marx, largely because Marx produced written statements of his point

of view, and most of the power of Bakunin seems to have lain in the vigour of his personality. Professor Carr in his record of Bakunin's adventures has given us excellent material for the study of underground forces in the nineteenth century. C. D. B.

84. THE LETTER OF AN OLD BOLSHEVIK: A Key to the Moscow Trials. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 79 pp. 2s.)

THERE can be few observers of events in the U.S.S.R. who have not been as much bewildered as profoundly shocked by the recent trials and executions of revolutionary leaders in that country. To all of those this little pamphlet by an anonymous writer will prove of absorbing interest. The author ascribes the recent renewed outbreak of terror to a change of policy within the Communist Party following upon the assassination of Kirov in 1934. The latter was an outstanding advocate of "internal party reconciliation," of which policy Gorky was another staunch supporter—*i.e.*, of the humane treatment of opponents who strayed from the path of strict political orthodoxy. His murder led to the gradual transfer of influence to those who were convinced that no progress could be made while positions of power were occupied by "irreconcilable nonconformists" like the old Bolsheviks. The trials represent, therefore, the wholesale elimination of the "Bolshevik Old Guard" and their replacement by new officials who could be trusted to co-operate with the Government.

The pamphlet represents the views of one man only, who may well be mistaken in his interpretation of obscure and tangled events. But it bears the imprint of reality, and makes refreshing reading in contrast to the aridity of "official" statements on the subject.

MARGARET MILLER.

85. G.P.U. JUSTICE. By Maurice Edelman. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 231 pp. 6s.)

APART from a short preface and appendices, the whole of this volume is occupied with the narrative of a German engineer named Peter Kleist, who was arrested on the usual charges of espionage and "wrecking" and, after some weeks' confinement and examination, released and allowed to leave the country. The book is designed to show that G.P.U. officials, far from being the monsters of popular imagination, are really reasonable and humane people. But foreigners are in many respects privileged people in the Soviet Union; and Mr. Kleist's story merely confirms the experience of the British Metro-Vickers engineers. What happens to Soviet citizens in the same plight is another matter. One can imagine that *G.P.U. Justice* might provoke bitter comment from Russian inmates of the Lubyanka and the Butyrki, if it ever fell under their eye. These observations would be irrelevant but for its avowed propaganda purpose. In itself, it is a readable and well-written book.

E. H. CARR.

86. THE UNITED FRONT. By Georgi Dimitroff. 1938. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 287 pp. 6s.)

THIS volume contains the principal recent pronouncements and articles of the Secretary-General of Comintern, beginning with the Congress of August 1935, when the new policy of a United front with all workers' parties against Fascism was first officially proclaimed. World-revolution does not appear to be mentioned anywhere in these pages. It may, on the other hand, be noted that:

joint action with the Social-Democratic parties and organisations not only does not preclude, but, on the contrary, *renders still* more necessary the serious and well-founded criticism of reformism, of Social-Democracy as the ideology and practice of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and the patient exposition of the principles and programme of Communism to the Social-Democratic workers.

E. H. C.

UNITED STATES.

87. OUR TRADE WITH BRITAIN: Bases for a Reciprocal Trade Agreement. By Percy Wells Bidwell. 1938. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations; London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. x + 129 pp. 6s.)

As a former economist to the United States Tariff Commission, Professor Bidwell is well qualified to write on the subject of Anglo-American trade relations. He roundly condemns the American high-tariff policy which culminated in the Hawley–Smoot tariff of 1930, and emphasises the significance of Mr. Cordell Hull's trade agreements—"the only substantial attack launched since 1914 on the barriers to international trade." But he does not exaggerate the reductions in the United States tariff since 1934. Between 1934 and 1937 American imports from the fourteen trade agreement countries rose rather less than imports from other countries.

Discussing the changes in British commercial policy since 1931, Professor Bidwell praises the flexibility of the British tariff. But he complains of the discrimination involved in recent British trade agreements, notably the privileged position secured for British coal exports in the Scandinavian and Baltic markets. He also quotes striking evidence of the diversion of British food imports from foreign to Empire countries.

As regards Anglo-American trade, the United States has a very favourable balance of trade with the United Kingdom, which has increased considerably in recent months. But this is largely counterbalanced by the surplus of American imports from British Malaya and other Crown Colonies. The real crux of the negotiations is the attitude of the Dominions. The United States is prepared to make concessions on high-grade woollen textiles and certain other British speciality products. In return, however, she wants concessions on her timber, wheat, hams, fruit and other agricultural products which can only be made by reducing the preferences which Empire countries have enjoyed in the British market since 1932. It is, therefore, not so much the United Kingdom as Canada and Australia who require compensation, and the question is whether the United States is prepared to modify her tariffs on their staple products such as Australian wool, which at present pays nearly 100 per cent. *ad valorem.*

The text of this excellent book is supplemented by a series of valuable statistical tables.

B. S. KEELING.

88. BRITISH WAR MISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1917–1918. By Colonel W. G. Lyddon, C.M.G. 1938. (Oxford: University Press. 8vo. xii + 233 pp. 10s. 6d.)

As the late Marquess of Reading reminds us in the Foreword he wrote for this book in 1934, "there was a steady growth of mutual trust and confidence between British and Americans who were brought together" during the War. The fact that the post-War history of British and American relations has not in all respects fulfilled Lord Reading's earnest hope that the collaboration between the two nations

for the avoidance of future wars and the maintenance of peace "may long be continued," is perhaps the major tragedy of the post-War world.

That very fact, however, only makes more welcome and more timely the appearance of Colonel Lyddon's excellent record of a period of co-operation which at the time was of immense value to both countries, and was essential for the success of the cause in which they became associated. As Deputy-Director of Munitions Inspection in the United States from 1916 to 1919, Colonel Lyddon's personal experience covered not only the years when America was in the War as an Associated Power, but also the previous, and sometimes difficult, period when she was an increasingly important source of munitions supply. It is well to remember on both sides of the Atlantic that during the period of close co-operation as an Associated Power the United States received help as well as giving it in full measure. It is right that in Colonel Lyddon's balanced and restrained account of the work of the British War Missions, more stress should be laid on what we obtained than on what we gave, and yet one could wish that fuller information had been given of the assistance afforded to the United States Army in organisation and training by the officers of General Trotter's Mission.

With this *caveat* the book may be commended strongly to all interested in a vital phase of the War which is over and to those concerned with understanding Anglo-American relations in the period of peace which is still with us. R. Pope-Hennessy.

89. England Expects every American to do His Duty. By Quincey Howe. 1938. (London: Robert Hale. 8vo. 255 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

There is a conspiracy among the upper classes in Great Britain (portraits of Lord Lothian, Sir Arthur Salter and Mr. Montagu Norman adorn the pages of the argument) to make the United States defend the British Empire from the perils threatening it "in a world of increasingly rapid change." Mr. Howe thinks that the United States should not remain, but become, isolationist, even to the extent of abandoning the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and reducing its foreign trade to a minimum. Thus it would best serve the interests, not of the American people only, but of "civilisation, democracy and progress throughout the world." The theme is worthy of a better-argued and more accurately informed book. Was it really General Smuts who originated the Guarantee Article of the Covenant? Did the Oxford Union really vote "against taking part in any war"? And is the record of the British Commonwealth since 1918 one of "standing put" on the *status quo*? A. Z.

90. Neutrality for the United States. By Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage. 1937. (Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 380 pp. $3·50, 15*s.*)

In the great trans-Atlantic debate on the past, present, and future of American foreign policy, Professor Borchard and Mr. Lage have raised a powerful voice. The argument of the book is a twofold one. Firstly, that from 1914 to 1917 the Wilson Administration favoured Great Britain unduly and, by their failure impartially and unflinchingly to assert neutral rights at sea, rendered war with Germany inevitable.

Secondly, as a logical inference from what is regarded as the lesson of those years, that a reversion to traditional practices rather than any of the current legislative enactments at home, or the pursuit of collective methods abroad, will now best safeguard the United States from entanglement in another European struggle. The evidence adduced with such impressive skill is, however, by no means conclusive. For Messrs. Borchard and Lage, having a case to make, exclude everything that may weaken or alter it. What they prove thereby can be valuable and revealing; but it is not the whole story. And it is just because so many of their thoughtful compatriots believe that it is the whole story (the bankers and munition-makers moving from the centre of the stage) that this very serious work has an immediate practical importance.

Perhaps one's chief quarrel with it springs from its attempt to write history in legal terms, to analyse historic events abstracted from their contemporary setting. Thus, while the Wilson Administration are indicted for pro-British errors which they stubbornly refused to recant, no really adequate explanation is offered of their unneutral attitude of mind. What, for example, was the state of German-American relations as contrasted with Anglo-American relations from the turn of the century until 1914? What about German espionage, sabotage and threats to foment revolutionary violence among German groups within the United States itself prior to 1917—did questions of that kind have no bearing on the temper and outlook of statesmen and officials, on the conduct of public business at the time? What would the position of the United States have been if Germany had won the Great War of 1914–18? What would it be if a similar danger should recur?

In point of fact Messrs. Borchard and Lage ignore so many elements that were vital in the history and mentality of their own country that it is no surprise to find their *obiter dicta* on British diplomacy and European affairs equally at fault. Seeking to apply the simple doctrine of the eighteenth century to the complex problems of the twentieth, they have composed a vigorous treatise on national escapism. And as such it is one that should be studied everywhere in the English-speaking world with the closest attention. For the judgment of American opinion upon the issues with which it deals is bound to have an effect far beyond the confines of the United States itself.

LIONEL M. GELBER.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

91. CHINA, BODY AND SOUL. Edited by E. R. Hughes. 1938. (London: Secker and Warburg. Sm. 8vo. 166 pp. 3s.) (*The proceeds from the sale of the book are devoted to the relief of distress in China.*)

THERE is, the editor tells us, no ordered progression of thought running through this collection of essays. Yet, unintentional though it may be, the writers have struck one common note, and that note is the essential *humanness* of the Chinese. One meets it, in one form or another, in all the lighter chapters of the book—those on Chinese art and literature by Laurence Binyon, Roger Fry and Arthur Waley, Eileen Power's story of the Little Rain God who had to endure a sun-cure to put an end to the drought, Miss Innes Jackson's sketch of

Li-Po, the old tippler-poet, and the editor's own contribution on the " Village and its Scholar."

Take for instance Roger Fry's dissertation on the Chinese and their dragons, illustrative of the kindly and humorous outlook of the Chinese artists on the universe. " We need not," he makes them say, " take the world or ourselves too seriously. We can play with the offspring of our imagination. If we like to imagine monsters we will, but however real we make them we will not be frightened by them." " And so," Mr. Fry adds, " it comes about that, however portentous Chinese monsters may be, they are never tragic like the progeny of our mediæval fancies." In the abundance of these examples of the human touch in everything Chinese lies the particular charm of the book.

There are contributions of a somewhat weightier nature included in the collection, such as the essay on China and Democracy by Professor Laski, Christianity in China by Basil Mathews, the unification of China by Sir Arthur Salter, and the Far Eastern Narcotic problem consisting of extracts from the League of Nations report. Professor Gilbert Murray has written the Introduction. In it he alludes to the tragedy in the Far East which is indirectly the cause of the compilation of the book and which casts its shadow across its pages. A gleam of light breaks through from the frequent reminders of the unconquerable soul of the Chinese race and the timelessness of its outlook, which makes even the worst of disasters appear as a passing phase. As an illustration of this, one of the writers quotes the experience of a friend who, walking along a smouldering street in Peking at the time of the Boxer troubles, saw hanging up a newly-painted scroll inscribed " Out of a Thousand Calamities rises the Everlasting Peace." There is, too, almost an echo of Rudyard Kipling's *Recessional* in the last words of the poem by Li-Po which is quoted by Miss Jackson :

> " The generals are unvictorious.
> What's the use of their engines of war ?
> The sages of old found no purpose for them."

G. E. Hubbard.

92. L'Évolution de la vie constitutionnelle de la Chine sous l'influence de Sun Yat Sen et de sa doctrine (1885–1937). By Tcheng Chao-Yuen. 1937. (Paris : Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 8vo. 191 pp. 35 *frs.*)

This book is designed to show the decisive influence of Sun Yat Sen's teachings on the development of governmental forms in China during the last fifty years. It fulfils its purpose very well. The main facts of constitutional history are briefly outlined ; a chapter is devoted to the life of Sun and a résumé of his doctrine, most emphasis naturally being placed upon that " People's Gospel," as the author describes it, " The Three Principles of the People " ; the many draft constitutions —from that offered by the Manchus in 1908 to the final draft promulgated in 1936—are described and commented upon in sufficient detail, with the circumstances which brought them into being. The text of the final draft, which was intended to be voted upon by a National Assembly in November 1937, is given in full.

With these materials M. Tcheng develops his thesis of the gradual acceptance of Sun's ideas, not only among theorists, but also in the hard testing-ground of practical political life. He brings out many interesting facts, not necessarily unknown, which in this setting help to

do justice to the posthumous influence of a remarkable man. One is Sun's unsuccessful attempt to introduce his three progressive periods of national reconstruction immediately after the 1911 Revolution. Had he succeeded, what a different story might have been written of the last twenty-five years! Legally, however, his doctrine only began to come into its own in the Organic Law of 1928. From that time on his peculiar contributions to constitutional theory in China have been clear enough, the differentiation between political sovereignty and administrative power, the emphasis on the people's rights of " revocation, initiative and referendum " in addition to that of suffrage, and the retention of the two governmental functions of " examination " and " control," peculiar to Chinese ideas, which Sun carried over from the old imperial régime.

M. Tcheng shows himself an impartial critic by refusing to follow many Chinese authors in dismissing the constitution of Yuan Shih-kai as unworthy of notice, and has many especially useful comments on the final draft constitution now awaiting the approval of the people. His book is marred by an excessive number of misprints and by faulty punctuation. It is also—at least to an English reader—a crying example of the need for a standardised romanisation of Chinese names and terms. E. W. MEAD.

93. ALIENS IN THE EAST. A New History of Japan's Foreign Intercourse. By Harry Emerson Wildes. 1937. (University of Pennsylvania Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. viii + 360 pp. 15*s*.)

ALTHOUGH Mr. Wildes entitles his book " A New History of Japan's Foreign Intercourse," he produces no new facts, and either misunderstands or misinterprets the majority of the old ones which he serves up. From his Foreword, one might imagine that the history of Japan's foreign intercourse prior to the Meiji restoration was virtually unknown, whereas few subjects have been so extensively and repeatedly treated. His book adds nothing of importance to the standard works of Hildreth, Murdoch and Sansom, but even when copying the versions of his predecessors Mr. Wildes cannot take the trouble to copy correctly.

It would probably be unfair to accuse the author of deliberate *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*; but we have no hesitation in saying that he must be either uncommonly ignorant or else criminally careless, judging by the crass errors he makes in dealing with matters of easily ascertainable fact. Proofs of this are to be found on every page, but the following examples should suffice. In Mr. Wildes' garbled version of the Portuguese discovery of Japan (pp. 2–4) he contrives to spell wrongly all three of the simple and well-known names of the actual discoverers. He is blissfully unaware that Pinto's claim to be the discoverer was challenged (and disproved) as soon as his book appeared in print (1614). The correct version of this event, which was first printed by Galvão in 1563, and later by Diogo do Couto in 1612, has always been accepted by the majority of historians. The Ningpo fable, repeated by Mr. Wildes on p. 4 of his book, has long been disproved, and is self-evidently impossible, as the Chinese of Ningpo had traded with Japan for hundreds of years before Pinto " discovered " it for them.

The story that the obscure Dutch gunner, Dirck Gerritszoon, exercised a baleful influence on the Japanese attitude towards foreigners

has no foundation in fact; neither have any of the other similar legends repeated by Mr. Wildes throughout his book, to prove his theory that the arrival of foreigners always coincided with great natural calamities in the eyes of the Japanese people. Comparatively minor errors abound. (p. 25) André Pessoa, captain of the *Madre de Deus*, was not beheaded, but blown up with his ship when he fired her powder-magazine in January 1610. (p. 39) The inventory of the *Brach* has been published, and the legend that her cargo consisted mainly of fine old Dutch cheese has long since been disproved. (p. 45) The execution of the Macaonese embassy in 1640 is represented as being that of the "survivors of a shipwrecked galleon," regardless of the easily verifiable fact that the vessel in question was neither wrecked nor a galleon. Even such a well-worn theme as the visit of the *Return* to Nagasaki in 1673 is here reproduced with errors of fact and deduction in every line (pp. 52–53). The economic effects of the Dutch export of gold and copper from Japan is dealt with in an almost incredibly misleading manner (pp. 55–57), Mr. Wildes being apparently unaware of serious works on the subject, like Y. Takekoshi's *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilisation of Japan* (3 vols., London, 1930).

The really astounding disregard of facts shown by the author is perhaps best revealed in his own words. Chapter VII, fittingly entitled "Washington, War God in Japan, 1771–1781," opens thus, "Because an egocentric Polish adventurer plotted to advance his private interests, Japan took sides with the American colonies during the ordeal at Valley Forge. One year after the declaration of Independence was signed, the Empire of the Rising Sun was praying earnestly for Washington's success." Had Mr. Wildes said that there was a contingent of Satsuma samurai at Brandywine and Germantown, he could scarcely have made a greater distortion of fact. According to Mr. Wildes, Holland had a King in 1771, which will be interesting news to all Netherlands readers, who are under the foolish delusion that their monarchy dates from 1814.

Even this gem is surpassed by the following comment on Koxinga's capture of Formosa from the Dutch, which, incidentally, took place in 1662, and not in 1661, as Mr. Wildes avers. "A wave of nationalistic sentiment engulfed Japan, for although Koxinga was born of a Chinese father, his mother was a scion of the proud Tagawa family. Koxinga's victory was regarded as a second Japanese conquest of the Dutch." Apart from the fact that the "scion of the proud Tagawa family" was in reality nothing more than the humble inmate of a local brothel in the little fishing-town of Hirado, one would like to know exactly how, when and where the "first" conquest of the Dutch by the Japanese took place; the kidnapping of Pieter Nuyts in 1628 can hardly be dignified by this term. *Et voilà justement comme on écrit l'histoire!*

Other equally irresponsible and totally unfounded assertions can be culled from almost every page, but enough has been written here to prove that Mr. Wildes' book is one of the greatest travesties of history which have ever been penned. This is all the more inexcusable, since he quotes in the bibliography numerous excellent standard works, like those of Professor Murdoch. Had he consulted these carefully he might have written a better book. C. R. BOXER.

94. TOKUGAWA JAPAN: Materials on Japanese Social and Economic History. Edited by Neil Skene Smith. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xvi + 176 pp. With 64 illustrations by artists of the period. 5s.)

THE first remarkable feature of this fascinating book is the pictures. They are the delightful black-and-white etchings of our childhood's Japanese fairy-tales, only, instead of Momotaro, they depict the trades and shops and street-life of Tokugawa Japan. The next remarkable feature is the price—five shillings. Why? The coloured picture of Sendai High Street which forms the frontispiece is worth that in itself. It is a marvel how the publishers can manage to charge so little for a book which one fears may have only a limited appeal to specialists. But it is to be hoped that at least everyone truly interested in understanding—and not merely abusing—the Japanese, will not hesitate to buy it. It is not about ancient art or modern armaments, but about the life and work of the Japanese people, how they carried on their businesses and brought up their families and trained their apprentices and apportioned their estates when they died, in the peaceful and prosperous two hundred years of the Tokugawa dictatorship, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. This was the age of those popular wood-prints upon which the editor has so freely drawn, the age of Utamaro and Hiroshige and Hokusai, before the Japanese had started to imitate the West, when the originality of their genius was still self-evident, and before it had become fashionable to say that the Japanese were mere imitators. Here is depicted a wholly original and very vital community, curiously like and unlike its contemporary England. Mr. Skene Smith presents his picture in anthology form, the book consisting of a series of illustrative quotations from the records of the times and from later historians joined together by the editor's well-informed commentary. The subjects, covered in this way and most delightfully illustrated, include population and resources (throughout the period the population remained remarkably stable at about 27 millions), road and sea communications, the organisation of trade, the guild system (*Kabu-nakama*), the business-tax (*myogakin* or "good-fortune-gold"), the shipping federation, the rice trade ("rice was by far the most important trading commodity of Tokugawa Japan, its transport and trade being controlled by both government and private merchants with the help of huge financial and marketing organisations"), the developments of the rice exchanges (spot and futures market) at Edo and Osaka, the oil trade, foreign and retail trade, employment and apprenticeship in business houses. The book is intended to serve as an introduction to an economic series dealing with the Tokugawa period; and the further volumes, if they are as engaging as this one, may be awaited with lively anticipation. P. J.

95*. FRENCH INDO-CHINA. By Virginia Thompson. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 517 pp. 21s.)

MISS VIRGINIA THOMPSON, whom we believe to be British and to have been helped in her researches by the U.S.A., is a Master and Doctor of Columbia University. Her wide travels include Indo-China.

This work, indispensable to the English-reading student of the great French tropical Empire, promises long to hold a place on his bookshelf. It is well written and well produced. It has a remarkable bibliography, in which it is a peculiar pleasure to find Monsieur

Bouvier's delightfully human *Thi Cau*, of which we hope for an early new edition.

Miss Thompson adopts the attitude of depreciation which the stay-at-home Frenchman so readily assumes towards his government and all its work, and therefore does less than justice to the advance which, judged by our standards of civilisation, Indo-China has made under French tutelage.

Though its flow has been checked by reefs and shoals, the result of seventy-five years of French rule may boldly challenge comparison with that of other empire builders.

As an instance of Miss Thompson's somewhat grudging attitude, let us compare her statement (p. 126) that since the French conquest, in Cochin China alone has there been a growth in rice production, with M. Paul Bernard's *Nouveaux Aspects du Problème Économique Indochinois* (pp. 28 and 29), which shows an increase in Tonkin and Annam, where the statistics are incomplete, of 300,000 tons and in Cochin China, from 1886 to the end of 1936, of 2,200,000 tons, with corresponding growths in area and expenditure.

Miss Thompson does not tell us that the rubber-planters are not only swiftly repaying the Government advances, but are also creating a large fund which, at least temporarily, will serve Indo-China for other ends.

La Société Financière Française et Coloniale has no monopoly in the field of electrical energy (p. 222).

The statement (p. 484) that the State never dared to publish the exact cost of the Colonial Exposition of 1931 is doubly untrue. The published accounts which Marshal Lyautey supervised show a direct profit of 28,000,000 fcs.

Despite these and other criticisms shut out by lack of space, and a style which sometimes moves a little laboriously, the work is a noteworthy addition to the literature of a neglected subject of great importance, in which there is happily an awakening interest.

H. SCOTT TUCKER.

96. NOUVEAUX ASPECTS DU PROBLÈME ÉCONOMIQUE INDOCHINOIS. By Paul Bernard. 1937. (Paris: Fernand Sorlot. 8vo. 175 pp. 15 *frs.*)

THE rising interest in French Asiatic Colonies has led to a welcome growth of books. Whilst there is no promise of a mid-day edition, much is being done to remedy the lack of information. May the Colonial Office or some other competent body undertake its collation.

M. Bernard's *Nouveaux Aspects*, published late in 1937, is this year followed by *Les Problèmes Posés par le Développement Industriel de l'Indochine*, of which he is part author. *Nouveaux Aspects* is written with that lucidity one expects from the scholarly French. The facts may be hard, they are not dry. The book is an eloquent plea for the better distribution of the plenteous fruits of the earth. It is ironical that whilst, to take one instance, Cochin-China produces more than 40,000 tons of rubber, and will double this figure within five years, ingenious chemists devote their energies to artificial rubber.

In less than fifty years, the cultivated area in Cochin-China has grown by 2,000,000 hectares and the rice exported by more than 1,500,000 tons. Despite this, M. Bernard and other writers warn us of the extreme poverty of the native, many of whom live at the edge of the abyss of famine, sometimes on a family budget of 37·50 *frs.* a month. The standard of living of the rapidly growing native popula-

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The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in the papers, discussions, or reviews printed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

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HUNGARY AND THE PRESENT CRISIS[1]

C. A. MACARTNEY

THE position of Hungary in relation to the crisis is not so much an aftermath as an integral part of the re-shuffle in Europe which began with the occupation by Germany of the Sudetenländer, and I believe it will prove in the long run to be not the least important part of that problem.

The card which was sent out described me as having recently returned. I must in fairness say that I left Hungary, where I had spent the summer, on September 24th, and since events move extremely rapidly nowadays I should make it clear that for developments since that date I have had to depend on the newspapers, English and Hungarian.

My subject, as I see it, falls into two parts: first, the rights and wrongs of the present Hungarian claims and Czechoslovak counter-claims in the present negotiations between the two Governments regarding the situation of Slovakia and Ruthenia; and, secondly, the position in Hungary itself.

In regard to the narrower and more immediate question of Slovakia, I shall simply begin by re-stating, quite shortly, the conclusions which I formed on this subject when I was engaged two or three years ago in writing a study for this Institute on the working of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon.[2] I see little reason to modify the conclusions at which I then arrived, and, in any case, no reason to modify them very greatly.

It is true that the situation is different from any which I envisaged when I wrote that book. I did not at the time anticipate the extraordinary and to my mind quite illogical solution of taking away the Sudetenländer while leaving Czechoslovakia still a sovereign State. I anticipated either that Czechoslovakia might go under altogether, or, more likely, that the Czechoslovak State as a whole would remain, but the question might arise, what, if any, revision should be given to Hungary within that State.

When you have to consider Hungary's claims for revision

[1] Address given at Chatham House on October 11th, 1938; Mr. E. L. Woodward in the Chair.

[2] See *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937).

against a Czechslovak State which does not possess the Sudetenländer, you must to a small extent revise your conclusions; but, as I said, the modifications are not very great.

In the main, the argument for revision is perhaps slightly strengthened, because the Czechoslovak State without its strongest industrial market is clearly a less attractive proposition than such a State with that market. From the minority point of view, it is also undeniable that Czechoslovakia was, apart from anything else, bound to pay a rather unusual amount of consideration to all her minorities, by the fact that she had one particular minority amounting to nearly a quarter of her total population. Even had she desired to do so, and I am not saying that she did, she was not in a position to treat the German minority with any great severity, and it was not possible to differentiate very much between the German and the weaker minorities.

There are, however, one or two considerations which point in the other direction; to these I shall refer as I come to them.

Broadly speaking, I thought then, and think to-day, that on the whole those Magyar minorities in Czechoslovakia which live in compact areas next the present Hungarian frontier ought to be returned to Hungary. Alternatively, if they were given a plebiscite as to whether they did or did not wish to return to Hungary, the majority of them would so wish.

I said then that I thought under normal conditions probably some 70 per cent. of the Magyars would vote for the return. Much would depend on world conditions at the time, and on the character of the régime in Hungary. The figure might rise to 80 per cent. or even to 90 per cent., but I did not believe it would fall below 50 per cent.

Present conditions seem to me to be unfavourable to Czechoslovakia, particularly as, through no great fault of the Czechs, and through no great provocation on the part of the Magyars, something approaching civil war has reigned in the minority districts for several weeks past. The present régime in Hungary seems to me to be exceptionally good. Therefore I think it likely that a free vote would give a large majority for return among the Magyar population.

That is not to say I think the treatment of the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia was bad, as treatments of minorities go, nor do I deny the fact that the Magyar minority benefited by the advanced social institutions of the Czechoslovak Republic and also benefited economically by the agrarian policy of the

Hodža Government. As, however, everybody who knows Central Europe to-day must know, economic considerations are apt to take a second place compared with purely national considerations. We have seen this very clearly, for instance, in connection with the German minorities both in the Sudetenländer and in the Saar.

It goes without saying, of course, that if the Magyar minority is to be returned to Hungary, the matter should be determined on an impartial basis as to what does constitute the Magyar minority. On that point I do not think that either the Hungarian census of 1910 or the Czechoslovak census of 1930 constitutes an absolutely trustworthy basis. In disputed cases, and where it is absolutely necessary to let economic or other considerations override ethnographical, the benefit of the doubt should be allotted fairly between the two claimants.

As to the Slovaks, I understand—although accounts differ—that the Hungarian Government is demanding a plebiscite among them. It is very doubtful, I think, whether a free expression of opinion in 1919 would ever have resulted in the Slovaks leaving Hungary. Nothing is more striking than the smallness of the figure given by their most active supporters of the actively conscious Slovak nationalists at the end of the War. The highest I have ever read is that given by Professor Seton-Watson, of 750–1000, " as apart from the uneducated and neglected masses." [1] Slovak leaders themselves gave me lower figures, and the Hungarian pre-War police had on its lists only 526 names marked as Slovak Nationalists.

The situation, however, has changed very much since 1919. It is true there has been friction between the Czechs and the Slovaks. It is also true that the Slovak districts belonged economically rather to Hungary than to Bohemia, and that their economic sufferings since the change have been severe, especially in the centre and in the east, although on this one point the recent mutilation of the Historic Lands may prove advantageous to Slovakia, which will be relieved of the competition from the more powerful Bohemian and Silesian industry which proved so disastrous to Slovak industry after the War.

In spite of these difficulties, I feel that a national Slovakian—not Czechoslovakian—feeling has been born and has grown strong in the past twenty years, thus radically altering the situation.

I myself see no particular objection to the suggestion of giving

[1] R. W. Seton-Watson, *Slovakia Then and Now* (London, 1931), p. 30.

the Slovaks a plebiscite. To ask their wishes would be paying a courtesy to this people which was omitted in 1919. If they want to vote on their future, I do not see why they should not, but I do not believe that a plebiscite would result in more than a comparatively small fraction of the votes being given for a return to Hungary.

Of the two small nationalities in Slovakia, the Germans and the Jews, I will only say that I believe the majority of the Jews, on the whole, to be rather more in favour of Czechoslovakia than of Hungary. But one must remember of the Jews that, except in the west, they are mainly Orthodox; and one of the very wise and proper principles to which Orthodox Jewry has to conform is to make the best terms it can with the civilian Government. Therefore, although I think the majority, and perhaps rightly, prefer Czechoslovakia, which has been extremely liberal in her Jewish policy, yet I think that if returned to Hungary, they would contrive to put a good face on it. As to the Germans, the great majority of them, especially in the Zips cities, were traditionally attached and even devoted to Hungary, and are probably so to-day.

The third important element in the population, after the Slovaks and the Magyars, is that of the Ruthenes. Here the question is different.

The Ruthenes, of course, are not Magyars, but neither are they Czechs, nor Slovaks, nor Czechoslovaks. Unless, therefore, you are prepared to take the somewhat drastic step of uniting them with East Galicia and with the Soviet Ukraine, mutilating the Polish State and overthrowing the U.S.S.R., you are obliged to agree that the Ruthenes must be attached to somebody else's national State; they cannot very well form a national State of their own. They are much too weak and too backward for complete independence.

The idea of attaching the Ruthenes to Czechoslovakia in 1919 was admittedly an afterthought, and it was done for strategic reasons, in order to give Czechoslovakia a corridor through which her friends and allies could give her military help; a corridor, that is to Roumania, but more particularly to Russia through East Galicia, the fate of which was still undecided when the Ruthene question came up at Paris. The potential value of this corridor was very greatly weakened when East Galicia was attributed to Poland and almost disappeared when Poland decided that she would not under any circumstances allow Russian troops to pass through her territory. Roumania might

prove more pliable, and it was rumoured recently that she would allow Russian troops or material to pass through her territory, but, so far as I know, only along one railway, which is a single-line railway crossing difficult mountains.

It seems to me that to give any effective help to Czechoslovakia by *terra firma*, as apart from the air, would require a million men, and to get a million men over that railway, as far as I can judge, would take about six months. I do not see what good that would be to Czechoslovakia in a crisis. It therefore seems to me that in the present situation of Czechoslovakia, especially after she has lost her fortresses, that corridor is more of a danger to her than a real help.

The Ruthenes have not done badly under the Czechoslovak administration. It is quite true that Czechoslovakia has never fulfilled the promise and international obligations she undertook to grant them autonomy. She has governed them on an autocratic basis, but she has governed them well. I think they have enjoyed far better administration than they would have given themselves, so I am not reproaching Czechoslovakia on that score; but the fatal trouble is that all economic considerations militate against the present arrangement.

Economically, Ruthenia is dependent on the Hungarian plain, and the Hungarian plain can draw great advantages from Ruthenia, which consists of timber-covered mountains with valleys running to the plain. It can supply timber to it, and draw wheat from it.

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has already more timber than she can dispose of. It is hard enough for her to keep the Slovak forests worked, without touching the Ruthene. Ruthenia has been an economic and financial burden to her which she will be less easily able to support after Herr Hitler has removed a considerable slice of the economic resources from which she drew the taxation with which to subsidise Ruthenia.

It is extraordinarily hard to discover what the Ruthenes themselves want. Their national consciousness is extremely vague and undeveloped, and where it exists it is excessively various. If you could discover the " general will " of the people—if it is not absurd to apply such a Rousseauesque term to a community such as the Ruthenians—I think it probable that on balance they might rather prefer to go back to Hungary than stop with Czechoslovakia. Neither I nor anyone else can be quite confident on that point; but I am confident that no solution which could be suggested—leaving them or giving them back—

would irreparably offend the Ruthene national consciousness, such as it is.

The Hungarians have asked for a plebiscite in that area. This is a very proper demand, but I myself doubt its practicability. I cannot conceive of a plebiscite in that particular area producing anything but the richest confusion, and in so far as it reflected any interests or motives, I think it would rather reflect the immediate economic motives of a small number of persons than the future economic conditions of the majority. The result would therefore rather depend on which bidder had the larger stock of ready cash at his disposal than where the real advantage of the country lay.

Therefore, if I personally were a dictator with power to lay down the frontier as I thought best, I should give Ruthenia back to Hungary, on the grounds that this solution would, in my belief, be that which best accorded with the real interests of the Ruthenes themselves, of the Hungarians, and, I really think, of the Czechs and the Slovaks also.

These, then, are my conclusions on the present Hungarian–Czechoslovak argument, and I expect to hear a spirited debate upon them when I sit down.

I now pass to the position in Hungary itself, where I shall be less expressing my own judgment than relating facts.

A year ago in an address which I gave here on the position in Hungary, I said that the stability and stagnation, both in internal and external respects, of the situation in Hungary—and in both respects this had been considerable—was gravely threatened—using the word "threatened" in quite a neutral sense—by the rise of German Nazi-ism or of Nazi German-ism—whichever way you like to put it. The internal and the external aspects of the question obviously react upon one another.

It is quite clear that the external or international situation of Hungary must be dominated by the question of treaty revision. Conditions since the War have not been so consoling for Hungary as to convince her that she would not be better off with a greater or less degree of treaty revision; the comfortable prophecies which we have often heard of an approaching spiritualisation of the frontiers when treaty revision would cease to have meaning have not been fulfilled.

It is, however, equally clear that treaty revision can only come, not necessarily through German help, but as a result of activities by Germany. I beg you to note the distinction.

The Little Entente has shown no signs of yielding one inch,

unless to superior force. If it has occasionally mentioned revision under conditions, those conditions have been clearly incapable of practical realisation. Article XIX of the League Covenant has proved to possess no more than a purely theoretical value. The only voice from outside Hungary raised in favour of revision has been that of Italy, and the Hungarians themselves, who have never forgotten 1914, have been well aware of the gap which is apt to exist between Italian words and Italian actions.

It is, therefore, quite clear to Hungary, and should be clear to anyone else, that any change in the international position which may come about must be a result of Germany's growing in force and breaking the ring which surrounds Hungary, not in Hungary's interest, but in her own.

Since it is a paramount interest to Hungary that this ring should be broken, she has every reason to welcome the expansion of German force.

On the other hand, this cracking of the ring is only the second step in the German expansion. The first step had to be the *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany, which brought the frontier of Germany up to that of Hungary. Germany is now a neighbour of Hungary, and of all her neighbours the most formidable.

The Hungarians are an historically-minded people, and are well aware that the two threats to their existence against which they have always had to struggle have come, not from the Slavs or the Roumanians, but from the Turks and the Germans; and of these two the greater danger has been the Germans.

This knowledge and the deep-seated fear of Germany born thereof are extremely widespread throughout the nation. They are not by any means confined to the Jews.

The fear relates not only to the still fairly considerable German minorities within western Hungary, including some right on the frontier, whom it might be thought that Germany, in fulfilment of Part I of the Nazi programme, might desire to incorporate in Germany. What is more important, these German-speaking minorities are the survivors of proportionately much larger German populations, which have been largely Magyarised during the last fifty years, and now form a big element in the Hungarian middle class. The true Magyars are not satisfied that this second generation of Magyars would prove reliable in a crisis. They are not satisfied that Germany might not decide, not to annexe Hungary, but to turn her into a pseudo-Nazi State, a German

vassal; and that these elements might not help her to do so. This price would, in the opinion of many Hungarians, be too heavy to pay, even for German help in the recovery of the old northern Hungary, unless revision was absolutely impossible in any other way.

For the question is not solely one of external politics. Nazi-ism may not in theory be an article for export; but it is certain that the present Germany regards with greater favour those countries whose internal systems harmonise with her own. Therefore a corollary of getting German help would be adopting to some extent the German social and political system.

It is natural that this prospect should be most unwelcome to many groups in Hungary: Jews, Social Democrats, active Churchmen of both main confessions, Parliamentarians—I do not list democrats and liberals separately because I have already mentioned the Jews.

On the other hand, there are elements whose views on matters of internal policy lead them to favour German influence; chief among them the Magyarised Swabians of the second generation, of whom I have already spoken, who form so large an element in the Hungarian middle class, and are attracted to an almost insensate degree by the anti-Semitic part of Hitler's programme. But there are also many workmen, many small or landless peasants, many young reformers who are attracted to Germany by the social aspects of the Nazi programme: the better land distribution, the better agricultural wages, the comparative disregard of class distinctions. This people believe their best hope of social reform to lie in linking up with Germany. It is unfortunate that the cause of social reform should thus so largely have identified itself with the German orientation, but the fault lies largely with the policy of previous Hungarian Governments, who have not only themselves neglected social reform, but have described its advocates as Bolsheviks. The result has been that the only safe or effective way to advocate such reform has been through the use of Nazi terminology, the adoption of Nazi ideals. Therefore in Hungary both on internal and external grounds there is a strong movement in favour of Germany, and a strong movement against Germany.

If asked to estimate what percentage of the population belonged to each movement, I should say about 80 per cent. each. That is not a mistake in mathematics. It is perfectly possible in Hungary at once to desire treaty revision and to fear Germany. It is possible for a Magyar to dislike both Jews and

Germans; such sentiments can exist simultaneously without difficulty in a Magyar bosom. The irreconcilables on either side are comparatively few; the Jews on the one hand, and perhaps the inveterate anti-Semites on the other. Between them lies a great central bloc which can be swung this way or that quite easily, according to circumstances. The strength of the pro-German party is the belief that the treaty revision and social reform cannot be brought about except by adopting the German orientation. But a man who could bring about these objects *without* paying the price of the German orientation would have behind him almost the whole of the country.

Last year many people were saying that when the *Anschluss* with Austria came it must mean a Nazi *Putsch*, and the establishment of a Nazi régime in Hungary. In fact, when the *Anschluss* came, Hungary lived for weeks in almost hourly expectation of such a *Putsch*.

The then Prime Minister, M. Darányi, was not a strong man, nor (I am told) entirely unsympathetic to the Nazi movement as such, and was prepared to make large concessions to it, even to the extent of taking into the Government that one among the twenty-four Nazi Führers in Hungary, M. Szálassy, who was popularly reputed to enjoy the chief favour of his prototype in Germany. One concession which was in fact made was the Jewish law which was introduced in the spring.

Yet at the last moment the pendulum swung the other way, for a variety of somewhat unexpected reasons. One was the disappointment felt, particularly in the Army, when Herr Hitler did not follow up his occupation of Austria by returning the Burgenland to Hungary. Whether any serious prospect had ever been held out that he would do so, I do not know; I only know that the expectation was there, and was lively. When, thereafter, Herr Hitler announced that the frontier between Germany and Hungary was now final, the declaration, in the circumstances, was not so comforting as it might have been; for it cut both ways. To this must be added the fact that Hungary was not as a whole entirely convinced of the sincerity of the declaration. It is true that Herr Hitler himself, by all accounts, behaved most correctly, and simply returned to the all-too-welcoming arms of the Hungarian gendarmerie deputations from two Swabian villages near the frontier which had gone to ask for incorporation in Germany. Nevertheless, the propaganda of German agents, official or unofficial, in West Hungary has not abated, and Hungary is not yet reassured.

Further, the social agitation unleashed by M. Szálassy was so radical as seriously to alarm many circles in Hungary—not all of them extreme reactionaries, and to induce a deputation from the Upper House to wait upon the Regent and to request him to replace M. Darányi by M. Imrédy. This the Regent did with the more readiness, because some of M. Szalássy's attacks had been directed against his own household. Accordingly, M. Darányi had to give way to M. Imrédy, who, almost immediately after taking office, eliminated the chief Nazi factor in his Government in the person of the Minister of Education, Professor Hóman, replacing him by Count Paul Teleki, the former Prime Minister, and the second strong man in the present Hungarian Government.

Therefore the very *raison d'être* of the present Hungarian Government is its determination to resist German encroachment, and preserve the true independence of Hungary. This is a most important and undeniable truth to which public opinion in Great Britain, through false information or from inability to get rid of old complexes, seems to be totally blind.

Further, the Imrédy Government is not only anxious to preserve Hungary's political, spiritual and economic independence; it is the best Government Hungary has enjoyed for a very long time. Imrédy and Teleki are undoubtedly the two best men in Hungarian public life to-day. Both are intelligent, honest and courageous, and have a strong social sense. Imrédy's programme, delivered on September 4th last, was one to which even the Opposition in the shape of the Peasant Party or the Social Democrats could take little exception. To summarise it, besides military service and labour camps, it included a wide expansion of the social services, family allowances, the minimum wage in agriculture, a steeply-graduated income tax, and power to sequestrate for leasing to smallholders one-third of all entailed properties of over 300 yokes (a yoke is roughly an acre), and one-quarter of the entailed properties over 500 yokes. The quantity of land thereby affected is very considerable, and although nominally Imrédy is only "empowered" to sequester and need not do so, there is little doubt that he intends to exercise his powers.

Imrédy's sincere intention to carry out his programme cannot, in my opinion, be questioned. There need also, I think, be little doubt of his ability to carry it through if he can remain in power. I am assured that his own party, the Party of Unity, will not revolt against him. The Parliamentary Opposition

parties will certainly not oppose him. The Jews, on whose shoulders the chief financial burdens arising out of the programme have been laid, will nevertheless support him rather than face the prospect of a Nazi régime, and there is every reason to expect that the big landowners also will bow to the inevitable, and will advise the Regent in the same sense. Whether, however, Imrédy remains in power depends on the Czechoslovak position in relation to Germany.

Any Hungarian Government is bound to work for some degree of treaty revision; that even the opponents of Hungary's claims must understand. And no Hungarian Government could allow its fear of German influence so far to affect it as to make it refrain from pressing its claims, now that there is a chance of securing some fulfilment of them.

Part at least of these claims must be realised; but very much depends on how they are realised. The position thereafter will be very different according to whether any success which may be achieved comes as a gift from Germany or as a concession by general agreement to principles of justice and equity. The result of the former would be to leave Hungary irremediably, much against her will, a vassal to Germany; particularly as it is quite possible that the gift would only be made to a subservient, pro-Nazi government. The result of the latter would be still to leave Hungary with her spiritual independence.

There is no doubt which of the two the present Government most earnestly desires, even though it should prove that the territory which they might acquire in this way might be rather smaller than what Germany might have given to a creature of hers. In this connection it is worth while remarking that both Imrédy and Teleki belong in spirit—and Imrédy in years, for he is only forty-six—to the younger generation of Magyars, which is by no means so convinced as its elders as to the desirability or wisdom of Hungary's pre-War policy or of the advantages to Hungary of incorporating in her State large blocks of unwilling alien population. This wiser spirit is not by any means universal in the Hungary of to-day, and in this respect I think it a pity the present situation did not arise five or ten years hence, when the younger generation had become better represented in public life; but it does exist, and no one has done more to foster it than Count Teleki himself.

The position would, however, of course be extremely difficult and indeed impossible for the Government, if after rejecting the rôle of second fiddle to Germany, and behaving with studied

moderation, it then failed, and came out empty handed. It would then undoubtedly be thrown out, and succeeded by a Government of force, and of more or less undisguised Nazi tools.

The middle way between these two dangers is extremely hard to tread. So far the Government has trodden it very skilfully. It has successfully resisted very strong German pressure; for when in August the Regent, Imrédy, Kánya, and the Minister of War, went to Germany, there is reason to believe that Germany intended to conclude agreements amounting to the complete dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, to be secured by the means of a military agreement with Hungary, but at a price amounting to the Nazification of Hungary. No such agreement was concluded; and not only was no such agreement signed, but the Hungarian Government timed to coincide with its visit, firstly the publication of the Bled Agreement with the States of the Little Entente, and secondly, the confirmation of Szálassy's conviction and the increase of his sentence from six months to three years: a striking contrast to what had been expected in Germany, to wit, that Szálassy would be amnestied to mark the occasion. I must say that my sympathies here rather go out to Szálassy, who has, perhaps, been made something of a sacrifice. Finally, if any attempts were made to separate the Regent from his Ministers, they did not succeed.

After this, again, the Government behaved with great moderation. Even after the first demand for self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, it did not go farther than to ask for national autonomy for the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia. It was only later when there was practically civil war in those districts that she asked for frontier revision. Nor was this demand accompanied by threats. I can myself testify that the mobilisation which took place was on a very small scale. The papers in Great Britain said she doubled her army, but omitted to say it was only doubled from about 100,000 to 200,000; Hungary always had much fewer men on her frontier than Czechoslovakia. Further, since the bilateral negotiations began, the Press has written moderately and with restraint of Czechoslovakia, without any of the abuse characteristic of the German Press during the corresponding period.

If the Western Governments had paid more attention to Hungary's claims at the time—not in the sense of conceding her uncritically anything which she asked, but in that of considering her demands fairly and intelligently—the Government's battle would have been won. Instead, there came the so-called Anglo-

French Agreement, which I must confess, I entirely fail to this day to understand. It was not based on the loyal respect for treaties or good faith, otherwise it would not have betrayed the Czechs. It was not based on the principle of justice, which demanded far rather the separation of the Magyars from Czechoslovakia than that of the Germans. It was certainly not based on good sense, for how on earth could anyone suppose that Hungary, with her natural grievance against Czechoslovakia, would be willing to abandon that grievance and guarantee Czechoslovakia—on what ground? On the ground that Czechoslovakia had lost the few assets which she ever enjoyed in Hungarian eyes, of providing a certain market for her produce and a certain barrier against German expansion.

After this Imrédy and Kánya were obliged to go to Berchtesgaden and, after all, ask Hitler to support their claims, although they were able slightly to soften the effect of this by getting Mussolini to put in a word in their favour first.

The situation was further partially retrieved at Munich by Hitler's failure to appear as a champion of Hungarian claims, and later even more, by his definite opposition to certain of them, and his belated championship of the Czechs.

This has given Great Britain an undeserved chance to restore her credit and help to rebuild a more practicable south-eastern Europe.

I am sorry for the Czechs, and I regret it was not possible to prevent what has happened now in Bohemia; but to some extent it was inevitable, in view of our policy for the past twenty years. You can treat the Danube Basin in one of two ways. Either you can try to get it to unite, and leave it alone, or try to rule it by dividing it. After the War, France attempted to rule it by dividing it in her own interests. She was not strong enough to maintain that system, and it is now clear that if anyone rules the Danube Basin through division, it will not be France, but Germany.

The moment, it seems to me, has now come to see whether we cannot try the other way. Some people suggest that German influence is now predominant as far as the Russian frontier. I do not take quite such a pessimistic view of the situation. It is not, of course, possible to exclude Germany altogether from the Danube Basin, or to assign her a definitely inferior rôle in it. If we want to get this result, we cannot do so by manipulating the map, making this State big and that small. That is beginning at the wrong end. The only way to achieve such an end is to walk in in the West and wipe out twenty or thirty million Germans.

I am not advocating that course; I am only pointing out that no other can achieve that end which some people desire.

But the French system of enlarging and buttressing up certain selected States has this weakness, that these privileges and advantages are granted at the expense of someone else, who feels his legitimate rights have been disregarded. The French system left two enemies within the gate in the shape of the two unsatisfied States, Hungary and Bulgaria, and opponents of the policy were always able to exploit the legitimate or illegitimate discontents of these two States.

The difficulties in the way of trying the other idea, of uniting the Danube Basin, are great, but not altogether insuperable. Perhaps the greatest of them are being removed to-day by the partial liquidation of Czechoslovakia, which of all the States concerned had been the most unreasonably favoured at the expense of her various neighbours.

An honourable compromise between Czechoslovakia and Hungary is, I believe, not impossible, on the lines which I indicated at the beginning of this paper, and this might provide a start. But it is necessary to go much further: among other things, to enlist the support of Poland. A supplementary reason why I think that it would be advantageous to restore Ruthenia to Hungary is that this would help on the formation of the bloc to which I am referring, by giving Hungary and Poland a common frontier. I am against manipulating territory for strategic reasons when they run counter to other considerations, but here they reinforce them, and I do not see why one should in that case be above taking advantage of them; and I am much fortified in my advocacy of this idea by observing the considerable opposition which Germany is putting up to it.

I hope, therefore, that Great Britain will take advantage of this heaven-sent opportunity to put this concession through as a gift from us and against Germany's opposition. This will bring Poland in and will help to create what Poland has been working for for some years: a neutral bloc, neither pro-French nor pro anything, but anti-German, anti-Russian, and anti-everybody, except themselves, which is the best we can hope to do in the circumstances.

There remain the difficulties of the Bulgarian frontiers and the difficulties between Hungary and Roumania, and between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The best thing would be a general settlement of all these problems, but of course the Hungarian question is at the moment the most urgent.

The Bled Agreement was a considerable step forward, and I have received a confidential but very strong hint that it is not impossible that in the near future Yugoslavia may make some sort of small territorial concession to Hungary. In the present state of feeling between the two countries such a concession, even if small, would go a long way. They are genuinely anxious to be friends. The Roumanian position, of course, is much harder, but something might be done, and the Minority Statute just published is, in appearance anyway, a very considerable step forward; and in the present situation even appearances are not to be despised. However little the statute alters the real situation of the Magyar minorities in Transylvania, it gives Hungary a chance of assuming that something has been or is going to be altered.

We have to remember that although all the countries of the Danube Basin have many dissensions, nearly all of them have two strong common factors, their common and deep-rooted dislike and fear of Germany and of Russia. These emotions are common to practically all nations of the Danube Basin. I think that is what Great Britain should take advantage of; not to try to draw individual members of the Danube Basin in her own interests into exposed positions, and then abandon them, but to try to get them to support each other in a mutual defence of their economic, spiritual, and political independence.

That is the best policy for them and for ourselves. How far it can be brought about depends very largely on our handling of the present situation in connection with Hungary.

Summary of Discussion

MR. J. T. WALTON NEWBOLD supported the plea that an attempt should be made to bring about co-operation or rather, to strengthen the co-operation, between Budapest and Warsaw. He did not feel that Poland's policy at Teschen or Bohumin had been anything like as hostile to the other Slav people as it had been made to appear by the Press in Great Britain.

He was certain there was a very strong movement on the part of Poland, with a considerable measure of support in Budapest, to build up that neutral bloc which was to include not merely Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Poland, but also what perhaps could still be called the Northern Powers. This had been brought home to him with considerable force because in travelling recently from Gdynia to Copenhagen he had found himself on the same boat as Colonel Beck when he was going from Warsaw to Oslo via Copenhagen, immediately after the meeting of the Oslo Powers decided on the line to take in

respect of Sanctions at the League. The Northern Powers and Beck were trying to build up something that would insulate war in eastern and north-eastern Europe.

MRS. HAROLD WILLIAMS said the Ruthenians were not a very articulate people, yet they had some ideas about themselves. The first was that they called themselves Russians. Ruthenia was an invention of the Austrians; they had not liked this small island of Russian people to be called Russians, but they *were* Russians.

She had been in Galicia during the War and had spoken with the people as she would speak with Russian peasants. What was perhaps more telling was that the Russian soldiers had spoken with the women there as to their own folks at home. The language of the Sub-Carpathian Russians was even nearer to the original Russian language.

She wondered whose fault it was that the Ruthenians were inarticulate. She supposed it was partly the fault of the old Austrian Government, and partly of the new Czech government. They were divided by the Treaties and no one now knew how many of them there were, as many, including some leaders, were in America.

Still, she could not see any practical result of arranging the new position of the Ruthenians without consulting them. She thought we had had enough of this "self-determination" over the heads of the people concerned.

MR. FRANCIS DEVERELL asked what would have happened if Czechoslovakia had carried out its promise in 1919 to give Swiss principles of government to the minorities, the hotch-potch of people turned into the State of Czechoslovakia in 1919; an arrangement which Mr. Asquith at the time said would necessitate revision in due course?

Would we have had the occurrences of the last few weeks if the Czechs had been honest enough to do what they promised?

If they had done that some years ago, there would have been a contented people in Sudeten Germany, whose lot would have been better than they might anticipate it was going to be by being now attached to Germany.

It all went back, as did all these things, to the essential dishonesty of the Peace Treaty, and to the inactivity of the League of Nations.

There was nothing possible for Mr. Chamberlain to do other than what he did, unless we were prepared to sacrifice the Czech people to a very natural desire to smash Nazi-ism while we had the chance. He did not think because people felt such disgust for certain forms of Nazi-ism we should be prepared to turn Czechoslovakia into a slaughter-house, being unable to help it in any way at all.

LORD STRABOLGI said that in 1921 he had divided the House of Commons on the rejection of the Treaty of Trianon, which he had always regarded as a very great injustice.

An interesting suggestion was put about some months ago, that in view of the obvious German threat to Czechoslovakia following the annexation of Austria, the Czechs and the Slovaks should come to terms quickly with Hungary, and that the overwhelming Magyar districts should be transferred, or given autonomy. Did that take root at all? Was there any development along those lines?

With regard to the future, Great Britain had to be very realistic. They had not the numbers any more, nor the prestige, but they had their brains still. They (the English) were very clever people, very clever diplomats, sometimes perfidious in a very clever way. They had to use all those arts in the future, as they used them when faced with threatened hegemony in Europe under Napoleon, Louis Quatorze or any other great conqueror. They had to make friends where they could, and support them wherever they could, somehow to regain their reputation of standing by their friends in trouble.

If the British wanted to survive in independence, they had to cling to old friendships and create new friendships. He would remind them of the situation on September 13th last. On September 12th we had a host of friends in Europe, of whom he believed Hungary was one. We lost our friends overnight. Supposing the dreaded war had come, what would Hungary's attitude have been? He had thought it would have been favourable to our cause.

Great Britain had to regain her former position by encouraging trade and subsidising it; by showing herself strong and resolute and by helping nations like Bulgaria, by showing recognition of their grievances.

He would begin to-morrow to rebuild the League of Nations. He knew this sounded ludicrous, but it was the only constructive policy he could envisage. He regarded the League of Nations as having been created almost by the Almighty for the protection of the things we believed in.

Our ancestors had not been so stupid, they had built up a great Empire, which until September 13th last was respected everywhere in the world. They created their traditions, regarded with great admiration everywhere. They built up the balance of power.

The League of Nations had the advantages of the balance of power without its disadvantages. Law was behind the League. Instead of losing faith in it, they must try to rebuild it.

Sir Charles Hobhouse said that Hungary, which he had visited, was principally an exporter of commodities for consumption—wheat, timber, etc. He had always understood Germany was the principal consumer of the Hungarian market in raw materials. If the party in opposition to Germany grew, what would become of the Hungarian export market? This was an economic and not a controversial question.

Hungary had become stable economically and financially. She was in process of repaying the Loan from the League of Nations, and

had balanced her budget this year with an excess of some millions of pengos. What would happen to that economic and financial stability if the opposition in Hungary grew in the direction the lecturer had indicated, so as to maintain the present Government in power, and opposed to the interests of the German Government?

DR. W. J. ROSE asked why we should talk about taking Slavs away from Slavs and tying them up to Hungary? There was nothing left of Czechoslovakia but a rump, but at least there were still the three national units side by side, Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenes. As a student of social psychology he knew that those people belonged over the mountains with the Ukrainian people, the largest body of whom were in the Soviet Union.

He would be ready to accept the speaker's argument, as put on economic grounds, but would feel it was a step backward, because many of those people thought of themselves as Russians, rather than anything else.

There were two groups by religion: the Uniates, who called themselves, on the Polish side, Ukrainians, and alongside them the Orthodox, a smaller group, who called themselves "Russians," or Ruthenes, because of Church affiliations.

Why did the lecturer seem to overlook their present position, and the maintaining of the group intact?

MR. S. DAVIDOVICH said he spoke the language of the people under discussion. Mrs. Williams had mentioned that the Carpathian Ruthenians must be Russians because they could easily converse with Russian soldiers who came there during the War. This was not strange, for those who spoke one Slav language could pick up any one of the others in a short period. Besides, out of the ten million Russian army were two and a half million Ukrainians who spoke the same language as the Carpathian Ruthenians.

Mr. Macartney had mentioned that economic grounds were not quite as important as national grounds for settlement, and yet he proposed a purely economic reason for the attachment of Ruthenia back to Hungary.

Concerning national consciousness in Ruthenia, he thought Mr. Macartney's statement was correct historically—twenty years ago, when, under Hungary's policy, schools with the Ruthenian language of instruction, which numbered 473 in 1867, dwindled down to zero by 1918; when, in the old Hungarian parliament under the Dual Monarchy, eight and a half million Hungarians were represented by 392 deputies, whereas eight million non-Magyars were represented by eight deputies.

There was now a national consciousness among the Ruthenians. These people knew where they belonged. That there was among them a growing national consciousness was shown by the fact that there were various cultural institutions there, quite a number of daily and weekly newspapers, and the people knew they were neither Czechs,

Magyars nor Slovaks, but that they belonged to the Ukrainian group under Poland and the south-western part of the Soviet Union.

MR. W. P. MORRELL said he had spent a fortnight in Ruthenia on foot in the preceding August with a small English party of seven and three Czech guides. None of the English party understood the Ruthenian language, so were unable to talk politics with the peasants, but he had a strong impression that the Ruthenians did not want to talk politics. They could talk politics occasionally with the large Jewish communities living in the villages as well as in the towns.

Every trade in these villages, even blacksmithing, was carried on by Jews. In the discussions of the fate of Ruthenia the interests of these Jewish communities should not be forgotten.

There were two towns in Ruthenia with a population of more than 30,000: he wondered very much whether the national consciousness, of which the last speaker had spoken, was not confined to a few young men in those two towns. He had seen no sign of national consciousness.

They had an opportunity of observing the bearing of their three young Czech student guides towards the peasant population. And of the peasant population towards them. He was sure if there had been any real hostility on the part of the average Ruthenian peasant towards the Czechs he would have seen some signs of it, but he saw none.

They had opportunities of seeing the bearing of Czech magistrates towards the Ruthenian population. They bought a horse from a peasant, the guide acting as negotiator, while a Czech magistrate stood by to see fair play. They had paid far more for the horse than they got for it at the end of their trip, when there was no Czech magistrate to see fair play.

It had been said that economic interests lay strongly towards re-union with Hungary. He wondered about that. The main economic activity of the parts he had visited seemed to be self-subsisting agriculture. The peasants did not do too badly in a simple way with this self-subsisting agriculture. He had seen a number of timber-dams not in any disrepair.

There was another industry in which there was a future for Ruthenia. The Czechs were very fond of the hills: they (the Ruthenians) had the mountains, and there was an opening for tourist traffic, and the Czechs, now they had lost their Bohemian hills, would want to make more use of the Ruthenian mountains.

MR. MACARTNEY, in reply to the fifth speaker, said that obviously no Hungarian Government could afford to take up an attitude of active hostility to Germany; but everyone must be anxious to prevent Germany from acquiring too absolute a political control over her through her importance to the Hungarian market—an importance which the *Anschluss* had, of course, immensely increased. He suggested that the best way of achieving this was for other countries—Italy or

Great Britain—to interest themselves in the Hungarian market. Nearly all the other speeches, except that of Lord Strabolgi, had been concerned with the question of Ruthenia. He sympathised with those who did not like the idea of putting Slavs under Magyars, but pointed out that these particular Slavs had exceptionally old and close connections with Hungary, and that they could not be placed in a national State of their own without the mutilation of Poland and the destruction of the U.S.S.R. The discussion that evening had reminded him strongly of discussions which he had heard in Ruthenia itself. Mrs. Williams had said that the Ruthenes were Russians; Mr. Rose, that the majority of them (the Uniates, *i.e.*, four-fifths of the total) were Ukrainians. In fact, most of them called themselves by the local term of Rusnyak. He agreed with Mr. Morrell that most of them probably cared very little one way or the other about the subject. He could not, however, agree with him that their agriculture was self-sufficient, or their position satisfactory. On the contrary, it had always depended largely on the connection with the Hungarian plain, where the peasants had been accustomed to go to perform harvest labour. The loss of this resource had been a great blow to them, and they lived in a state of poverty which he had rarely seen equalled in Europe, outside parts of Ireland. He also agreed that there was little hostility to the Czechs; but as regards the argument in favour of keeping Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia on account of tourist traffic, Hungary had far fewer mountains, and could exploit this particular resource much better. He did not wish to settle the fate of Ruthenia against the wishes of the Ruthenes: he merely thought that given the local conditions, a plebiscite would not ascertain those wishes.

In reply to Lord Strabolgi, he had not heard of any offer from Czechoslovakia in the summer, and doubted whether any acceptable offer had been made. In a war Hungary would probably have tried to remain neutral.

He did not think that the reproaches which had been addressed to Poland and Hungary were justified in the case of the latter. Hungary had neither threatened nor attacked. She had taken the utmost pains to act correctly, and she should have the credit for this.

FOREIGN INTERESTS IN MEXICO[1]

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON

I

DURING the last decade we in the United States have become conscious of the significance of the financial items in our business account with the rest of the world. Economic foreign policy which emphasised balance of trade is slowly giving way to an economic foreign policy which takes account of the more comprehensive dealings reflected in the balance of payments,[2] including in particular capital movements.

My subject to-night is "direct investments," as we call them in the United States, illustrated by foreign interests in Mexico. The American Department of Commerce defines "direct investments" to be the "international extensions of American business enterprise involving the acquisition or ownership of an interest in some business or property from which a return is normally expected." We should recall in passing that other financial items affect the balance of payments of the United States. They include, among others, the War debts and "portfolio" investments. I mention them to emphasise that they represent problems and policies distinct from the problems and policies represented by "direct investments." The distinction, if kept in mind, will dispel confusion and help to define and clarify policy.

In the first place, inter-governmental debts are a distinct problem. Their settlement, by refunding or otherwise, will some day make them factors in America's creditor position. For the time being, the eleven-and-one-half billion dollars of War debts due to the American Government should not be classified as commercial obligations. The War debts were political in origin, and they call for a political solution.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on October 4th, 1938; Sir Edward Peacock in the chair.

[2] See, among other Government reports, Amos E. Taylor, *The Balance of International Payments of the U.S. in 1936*; Paul B. Dickens, *American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries, 1936*; Amos E. Taylor, *Foreign Investments in the U.S.* (1937). See also Cleona Lewis, *America's Stake in International Investments* (Brookings Institution, 1938).

In the second place, portfolio investments represent a distinct category. They include securities, publicly offered and traded in on the exchanges, of governments, semi-governmental bodies and foreign-controlled corporations. The story of British and American lending across frontiers during the last century furnishes plenty of grounds for charity on both sides in the discussion and settlement of present-day problems. The unwise lending in the American market during the years just before 1930 has parallels in the lending in the British market at times during the nineteenth century. You profited by your experience, and we, I hope, are profiting by ours. We have established a Bondholders' Protective Council, with functions similar to your Council of Foreign Bondholders. The existence of these salvaging agencies suggests that some governmental measures should be taken to limit issues to those which are sound and which have a reasonable chance to run their course without default. Both in your country and in mine the State is concerning itself in an increasing degree with this question.

With its recent unhappy experiences in mind, the American public is still shy of foreign issues. But time will change this. And when foreign capital issues again seek buyers in the American market, it will be under a system of control which will restrain the irresponsible underwriter and bondsalesman, and also the gambling instincts of the public. The recent report of this Royal Institute on international investments suggested the following criteria for judging an issue: [1]

"Whether the purpose of the issue is sound and is likely to be profitable to the borrower so that he can make service payments; whether the issue, even though itself used for productive purposes, is likely to enable the borrower to embark on some unsound enterprise; whether the industry in which the money is to be invested is in danger of becoming over-developed; whether the balance of payments of the borrowing country is likely to be adversely affected; and whether transfer difficulties may arise because the country as a whole has been overborrowing."

II

Now let me turn your attention to "direct investments," *i.e.*, to the extensions of business enterprise into foreign countries. In the United States the managements of successful businesses have gone abroad and purchased or developed new properties—mines, oil-fields, factories, distributing agencies, plantations and

[1] See *The Problem of International Investment*, by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 84.

utilities. From the standpoint of responsibility and stability this type of investment in foreign countries has distinct advantages in the modern world. It is productive. It stimulates the purchase of machinery, patent rights and other values. Through the parent company at home, it creates a wider market for securities. It is not in any sense the migration of industry, but rather the extension of industry through the export of capital and the reinvestment of foreign earnings. It has back of it the directing ability of business executives and boards of directors who are interested in developing enterprise on a long-time constructive basis.

The recent report of the American Department of Commerce on American direct investments in foreign countries says:

"The direct investments by American corporations and business men in foreign enterprises and properties at the end of 1936 totalled $6,691,000,000, as compared with $7,528,000,000 at the end of 1929, reflecting a net decline of approximately 10 per cent. in value during the intervening period. Direct investments in Canada of $1,936,000,000 not only exceeded those of any other country, but were larger than those of any other important geographic area. The totals for South America and Europe, which followed in order, were $1,466,000,000 and $1,245,000,000, respectively. Direct investments in other areas ranked in the following order: West Indies, Central America and Mexico, Asia, Oceania and Africa. Cuba's share in the total value of American foreign direct investments, which amounted to $660,000,000, was second to that of Canada, while, among the other more important countries, Chile, Mexico and the United Kingdom followed in the order named.

"The principal industrial group among the total direct investments abroad at the end of 1936 was that comprising public utility and transportation investments. These investments totalled $1,640,000,000, and were confined largely to the Western Hemisphere. Manufacturing investments, which amounted to $1,441,000,000, were concentrated largely in Canada and Europe. The remaining important groups were in the raw-material branch of industry, with investments in the following amounts: petroleum, $1,075,000,000; mining and smelting, $1,035,000,000; agricultural investments, $480,000,000."

III

The utility of the classification of investments into "portfolio" and "direct" becomes increasingly evident when we turn to a consideration of public policy. I have already spoken of governmental concern over the former. The public interest is as great in the case of the latter. Here private property in land, oil-fields, mines, railroads and other public utilities is involved.

Not only are the shareholders interested in the protection of the properties under the ordinary guarantees of international law, but the general public in both the creditor and debtor countries has an interest in a stable basis of law and practice on which enterprise can prosper.

IV

Direct investments of aliens in Mexico have encountered many vicissitudes. I will not undertake any comprehensive historical survey. The policy pursued by the Mexican Government towards investments in railroads, lands, mines and oil-fields has in many cases not been in conformity with the minimum guarantees of international law. I will mention by way of illustration the principal facts about lands and oil properties, since they have been the subject of recent Notes addressed by the British, American and Dutch Governments to the Mexican Government.

Mr. Hull, the American Secretary of State, points out in his Note to Mexico of July 21st, 1938, that agrarian expropriation began in that country in 1915. A considerable number of properties of American, British and other foreigners were seized, and although there have been repeated requests for compensation, the owners of these properties are still without relief. Mr. Hull, in his Note, emphasised the expropriation of moderate-sized properties which had been taken up by American citizens who had migrated to Mexico and were there endeavouring to make a modest living.

The exploitation of oil properties in Mexico began about 1900. The obstacles which were faced and overcome by the foreign oil companies were enormous. In an incredibly short time Mexico became, due to the investments and engineering skill of foreigners, an oil-producer of the first rank. The development of the oil-fields transformed Tampico and other localities into thriving communities. Areas which only a few years before had been tropical wilderness began to provide comfortable livings for thousands of Mexican workers, a substantial local market for Mexican products and a secure basis for income for the Mexican Government.

Hundreds of millions of dollars were expended by the foreign companies in exploration, drilling and development. The risks were very great. Mexican capitalists were not prepared to participate in this speculative enterprise. It is beyond dispute that the oil companies took to Mexico for the first time the

practice of paying high wages and providing continuity of employment. The standard of living of the Mexican workers and the advantages which they gained from improvement in sanitation and housing were beyond anything that Mexican business had ever provided. The wage scales in the oil-fields were substantially higher than the average daily wage throughout the Mexican Republic.

Unreasonable demands by the Labour Unions constitute the background of the crisis which resulted in the taking over of the oil properties by the Mexican Government. The award of the Mexican Labour Board is so extreme in its terms [1] that it suggests the intentional creation of an *impasse* between the Mexican Government and the oil companies which would afford an excuse for the Expropriation Decree. The Expropriation Decree was issued by President Cardenas on March 18th, 1938.

V

Some interesting questions of international law have been again brought to public attention by the controversy between the Mexican Government on the one hand and the American, British and Dutch Governments on the other. The Mexican Government has maintained in effect that private property can be confiscated without violating international law if the

[1] Summarising the Board's award the report of August 15th, 1938, of the Foreign Policy Association, New York, says:

"Increases in wages and welfare benefits totalling 26,329,393 pesos were recommended. The award provided for a 40-hour week with pay for 56 hours; vacations of 21–30 working days, in addition to 16 other holidays on full pay; double pay for all overtime, and triple pay for work on holidays and rest days; retirement pensions available at the age of 55; indemnification for accidents and illness, both vocational and non-vocational. The companies were to furnish housing facilities, and were also required to provide free medical, surgical, dental, laboratory and hospitalisation services, both for employees and for members of their families, in any case of illness or injury; and (with limited exceptions) regardless of cause. They were to contribute an amount equivalent to one-tenth of their annual wage bill towards a savings fund for the workers; and in addition were to pay one-half the premium on life insurance policies of 4000 pesos for each permanent employee.

"The award also placed limitations on the companies' control of personnel. Promotions were to be based on seniority. No reduction in personnel or no discharge could be effected without consulting the union; but the companies were obliged by the so-called 'exclusion clause' to discharge any worker expelled by the union. If workers had to be laid off, non-union individuals were to be let out first. But what most aroused company opposition was the provision affecting so-called 'confidential employees' (executives and persons in other positions of trust and responsibility), which markedly limited their number. Positions such as managers of refineries and of production, traffic, credit and transportation departments, cashiers and paymasters were to be filled by union members, who were also to be entitled to occupy half of the positions in the legal departments."

confiscation is general and impersonal in character. The argument is further urged that a government, even when it is too poor to pay promptly adequate and effective compensation, is justified in taking private property in the interests of social betterment and to further the carrying out of a social programme designed to improve the conditions of the Mexican people. In other words, the Mexican Government contends that if there is a social excuse and if a government despoils its own nationals, the foreigner has no grounds on which to complain. Mr. Hull, in his Note of August 22nd, 1938, on lands, deals effectively with this plea. He said in part to the Mexican Ambassador :

"The doctrine of equality of treatment, like that of just compensation, is of ancient origin. It appears in many constitutions, bills of rights and documents of international validity. The word has invariably referred to equality in lawful rights of the person and to protection in exercising such lawful rights. There is now announced by your Government the astonishing theory that this treasured and cherished principle of equality, designed to protect both human and property rights, is to be invoked, not in the protection of personal rights and liberties, but as a chief ground of depriving and stripping individuals of their conceded rights. It is contended, in a word, that it is wholly justifiable to deprive an individual of his rights if all other persons are equally deprived, and if no victim is allowed to escape. In the instant case it is contended that confiscation is so justified. The proposition scarcely requires answer. . . .

"It may be noted in passing that the claim here made on behalf of American nationals is, in substance, similar to the claims which Mexican nationals have against their own Government under the Mexican Constitution adverted to by Your Excellency's Government. It is, of course, the privilege of a Mexican national to decline to assert such claim, as it is the power of the Mexican Government to decline to give it effect; but such action on the part of Mexico or her nationals cannot be construed to mean that American nationals are claiming any position of privilege. The statement in your Government's note to the effect that foreigners who voluntarily move to a country not their own assume, along with the advantages which they may seek to enjoy, the risks to which they may be exposed and are not entitled to better treatment than nationals of the country, presupposes the maintenance of law and order consistent with principles of international law; that is to say, when aliens are admitted into a country the country is obligated to accord them that degree of protection of life and property consistent with the standards of justice recognised by the law of nations." [1]

[1] In like manner the American Government expressed its views in 1918 to the Mexican Government :

"The Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the great

VI

Closely related to the unsound argument, thus disposed of, that foreigners must accept unjust treatment if unjust treatment is accorded to the nationals of the country, is the argument urged by Mexico that in case of conflict between domestic and international law the former must prevail. This point is not new to international discussions. On several occasions in the past representatives of certain States, seeking to avoid the consequences of accepted principles of international law, have contended that their municipal law always controls as against international law; that is, that international law is merely, as they argue, supplemental to national law. I need not urge that this point of view cannot be justified by citations from authoritative writers or decisions of international tribunals. It amounts to a denial of the existence of international law.[1]

If nations are to dwell together in an international community, they must accept and apply principles of international law, and they must be willing to conform their national law and practice to the rules which nations have laid down to govern their mutual relations. In the abstract, statesmen of all countries seldom deny these general principles. In fact, lesser States, which in their contests with the so-called stronger Powers have denied the application of principles of international law, have urged those very principles against other States in defence of their own

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weight of international law and practice supports the view that every nation has certain minimum duties to perform with regard to the treatment of foreigners, irrespective of its duties to its own citizens, and that in default of such performance it is the right of the foreign Government concerned to enter protest. Not the least of such duties, as the Government of the United States believes, is to refrain from measures resulting in confiscation of the vested property rights of foreigners acquired in good faith and in accordance with the laws of Mexico in which the property is situated. While the Mexican Government may see fit to confiscate vested property rights of its own citizens, such action is in equity, no justification for the confiscation of such rights of American citizens." (Mr. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, to Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher, December 13th, 1918.)

[1] In 1887 American Secretary of State Bayard, opposing the attempt of certain Latin-American countries to pass upon the scope of their international duty, remarked:

"If a government could set up its own municipal laws as the final test of its international rights and obligations, then the rules of international law would be but the shadow of a name, and would afford no protection either to states or to individuals. It has been constantly maintained and also admitted by the Government of the United States that a government cannot appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to demands for the fulfillment of international duties." (Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Connery, November 1st, 1887, *For. Rel.*, 1887, pp. 751, 753.)

nationals. No nation which is sincerely interested in the preservation of its rights and the rights of its nationals can afford to support the proposition that sovereignty is a defence for mismanagement and injustice.

Referring to this point, the British Government in its Note to the Mexican Government of April 21st, 1938, made the following observations (Cmd. 5758, 1938):

"For this reason alone His Majesty's Government have the right, which cannot be affected by anything in the Mexican Constitution, to protest against an action which they regard as unjustified, and to request the restitution as being the only practical means of avoiding serious injury to extensive British interests. . . .

"If the doctrine were admitted that a Government can first make the operation of foreign interests in its territories depend upon their incorporation under local law, and then plead such incorporation as the justification for rejecting foreign diplomatic intervention, it is clear that the means would never be wanting whereby foreign governments could be prevented from exercising their undoubted right under international law to protect the commercial interests of their nationals abroad."

Ambitious social programmes, together with rising nationalism in countries which owe their economic development largely to foreign capital, have created an insecurity for foreign property which can only be dealt with by the determined insistence on the part of creditor nations on the strict observance of international law. Any other course will invite a flood of half-thought-out plans for social betterment sponsored by irresponsible politicians without either the power or intelligence to make use of the valuable properties which they will seize.

International law does not admit that social reform alters in any way the obligations of States in the taking of property of foreigners. Whether taken for social betterment, for the building of armaments or for any other purpose, good or bad, a State may expropriate foreign property only on condition that prompt, adequate and effective payment is made. This principle is accepted not only by international authorities, but is written into the constitutional law of all countries which pretend to be governed by a constitution. National courts as well as arbitral tribunals have reaffirmed it. Even the Supreme Court of Mexico has upheld the very principles which now form the basis of the case of the British, American and Dutch owners of oil-fields in Mexico.[1]

[1] See "The Mexican Expropriation of Oil Properties," *United States Law Review*, New York, June, 1938.

VII

Mexico, in her replies to the American Government, appears to agree to the principle of compensation, but thus far has suggested no basis of payment which can be considered as anything other than a veiled justification of confiscation. The proposal has been put forward, for example, that the owners of the oil properties be paid over a period of years out of the profits of the oil-fields. It has also been suggested that the Mexican Government sell the confiscated oil to the expelled companies at a reduced price and that the margin be applied to pay for the properties.

Mr. Hull has made clear in his Notes concerning agricultural lands the basis of compensation recognised by international law. Moreover, referring to the oil properties in a Memorandum released March 30th, 1938, he declared that the expropriated oil properties should be paid for "by compensation representing fair, assured and effective value to the nationals from whom these properties were taken."[1]

The subject of compensation itself is a large one in the field of international law, but the principles of effective, adequate and immediate compensation have been well established by the decisions of international tribunals, following in general the basis of compensation for property taken under constitutional guarantees for public purposes within the United States and Great Britain.

In the case of the oil properties in Mexico, a particular question arose immediately with respect to compensation; namely, whether or not the Mexican Government is economically able to pay under the requirements of international law. The answer to this question appears obviously to be "No." The mere statement of Mexico's existing obligations, largely in default, and an analysis of her budgetary and economic position make it quite evident that her Government is unable promptly and adequately

[1] Mr. Hull in his Note of August 22nd, 1938, said:

"The Government of the United States merely adverts to a self-evident fact when it notes that the applicable precedents and recognised authorities on international law support its declaration that, under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor. In addition, clauses appearing in the constitutions of almost all nations to-day, and in particular in the constitutions of the American republics, embody the principle of just compensation. These, in themselves, are declaratory of the like principle in the law of nations.

"The universal acceptance of this rule of the law of nations, which, in truth, is merely a statement of common justice and fair-dealing, does not in the view of this Government admit of any divergence of opinion."

to compensate the foreign property-owners. Moreover, the record of the Mexican Government for failure to pay even awards established by international commissions has become notoriously bad.

Undoubtedly this was the reason why the British Government, in its Note to the Mexican Government, instead of asking for compensation, requested the return of the properties to their legal owners. The Note of His Majesty's Government, dated April 8th, 1938 (Cmd. 5758, 1938), concludes as follows:

" In the face of considerations such as those set forth above, which His Majesty's Government must reserve the right in due course to restate and to add to, they find difficulty in escaping the conclusions that the real motive for the expropriation was a political desire to acquire for Mexico in permanence the advantages of ownership and control of the oil-fields; that expropriation was tantamount to confiscation carried out under a veil of legality formed by basing it upon labour issues; and that the consequences have been a denial of justice and a transgression by the Mexican Government of the principles of international law.

" His Majesty's Government see no way in which this situation can be remedied but by the restoration of its properties to the Company itself. This His Majesty's Minister is instructed hereby formally to request."

VIII

Before leaving the legal phase of this subject, I would like to add a word on the distinction in international law between substantive principles and procedure. Sometimes when I have discussed the Mexican problem with certain individuals, they have observed that the issue is political, and not legal. It can be shown, I believe, by the great mass of authorities, writers and findings of international tribunals, as well as by the decisions of the courts of advanced States, that there are accepted principles of *substantive* international law which protect and guarantee the personal and property rights of aliens who cross frontiers. Here and there differences of interpretation exist, but no serious dispute exists over basic principles which fix the responsibility of, for example, the Mexican Government in the situation created by the expropriation decree of March 18th, 1938.

It is when we turn to the question of procedure that the political element enters. This is due to the fact that nations have not set up adequate courts, tribunals or commissions for the purpose of applying to particular cases the accepted principles of substantive international law. Therefore, the only resort which

individuals and corporations have, once there has been a denial of justice [1] in the offending country, is a political appeal to that Government either directly or through the diplomatic channels of the injured owner's country.

Obviously, this procedure may not be satisfactory. Foreign Offices are burdened with a variety of issues, and their views with reference to the merits of a particular case may be coloured by other matters which may seem for the time being more important. Nevertheless, it is an accepted principle that the nationals of a country are entitled to the support of diplomatic interposition for the purpose of protecting their personal and property rights in foreign countries, and the ineffectiveness of this procedure, if and when it exists, does not modify one jot the substantive rights of an injured alien under international law.

IX

It has been observed that as against the British and Dutch, the Mexican Government is trying to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine, and as against the Americans behind the Good Neighbour Policy.[2] Which brings us to some of the wider issues, of which the Mexican confiscation is an extreme and flagrant illustration. For the Mexican Government has endeavoured to give generality to its defiance of international law. It has appealed to left and anti-foreign groups in other countries, not only to support Mexico's action, but also to follow the Mexican example. At the same time that Mexico is protesting against interposition by foreign governments in behalf of their injured nationals, she herself is seeking to influence policy, particularly in Latin-American countries, against aliens who own properties there. In general, this appeal has met with no approval except in the columns of the radical Press. The most influential forces in Latin-American countries have disapproved Mexico's action, not from any concern over the protection of foreign property-owners in Mexico, but primarily because it is realised that the general acceptance of the policies of confiscation and violence

[1] The Press of May 8th, 1937, reported that the Attorney-General of the Republic of Mexico made a formal call upon the Supreme Court at its chambers, after which he announced that he was received in a friendly fashion, and that he felt sure that the court would as "a helping element" co-operate with his department in showing that, under President Cardenas, there existed "a public administration dedicated only to the service of all social sectors of the nation."

[2] President Roosevelt, in his World's Fair speech on June 30th, 1938, said that the Good Neighbour Policy was "bilateral and multilateral" and that "the fair dealing which it implies must be reciprocated."

applied by Mexico would destroy social stability within countries and wipe out the basis for economic co-operation among States.

X

Thus are dramatised on the world stage the rights of business, the responsibilities of governments, and the interests of the general public in the orderly progress of international economic relations and in the enforcement of the principles of international law.

The experiences of recent decades and the threats of extreme social reform have created in modern business, if not a degree of timidity, at least a disposition to apologise for our economic system and to acquiesce in attacks upon it. In these days we do not pause long over arguments upon economic ideology, but we are interested in an economic organisation which works; that is, which creates abundant wealth and distributes it equitably. Under this test the system of private enterprise still produces the most satisfactory results, especially in economically undeveloped areas where risks must be taken and capital and skill applied in the spirit of business adventure.

Sound policy invites co-operation between countries with surplus capital and countries with undeveloped resources. In spite of changes in national economies in recent decades, this is still true. The extension of enterprise into the less-developed countries increases employment, betters labour conditions, develops resources which could not be developed by local capital and engineering, creates local markets for native products, and enlarges the taxable wealth for the government. At the same time, the extension of enterprise from a creditor country enlarges the volume of its foreign trade, brings profits to shareholders and increases the prosperity of its farmers, manufacturers and labourers.

In the United States and in Great Britain, the two great creditor States, capital tends towards "direct investments" rather than towards long-term securities offered on the public exchanges. The Royal Institute study group has noted this tendency in its able report on international investments.[1]

[1] *The Problem of International Investment*, pp. 106–7:

". . . There are three other types of international investment which will, to a certain extent, tend increasingly to replace issues of long-term securities by external borrowers in New York and London.

"The first are exports of capital by corporate rather than private individuals, *i.e.*, 'direct' investments. . . .

"Secondly, medium-term credits may be expected to continue partly to displace long-term capital raised through the new issue market. . . .

"Thirdly, exports of capital by means of the purchase of securities already issued on foreign stock exchanges are and may be expected to be increasingly important."

Business is trying to do its part to restore economic sanity and world-wide prosperity.

Nevertheless, we see in many countries governments invading the domain of private enterprise and private rights. Governments, sometimes representing minority or class groups, claim exemption from ordinary obligations under law and take over property without compensation on the plea of social necessity and reform. The interest in this tendency is an interest which extends far beyond the business community to the peoples in both creditor and debtor countries. But the primary responsibility for defining the issues and defending principles rests on the business and other public-spirited leaders, especially in Great Britain and the United States.

The time would seem to be here to raise a voice against a tendency which is beginning to make stealing by governments respectable. The issue is one which concerns not only business, but also the people of the countries in both the creditor and debtor worlds. The nature of the modern economic world is such that there must be some limits to nationalism. It should be of general concern that the world again return to the normal flow of capital between States, but this economic necessity is not possible without adequate guarantees for the protection of property.[1] The issue is the responsibility of States. On the one hand, we are confronted with policies of necessity, expediency, confiscation and force urged in the name of extreme nationalistic reforms. On the other hand, we have a growing appreciation in democratic States of the wider issues in the economic relations of peoples, and a greater willingness to insist upon the guarantees of constitutional and international law. Mr. Hull voiced this tendency in his Note of August 22nd, 1938, when he spoke of " the imperative need of all countries to maintain unimpaired the structure of common justice embodied in international as in basic national law," and when he appealed to the Mexican Government, as he might appeal to others, " to refrain from persisting in a policy and example which, if generally pursued, will seriously jeopardise the interests of all peoples throughout the world."

Summary of Discussion

LORD MARLEY said that he would like to know how Great Britain could pay her debt to the United States in a political manner. He

[1] President Calvin Coolidge, at a dinner of the United Press Association, in April, 1927, said:

" The person and property of a citizen are part of the general domain of the nation even when abroad."

suggested that against it might perhaps be set off the losses which British investors in the United States had sustained. He had himself invested in American securities with touching faith in the capacity of the United States to make large profits, and the money had gone. For his own part he would willingly see increased taxation in Great Britain in order that the debt question might be settled; it did considerable harm amongst the ill-informed who were the majority in both countries.

He was interested to hear that the American external investment was between six and seven billion dollars. Rather over four billion dollars represented American investment in Canada; this was nearly twice as much as British investment in Canada and fifty times that of the whole of the rest of the world.

Another point was the political effect of private investment abroad. British investments in North America in the early days had been made entirely to bring a good return to the investor, and the cupidity of the investors had resulted in political opposition and the foundation of the United States of America in revolt against the demand for heavy returns. This, as it happened, was a good result since the world had benefited by the division of the English-speaking people into two. In more modern times the political results of investment had been less happy. The very large British investments in Spain had resulted in the adoption of a policy of general support for the side in the Spanish conflict which appeared most likely to secure those investments, which were estimated to represent something like four or five hundred million dollars. Political effects of private investments abroad could also be seen to some extent in Mexico.

With regard to the application of the laws of a country to all alike, in Eastern Europe, from which he had just returned, he had found that laws applied by governments to all frequently resulted in great injustice to a small minority; where all big farms were expropriated and broken up for the benefit of the peasants and where all big farms were owned by Germans, the law was obviously unfair to the Germans, although it might apply to everybody.

Mr. Culbertson had clearly expressed the opinion that private enterprise was always the best method of development, and he spoke with considerable knowledge of the matter, as the United States was making a most interesting experiment in such enterprises as the Tennessee Valley Authority, which involved considerable government interest in public utility works. This type of government activity was raising criticism, but it was being tried all over the world. In Poland the Government was doing a great deal more in the direction of the public development of monopolies; and the German Government was one of the prime experimenters in the matter, through the barter exchange of German machinery and even whole factories in return for raw materials.

MR. CULBERTSON replied that the question of inter-governmental debts and of the purchase of securities in the United States by the

British public, which had not always worked out well, was really beyond the scope of the problems with which he had been dealing, but he would like to say that he thought the debt question loomed altogether too large in the relationship between Great Britain and the United States, and he wished it could be put aside, as it was an overhanging threat to the economic situation, and a source of irritation from the political point of view far beyond anything that the circumstances warranted.

On the question of British investment in American issues, there was a long story behind that. The Brookings Institute had published a review of the whole history of American investment entitled *America's Stake in Foreign Investments.*[1] This told how the British public invested in bonds of the Southern States, which went into default, and how they were still carried on the list of British foreign bondholders as defaulted securities. The trouble was not only due to the eagerness with which the bankers offered securities, but also to the insane way in which the British and the American public threw their money away in the effort to invest it.

With regard to investments in Canada, the figure of between six and seven billions of dollars referred only to direct investments, not to all the holdings of securities purchased by American citizens publicly on the Exchange.

The question of the competition between private enterprise and government enterprise was fundamental to the topic on which he had spoken. It had been carried to the United States Supreme Court on the issue of the infringement of private rights, and it was hoped that some arrangement would be worked out in those regions where the Government was operating and participating in business in competition with private enterprise. There was a great deal in American law under the head of unfair competition, and the Federal Trade Commission existed to deal with questions coming under that head. If the Government competed with private business while being exempt from taxation and claiming every privilege of government, this competition was unfair. There must, in those circumstances, be either all government enterprises or all private business. The existing competition was driving more and more towards some form of State socialism. If the Government was to go on competing with private enterprise, as in the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority, it should accept the same obligations as were laid on private business.

MR. VINCENT YORKE said that he had been connected with Mexico for nearly forty years. The Mexican Railway, of which he was Chairman, started in 1870 as the first railway in Mexico, and it had done untold good to the country; it not only showed that railways could be built in Mexico, but also encouraged the vast network of American railways. In 1910 the company in London used to receive £10,000 every week; in the last three months their total receipts had been

[1] By Cleona Lewis. 1938. 17s.

exactly £125. That showed the change which had come about. Extravagant wages were being paid to the men; engine-drivers were receiving in purchasing power the equivalent of £1200 per annum and conductors from £600 to £700. Arbitration courts almost invariably decided any dispute against the management. Such a state of things made him wonder whether it was any use to go on. Was there any chance of President Roosevelt adopting, instead of a "good neighbour policy," a "bad neighbour policy"? Was there any chance of any representations, diplomatic or commercial, making the Mexicans change their minds, or must the whole thing be written off?

MR. T. C. OWTRAM spoke of the social and economic aspects of the Mexican policy. Anyone following events in March 1938 must have reached the conclusion that the Mexicans took the oil-fields not on the grounds of anything done or left undone by the foreign holders, but because they wanted to run them for themselves. It was still very questionable whether they effectively owned their oil resources to any greater degree than before. The companies had paid very good wages to their workers, and in comparison to what the basic grade of labour in Mexico earned, the difference was at least as great as that between wages in the most favoured trade in British industry and earnings of peasants in remote parts of Ireland and Scotland. In addition, the Mexicans had enjoyed the advantage of all the technical ability, financial strength and commercial experience of companies which had the management of the oil industry all over the world, and their resources were being developed without their incurring any burden of indebtedness, while a large part of their national income was derived from the taxation of the oil products which were exported. The payments of profits abroad represented only a small part of the proceeds, and if it was a burden to the country, it was only so in an ideological sense.

At the opening of the Mexican Congress on September 1st, President Cardenas had definitely said that his idea of the position of the concessionaire was that of a mortgagee in possession, who was only entitled to stay long enough to pay himself back. The Mexican was prepared to borrow money—at least, he was prepared to owe it—but the type of investment which was most favourable to a fertile marriage of the resources of the old and strong countries with those of the weak and undeveloped countries was the very type which the existing régime in Mexico was determined not to allow.

MR. CULBERTSON said that the fundamental problem for American and British diplomacy in countries like Mexico, so-called economically undeveloped countries, was to deal with the impact between expanding economic life and the public opinion of the country. Almost every question that came up was some variation of that impact. The expansion of industry and enterprise into such areas was welcomed in the first instance; people were delighted that foreign money was

being put into the development of enterprise. It was only when the investments became settled and profits became valuable that the political question arose. The problem was to prevent the issues from becoming involved in local politics; before that stage was reached a solution could often be worked out, but afterwards the cry was raised against foreign capital and imperialism and the situation then became extremely difficult.

The modern tendency towards so-called social reform created an added difficulty. The undeveloped countries were trying to catch up, and wanted to emulate the others by means of short-cut methods which did not conform to international law. They had not the capital, the engineering skill or the business ability to develop their own resources. An example of this could be found in the countries on the west coast of South America, where there were low-grade copper ores. The foreign companies which had developed production there had had to wait ten years, after establishing enormous plants and investing millions of dollars, before they received any profits. The business executives had tried hard to get the people of the country to hold securities, but they had not been willing to wait for a return. The result was that when the properties began to pay, all the securities were held by foreigners, and the cry then arose that the foreigners were exploiting the natural resources of the country. In Mexico, of the four major oil-fields, three were on the decline and there was no exploration going on. If Mexico was to continue to be an oil-producing country, there must be the initiative which would lead to the exploration and development of new fields, and the government administration had not yet demonstrated that it could do this, therefore their policy was from the economic point of view on a short-sighted basis. If a sensible point of view could be developed which would establish co-operation between the British, American and Dutch on the one hand and the Mexicans and others in a similar situation on the other hand, there would be a basis on which there could be an increase of wealth which must lead to an increase in the standard of living of the people of the country.

Mr. J. T. Walton Newbold said he thought that the tendency in Mexico was very much like that in some countries in Europe, where the holders of visible assets were expropriated and productive or transport concerns, land companies and so on passed into the hands of public utilities in such a way that the lower middle class and bourgeois elements which crowded the Socialist movements of modern Europe could replace the alien management and push themselves forward into the smaller bureaucratic jobs, into the management and into the control of such concerns. They wished to get rid of exploitation at the point of production, but were not very particular as to exploitation later on. In the long run that kind of thing required the raising of new loans, and gave an opportunity to politicians and their friends at the appropriate moments to bring in a new grouping of capital

which had not previously been able to get in. This process was characteristic of the history of financial operations in both the United States and Europe during the nineteenth century. It was a travesty of the facts to talk of imperialism; the term was applied by one set of capitalists to another.

MR. E. J. ELLIOT said that according to Mr. Culbertson's exposition, international law was something of almost transcendental virtue which the governments of sovereign States were prepared to accept. But actually was it not a rather nebulous conception in matters such as those under discussion, because States would not accept any diminution of their sovereignty by accepting any universal principles of international law? It might be that in some written constitutions such principles as the protection of the rights of foreigners were embodied, but in the British Constitution principles of that kind would not be held to prevent the Legislature from passing any legislation it liked. There were no limits to the legislation which the British Parliament could pass as against private property or anything else, at any rate theoretically. Would it not be a surer basis for the consideration of the Mexican problem if one could appeal to treaties, commercial treaties in particular, which would prescribe, and engage the faith of the nation to observe, particular treatment for individuals in relation to business investments and private property? The provisions of such treaties would for the most part be based on national treatment, and the foreigner could not be expected in general to receive any better treatment, though that would not be excluded from contractual engagements of such a kind.

MR. CULBERTSON quoted a statement of Mr. Hull about international law: "There is indeed no mystery about international law. It is nothing more than the recognition between nations of the rules of right and fair dealing such as ordinarily obtain between individuals and which are essential for friendly intercourse." Law in international affairs could be divided into two classes, just as in national law; namely, statutory law and common law. Treaties dealing with commercial matters and questions of private international law came under the second head. The distinction had been very thoroughly discussed the previous month by the International Law Association in Amsterdam. The question was that which had led him to make his distinction between substantive international law and procedure. The confusion which arose in understanding international law resulted from the absence of any adequate means of enforcing international law, and some academic writers held that there was no real law in international affairs because there were no sanctions. He dissented from that point of view, because nations could not live together in a world community unless they were governed by law, and the mere fact that there did not happen to be at that stage a means whereby that law could be enforced, did not prove that there was no law which governed the relations

of States and established the rights of individuals when they had crossed frontiers.

THE CHAIRMAN (Sir Edward Peacock) said that it was a long time since he had been in Mexico, and he was interested to hear Mr. Vincent Yorke say that he had lost patience. This must mean that Mexico was in a very bad way, because Mr. Yorke was always optimistic in earlier days. From the Mexican point of view the days of Diaz had been the golden age of foreign investment. Since then much of the foreigners' property had been confiscated on the plea of improving the social condition of the workers. There had been little improvement in the workers' social condition, while there was apparent a great deterioration in the general condition of the country.

With a few notable and honourable exceptions, investment in foreign countries since the War had been a very hazardous business. In the days when foreign investment was made with a reasonable expectation that contracts would be honoured, both parties had profited. Mexico and many other countries were enormously assisted in their progress towards better conditions by foreign money. Equally, Great Britain had profited by her investments abroad, which, by and large, had returned a reasonable dividend. The investor got his interest, and there was also the return in the trade which accrued. The fact that foreign investment had become a hazardous business was bad for Great Britain, but it was much worse for the other parties. They did not get the capital needed for development: it was very short-sighted of them to kill the goose that laid the golden egg.

THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAGUE[1]

ALEXANDER LOVEDAY

THERE is one fact that renders this year not an inappropriate one for considering what economic and financial work the League of Nations is doing, namely, that the work has been undergoing a change recently and the nature of that change is now becoming clear.

During the first years of its life the Economic and Financial Organisation devoted its energies mainly to two types of work—to the conclusion of international conventions on commercial questions, and to the emergency needs of certain distressed areas. This was natural enough—for does not the Covenant of the League—so remarkably silent about economic life in general—specifically mention the equitable treatment of commerce?

The international conventions, as distinct from the protocols relating to Austria, Bulgaria, etc., concluded during this period covered a wide range of subjects, such as Customs formalities, Arbitration Clauses, Counterfeiting Currency, Bills of Exchange, the Regulation of the Whaling Industry, etc.; and there can, I think, be no doubt about the value of this attempt at international legislation on economic subjects. But the conventions suffered, to a certain extent, from the desire to make them as universal as possible and to make their terms identical for all States. As a result the draft conventions were frequently docked and pared during the discussions and negotiations to meet the difficulties of the least advanced States participating in the Conference—States which in the end very often failed to ratify them.

Now to-day conditions are much less favourable for multilateral negotiations—if I may employ that dreadful term—and it might be expected that the League could do nothing useful at the moment to promote formal inter-State agreements. In fact, the lessened importance of this type of work is one of the major changes which I want to discuss. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this change is necessarily permanent, or that

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 16th, 1938; Professor J. B. Condliffe in the Chair.

because no conferences for concluding conventions are being convened at the moment, nothing is being done or could be done to promote international agreements.

Procedure has changed, and the scope of this type of work is at the moment more restricted, but the work still continues. Procedure has changed partly because conditions have changed and partly because the weaknesses of the old procedure are better understood. Differences of national conditions are more fully appreciated, and, what is equally important, Governments are now prepared to admit that it may be wise and proper to confine League conferences to a limited number of States specially concerned in any particular problem. The holding of regional conferences, such, for instance, as the proposed European Rural-Life Conference, or of conferences confined to a limited number of States interested in some particular question, as, for instance, the Wheat Conference of 1933, has enormously facilitated our work.

We are in fact gradually moving from a system of general conventions to the system of applying to each problem the procedure which seems most likely to result in business being done—in business being done, not universally, not even between or as regards all Member States, but between those States where there is a desire to do business.

Let me give an example. The political conditions in the world to-day, as I have said, are such as to render multilateral agreements even between a relatively restricted number of States extraordinarily difficult. Does that mean that the League can do nothing to help as regards questions which can only be settled by inter-State negotiations? Is collective action, in the sense of collective undertakings by governments to act in an exactly similar and defined manner, essential to the usefulness of the League in economic affairs? We have, I think, already proved that that is not the case. As most of you probably know, we have been working for a long time now on the question of double taxation. It is a question which involves very great technical difficulties, and at the same time, as all taxpayers know, one on which revenue departments are most reluctant to make concessions. What did we do? A Committee was instructed to study those difficulties, and after a very far-reaching inquiry into the taxation conditions, systems of assessment, etc., throughout the world, it drafted a series of model treaties each dealing with a distinct group of taxes. These completed, there was naturally pressure on the League from certain quarters to convene

an international conference in order to get these conventions approved—as we call it—multilaterally. But wiser counsels prevailed. We did nothing of the sort. We sent these conventions as models to governments, and said to them: Try to open up bilateral negotiations, and when you do so, use these models as far as you can, as far as they fit in with your local conditions, with the particular problems on which you are negotiating. We refrained, you will observe, from endeavouring to induce governments by the pressure of a public conference to give their signatures to a collection of formal undertakings which they might on further consideration fail to ratify. Instead we rendered them a real assistance by thrashing out the technical difficulties and furnished them with a series of instruments which could be adapted to the needs of each individual case. What has been the result? Between 1929 and 1935 some sixty new conventions dealing with double taxation, and very largely based on the model conventions drawn up by the Committee, have been signed, and since 1935 a further twenty have been concluded. That seems to me an astonishing result to have achieved in this period, during much of which the world was suffering from the most serious economic depression in history and the fingers of finance ministers were sticking to every *sou* they could touch.

Such a system cannot, of course, be applied in all cases; but when it is applicable it has very real advantages. It achieves uniformity—it achieves exactly that measure of uniformity that is compatible with national idiosyncrasies and with the unavoidable differences in economic structure and financial practice. Moreover, it is dynamic. As one country or another develops, it is able to apply more and more of the principles laid down in these models.

I have quoted the case of double taxation because there one can demonstrate—if indirectly—cause and effect. There are similar instances that I might quote; but I want at this stage to emphasise another point. There is an unfortunate tendency to assume that whenever a League Committee meets, it should issue a report, and that the value of the meeting can be determined by the report. Very often this is quite untrue, and the value of the meeting lies simply in the act of meeting. On this point the Bank for International Settlements has been admirably free of all pretence. The value of the meeting lies in the act of meeting, and that is particularly the case when the persons in question would normally only meet otherwise to negotiate. The League's Economic Committee consists mainly of persons one of whose

functions is to negotiate commercial treaties. They come together at Geneva to discuss other subjects, but also to discuss commercial policy, and there is, I believe, a very real advantage in their coming together in this way to sit round a table instead of sitting on opposite sides of it, and in discussing their difficulties and preoccupations in common, not in competition. It paves the way for later bilateral negotiations.

The first big change in our work, then, is largely one of procedure—we are moving from the general to the particular, from universal to restricted conferences, from preparing the way for multilateral conventions to preparing the way for bilateral conventions.

The second and more important change is that, owing to political conditions, governments, or certain governments, are less prepared to make binding agreements of any sort at the moment, and that, in consequence, some of the work that has attracted most public attention is slowing down.

As an example I may take a problem that has attracted universal attention in recent years, namely, that of quotas and exchange control. For several years now the Assembly of the League or the League's technical committees have argued against these quantitative restrictions on trade, and M. van Zeeland in his recent report has reiterated those arguments.

The Economic Committee last September adumbrated principles of policy with a view to their abolition—suggesting in effect that a general agreement should be sought, under which the Western countries in Europe which impose quota restrictions should remove or relax them, and that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, being thus enabled to sell more freely abroad, should—with some special aid if necessary—for their part remove or relax their exchange controls.

The Assembly blessed this line of thought and requested the Economic and Financial Committees to elaborate the details of procedure. The underlying principles of M. van Zeeland's report are identical.

The League Committees are at the moment conducting an inquiry in order to ascertain what in detail are the difficulties which present themselves to governments in the application of such a policy; and public opinion is inclined to wonder why this whole business takes so long in being transacted. The reason for the delay is really obvious enough. The difficulties in the way of removing exchange control and quotas to-day are not mainly economic: they are mainly political. It is often urged that if

you could solve the economic problems, the political problems would largely solve themselves. But life is not made thus of water-tight compartments. Exchange control is, in part at least, an expression in certain countries of the general political conception of autarky. It is maintained because there is a political will to maintain it. In other countries where this motive is absent or less dominant it is maintained, in part at least, to prevent capital emigration. Why this fear of capital emigration? Because the citizens of these States in the present political situation in Europe want to spread their risks—they want to keep some of their capital in other parts of the world where the risks are—I won't say less—but different.

Since the League Assembly met in September 1937 events have taken place which make them more anxious than ever to spread their risks and make governments more determined than ever to maintain some check on capital exports.

In the face of these conditions the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League can do two things. It can point out the economic disadvantages of the present system which must be weighed against the political considerations; it can lay down a general line of policy, and in doing so suggest a solution of the technical difficulties to the extent that the circumstances of the moment permit. That it has done and is doing. Collective action will be taken when there is collective political will to take such action. Meanwhile, however, a steady and persistent relaxation of control has been effected, and I have no doubt—indeed I know quite definitely—that the discussions that have taken place at Geneva have stimulated this policy of loosening control.

Let me give a few examples of recent changes. Portugal has abolished such control, and Austria had also done so as regards countries with what we call free currency systems. Austria led the way; she showed the world and the League that this could be done gradually and without disturbing confidence, by allowing a larger and larger proportion of the foreign-exchange transactions to be negotiated outside the control. In Yugoslavia, where in 1935 sixty per cent. of all foreign exchange from exports had to be returned to the National Bank at official rates, the proportion was reduced last January from one third to one quarter.

Last year Czechoslovakia abolished exchange control altogether as regards imports, replacing it by a licensing system, and about one third of her imports (1935 values) are now completely free.

Denmark, which also has a licensing system, is gradually increasing this free proportion; Bulgaria has been adopting on an increasing scale the Austrian system of what is called private compensation. I could give a lot more examples; but that is, I think, enough to prove my point, that, although no dramatic collective action has been taken, each government has been acting year by year and month by month along the lines advocated by the League. But because no dramatic collective action is taken, the press and the public remain largely ignorant of the progress achieved and wonder what the League is doing.

Well, what exactly is it doing in the changed circumstances of to-day? The political difficulties of which I have spoken reflect in part a widespread social revolution and changes in the economic structure of nations.

Economic conditions are changing with unusual rapidity, and each government is faced with a crop of new problems at home which it has to solve and on which it is often anxious to obtain information about how other governments are dealing with them. It is in that connection that the League's Economic and Financial Organisation is performing perhaps one of its most useful functions to-day.

I find it convenient myself to think of its work as falling into three or four definite classes, all closely related but still distinct.

First there is what we may call the Royal Commission type of work, when some question of common interest either to a number of governments or to a number of interests in different countries is submitted to a special committee to advise on. The object in this case is to obtain an authoritative opinion of experts drawn from different parts of the world. I will give some examples of this commission work shortly—the recent report on Clearing Agreements is a case in point.

But frequently what is wanted is not a counsel's opinion, so much as evidence. Governments may want to know what their neighbours are doing about some question of concern to them all and how this or that experiment has worked. In such cases it simply charges the League to make an inquiry, to furnish the evidence in the form of a report. We have an inquiry of this sort—into housing policies—now in hand.

They may go a step further, and decide that there should be a personal confrontation of evidence and exchange of views between experts working in the same field. The last Assembly decided on this course as regards nutrition. I shall try to explain how the system works.

The first point I want to make about all this class of work is that it relates just as much to domestic as to international affairs. A government wants, let us say, to modify its agricultural credit legislation, and wants to know first how systems in other countries function. It proposes therefore at the Assembly that a study of this question should be made and, if other countries also want information on this question, the inquiry is made. The League is used as a clearing-house of information and of ideas.

Let me begin with ideas. I referred just now to the report on Clearings. It affords a good example of what I call the Royal Commission type of work and of the manner in which a concensus of opinion is gradually built up through the instrumentality of the League.

Clearing agreements were the product of exchange control and of an endeavour by some creditor countries to get their short-term debts repaid more rapidly than they believed they would be able to in the absence of such agreements. They were obviously working badly and impeding trade. In 1934 the Assembly decided to have a report made on the whole subject.

I will not attempt to summarise that report here, but from the careful arguments it contained, three major conclusions emerged. First, that clearing agreements should be done away with altogether as soon as conditions permitted; secondly, that so long as some such agreements were unavoidable, it was better to have a payments agreement than a clearing agreement; and, thirdly, that the essential vice in most clearing agreements consisted in employing in them an arbitrary rate of exchange.

Now, what happens when a report of this sort is published? What is apt to happen is that when the report is published it receives a large measure of publicity, is approved or criticised or both, and a lot of people assume that it will or should lead to some dramatic and widespread result. In fact, no collective, no dramatic, action is taken, and it is then often assumed that it has failed. The assumption is likely to be quite erroneous. Governments do not advertise the fact—unless there are quite special reasons for doing so—that they have changed their policy because a League Committee has made certain recommendations. But in fact they are influenced if the Committee really contributes to thought. What is essential is that the report should really throw new light on the question; should marshal the evidence and draw its conclusions from that evidence. League Committees have one great advantage, that they can collect evidence from all over the world. The recommendations they make are

more likely than not to be based on what some government has already accomplished. The value of the League, and its Committees, is that it is a clearing-house of ideas. Thus, to return to my example, when the Committee recommended payment agreements in preference to clearing agreements, it did not invent the idea of payment agreements. They had already been successfully applied in Great Britain. Since its report was published, Hungary has converted the whole of its clearing agreements into payment agreements, and was able to abolish bilateralism with some countries altogether. The Bulgarian National Bank has, as I have said, thrown by far the larger portion of its foreign trade into the private compensation market, which means that an exporter and importer decide the rate of exchange, and hence that a market, and not an arbitrary rate, is used in the clearings.

Yugoslavia has abolished its clearing agreements with Belgium and France and has relaxed others. Estonia has abolished its agreement with France; Finland has made a new agreement with Roumania admitting Roumanian goods freely, and so forth.

It is of course impossible to assess accurately in any case the exact influence of such work. One can only know occasionally and by chance whether a League suggestion or some completely independent circumstances have led to any particular action being taken by a government. Moreover the effect of a League report is of course likely to be dependent on whether economic conditions at the moment are favourable to the adoption of the ideas expressed in it. Thus, had there not been a substantial improvement in economic conditions and in prices of crude products, exchange control would not have been relaxed, and clearing agreements would very likely not have been modified in the way in which they were. Indeed, with the recent worsening in economic conditions there has been a tendency to tighten up control again.

In the case of clearings it was more or less assumed by the Assembly that government policy had gone wrong and that the system created required serious modification. But the work of the Economic and Financial Organisation is by no means confined to trying to remedy mistakes. On the contrary, there is obviously much greater scope for useful work when the problem is one of constructive policy. Nutrition is a case in point. The League's work on nutrition naturally began as a health problem and nothing more. But when the movement in Great Britain had acquired considerable impetus, the whole question of nutrition

in its widest aspects—social and economic—was submitted by the Australian Delegation to the League.

At first it was treated, but half seriously, by certain delegations —malnutrition was widely believed to be the natural result of the horrible food one gets in Great Britain, and hence a national, an English-speaking (or -eating), problem. But gradually the movement spread over wider and wider areas, and this largely because the Committee that was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Astor did a very sensible thing. Before it had prepared any sort of report it urged governments to set up national nutrition committees. That allowed the small groups of scientists and social workers that had been struggling—generally rather obscurely—with the problem, to get the ear of their governments; it focussed attention on the question. Three years ago there were, I think, about two or three national nutrition committees; to-day there are about twenty.

In addition to their work at home, these national committees proved of the greatest assistance to the League in the preparation of its report, for they collected evidence about local conditions and furnished information about national policy. Before the final report of the League was drafted, I sent an official round Europe to discuss the whole question with the members or staff of these committees.

What contribution does the final report of the Nutrition Committee make to the cause of improved nutrition? First and foremost it attracts attention to the problem, and in this question it is imperative to awaken the interest of the man in the street. It is he or his wife who decides what he will eat. The number of persons in the world who will read a League report published only in the two official languages is, of course, limited; and although this report ran into a second edition in a few weeks and is being translated into various other languages on private initiative, it is not the number of its direct readers that really matters. Its real value is in giving information which can be used for all those innumerable pamphlets and articles that are being published to-day all over the world. The first object is to tell people something they did not know—and let them tell it to others. That in this case is, I think, more important than the conclusions, which, owing to the vastness of the problem and to the different ways in which it presents itself in different countries, are necessarily rather general and vague. But, if you examine them, you will find that they are based on the large mass of evidence assembled. They have the merit of being deductions and not

dogmas. They can therefore be adapted to local conditions as further evidence about those conditions is collected.

The essence of this report, therefore, as I see it, is that it has collected evidence over a wide area about local conditions, and to a less extent about local policies. Now, this nutrition problem is a new one, or rather it is a new concern of governments. Governments all over the world are facing up to it for the first time. They are experimenting; they are gaining experience. The work that the League can do and is doing is to allow of an exchange of experience. In the spring of last year we arranged for a meeting of the secretaries of national nutrition committees at Geneva. It was an unusual and, in my opinion, an ideal form of meeting. The agenda was confined to one or two very general questions; those present were not asked to prepare any report; we were not concerned with reaching an agreement. We arranged simply for a group of men all facing the same problem at home to come and discuss what their major difficulties were; how they faced them; where they had succeeded and where they had failed. It is by that means, I believe, that real progress is made. We are going on with that. The 1937 Assembly decided that such meetings should be convened every year, and that a report should be issued every year. But we are not going to waste the time of these people by asking them to prepare a joint report. We shall write this report in the Secretariat basing it on statements submitted to us by national committees and on the stenographic records of these annual conversations.

It may be thought that nutrition is a curious subject for the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League. I confess I thought so myself at first, when it fell to my lot about eighteen months ago. But the fact that it is being handled largely by that Organisation reflects, I think, a change in politico-economic outlook of the utmost importance. We have been in the habit of looking on economics as the art or science of production, as being concerned with the amount of the national income or with man as a producer. To-day we are beginning to think of man as a consumer and of the economics of consumption. We are beginning to ask ourselves not simply how much is produced, but what is consumed and by whom. We are beginning to believe that, even though politics set limits to economic negotiations, many of our political worries may be solved not by talking politics but by satisfying wants, the wants of the individual consumer. If the problem of wants is tackled indirectly through production only, some direct physical needs are inevitably left

unsatisfied, and you as a society go on breeding from the physically impoverished. You breed trouble—political trouble. You avoid it by raising the standard of living and by letting no one's standard fall too low. I have had the privilege, and it is a privilege, of living in Switzerland for seventeen years. I do not think there is any country in the world where the general standard of living of all, in good years and bad, is so high. Why is it? Because they have had no wars for over a hundred years, and because they are really concerned about the standard of living of everyone. Their standard is high because they have had no wars; but because their standard is high the last thing in the world they want is war. So it is perfectly logical that the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League should concern itself with nutrition and consumption and the standard of living.

We are continuing along that line, and I hope we shall continue. For instance, this year we have just started an inquiry into the financial aspects of housing policies. The housing boom in Great Britain has been exceptional in recent years. But every sort of housing scheme, national, municipal, private, has been put into execution since the depression in different countries. We want in the first instance to compare objects, results and costs. We want to furnish governments with evidence about what others have achieved or failed to achieve and how. But the object again is to help them to meet the needs, the real physical needs, of the consumer in the cheapest and most efficient manner. Partly with a similar object, no doubt, the 1937 Assembly raised the general question of the standard of living. That phrase seems to me to embrace the whole of what I call the economics of consumption, and it remains still to be decided through what new avenue an approach to it will be made.

I do not want to give the impression, however, that the major part of our work is concerned with consumer economics. On the contrary, the major part—excluding for the moment our intelligence service—is still concerned with financial and commercial policy. Indeed, the consumer and producer are often indistinguishable. This is clearly the case in Eastern Europe, where the peasant produces most of what he consumes. There the vital financial problem is agricultural credit, and we are conducting an inquiry into this question at the moment which is typical of a great part of our work to-day. In most of the countries of Eastern Europe, the agricultural credit systems were very seriously hit indeed by the depression and the fall in prices. Innumerable measures have been adopted to relieve the indebted peasant.

Measures of relief were inevitable. But to-day the peasant is faced by the greatest difficulties in obtaining credit, and the State is faced by the political risk of the private money-lender and the need for reorganising the general mechanism of agricultural banks. The 1937 Assembly decided that this problem should be studied, and it is being studied.

These problems of, for instance, nutrition, agricultural credits, housing and even clearings are, taken individually, perhaps of secondary importance to-day in a world that is convulsed by revolution, war and the threat of war. Collectively I believe their importance to be enormous, and I do not believe that the threat of war can be or will be permanently removed by rapidly concluded political pacts, or by each country diverting more and more of its men and equipment from producing what is intended to satisfy wants to producing what is intended to destroy wants by destroying human beings.

Two of the greatest dangers to social tranquillity and to political peace to-day in the long run, as I see it, are, first, economic depressions and, secondly, the social pressure of populations. In what state would Europe be to-day if an economic depression had not occurred in 1929? Unemployment is no longer a personal risk, but a national and international danger. Before the War, Europe exported her surplus population to marry the raw materials and capital of the United States. After the War American capital migrated to Europe to employ the surplus and enclosed populations of Europe. To-day both movements are stopped; and we have no solution of that problem, a problem which becomes more and more serious on the occasion of each depression. We cannot hope to avoid social and political troubles of the most serious gravity unless and until we devise some means of averting or lessening economic depressions.

That view was endorsed by the 1937 Assembly which instructed the Economic and Financial Organisation to study the means which might be adopted with a view to avoiding or mitigating such depressions. In fact the League has occupied itself for a number of years with this question in an academic way. We began by analysing the various current theories of trade cycles in order to make clearer the real points of agreement and disagreement. That done, we are now subjecting these theories as far as we can to the test of fact, especially statistical fact. That is a very large and difficult undertaking. Our investigation has not yet got far enough to allow us to guess what results may be reached.

That this problem is vastly difficult and complicated is apparent from the simple fact that the world continues to run into depressions blindly and baldheaded, and climbs out of them painfully and balder. It is inconceivable that if we knew what to do we should not have done it. But that very problem, what to do to avoid depressions, has now been submitted to the League, and has got to be faced. It is too early to foresee what the body that has been appointed to report on it will recommend. But there is one remark I would like to make. This is a question on which some sort of co-ordination of national policy is essential. We cannot see countries climbing out of the next depression on the backs of each other again, as they have in recent years. Measures adopted by one country alone to revive business may first depress its exchange rates and then involve the risk of currency depreciation. Currency depreciation, save in very exceptional circumstances, tends to lower world market prices and intensify the depression in countries dependent on world prices. Thus excellent measures in the absence of international co-ordination may have disastrous results.

Less immediately urgent perhaps, but scarcely less important, is the question I just mentioned of population, and especially of population pressure. Now, how the Economic and Financial Organisation is going to tackle this population problem has not yet been decided. The Polish Government has urged very strongly that it is a mistake to deal with problems of goods and services and finance and to neglect the human problem. There is no doubt that it is right. As I have just said, the simultaneous obstructions that exist to-day to the movement of men and of capital constitute a real danger, and one for which at present no solution has been found. This question has, however, only been submitted for a preliminary exploration. I shall not therefore spend more time on it. But it constitutes one vital part of that whole field of new work to which the Economic and Financial Organisation has to devote itself.

In emphasising the new type of work that we are undertaking it may be thought that I have unduly neglected those questions with which the public is more familiar. Much of the financial work of the last six or seven years has been the handling of the heritage of the 'twenties when the League lent its aid to governments in raising reconstruction loans and elaborating reconstruction schemes. Many are familiar with the reports of the Financial Committee on Bulgaria, Hungary, etc. and with the steps that that Committee has taken in recent years to help both

the debtor governments and their creditors. This heritage of the 'twenties has taken much of the time of the Financial Committee, and it is only now, when conditions have improved, that it is able to find time for all those other fields of work that have been submitted to it.

But other strictly financial questions have, nevertheless, been handled by the Financial Committee or by the Organisation. Thus the Council of the League has recently circulated a protocol to governments for the prevention of the falsification of stocks, shares and other securities; the Fiscal Committee has been busy on the question of fiscal evasion; there is a Committee now at work on the problem of the form and content of loan contracts. This question was raised in 1935. It is highly technical, and I do not propose to deal with its technicalities. But, though technical. it is, I venture to believe, of very real importance if international lending is ever going to be resumed. To-day contracts are made between a single government on the one hand and an unascertainable number of anonymous holders of bearer bonds on the other. If circumstances arise in which some modification of that contract is agreed by everyone to be necessary, it is impossible to effect such a modification legally. The bondholders have no means of representation. If nine hundred and ninety-nine agree and one does not, the debtor government may still be forced into the position of a delinquent unilaterally breaking the contract, if any modification of it is made. The trustees, if there are trustees, in such circumstances, even if they wholly agree with the action taken, are bound to protest. In consequence it is difficult to distinguish between good debtors and bad, and the position of the trustee is rendered well-nigh intolerable. When questions of dispute arise, for instance as to the meaning of the terms of the contract, they are governed not by international law, unless there is an arbitral clause, which is rare, but by municipal law: and we find in some cases that the contract itself is at variance with the spirit of the relevant municipal law, for instance when it was drafted by the lawyers of the creditor country and is ruled by the law of the debtor. We find in other cases the greatest uncertainty about what municipal law applies. This question of jurisdiction has given rise to endless trouble in recent years on account of another vital problem, that of the money in which the service of the loan is payable.

The Committee which is now at work on this question of loan contracts is in no way concerned with past and present disputes; it is not being asked to express any sort of opinion on the merits or

meaning, for instance, of existing gold clauses. The duty with which it is charged is that of examining ways and means for improving such contracts in the future. The discussions that have already taken place, as also the experience of past years, show how vital are the points on which that improvement might be effected.

As I said earlier, the nature of our work is changing or should I say that that work has developed? In fact there is little that we have attempted in the past that is to-day wholly abandoned. But new forms of work have been undertaken, and the emphasis is changed. Only a small part of the economic and financial problems with which States are concerned are of an international contractual nature, and there is no sort of reason why the usefulness of the League should be limited to such questions. It is the fuller realisation of that fact that has brought about this change in emphasis. Much of its work to-day, as will have been seen, is devoted to furnishing evidence or affording advice on questions which are primarily national. The problem of agricultural credit now being considered, and the housing question, are strictly national, the question of the standard of living is primarily national, as too is nutrition. Other questions, such as the mitigation of depressions, demand not international agreements about how one country will behave to another, but international co-ordination of national policies. Work still continues on contractual problems, such as double taxation, trade in meat, etc., and will no doubt develop again, but it also for the moment has changed its character. Personally I think this change of emphasis is propitious. For first it widens the scope of the League's usefulness, and secondly it creates the habit amongst governments of looking to the League when in need of evidence. You will never build up a successful League if you confine it to settling disputes or to international bargaining. Utilise it in solving the day-to-day problems which are common to governments in a rapidly changing world, and you will at once derive the most benefit from it, and by thus strengthening it make it the more able to render benefit.

I have personally always held the view that the value of the League would, in the long run, be largely determined by the extent to which it enabled peoples and governments to learn something they did not know, to frame a judgment on evidence adequate for that purpose. What I have called the Royal Commission type of work affords one example of this form of usefulness.

But of course the Economic Intelligence Service has from the earliest days of the League's existence tried to perform this function through its various publications on economic and financial questions. I have been so long personally connected with this work that I propose to say very little about it. But I should perhaps make it clear that it is quite distinct in origin and object from the Committee reports, such for instance as those on Clearings or Nutrition to which I have already alluded. The object of the Committee reports is to furnish evidence, to formulate opinions and give advice. The regular publications of the Economic Intelligence Service are prepared by the Secretariat; they are intended to give facts and nothing more. Their motto is " no criticism by request." They are based on facts and figures; those facts and figures tell their own story. Sometimes they suggest that this or that policy may not have been successful; if they do, they do; but it is they, the figures, and not the authors of the volume which point a finger. Our constant intention is to be absolutely objective, and that objectivity is essential. Sometimes I am urged to write a preface underlining certain conclusions in the hope of influencing policy. Such a step would in my opinion not only be a misuse of my position, but a fatal folly. The result of our objectivity has been that we have been able to continue our work without any sort of interference, that governments of Member and most non-Member States collaborate with us and always have done so, and that in a world of ideologies we are not even accused of preaching a Geneva doctrine.

In the long run knowledge is more important than belief. What we are trying to do is to extend the basis of knowledge, and that is true to-day not only of the Intelligence Service, but of the whole Economic and Financial Organisation. The greatest use to which that Organisation can be put is that each country may learn from its neighbour. It is being put to that use. But much more could be done if governments and individuals willed it.

Summary of Discussion

PROFESSOR J. B. CONDLIFFE (in the Chair) said that he was always impressed by the difference between the view of the League taken by those who worked on the Secretariat and many people outside Geneva. A great number of the Secretariat officials were engaged on matters which were not current in the Press. They were working quietly, steadily and effectively as international civil servants, and working in close relations with their opposite numbers of national civil services, acting as a clearing-house between civil services of various countries.

A MEMBER said that the lecturer had described with extreme modesty the important part he had played in the financial and economic work of the League. People were apt to dwell not on the successes of the financial and economic activities of the League, but on the less satisfactory results which, through no fault of its own, it had obtained in the political field. One of the most important aspects of the economic and financial work, as the lecturer had pointed out, was that it enabled people to meet round a table; not only this, but when the various people went back to their own countries they knew the personality of those with whom they had to deal, and this was extraordinarily valuable. The League also enabled contacts, once made, to be maintained and strengthened.

The lecturer in particular had made a great contribution to the amount of statistical knowledge available. Statistical work had only grown up during the last generation or so, and each country had made up its statistics on its own lines, the result being that when a comparison between the statistics of different countries was desired, it was necessary to go through an elaborate process in order to find a common denominator. The lecturer had taken over this task, and he and his staff had done a great deal to introduce uniformity into the statistics of different countries. He had produced comparative statements of banking statistics and laws which had not existed before.

At the moment the work of the League was being carried out in a difficult atmosphere owing to certain States being unwilling to co-operate. The speaker regarded the present period in this respect as a kind of interregnum. The League stood for something of permanent value. When the present phase of autarchy passed, those countries now unwilling to co-operate with the League would, he hoped, be anxious to come back to it. For this reason it was very important that there should be no intermission in its work, but that it should continue working at high pressure, producing valuable results and information, so that when international co-operation became, as it would do, the most important factor in public life, material would be available upon which to work. It was inconceivable that, at a time when contact between nations was becoming closer through the abolition of distances and by other factors, nations should continue for very long to think that they could achieve any durable prosperity or success through putting a wall round themselves. For this reason the work being done on nutrition, raw materials and financial depression was extremely important. The population and immigration questions were burning matters also: there were undoubtedly countries which could accommodate larger populations, while others found the burden of excessive population one of their greatest embarrassments. If any organisation could do anything to facilitate the solution of this problem it was the League, because there all countries met and exchanged views.

When people asked what they got for their subscription to the League, they should be told to read the lecturer's address. They

would then realise that the sum paid by any particular country towards the running of the League was a trifle in relation to the value of the results which countries could obtain from the League if they chose to do so.

MR. W. NEWBOLD said that in 1929 he had been called upon with thirteen other colleagues to inquire into the international and internal factors affecting the operation of credit and banking systems. His colleague Mr. Ernest Bevin had chosen to investigate the internal side of the matter, leaving the international aspects to the speaker. During the next eighteen months he had travelled from the International Federation Union in Amsterdam to the Labour Social International in Zurich. None of the international organisations visited had been as full of information as that presided over to-day by the lecturer.

The question of the pressure of population should certainly be considered at the same time as the question of depression, and related also to how far it might be possible in certain limited areas of the world, and between certain member and non-member States, to get international lending going again. A matter which the speaker had discussed at Leinster House in 1930, and which was only now entering the field, because of the solution of political difficulties, was the question of migration between congested industrial and agrarian areas on the two sides of the Irish Sea and of the Atlantic, particularly affecting the Irish. When rearmament slackened (it would probably continue at a decreasing or alternating *tempo* for the next fifteen years), there would be a vital problem in Great Britain as to what to do with the large number of Irishmen who had come over since 1935 and 1936 and who would inevitably have to return. Whether they would be able to settle on the land in Ireland the speaker did not know, but he did consider that they might be accepted in various parts of the United States, where others from Central and Eastern Europe might not, and it was to be hoped that in this respect the League would co-operate.

MR. LOVEDAY said that he had referred very briefly to this question of population, as it had only been raised recently. In fact, it was raised at the 1937 Assembly by the Polish Delegation, which urged that it was paradoxical to deal with the question of the movement of goods and capital and not with that of the movement of human beings.

Meanwhile, the International Labour Office had held a small technical conference, restricted to a certain number of States, on this subject.

SIR ERNEST BENN said that he would like to intervene as the discussion seemed slightly in danger of becoming one-sided. It had been a great privilege to hear a great brain working on a mass of world problems of which undoubtedly it was the master, but the

speaker had felt distinctly disappointed not to hear some scraps of information concerning the disastrous story of the League loans. Perhaps this did not come within the subject of discussion. He had hoped that it would. He had been delighted to hear that the lecturer sincerely gave up the folly of the multilateral treaty which had been at the base of most of the world's troubles during the last twenty years.

The lecturer had told the audience about some wonderful and fascinating research work which had been done, and put forward his belief that the dissemination of information, facts, was more important than endeavouring to arrive at agreements. The speaker wished that the League of Nations had never been thought of, and would be glad to see the complete end of it. He doubted whether it was for the general good that this work should be continued in this way in the curious international atmosphere of Geneva. He could imagine great good from transferring the lecturer and his staff to one of the departments in Great Britain, where his genius might be used to more practical effect. He was not as impressed as one of the other speakers with the development of statistics during the last twenty years, because it had been in inverse ratio to the progress in trade. The statistics were used chiefly by the bureaucrats of different nations to found misguided regulations and arrangements of their own and to put the world into the position with which all were familiar.

A speaker had said that a great many Irishmen were making munitions who would have to go when the time came. Supposing that the lecturer and his Royal Commission produced all that there was to know upon the subject of surplus foreign population, relating it to the speaker's practical experience in the realm of particular trades, it reminded him of the dissemination among the manufacturers of steel, of tin pans, of boots, etc., of information concerning the methods and detail and costs of all the others, with the idea that the different manufacturers would take the best points out of everybody's programme and economise and improve things for the benefit of the consumer. Exactly the reverse had in fact happened. In the same way, when the lecturer had told the different nations exactly how to solve the problem of surplus population, his information would be used by the bureaucrats, forgetting the rights of the populations themselves and the problem would be accentuated.

MR. LOVEDAY said that he owed the last speaker an apology if he had given him the impression that all the work of his department was research work. He could understand people saying that fiscal evasion was a research problem, some spent a good deal of research on it, but he could not understand anyone saying that, for instance, the relief of double taxation was a research problem. Most of the matters touched upon, clearings, for instance, were only research questions in a sense that if one were going to take action it was better to think before acting. The results were practical.

Concerning the question of loans, it was often assumed by those who ought to know better, and almost generally assumed in the Press, that, in those countries in which in the early days the League had a reconstruction scheme, it had had also some sort of control.

In fact, it never had any sort of control once the money from these loans was spent. What the League had tried to do was to keep in closest touch with these governments, gain their confidence, give advice and issue reports on their situation. If the advice was good and acted upon, the debtor's capacity and willingness to meet his debts were increased. But the Financial Committee had not been concerned with these countries in recent years, simply because they owed money under loans issued under the auspices of the League. It had been concerned with them because it was anxious that the work of reconstruction begun in the 'twenties should not break down owing to the depression of the 'thirties.

MR. R. M. CAMPBELL said that he also, in the interests of brevity, wished to take points of possible criticism of the League's economic and financial work, rather than to praise what was so clearly praiseworthy. Reference could be made first to the content of that work, and secondly to its bearing, and the bearing generally of the "welfare" side of the League, on what was termed the "political work" of the League, by which was meant its job of preserving or restoring peace. Under the first heading the only criticism that might be suggested was that it seemed to give some governments a welcome excuse for inertia. In respect of nutrition Mr. Loveday had made no pretensions to considerable action by the League: yet it was regrettable that words spoken at Geneva were at times deemed a sufficient alternative to action by governments at home. However, there was no reason to doubt that, even if Geneva never existed, governments would have ingenuity enough to find reasons for doing nothing.

As to the relations between the welfare work and the peace-and-war work of the League, he felt that clear dissent was required from the propositions: (1) that the League "can regain in the economic and social sphere the prestige it has lost in the political sphere," and (2) that the habit of co-operation on relatively uncontroversial subjects contribute much to the League's efforts in preserving peace against aggression. The League must rather stand or fall by its success in this latter sphere. The other sphere properly belonged to the more inclusive International Labour Organisation.

Finally, and dissenting from Sir Ernest Benn, he thought that the ample publications prepared by the principal speaker and the Chairman and their colleagues were splendidly worthwhile: if only to show by their plain chronicle of facts and dates that regulations and intervention by governments in extended spheres were the result and not the cause of the difficulties in which the capitalists of the world found themselves.

MR. A. G. LIAS said that the remarks of the fourth speaker upheld the widespread misconception that the League was a super-State. Really there were no such things as League Loans. The Loans had been made by individuals in different countries. The League had had no status therein except as a kind of semi-trustee. It was more than ever necessary to-day that the League should exist as a clearing-house for the expression of ideas on all these problems such as migration, currency, etc., by all the States in the world. The problem of migration, for instance, had got to be discussed internationally, it could not be solved in any other way, as the people had to go from one country to another.

PROFESSOR J. B. CONDLIFFE (in the Chair) said that the lecturer had presented his case as a case for knowledge, and for the organisation of a sensible world based upon knowledge. The fourth speaker had stated the case against knowledge because it might be wrongly used. The chairman thought that it was a mistake to think that if there were no statistics upon which to work there would be no regulations. The regulations would be made in any case. It was surely better that they should be founded upon correct statistics than upon ignorance.

The lecturer had described an important task which was being well done, whose results were important in the long run, although the details might not always seem exciting in their immediate context. Technical work, however, even when important and well done, was not a substitute for the discussion of real political issues. It might be the only thing which the League could effectively do for a little while, but it could not be regarded as a practical alternative to the facing of political issues.

There was need for an initiative in favour of peace directed towards those people willing to co-operate and to trade. It was a mistake to dance to the tune set by the people who did not wish to co-operate except on their own terms. But such an initiative could not be made by the international civil servants at Geneva acting on their own responsibility. To be fruitful it must be made by the national governments in the various countries. If this were done, then the League Secretariat and the machinery built up by it were a competent instrument with which to carry through international collaboration.

PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS[1]

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT, K.B.E.

MY subject is so broad and so complicated that I shall have to be arbitrarily eclectic in my treatment of it and confine myself merely to the three questions which seem, to me at any rate, to be the most interesting of its various facets.

The first question is, how far does the great growth of government propaganda and publicity, which has been such a striking feature of international relations since the War, really influence the news we read or hear from day to day about foreign affairs? The second question is, are we holding our own in the intense competition that now goes on between different countries in the field of national advertisement. The third question is, if we are not holding our own, and I may as well confess that we are not, what can be done about it?

Now, to take the first question, how far is the foreign news we read at breakfast contaminated by the propaganda of governments. I think the best way to approach it is through the relationship of the Press with Foreign Offices. I say that because I feel strongly that, in spite of the progress that the wireless and the cinema have both made as purveyors of news, the Press remains fundamentally by far the most important instrument for that purpose. There are various reasons for this judgment. The wireless is, of course, an unsurpassed medium for emergency propaganda. President Roosevelt and Herr Hitler, unlike as they are in other respects, are past-masters of its use for that purpose. But it will have been noticed that neither of them uses it more than about once a year because they know how easily it can be overdone.

In the matter of routine news the Press still has the advantage. There are obvious reasons why it should. In the first place there is the question of space. I think I am right in saying that the whole of one of the excellent news summaries of the British Broadcasting Corporation goes into something less than two columns of *The Times*. Then there is the question of time. You

[1] Address given at Chatham House on April 5th, 1938; Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., in the Chair.

can read a newspaper article when and how you like. You can read half of it, put it away, finish it at another time, put it in your pocket and discuss it with your friends, and so on. You cannot do that with wireless. You have to be at a certain place at a certain time if you are going to hear its news or views, and if you have not understood what is said the first time, well, you do not get a repetition; at least, not as a rule. It is, from the practical point of view, the same with the cinema, with the News Reel, a very important organ of publicity and propaganda in some ways, but not, from the routine point of view, anything like as important yet as the Press. Then there is another less obvious reason for the pre-eminence of the Press in the realm of news. It is that virtually all the news given out, say, by the wireless, comes in the first instance from the news-collecting organisation of the Press. Such, very roughly, are some of the reasons why it seems best to approach the question of Government propaganda and foreign news by way of the Press.

I have been connected in one way or another with international journalism for over thirty years, and nothing has changed more in regard to it in those thirty years than the relation of Foreign Offices and the Press. In the first decade of the century there was still the same relationship between those two bodies as had existed at any time for the last hundred years. It was casual. Many politicians and officials realised the importance of the Press, but there was no proper organisation for mutual contact. The general feeling on the part of the Press was that the diplomat was an exclusive and rather priggish sort of person who resented anybody trying to break into his laboratory to discover how he performed his mysteries. The average diplomat, on his side, retaliated by treating the emissaries of the Press as nuisances, who, luckily, could usually be avoided. Hence there was not a great deal of contact between the two. I remember when I was at the Foreign Office, I think at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Locarno, having to make some arrangements with one of our office-keepers about the admission of the Press to witness the ceremony. He said to me: "Well, sir, this is a change from what it used to be. Before the War these Press gentlemen used to line up in the courtyard outside the office at about four o'clock and one of us would come out to them and say 'Nothing doing to-day, gentlemen,' and they went away." That, of course, was an exaggeration, but it does rather reflect the sort of impression which I had as a young man of the relations of Foreign Offices with the generality of journalists.

I had, of course, seen something of the way in which the German Foreign Office manipulated the Press; but it was only when I arrived in Washington that I found a Foreign Minister dealing with the Press in the modern manner. Now all Foreign Offices have the organized contacts with journalists which the American State Department had already perfected in the first decade of the century.

The reason for the change is pretty obvious. A good deal of it flows from the War. The War caused governments to organise propaganda on a big scale and though newspaper men always say that they dislike official "hand-outs," I think on the whole they do find that those "hand-outs" rather lighten the labour of news collecting. Then behind that there is the different point of view that now obtains about war, and therefore about diplomacy, whereas war in the past was looked upon rather as a specialists' job, and was not considered very seriously by ordinary people. Everybody everywhere now feels that its recurrence on a large scale would be the final disaster. Hence international relations are no longer looked upon as a field in which diplomacy can be allowed to disport itself as it likes. And behind that obvious consideration, again, you have the result of mass education, the mass-produced Press and so on. All this means that ten journalists now write about foreign affairs as compared with one in the old days. The first international conference that I had anything to do with was the Conference of Algeciras. I was not there; I watched it from Paris; but from what I remember of it I doubt whether there were more than twenty or thirty journalists at it in all. Well, in 1930 or the end of 1929, I was on the Committee which prepared for the Naval Conference of that year in London, and I remember shocking even the imperturbable Sir Maurice Hankey by suggesting that, at our first meeting, I should want as much floor-space for the Press as the rest of the Conference would need for its deliberations. I did not get quite that: but I must have secured a good many thousand square feet in St. James's Palace for the journalists. The only real rebuff I had was over a ban for alcoholic drinks. That was considered to be incompatible with the dignity of the palace. It was left to the League of Nations to make alcohol an official adjunct to the "ploy" of conference news-getting. At a first-class conference you have anything up to five hundred journalists to begin with. They usually dwindle pretty quickly after the first week or two. Then on the Government side there has been a great development of the Press Bureau or Press Department, or whatever you like

to call it (we call it News Department), which the different Foreign Offices maintain. The manner in which those Press Bureaux function is in all cases much the same. You can divide their functions into three parts. There is the giving out of news. There is, I was going to say, the colouring of news, but perhaps that is not altogether seemly; let us say, the serving up of the news with the sort of sauce that the political masters of the particular Press Bureau like us to have with it for breakfast next morning. Thirdly, there is counter-propaganda, that is to say the putting right of stories which other Governments and Press Bureaux, and so on, give out.

The methods of Press Bureaux vary considerably. There is a great difference between the way in which a Press Bureau in a democratic country and a Press Bureau in a dictatorial country carries on its business. So far as the Home Press in a dictatorial country is concerned, the Press Bureau has complete control. There is in, say, Germany or Italy no censorship in the sense that everything that is written must be submitted to the authorities, but the head of the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin or Rome has very definite ways in which he can make editors toe the line. I need not go into that. In the democratic countries, of course, it is a question of suasion. You have got, somehow or other, to persuade your Press, both Home and Foreign, to take the line your masters want. I would add that in the dictatorial countries, as far as the Foreign Press is concerned, it is also a question of suasion, though helped by other factors. For instance *The Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Mr. Gedye, got turned out of Vienna the other day. Mr. Ebbut, the correspondent of *The Times*, was forced out of Berlin about a year ago. The knowledge that this sort of arbitrary intolerance lurks in the background must cramp the style of the Foreign correspondent in dictatorial countries, admirably as most of them refuse to be intimidated. Apart from that the suasion to which the writer on foreign affairs is subjected is exercised in all Press Bureaux in much the same way, namely, by dint of meetings between the journalist in question and some member of the Press Bureau. One might imagine that that would lead to a good deal of colouring of news. Personally, having seen both sides of the game, I do not think it does. I do not think that our Foreign news as it enters, as it were, the international news stream of the world is badly coloured.

There are a great many factors, even in dictatorial countries, which militate against the official propagandist. In the first place, the average correspondent is pretty wide awake. He was

not born yesterday. He has got a good idea of what is likely and what is not. In the second place, in a democratic country, he has had the Opposition Parties and the local Press generally to keep him straight. He lacks that advantage, of course, in the dictatorial countries. But both in the dictatorial and in the democratic countries he has other safeguards. He has his own diplomatic mission. He can go to his own Embassy or Legation and be kept fairly straight from the point of view of his own country. He probably has friends even in dictatorial countries who talk to him pretty frankly and, most important of all, he has his colleagues. In all the big capitals and at conferences there is a great deal of co-operation between the journalists and even between the journalists of different countries. They have to co-operate. The field is too big for any of them to cover single-handed or even for several of them working together in the big newspaper or news agency correspondents' offices to cover. An English correspondent, for instance, will probably get the American or French view in the capital or at the conference from the American or French correspondent who has been in touch with his own people. At a conference, especially after a secret session, you are apt to find delegates as they come out of the meeting surrounded in the lobby by a compact little group of their own national correspondents, telling them how they alone have saved the day and so on. Even the correspondents of dictatorial countries do not take that sort of stuff without a grain of salt. The different nationalities compare notes as to what their delegates have told them and gradually arrive at something which more often than not approximates to even the secret truth. In those and other ways the correspondent generally manages to keep government propaganda pretty well in its place. I do not believe that what I called just now the international news stream is much more contaminated by organised propaganda now than it was by the sporadic and amateurish propaganda of thirty years ago. I say " much more " because, of course, the news sent to the dictatorial countries must for obvious reason be in line with the arbitrary policies of those countries.

The real danger from propaganda, if I may speak frankly, lies much closer at home so far as we are concerned. It comes from the play of proprietorial prejudices and Party politics. It is after it arrives in the newspaper office that the foreign news is apt to get a particular twist put upon it, either by headlines, or by leading articles, or by prunings and partial suppressions. And that is where the foreign propagandist can get in his work, and

especially the propagandist of the dictatorial countries. You find those countries quietly sending efficient people here and to other capitals to make touch with journalists and key politicians (both practising politicians and amateur politicians) and nobble them in one way or another and thus influence public opinion. And you find the same thing abroad. Directly one of our politicians, in or out of office, develops a tendency to travel the propagandists abroad are out to collar him. That, I think, is where the danger lies more than in the foreign news which comes into the country.

My second question concerned the extent to which we in Great Britain are holding our own in the very intense competition that now goes on in national advertising. There the situation is disquieting. But, first of all, what is this international publicity and propaganda? As I see it, it divides itself roughly into two broad categories. There is news and there is everything that goes under the name of cultural propaganda, which really means everything from the production of the sort of national super-film the Russians get out down to the presenting of a boys' school in Bolivia with the *Boys' Own Paper.*

Let us look first at the news side of international propaganda. Let me start by a glance at the very important news collecting and distributing organisation called the News Agency. Everybody knows what News Agencies are and why they are. They came into being during the last century to supplement the endeavours of individual newspapers to cover the rapidly growing field of world news. What with the telegraph, the filling out of the world and so on, no newspaper, however rich, could possibly collect all the news it wanted every day all over the globe through its own staff. At first the News Agencies collected news and sold it in their own countries. Then the larger ones amongst them started to branch out and sell in other countries as well. The leader in all this development was *Reuters*, the great English Agency, and very close behind it came the great French News Agency, *Havas.* At one time *Havas* and *Reuters* sold their news, so far as the outer part of the world went, by drawing a dividing line between the two hemispheres. *Reuters*, if I remember rightly, took, roughly speaking, Asia and the Far East and *Havas* took Latin America. That, however, is a thing of the past. There is going on now at the present moment a very keen fight, between the different News Agencies of the different big countries, to sell news, especially in the outlying parts of the world. And this fight is not progressing in a particularly satisfactory way for Great Britain.

The reason for this is that there are two types of News Agency, commercial and State-controlled, or at any rate State-aided, News Agencies. Of the commercial News Agencies *Reuters* here, the *Associated Press* and the *United Press* in America are the chief examples; among the State-controlled or State-aided Agencies you have the new German Agency, the *Deutsche Nachrichten Buro*; the French Agency, *Havas* (*Havas* is not State-controlled but it is State-aided); you have the Italian *Stefani* which is definitely State-controlled, you have *Domei* the Japanese Agency, *Tass* the Russian Agency, and so on. All those Agencies are being helped on a very large scale by their Governments to spread their own national news over the world. The result of that is that the British Agencies, of which *Reuters* has by far the biggest foreign service, are at a disadvantage. *Reuters*, though it is a very strong and well-organised Agency, is having a difficult time in holding its own in the vast area over which it used to distribute news in the Far East, in the teeth of the new subsidised competition of its Japanese, German and French rivals. In South America we hardly distribute any news at all. There the field is bitterly disputed between the American Agencies which have been established there for some time and *Havas*, who has lately been pouring out money in order to push into that part of the world. That will hit us hard in the event of another war. Propaganda is going to play a very important part in warfare in the future. And to my mind, though everybody will not agree with me, you cannot improvise channels of propaganda at the last moment. People who think that we can are, I believe, deluded by their memory of the last war. It was a different thing then, because the large-scale propaganda field was virgin soil, and it was quite easy then to improvise. But, if there is another war, it will be quite different because all the channels of propaganda will have been pre-empted. People in different countries will have got used to taking their news from the existing sources, and it will be very difficult for new streams of news from England or anywhere else to break into South America or to the Far East or anywhere else. So we are falling behind, I am afraid, in an extremely important aspect of "preparedness."

There is the trade aspect too. It was always said in the old days that trade followed the flag. In these days it is becoming more and more obvious that trade also follows news. And it follows from what I have said that there is very little straight English news now in South America, for instance. Most of the news about us there comes through the French or American

Agencies. I do not for a minute want to suggest that *Havas* or the American Agencies are unfair to us. I do not think they are, but obviously the Americans are going to specialise in American news and stress American trade, and *Havas* is going to do the same with things French. Also in times of political crisis, whether national or international, we need our own media of news distribution. We do not want to rely on the best and most friendly foreign news services. It is never the same thing.

Next to the News Agencies comes the spoken wireless as a means of news distribution.

There also we have not been doing any too well. If you travel in the United States you find that the Germans are pouring out rather good wireless propaganda. They give good musical and entertainment programmes, ingeniously interlarded with tendencious stuff. You get the Italians doing the same sort of thing for the whole of the Western Hemisphere. I imagine it is the same in the Far East. I know from listening to the European wirelesses that the Old World is criss-crossed by wireless propaganda. Much of this is part of the immense drive which the totalitarian countries, Germany, Italy and Russia, have been making with regard to short-wave emission in foreign languages. I think I am right in saying that those countries send out programmes in practically every conceivable language. I remember hearing during the Abyssinian crisis that the B.B.C. were mystified for some days by a broadcast from Berlin which none of their people could understand, and which turned out to be Zulu. I have never checked that story so I will not answer for it, but there is no reason why it should not be true. Lately, we have been doing something also in the foreign-language line, stirred up by the notorious Bari Wireless which the Italians used, until the recent *détente*, to make propaganda against us in the Near and Middle East in the appropriate languages. The B.B.C. now emits messages in Spanish and Portuguese for the Western Hemisphere and in Arabic for the Near and Middle East. And in about a year it will be able to increase this service, when the new transmitters which are being put up at Daventry are ready. Also the B.B.C.'s Empire Service has a good national advertisement value. Nevertheless for the present our use of the radio in that field is not what it might be.

We come next to the question of cultural propaganda. There again other countries have got ahead of us. We used to try to do a little cultural propaganda in my days at the Foreign Office, but only on a very limited scale, for the good reason that we were

never allowed to spend any money. While the French Government were spending, for instance, over a million sterling a year the most that we could get was a few thousands. Now, I am glad to say, things are better. We are now forging ahead a little, again stirred up by what the totalitarian countries are doing. We have started, as is generally known, an organisation called the British Council. That organisation, if I may say so, was a Foreign-Office invention. Unable to get as much money as they wanted from the Treasury, from the Government, the Foreign Office hit upon the idea of extracting what money they could from those sources and then trying to supplement it from private sources. So they set up, naturally with the consent of the Government, the British Council. The Council consists partly of officials, representatives of various Government departments, and partly of non-official people endowed with the many sorts of special knowledge which the Council needs. It was started at the end of 1934 and its chairman has always been non-official. Its first chairman was Lord Tyrrell after his retirement from the Paris Embassy. Then came Lord Eustace Percy and now Lord Lloyd.

The British Council does excellent work, the nature of which can be gathered from the little brochure which it puts out. Besides its Executive Committee it has a number of smaller committees with their various cultural propagandist activities, such as the encouragement of British Institutes abroad of Anglo-Foreign Societies, and so on. It founds or helps English Professorships and lectureships abroad It helps British schools abroad. It builds up British libraries. It sends out British periodicals. It tries to get over here as many foreign students and teachers as it can. It arranges lecture and concert tours, exhibitions of British Art, documentary and other films abroad.

Such are some of the very useful avocations of the British Council. But it ought to function on a much larger scale if it is to compete with the similar activities of other countries. Compare, for instance, what it spends with what other countries pay out for the same sort of work. Last year our Government gave sixty thousand pounds towards its expenses. This year it is hoped that it will give, I think, a hundred and ten thousand pounds. The Council at the same time gets, as I have said, what money it can from private sources. But not probably much more in all than the Government contribution. And what do other countries spend? Well, we know that both the French and the Italian Governments are spending, are going to spend this year, well over a million sterling, and we suspect that they really spend

more. The German figure is difficult to get at, but it is certainly bigger, probably between two and three millions. You realise what this discrepancy means sometimes when you are abroad. I have already spoken of the drive of foreign propaganda that you find on the other side of the Atlantic. I was in Rome the other day, and was much struck by the importance of what they call their Ministry of Popular Culture, which, of course, does a great deal of Italian home propaganda as well as foreign propaganda. Every other Palace in Rome seems to be taken up by its offices. On my arrival I wanted to see an old friend who is now head of the section which looks after the Foreign Press. I vaguely told my taxi-driver to go to the Ministry of Popular Culture. We visited three or four vast propaganda buildings before I found the one I wanted. The activity emanating from all those buildings was immense. Every sort of Italian patriotic society at home or abroad is now under the control of and being helped by the Ministry. The Italian Dante Society has a membership of well over half a million, very largely abroad. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Propaganda stresses the use that the foreign organisations of that society had been in counteracting the hostility aroused by the Abyssinian affair. Then there is a great organisation for Italian classes and courses abroad. I think there is a course in Berlin attended by about seven or eight thousand Germans. There is one in Buenos Aires to which two or three thousand people go, and so on. When I have been lecturing in the United States I have come across the track of Italian lecturers, and indeed the lecturers of other countries, over there, one imagines, largely at the public expense.

I rather think, if I may put it brutally, the best illustration of our standing as propagandists abroad and that of other countries was to be found at the Paris Exhibition last summer. The contrast between our shoddy little building and the Italian, Russian and German pavilions gave me the key. I happened to be at the Exhibition on July 14th and I spent a good deal of time in the Russian and German pavilions, listening to the comments of the great crowd of French provincials who had come up for the day and realising what really telling propaganda those buildings were doing for their countries.

Well, what can one do about it all? One does not want to go in for cultural or any other sort of propaganda on the scale on which it is being done by the continental countries. I should hate to see us, for instance, set up a Ministry of Propaganda such as the Germans or the Italians have got. It would be a great

mistake to do so. It would, for one thing, almost inevitably make propaganda a subject of Party manipulation and controversy. I believe that as far as cultural propaganda goes we are on sound lines with the British Council, which is a curiously characteristic English compromise of the official and the unofficial. But I do think, as I have already indicated, that its activities ought to be greatly enlarged. There should be no question of its having to eke out its funds by private subscriptions. The Government should be made to realise that propaganda is an essential part of military preparations and is worth the cost each year of the tenth of a battleship or so. In the same way, I should like to see the Government forego part of the money which the Post Office collects from the B.B.C. and allow the B.B.C. to spend it on foreign broadcasts and on carefully considered, honest, straightforward propaganda. Then I take it that something ought to be done to increase the ability of our News Agencies to compete with the agencies of other countries in the distribution of news. That also would help enormously in getting the propaganda side of "preparedness" up to the level of our other "preparedness." I know there are people who say that one cannot possibly compete with certain other countries, that one could not sink to the level of misrepresentation, and so on, to which they have descended. I agree. I do not think it would pay us so to compete. I believe that in the long run the truth systematically and consistently propagated will beat even the cleverest campaign of misrepresentation. I was struck by that in the United States last year. As I was saying, the Germans are putting out a very efficient trans-Atlantic wireless propaganda on the short wave which is not usually too outrageously tendencious. But it was losing ground to our Empire news service, the service emitted by the B.B.C. People, I found, made a point of listening to the Empire service because it was trustworthy. I heard it, indeed, favourably compared with some of the American programmes. That is a fairly good answer to the defeatists who say that it is no good trying to make the truth prevail in propaganda, that a lie once circulated can never be knocked on the head, and so on. I see no reason, in fact, why we should not do as good national advertisement as any other country, if we will wake up and remedy defects in our methods, such as those which I have tried to indicate.

Finally, I would like to say this: Personally I am more worried by the ultimate effects of the home propaganda of countries like Germany and Italy than I am by their propaganda

abroad. Obviously the thing which counts now in world affairs in these days more than anything else is the tremendous drive of the new totalitarian States. Somebody, I noticed, spoke the other day of the majestic tranquillity of Hitler's diplomatic progress. It sounds rather an odd phrase in view of the noisiness of his methods, but I am not at all sure whether the ultimate historian will not approve of it. Germany has gone on from objective to objective doing exactly what she wants and humiliating (is it too strong a word, I do not think so) the democracies at every turn. Well, one of Herr Hitler's great allies in that progress, so to speak, is undoubtedly this new totalitarian mass hypnotism, mass suggestion which he, like Signor Mussolini, is so successfully employing. It makes their nations compact instruments to their hands. I had an astonishing example of what it can do when in Italy the other day.

I was in Northern Italy when Mr. Eden resigned. The whole atmosphere changed. One gradually realised that everybody in Italy had thought that Mr. Eden was master of Great Britain, that his sole policy was to attack Italy directly we were strong enough to do so and to revenge himself for his Abyssinian humiliation at the hands of Signor Mussolini. This was the result of the propaganda which Rome had been putting out in the Press, on the wireless and in a whispering campaign for the last two years, and it had produced a situation in which anything like good Anglo-Italian relations could not even be thought of so long as Mr. Eden remained in office. In Rome, indeed, I was told that even people high up in the Fascist organisation were obsessed by this "myth." The ease with which this sort of thing can be done in a totalitarian State gives one a good deal to think about. It means that propaganda can give that type of State an effective solidarity, and therefore a prestige abroad, such as we with our free institutions and freedom of thought and debate cannot often emulate. What is the answer?

Was Lord Baldwin right when he said that democracy must always be two years behind dictatorship? I do not think he was. I do believe that the unsuccess of our foreign policy lately has been less due to inevitable popular indifference or slowness of thought than to the fact that Lord Baldwin and our other political leaders have not been particularly educative, or clear-cut or convincing in their approach to external problems. Even totalitarian opinion is at a loss when its leaders hesitate or are inconsistent. I saw that also in Italy the other day, when circumstances forced Signor Mussolini to proclaim that the Germanisation of

Austria had been beneficently ordained in spite of the fact that he had been ready to fight to prevent it less than four years ago. Italians were just as much bemused by that spectacular change of direction as our people have ever been by the chops and changes of our politicians over, say, collective security.

But I do not want to become political. What I have tried to do to-night is to indicate very superficially the case for greater interest in national advertisement and propaganda. Our weakness in that field has been largely inherited from the nineteenth century when we were top-dog to such an extent that we did not have to do any propaganda at all. Things are very different now. I like to think that the activities of the British Council, the foreign language programme of the B.B.C. and such things as the committee which the Government recently set up to co-ordinate different forms of British advertising and propaganda abroad, do mean that our rather careless complacency is vanishing and that we are realising that we have got to look upon better publicity and propaganda as an essential part of rearmament, that we have got to organise our preparedness on the psychological as well as on the physical side.

Summary of Discussion

SIR JOHN POWER said that he agreed with everything that the lecturer had said concerning propaganda. He was, himself, an officer of the British Council. It was to be hoped that the British Council would be continued on the lines on which it had been started, both Government and private, because it had certainly met with a good deal of success. It had the support of every Party in the House of Commons, and there would be no difficulty in gaining the assent of that body to any grant which the Treasury might care to make. In fact, the only question ever raised by any member of Parliament on the subject was: why did the Government not give the British Council more money?

The British Council had made arrangements for something like eighty-two foreign students to take courses at various universities. It was, however, difficult to get professors to go abroad because the salaries offered were often not sufficient for a decently qualified man to live upon, and the tenure of office was not long enough to enable the right people to be chosen. Consequently the Council had first to guarantee them a living wage, and secondly it had to guarantee them a decent tenure of office. The number of projects before the Council was staggering.

MR. CLEMENT JONES said that twenty years ago an important Senator had arrived from the United States and a luncheon party had

been given in his honour by Lord Curzon. Towards the end of luncheon the Senator had been explaining how potent and excellent was the German propaganda in 1918 in the States, how wonderful it was, how it stretched from Maine to Mexico. Lord Curzon then asked the Senator what he thought of the British propaganda, and the Senator answered that it was "very dignified!" Whereupon Lord Curzon had quickly replied that by that he supposed he meant that it was "wholly impotent."

Now it seemed, after twenty years, that with regard to this German propaganda in the United States and the relative position of British propaganda matters were almost exactly the same and, to modify Lord Curzon's words, British propaganda was relatively impotent. The lecturer had said that, in his opinion, the Press was more important than the wireless, and this had always been the opinion of the speaker on his many visits to the United States. Could not this fact be made use of? When there was all this talk of going to war, it was necessary to think of the probable belligerents and neutrals, and particularly of the probable neutrals when it came to the question of propaganda. The United States was the important neutral for Great Britain to consider. Could anything be done as man to man and democracy to democracy between the Press of Great Britain and the Press of the United States to help this situation?

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT replied that, for the moment, he was not particularly encouraged as to the prospects of being able to do anything through the Press in this direction, because there were two fundamental difficulties in the way of a really good American opinion about Great Britain. One was the War Debt, and the other was Sir John Simon, Mr. Stimson and Manchuria. Possibly the last-mentioned matter might be cleared up through the Press. The lecturer thought that Sir John Simon had been put in rather a false position, especially by a rather gratuitous communiqué put out at the time which said that the British Government was not worried about the possibility of Japan grabbing Manchuria. This had never been forgotten in the United States, and caused British policy still to be regarded with undue suspicion which, however, it ought not to be impossible to allay.

The question of the War Debt was far more difficult. It was a question of money talking. The average American brushed aside difficulties of transfer, of their own high tariff wall and so on. He (the American) heard members of our Government constantly proclaiming that Great Britain was the richest and most powerful and most respected country in the world and he asked himself why, then, could she not pay her debts. The War Debts question was, in fact, a great handicap to Anglo-American relations.

COLONEL MEDLICOTT asked whether it was not a great handicap in the matter of successful national propaganda to have people in the Houses of Parliament who put Party before State. The talk in Parlia-

ment, the fact that there was no unanimity frequently misled the foreigner concerning the real opinion of the mass of British opinion.

Secondly, could the lecturer say how he thought the Bari broadcasts now stood in relation to the British counter-propaganda? He had heard that the British broadcasts in Arabic were dull and were followed by boring gramophone records which the Arabs liked a little less even than the English.

Thirdly, he referred to Herr Hitler's chapter on propaganda in *Mein Kampf*, wherein British propaganda during the War was compared very favourably with German.

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT said that he absolutely agreed with what had been said about Herr Hitler and his chapter on propaganda in *Mein Kampf*. Herr Hitler had also said that the greater the lie the greater the chance of its being believed. In addition, he had pointed out that the simpler the slogan the greater its effect. Simple slogans were much more difficult for us with our party system and constant party controversy, which enabled the foreign propagandist to find a text in *Hansard*, for instance, for almost anything he wanted to have believed about us. That was one of the reasons why it would help us so much in these days if we could get back to our old, much-vaunted continuity of foreign policy.

The Italian broadcasts in the Near East were certainly more imaginatively conceived than those relayed by the B.B.C. But there was now a truce, at any rate, in that particular field of competition; and anyhow perhaps in the end we should have been able to make truth more interesting than fiction. The Government should see that receiving sets capable of reproducing the British news were supplied in the East. The Italians had been practically giving sets away, and much more initiative was required on the part of Great Britain in that sort of thing. Our propaganda during the War had, the lecturer thought, been good, but Herr Hitler probably did not realise how often we had scored by knowing when not to make it rather than by making it.

A MEMBER said that only one reference had been made to industrial propaganda. The lecturer had said that trade not only followed the flag, it also followed the news. No department of British propaganda was so backward as industrial propaganda. The Department of Overseas Trade was practically forbidden to undertake propaganda. In what direction and along what lines did the lecturer think that more propaganda might be done in order to expand British trade abroad? Political propaganda was largely concerned with the struggle between the two ideologies of Fascism and Democracy. Cultural propaganda dealt with the civilisation and mode of life of Democracy versus Fascism. The fact that Great Britain depended ultimately on her export trade should be considered together with this matter of intensi-

fying and increasing the present very poor propaganda for British industrial products abroad.

GENERAL POPE-HENESSY said that he had discussed the question of propaganda during war with one of the best German Generals two and a half years after the termination of the Great War. The latter had complained rather bitterly of the quality of the British propaganda, saying how vicious and deadly it had been, and when the speaker had tried to find out the essential reason for this deadly and vicious quality, he had found that it lay in the fact that the British had nearly always told the exact truth concerning a situation, and Germany, on her side, had taken the two or three important steps necessary to convince the world that she was in the wrong. She herself had been the best propagandist for the Allies. For instance, Germany, not Great Britain, had invaded Belgium. When it had come to sinking neutral ships, Germany had done it with the greatest amount of publicity and filled her newspapers with the glorification of those who drowned sailors, women and children. The more truth there was in propaganda the more deadly it became, the more imagination the more futile. That was why the inventions of Bari would be, in the long run, much less powerful than such fragments of truth as the British might put across. It was not a question of enlarging the volume and scope of propaganda, but the quality which should be kept high and such that nobody could question its truth.

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT said that he agreed absolutely with the last speaker. That was why he had said that the best British propaganda during the War had sometimes been no propaganda. He had been connected with what had not been done in the first three years of the War in the United States, and British, French and Belgians had all tried to restrain their nationals there from doing anything, telling them to keep quiet and to let the Germans hang themselves by the rope of their clumsy propaganda.

Concerning commercial propaganda, surely the greater part of it should be done by the commercial houses themselves, by the quality of goods which they sent abroad and by the way in which they were advertised, and so on?

THE MEMBER who had spoken previously agreed, but said that there was little co-ordination between the British business houses and organisations compared with their German competitors for example.

A LADY MEMBER said that she agreed with what had been said about the predominance of Italian propaganda in the Near East, but that the German public were reading a great many more English newspapers than they ever had before, and were therefore a great deal better informed than many might think.

Secondly, she considered that the propaganda now indulged in

by Germany was only an extension of the propaganda which had always gone on in that very undemocratic country.

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT said that he had asked a member of Dr. Goebbels' Staff about English newspapers being circulated in Germany, and he had replied that they did not matter very much, as so few people read them that they really did not touch the masses. Again, he had pointed out that the reproduction of extracts from them was controlled. This was a very important point.

MR. A. L. KENNEDY said that he had travelled back from Austria a few days ago, stopping at different places, and buying whenever possible the local newspapers, and he had been amazed at the completeness and rapidity with which the standardisation of the Austrian Press had been accomplished by the Nazis. All news was completely uniform and non-objective, and all the papers had been filled with expressions of admiration for Hitler and the Greater Germany. Any articles had been concerned with tales of joy-rides taken by Austrian workmen to Berlin, etc. There certainly was a greater circulation of British newspapers in Germany since the Nazi régime, but even now only a small section of the population, relatively, read English newspapers, and in many small places they were not obtainable.

MRS. PICKETT asked whether there could not be more propaganda in the Dominions. When she had been in Australia two years earlier she had found in the Press a strong feeling against Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden.

A GUEST said that perhaps the main trouble in Great Britain was that most people wanted a certain amount of publicity, but did not want to have any publicity with it !

Was not the effect of the Press sometimes counteracted by the effect of the film? The minimum number of people visiting a West-End cinema theatre was fifty thousand a week.

Subsidised Foreign News Agencies had been mentioned. The Dominions often found themselves in a serious position in this matter. There were several newspapers in Africa, for instance, which were too poor to pay for a really good news service and who had to obtain their news from any news service who would supply them.

With regard to the radio, the speaker considered that stations such as Luxemburg had done a great deal of harm by mixing so much advertisement with their programmes.

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT said that until a short time ago, he, too, had thought that advertising in radio programmes would not go down well in England, but he had been told at lunch that very day, by a foreigner interested in the matter, that the taste for advertisement in radio programmes was growing in England.

THE HON. MRS. ALFRED LYTTELTON asked whether indirect propaganda such as what was organised by the British Council did not often have a greater effect than direct propaganda. The misapprehension in many countries as to what England was doing was due to the fact that the people in those countries did not in the least understand what queer creatures the English were. It would be of more value to make other countries realise what the English characteristics were, their peculiar faults and their peculiar virtues, than to try to spread a great deal of direct propaganda.

A MEMBER said that from the nature of his own job he knew that what the lecturer had said had been fundamentally correct. He agreed that there was no propaganda so effective as the truth. It was the quality of propaganda which mattered, not the quantity. The speaker was not at all impressed by the huge sums of money which were being spent by the totalitarian and other countries. A very good case could be put across with far less money, providing of course that there was a good case to put across. It was not necessary to propagate the truth at the rate of fifteen thousand words a day. If truth were expressed and circulated at the rate of five thousand words a day, a very good day's work would have been done; and for this a great deal of money was not required. The speaker was not concerned with cultural propaganda, but with foreign news service.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH (in the Chair) said that personally he felt certain that there was no need for anxiety in regard to the capability of Great Britain to compete with any foreign Power in the matter of propaganda. During the Great War they had done as well and better in this field than any other Power, and he felt sure they would do so again. Propaganda was started at G.H.Q. France at the very beginning of the War, and it is probable that the first use of wireless for that purpose was that made of it about October 1914, when broadcasts in German were issued from British Army Wireless Stations. By 1916, when he went to the War Office as Director of Military Intelligence, British propaganda had reached a very high development.

He agreed with the speaker that South America as a whole was ill-provided with British news. When he was in Venezuela in 1925, he found that there was a great deal of American and, especially, French news, but hardly anything about affairs in Great Britain. He was, however, interested to find that a remembrance of British War propaganda still existed, and he had found in far-away parts of Venezuela copies of a magazine *America Latina*, which had been issued by the British Propaganda Agencies during the War.

He would also like to support what had been said about the British Council. It was doing very good work with the small funds at its disposal, and he hoped that additional money would be forthcoming, so that it might extend its activities.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1. ARMS AND THE COVENANT: Speeches on Foreign Affairs and National Defence. By the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill. 1938. (London: Harrap. 8vo. 466 pp. 18s.)

MR. RANDOLPH CHURCHILL has carried through this filial task with admirable skill and clarity. He has collected forty of his father's speeches on the international situation, prefacing each with a brief indication of the atmosphere in which it was delivered, and providing a general introduction which summarises the argument and the movement of the speaker's mind.

To the speeches the House of Commons has already paid tribute in the interest and respect with which Mr. Churchill's interventions in debate are welcomed. Reading them now as a connected whole, the British public cannot but endorse that verdict. They are a sustained effort to get our Government to realise our unpreparedness in the face of Germany's rearmament, an effort renewed and reinforced after every rebuff which the mentor experienced. There is all the insistence of Cato, without the bitterness; on the contrary, an unfeigned admiration for the German people and a recurring hope that they may yet return to the European family of nations and bring their grievances to its forum.

Apart from their literary graces, the speeches are in three respects remarkable. First is the restraint of their language, while censuring and correcting the delays, the blunders and the inaccuracies with which Mr. Churchill charges the Government and its advisers. His politeness, it is true, wears thin when he is dealing with those who are not of his own political persuasion: the Prime Minister, for example (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1933), possessed "the gift of compressing the largest number of words into the smallest amount of thought." Otherwise, it is only under extreme provocation that his satire waxes acrid, as when in November 1936 he describes the Government as going on "in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent."

A second characteristic of the speeches is the detailed technical knowledge which they exhibit, especially in the series of homilies on Air Defence. There seems nothing from naval strategy to the jigs and tools in an arms factory or the devices for "clawing down marauding aeroplanes" on which Mr. Churchill is not an expert. Third among the notable features of the volume is Mr. Churchill's conversion to the principle of Collective Security. In 1932 what impressed him most about the League of Nations Union in this country was its "long-suffering and inexhaustible gullibility"; but in 1934 he was coming

round to the ideal of a League with an international police force, and by the end of 1936 he was urging our people to use their " full strength and influence to rebuild the League of Nations, to make it capable of holding a potential aggressor in restraint by armed power, and thereafter to labour faithfully for the mitigation of just and real grievances." Never has the Geneva ideal found more cloquent expression than in the peroration of the fine speech (March 14th, 1938) on the Annexation of Austria. MESTON.

2*. THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE. By M. J. Bonn. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 432 pp. 15s.)

IT is an irresistible temptation, and even a necessity, to stand aside from time to time from current events and generalise about the course they are taking. Such attempts to fit contemporary history into the framework of world history are speculative, hazardous and, as a rule, far too sweeping. But they are none the less stimulating; and once in a century a genius like Karl Marx arises and make a generalisation which in itself becomes part of history.

Dr. Bonn's book has the merits and defects of this kind of writing. The theme which he takes as his *leit motif* of current events is that "an age of empire-breaking is following an age of empire-making." The age of colonisation in the old sense is over. There are no more empty spaces to occupy. With the growth of nationalism an age of " decolonisation " has set in. Empires have disintegrated, and former " colonies " have set up on their own. The next step must be a sort of " re-colonisation " (Dr. Bonn does not use the term, but it fits his thesis) which must, however, be, not like the old colonisation " vertical," but " horizontal "—*i.e.*, it must come about by federation of existing units.

On this theme Dr. Bonn has strung together a long series of facts and observations on many aspects of international politics. He acknowledges a debt to Chatham House, which is clearly visible on many pages. His chapters on the colonies have quite properly drawn largely on the two Chatham House publications *Raw Materials and Colonies* and *The Colonial Problem*. Elsewhere he effectively emphasises the changes which are always going on in the internal structure of countries, changes which make the preservation of the *status quo* " a rather formal conception." Here Professor Carr-Saunders and other recent students of the population problem have stood him in good stead. Well worth pondering also is Dr. Bonn's diagnosis of the underlying difference between Germany and Italy:

> Germany's grievances resemble those of Italy only superficially. . . . She does not need victories in order to recover her self-respect; she has shown the world that she can wage wars and win battles without the aid of powerful allies. Her main political problems are continental, not maritime. An oversea empire may be of great economic assistance to her. But whatever her romantic imperialists may say, her spokesmen, from Bismarck to Hitler, have always looked upon oversea possessions as complementary parts of a continental empire, not as substitutes for one.

A discursive work of this kind rather invites superficiality, and Dr. Bonn has not completely avoided this temptation. " Science no longer supported liberty, but power. . . . Minerva had sold herself to Mars " is a pointless epigram. There never was a period in modern history, from the age of gunpowder onwards, when the military arm did not enlist the resources of science. In several places Dr. Bonn seems

to treat political theories as if they came down from heaven to direct the course of history instead of, in fact, emerging out of historical events. "Whilst Machiavelli, Bacon or Harrington outlined the theory, statesmen, soldiers, and adventurers embodied it in large-scale practical experiments," is a curious inversion. Borgia could have existed without Machiavelli. But *The Prince* could not have been written without a Borgia. And before writing p. 92, Dr. Bonn might have pondered Halévy's dictum that eighteenth-century England "put into practice the policy of *laissez-faire* before it found a justification, or even an apparent justification, in the new doctrine." As Professor Hobson put it, "Empire precedes Imperialism."

It is difficult to write on the present international situation without seeming either gloomy or Utopian. Dr. Bonn's concluding pages offer us a judicious blend of both qualities. But does not his view that economic collaboration is not possible between autarkic and other Powers imply a dividing-line which does not in fact exist? The United States were born (more or less) autarkic. Great Britain achieved (more or less) autarky through sea-power and imperialism, supplemented by such devices as the sugar subsidy and oil policy. Germany and Italy are having autarky (more or less) thrust on them by a rather painful process. If we realised that we were all going the same way, but that some of us are better equipped by nature than others to stay the course, perhaps understanding and collaboration would be less difficult. E. H. Carr.

3*. Dare We Look Ahead? By Bertrand Russell, Vernon Bartlett, G. D. H. Cole, Harold J. Laski and others. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. Sm. 8vo. 190 pp. 5s.)

4*. Constructive Democracy. By Sir Ernest Simon, Lord Halifax, Lord Lothian, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Sir Arthur Salter, Professor Moritz Bonn and others. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 247 pp. 7s. 6d.)

The first of these books comprises Fabian Lectures delivered in the autumn of 1937. It is concerned with the present situation of frenzied war-preparations which has resulted from the failure of democracy to cope either with international or "class" relations. The authors, as Fabians, are convinced that until a greater measure of economic equality has been attained there will be no solution of international problems. *Constructive Democracy* (lectures given at a summer school held by the Association for Education in Citizenship) investigates the nature, strength and weaknesses of democracy. The effect of the two books, read together, is curious: a discussion of the conditions of "the good life" in a society rapidly approaching dissolution, judged by the state of its international relations. Mr. Vernon Bartlett in *Dare We Look Ahead?* is surprisingly optimistic; while Lord Lothian in *Constructive Democracy* declares that the international problem is not so much the "greatest" as the "only" problem which confronts democracy to-day—since it can "almost certainly solve every other issue." Sir Alfred Zimmern's lecture on "Learning and Leadership" is one of the most interesting and stimulating in either book; without making the facile assumption that "education" is a short-term panacea for all ills, one may feel that he touches here the core of the problem. These two books show the diversity of aims and remedies which the present state of international anarchy and the resulting armaments race reveals even among

believers in democracy. But it is not that diversity itself which makes the situation dangerous and depressing, so much as the time lag between the ruthless speed with which " ploughs are being forged into swords " and the attainment of true democracy, a society based on the " existence of values which the ordinary man must get on tip-toe to reach."

H. G. L.

5. NATIONALGEIST UND POLITIK: Beiträge zur Erforschung der tieferen Ursachen des Weltkrieges. Band I: Staatstradition und Nationalismus. By Friedrich Hertz. 1937. (Zurich: Europa Verlag. 8vo. xv + 479 pp.)

THIS work is based on the entirely admirable thesis that the outbreak of the World War cannot be understood unless we look beyond the activities of diplomats to deeper and more indirect causes. Accordingly the present volume, intended to be the first of five, shows how the history of the various countries has shaped their national traditions and public opinion. As a distinguished sociologist, Dr. Hertz is in a position to approach these problems from an unusual angle, and in many places, the most notable of which is perhaps the chapter on Austria-Hungary, his narrative gathers together in an authoritative summary the conclusions of previous historians. So widely do the causes and consequences of nationalism extend that any treatment of the subject calls for constant selection, and places no small strain upon the discretion and impartiality of the author, especially as there is no room in a book of this kind to support with adequate evidence many of the conclusions reached. But, beyond a certain antipathy to Prussia and a certain scepticism about the decisive character of economic forces, the fairness and objectivity of Dr. Hertz are beyond question. It is sincerely to be hoped that the remaining volumes will not be slow in making their appearance.

M. BALFOUR.

6. DIE SOZIALE FRAGE. By Johannes Messner. 1938. (Innsbruck: Verlagsanstalt Tyrolia 8vo. xii + 772 pp.)

THIS is a comprehensive and profound study of the religious, philosophical, economic and political causes of present-day social problems.

As between the contending philosophies, capitalism and socialism, Professor Messner leans towards the former, but he is not blind to its defects. He sees little that is commendable in the present socialist *Weltanschauung*, although he is a staunch defender of democracy. In his view, however, socialism prevents the realisation of this, for it tends, inevitably, towards an absolutism which ends by denying to the individual, and the societies formed within the framework of the State, that freedom which is theirs by the law of nature. He believes that the hope for the future lies in the Christian democratic corporative State, which could preserve the most valuable principles of both capitalism and socialism while avoiding their defects. But he emphasises the fact that the form of the State must be adapted constantly to the changing needs of the time, and that the just balance between the individual and society, between freedom and authority, must be constantly re-assessed, and will never be perfectly realised. Utopia is not, he thinks, of this world.

The book throws interesting light on social developments in Austria and Germany since the rise of capitalism, especially on the attitude of the Catholic Church towards problems of public life. Its chief weak-

ness probably lies in the under-estimation of the material achievements of socialism in the Soviet Union. The assertion that this experiment has been a failure from the economic standpoint is one with which many people would hesitate to agree. MARY MACDONALD.

7*. MARGINAL MAN. By Everett V. Stonequist. 1937. (New York: Scribner. 8vo. xviii + 228 pp. $1.60.)

THIS is an interesting preliminary survey of a large and complicated subject. In one sense we are all marginal men in the shifting world of to-day, and the fact makes the situation of the real marginal man, as defined by the author—that is to say (i) the racial hybrid, and (ii) the cultural hybrid—all the more difficult. Because all are feeling more or less unadjusted to their circumstances, all are therefore the more inclined to be combative in their own defence. Examples of the racial hybrid are the Eurasians of India, the Cape Coloured of South Africa, the Mulattoes of the U.S.A., and so forth. The circumstances of each differ and require separate examination. Examples of the cultural hybrid are Europeanised Africans, westernised Orientals, denationalised Europeans, the Jews and so forth. All have their own peculiar problems, and must be studied separately. A little more than half the book is devoted to this "analysis of specific types of situations." The next question is, Is there a typical life-history or cycle common to all marginal men? The author claims that there is, and that it has three significant phases. In the first the marginal man is not aware of any conflict. In the second he begins increasingly to experience it. In the third he either succeeds in adjusting himself anew or he fails. The same three phases have been noted and fully described by Raoul Allier in his brilliant book, *La psychologie de la conversion chez les peuples non-civilisés*. It is the third that constitutes the real problem. What adjustment should the marginal man aim for? Should it be assimilation, or a separate nationalism, or an intermediary rôle? No one can give a categorical answer. It is only possible by studying the facts of each case to try to find some guidance. H. A. WYNDHAM.

8*. FREE, COMPULSORY AND SECULAR: a critical estimate of Australian education. By G. V. Portus. [*University of London Institute of Education, Studies and Reports, No. XI.*] 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 71 pp. 2*s*.)

9*. THE THREAT TO DISINTERESTED EDUCATION: a challenge. By Robert England. 1937. (Toronto: Macmillan. Sm. 8vo. 28 pp.)

PROFESSOR PORTUS outlines the history of education in Australia and shows how it has become "free, compulsory and secular"; he then discusses critically the formal agencies of education existing in Australia to-day, particularly those "which act upon the adult after his school and university periods are ended: the press, the cinema, the theatre and broadcasting." In his conclusion he urges the importance of the wider aspects of education. "Democracy is more than a form of government: it is a way of living together. Schools and universities unaided can turn out Fascists, Nazis and Communists, given a rigid adherence to one social ideal. But they alone cannot produce democrats, for the essence of education in a democracy is a free commerce in ideas that must persist throughout life."

Professor England shares these views as to the nature and function of education to-day and has, in particular, some incisive things to say on the subject of "education for citizenship." "Civics" in schools will not produce the good citizen, since citizenship is a "life, not a subject." He declares that the "hasty mobilisation of sentiment and public opinion in defence of democracy . . . will prove useless without a standing army of men and women who know the reason for the faith that is in them." This word of warning was addressed to a Canadian audience but it is also needed on this side of the Atlantic.

H. G. L.

10. AIR RAID. By John Langdon-Davies. 1938. (London: G. Routledge and Sons. 8vo. 143 pp., illus. 2s. 6*d*.)

THIS slight book—it is only little more than a brochure—is a plea for the study of the Silent Approach of bombing aircraft. By an examination of the effects on people and buildings during a silent raid on Barcelona the author lucidly and logically explains the dangers and possible effects of a similar raid on London. The instructions to the populace which in these circumstances he would issue are contrasted with existing A.R.P., some of which are shown to be of little use.

The narrative is most ably supported by an admirable number of photographs of the actual damages wreaked in Barcelona: their reproduction at lantern lectures of A.R.P. officers would afford valuable instruction.

R.

11*. IMPERIALISM: a Study. By J. A. Hobson. Third, entirely revised and reset edition. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 386 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.).

In his introduction to this new edition Mr. Hobson writes that, while it may seem an act of impertinence to republish a book dealing with issues as they presented themselves at the beginning of the century, he believes it worth while to show that "the chief perils and disturbances associated with the aggressive nationalism of to-day, though visibly inflamed and accelerated by the Great War and the 'Bad Peace,' were all latent and discernible in the world of a generation ago and find their economic, political and moral roots in the foreign policies of the advanced industrial countries." Relevant statistical material is given in a series of appendices.

12*. CHRISTIANITY AND PRESENT-DAY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. (The Burge Memorial Lecture for 1938.) By André Philip. 1938. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Sm. 8vo. 46 pp. 6*d*.)

The author, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, first states the position of the Christian in relation to international and social problems as he sees it, and then considers shortly the present international situation. He rejects the idea of a definite "Christian policy," and holds that the Christian must make a decision in accordance with each given situation. In his eyes "a Christian is always a conscientious objector: there is always something to which his conscience objects and which he cannot accept" And he must always love, and must always seek and speak, the truth.

13*. WHY THE LEAGUE HAS FAILED. By "Vigilantes". [*New People's Library*, Vol. XI.] 1938. (London: Gollancz. Sm. 8vo. 96 pp. 1*s*. 6*d*.)

This little book consists, in the authors' own words, of a "series of flat statements of what they believe to be the relevant and decisive facts" in the history of international relations in the post-War period; it is "impartial" only in the sense of a respect for facts, and "partial" in that the

authors "know what they want." The result is a vigorous, uncompromising and challenging statement of the thesis that the War of 1914–18 was caused by "blind capitalist forces which made governments and ruling classes the puppets of reaction and greed," and that the League of Nations has failed because it was a league of capitalist and Fascist governments ("Fascism is simply capitalism at bay"). Great Britain has been powerless to save the League, since the National Government is intent only on the preservation of the existing economic and social order and "fatalist" in the face of want and war. The need for compression has doubtless been responsible for over-simplification and for statements so sweeping as to be no more than half-truths.

14*. THE DOCTOR'S VIEW OF WAR. Edited by H. Joules, M.D., M.R.C.P. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 122 pp., bibl. 3s. 6*d*.)

An attempt to lay before the medical profession and the public the facts with regard to modern war and to indicate the responsibilities of the doctor and the part he might be called on to play. There are chapters on "diseases of war," "shell shock," "the defence of the civil population," "Doctors and the State" and "rational therapy." This last chapter discusses international measures for the prevention of war. The author's conclusion is that "all measures must be taken for the prevention of war, just as all possible measures would be insisted on for the prevention of epidemics"; the foreign policy of his country is a doctor's concern as a citizen, but he has also a special responsibility, since all causes of suffering and death fall within his purview. The scientific and dispassionate spirit in which the book is written enhances the effect produced by its record of human heroism, achievement and stupidity. H. G. L.

15*. ANNUAIRE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE: LA VIE POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTIONNELLE DES PEUPLES. Année 1938. 1938. (Paris: Sirey.)

The first part of this annual volume deals with the political and constitutional life of each separate country, giving the area, population, racial divisions, religions, the executive and legislative power, and political history for the current year. The second part is concerned with the Interparliamentary Union.

16*. INTERNATIONAL DIGEST OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES. Vol. I. 1938. (Geneva: International Legislative Information Centre. 8vo. 739 pp.)

This volume contains the laws, orders, decisions, ordinances and various other legislative acts adopted in all the countries in the world. It will be published monthly by the International Information Centre at Geneva, so that it can be kept up to date, and is intended to be a reference handbook. The classification is according to the main branches of the law, and within each branch the texts are arranged according to the country, date and particular subject treated.

PRE-WAR HISTORY

17. PAUL CAMBON, AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE (1845–1924). Par un Diplomate. 1937. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 8vo. 327 pp. 40 *frs*.)

THOSE who knew Paul Cambon will read this volume with pleasure and, maybe, with a twinge of regret. They will learn with pleasure that the man whom they admired, whom they recognised as the greatest ambassador France ever sent to London, had been—to quote Robert Louis Stevenson's phrase—"steel-true and blade-straight" throughout his long life, and that the steel in him was of the finest temper. What they will regret is that they should not have known more during his lifetime of the heroic quality of this perfect diplomatist, to whose

work for his country, against his country's traditional prejudices, England owed in large measure her own escape from mortal peril.

I had known something of his career as Prefect of French Departments, as the first Minister Resident of France in Tunis, and as Ambassador at Madrid and Constantinople before I first met him in London. Then I was able to see how clear-sighted was his caution, how firm his resolve when his mind was made up, and how unhesitatingly he would take personal risks for what he thought right. Yet this book makes me feel that I missed something. It is as though one had failed to divine the full meaning of a masterpiece through ignorance of its inner history.

There was nothing showy about Paul Cambon. Diplomatic reserve seemed a part of his nature—save to those whom he trusted fully. Never shall I forget the intensity of the pain in his voice as he said to me on the morning of Sunday, August 2nd, 1914, when the British decision to stand by Belgium and France was in doubt and I had asked him what he knew: "I know nothing. Luxemburg is invaded. There is the Treaty (pointing to a volume open on his desk) in guarantee of her neutrality with the signature of England. I have just shown it to Grey. He said nothing. I do not even know whether this afternoon the word 'honour' may not have to be struck out of the English vocabulary."

On the eve of his departure from London, at the end of his career in December 1920, I reminded him of those words. "Did I say that?" he exclaimed. "I must have been deeply moved."

Not until the evening of August 2nd, 1914, did Cambon get a hurried note from Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, to tell him of the British decision to stand by Belgium. I have always thought his words to me the most convincing refutation of the legend that Great Britain had given any secret assurances to France. Two days later, as this book records, Cambon wrote in a private letter: "The day of August 2nd, 1914, is the day on which I passed through the gravest moments of my life." I know that this is true.

WICKHAM STEED.

18*. THIS WAS GERMANY: an Observer at the Court of Berlin. Letters of Princess Marie Radziwill to General de Robilant, K.C.B., G.C.M.G. [1908-1915]. Edited and translated from the French with an Introduction and Notes explaining events by Cyril Spencer Fox. 1937. (London: John Murray. 8vo. vii + 403 pp. 15s.)

THE letters, translated from the French, which are contained in this volume, were written during the years 1908–15 by Princess Marie Radziwill, a Frenchwoman by birth, to General de Robilant, sometime Italian military attaché at Berlin. They cover a wider range than Germany, however, and a large number are issued, not from Berlin but Kleinitz, a country seat, and many from Paris and Rome. The letters give a running commentary on German and, in a less degree, on Austrian and French political affairs, written by a clever woman who had exceptional acquaintance with Court, Ministerial, and diplomatic circles, and with men of note or notoriety who were making or marring European history during the period dealt with, and could bring to her task a temperate, level-headed and shrewd judgment. The memoirs may not make a very important addition to our knowledge of the events chronicled, yet all that is said about public reactions to

those events in the several countries concerned is interesting, and the writer's conclusions and forecasts are seldom wide of the mark.

A large part of the volume is occupied with the internal situation in Germany, the perpetual contrast between the peaceful civilians and a bellicose military party, the Morocco problem, the Balkan troubles, and finally the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914. In dealing with these and other subjects the Princess writes with frankness and fairness, though when Franco-German relations are touched, as in the case of Morocco, there is sometimes a trace of bias. Thus in referring to the Morocco dispute she speaks of Germany as "slashing against the treaties," ignoring the fact that it was France who first slashed at the Anglo-French Declaration of April 4th, 1904. Yet writing on this topic in May 1911, she confesses her belief that England will take the side of France "because if England can do anything disagreeable to Germany she will not let the opportunity slip."

The letters show how, as the years passed, the Princess became increasingly anxious as to where European statesmen and diplomatists were leading their countries. There run through many letters written long before 1914 the suspicion—taking at times the form of a definite prediction—that a crisis soluble only by a disastrous European war was becoming inevitable, and this foreboding naturally colours some of her personal judgments. Having the normal woman's strong likes and dislikes, she speaks of Bülow as "a comedian," of Bethmann-Hollweg as "a clumsy chancellor," of the sinister and inscrutable Holstein as his country's "evil genius," and of the Austrian Aehrenthal, "whose Semitic origin is not difficult to trace from his face," too mildly as "an ass." On the other hand, for the ex-Kaiser William she has a genuine admiration, and she chides the Germans for not being proud of him. It will surprise most readers to find that when the Serajevo murders were perpetrated, though she describes the Serbs as "really savages," she is prepared to believe that the hand of Providence was in the tragedy, Providence being concerned that the Archduke should not reach the throne! She frees the ex-Kaiser from sharing the war-fever at that time, and says that he refused thrice to sign a declaration of war, on each occasion with a decided "No!"

Mr. Cyril Spencer Fox, the editor of the letters, has introduced an excellent innovation, well worth imitation by other editors, in the form of carefully written explanatory notes on the leading events and situations dealt with.

It is questionable, however, whether he was wise in reproducing so many of the writer's expressions in conversational style ("isn't," "we're," "he's," "can't," and the like), while someone is to blame for much appalling punctuation. W. H. DAWSON.

19. SPANIEN UND DIE FRANZÖSISCH-ENGLISCHE MITTELMEER-RIVALITÄT, 1898–1907. By Hans Hallmann. [*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkrieges.*] 1937. (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer. 8vo. viii + 143 pp. *Rm.* 9.)

20. EUROPAS DIPLOMATIE AM VORABEND DES WELTKRIEGES. By Ernst Anrich. 1937. (Berlin: Quaderverlag August Bach. 8vo. 85 pp. *Rm.* 2.)

HALLMANN does not fulfil the promise of his title: his book is a rather uninspired précis, derived from the British and French documents, of Anglo-French relations concerning the Western Mediterranean

from 1898 to 1907, and Spain figures but rarely; there is no attempt to trace Spanish policy, and no Spanish sources are used. Hallmann's central thesis is that "the Anglo-French rivalry in the western Mediterranean was gradually transformed into the *Entente Cordiale* because of a common hostility to Germany." The German cannot conceive of a settlement of difficulties for its own sake; for him friendship must always be friendship *against* a third party.

Anrich's summary of the crisis of July 1914 is of interest as a competent expression of what is now presumably the official German view. All the Powers (except, oddly enough, France) acted sincerely for what they imagined to be their vital interests. The main responsibility for the development of the crisis into war is laid on England, because she, being the most detached, could have restrained France and Russia, had she not believed that Germany aimed at dominating Europe. Anrich admits that German errors, such as the Moroccan policy and the building of the fleet, had misled the English; but, he argues, they were in fact mistaken. The moral of the book is clear: as Germany has no aggressive designs, Anglo-German friendship would secure the peace of Europe (of course, *against* France and Russia).

A. J. P. TAYLOR.

21. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA, 1908–1909. By Bernadotte E. Schmitt. 1937. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. viii + 264 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

PROFESSOR SCHMITT has written a very useful summary of the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–9. He has made exhaustive use of all the available documents, and there is no point at which his accuracy can be impugned nor his judgment criticised; his book is not final, only because the French, Russian and Serbian documents are still unpublished. Within its limits the book is impeccable. But its limits are very narrow: it is a study in diplomatic history pure and simple, a reliable précis of the documents, and never departing from the documents for a moment. The events are not real events, but moves in an elaborate game; the persons mere names, without life or character — they might as well be called A, B and C. The underlying causes of the Bosnian Crisis—the South Slav question in Austria-Hungary and the factors which made a peaceful solution of it impossible; the influence of Pan-Slavism in Russia; the German recollection of the failure of 1905–6 (even within his limits Professor Schmitt might have mentioned the part played by Holstein in stiffening Bülow's determination in October 1908); the long-standing French refusal to allow change in the Straits without change in Alsace-Lorraine; the opposition to the Anglo-Russian entente within the English Liberal Party which made Grey proceed so carefully—all these are ignored, or at any rate assumed. In a word, this is a book for the already learned; the ordinary reader will derive only the impression that pre-War diplomacy was a very odd business.

A. J. P. TAYLOR.

22*. LA CRISE BOSNIAQUE (1908–9) ET LES PUISSANCES EUROPÉENNES. By Momtchilo Nintchich. 2 vols. 1937. (Paris: Costes. 8vo. 830 pp. 120 *frs.*)

THE Yugoslav ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs has compiled from all the available documents and his own experience an exhaustive treatise on the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have been

better if it had been shorter. His conclusion is that "the political position of the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary was reinforced by the annexation," which "rendered more urgent the solution of the Southern Slav question," while Aehrenthal's "abandonment of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar tended undoubtedly to weaken the Balkan position of Austria-Hungary." Thus a diplomatic success was really a failure at home and abroad; little Serbia, forced to submit in 1909, became big Yugoslavia in 1919, and the Great War arose from the Bosnian capital.

While Beust in 1867 wanted these two Slav provinces, Andrássy, wiser than Aehrenthal, prophesied in 1874 that their annexation would cause Austria's ruin; but Austrian military circles demanded annexation as early as 1856, and the Emperor's Dalmatian journey in 1875 "was the first step towards occupation." Franz Ferdinand, the victim of Serajevo, is shown to have been against annexation, as were for other reasons the Hungarian magnates, afraid of increasing the Southern Slav element in the "ramshackle empire," and thereby substituting Trialism for Dualism. Aehrenthal's fiasco in the Sandjak railway scheme is exposed, and the connection between the annexation and the declaration of Bulgarian independence displayed, while the Friedjung trial is shown to have "cemented the union of Serbs and Croats."

The reviewer, who twice visited Bosnia during the occupation, can testify to the fact that the material progress due to Austro-Hungarian administration had not quenched the racial sympathies of the population with Serbia. As we found in the Ionian Islands, people prefer to be governed less well by their own flesh and blood. The book analyses the policy of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, then weakened by the Japanese war and unable to fight, and ends with a comparison between Bismarck and Bülow, unfavourable to the latter. WILLIAM MILLER.

23. MON AMBASSADE EN RUSSIE (1903–1908). By Maurice Bompard. 1937. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. xlix + 335 pp.)

M. BOMPARD'S account of his five years as French Ambassador at St. Petersburg is well constructed and easy to read, but it contains little of historical importance; nearly all of it could have been written by any careful student of the French and German documents. There are practically no revelations, and the quotations are all from Bompard's official dispatches. It is, however, interesting to learn that Delcassé, as late as June 1904, expected a Russian victory in the Far East. The most important addition to our knowledge is the account of a visit to Paris on May 26th, 1905. Rouvier consulted Bompard, as he had already consulted Barrère and Paul Cambon, on the wisdom of Delcassé's Moroccan policy; Bompard said that, if the Anglo-French entente was firm, they should resist the German demands, but Rouvier insisted that on the first threat of war there would be a revolution in France. The conversation sounds authentic, and sheds some additional light on Delcassé's fall. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

24. THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, 1904–1914. By G. Lowes Dickinson. New edition, with a Foreword by Sir Arthur Salter. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xviii + 516 pp. 7s. 6d.)

The International Anarchy was first published in 1926; it is now republished with no alteration or addition other than a commendatory foreword by Sir Arthur Salter. Lowes Dickinson wrote his book

before most of the evidence concerning pre-War history had been published; he was forced to use sensational, and often unreliable, sources, such as Conrad, Eckardstein, and Repington. Even with adequate evidence, diplomatic history is full of traps for the unwary; Lowes Dickinson was a literary dilettante, not a trained historian, and his book abounds in misconceptions and errors as primitive as would be those of a man, who—hearing some scientist mention a machine which made so many "revolutions" an hour—should write a book denouncing scientists as anarchists.

But, it is claimed, the value of the book rests not on its facts (these, like Joseph Chamberlain's figures, are merely for purposes of illustration), but on its explanation of the underlying forces: the cause of the War of 1914 is shown to be the existence of independent, sovereign States. This, though true, is not very profound; all it means is that war (*i.e.*, conflict between States) is caused by States conflicting. In practice, Lowes Dickinson did not confine himself to this platitudinous theme; reacting from "war guilt," and desiring to shake the complacency of his readers, he tended to argue that in any particular crisis (*e.g.*, the Moroccan crisis of 1905, where he denies that Germany aimed at breaking the Anglo-French entente; or the Bosnian crisis, where he explains away the German ultimatum to Russia) German policy was comparatively innocent. He accepted the German complaints of encirclement, but not the British complaints against the German fleet; he put forward the Austrian plea for crushing Serbia (that failure to do so would destroy the Habsburg monarchy), but not the Russian plea for supporting Serbia (that failure to do so would destroy the Romanov monarchy). The uninstructed reader will feel that the Powers were a bad lot, but that Germany was the best of them; the instructed reader will feel that there must be something wrong with the cause of the League of Nations if it has to be supported by such a rigmarole of absurd misstatements.

The International Anarchy is a curious memorial of a time when well-meaning men thought that peace could be secured by being sympathetic to Germany; that the Concert of Europe could be made real by calling it the League of Nations; and that the League of Nations could then over-awe the law-breaker without the backing of superior force. It will therefore always be of interest to the historian of ideas; but as a contribution to contemporary politics it is now either irrelevant or misleading. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

25*. REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE AGENDA OF THE NINETEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. [A. 16. 1938. II.B.3.] 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 25 pp. 6*d.*)

26*. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE. (Geneva, July 4th–9th, 1938.) [1938. II.A.8.] 4 pp. 6*d.*)

27*. REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION. I. Some Observations on the General Situation. (1938. II.A.9. 31 pp. 9*d.*)

28*. REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION. (1938. II.B.2. 13 pp. 6*d.*)

29*. REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL. (1938. II.A.10. 53 pp. 1s.)
30*. REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STATISTICAL EXPERTS ON THE WORK OF THE SEVENTH SESSION. (1938. II.A.7. 28 pp. 1s.)

WITH the shrinkage of the field within which the League of Nations can usefully exert its political influence, it is natural that those who regret this trend should look more eagerly to see what can be done on the economic side. For effective work in the economic sphere, as the Economic Committee points out, " the co-operation of all nations is not indispensable." In order to make possible progress, which is none the less valuable because it is piecemeal, it is not essential that every country should follow exactly the same path. It is, in fact, easy and not a little dangerous to exaggerate the extent to which the economic side of the League's work is damaged by the absence of universality. The countries which participate in the work of the League's Economic and Financial Organisation still accounted, in 1937, for over 86 per cent. of the world's trade, and in these circumstances special interest attaches to the recent publications of the Economic and Financial Section of the League which formed part of the foundation for the discussions of the Assembly of 1938.

During 1938 the hopes of effective joint action in the field of trade policy which had been cherished during the previous year have become rather faint, but it is important to remember, as the Economic Committee points out, that a programme of economic normalisation " is undoubtedly more urgent to-day than it was at the close of last year." In the general attitude towards such a programme there has been an intelligible oscillation between the desire to deal with everything at once, and initiate grandiose large-scale reforms, and the more modest satisfaction to be derived from dealing with one thing at a time. For some time large-scale efforts have been out of fashion. Even Monsieur van Zeeland's limited proposals for joint consultation have aroused no favourable official response, though he too felt constrained to throw back responsibility upon the politicians, who had hoped, though perhaps not very confidently, that, by some extraordinary stroke of luck, he might solve their problems for them.

For the most part the economic organs of the League still feel themselves constrained to operate in restricted fields and on short-range problems, and useful investigations of this kind, statistical and otherwise, are outstanding items on the agenda. But at the same time they repeatedly draw attention to the discouraging effects in the economic field of the deterioration of the political situation and of the widespread fears of further recession. When we try to do one thing at a time, it has often been found that we can do very little unless complementary action is at the same time initiated in other fields. Another World Conference would perhaps do little more than deepen the feeling of disillusionment which still renders so many discussions of international co-operation barren and futile. But that fact in no way diminishes the urgent necessity for simultaneous advances along many lines. It is significant in this connection that the Economic Committee proposes to stimulate demographic studies. The fact that, no doubt quite justifiably, it deems it necessary to start with a careful proof of the meaninglessness of measurements of density of population based on a crude comparison of national areas and national populations, is unfortunately eloquent testimony to the low standards of economic literacy which are still an important factor in the situation.

It is no longer considered indecent to refer in public to an impending

recession, and in a sober comparison of the prospects of to-day with the situation before the Great Depression, the Financial Committee takes a relatively cheerful view. "A reasonable degree of optimism may be felt," it is declared, but it has always been notoriously difficult to determine exactly what constitutes a "reasonable" standard of "reasonableness."

The Report on Exchange Control is a valuable technical analysis of the effects of the numerous devices adopted to keep national currencies independent of external fluctuations. It is emphasised that "it is only by remedying the troubles that led to the imposition of exchange controls that the system, as a whole, can be swept away," and it is noted that exchange controls have in fact been relaxed more than is generally appreciated. But even when more fundamental issues are left, for the time being, on one side, a purely technical study gives useful results which abundantly justify the most strenous efforts to combat any further extensions of the field of exchange control.

Perhaps the most encouraging activity discussed in these documents is the examination of measures designed to raise the standard of living. Insistence upon this obvious and elementary objective of economic policy still occasions a certain amount of uneasiness in certain quarters, but there can be little question that the paths opened by such a study are at the same time the most likely to lead to a solution of all the other tangled problems which to many appear so bewildering.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

31*. REVIEW OF WORLD TRADE, 1937. [1938. II.A.5.] 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 95 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THIS volume continues the valuable series of analyses of world trade trends, for which the Economic Intelligence Service of the League is responsible, and the general scope of which is already familiar. The value of world trade, estimated in terms of gold, increased, it is estimated, in 1937 by 23 per cent., the quantum by about 13 per cent., which brought it within 3 per cent. of the level of 1929. The contribution made by raw materials was relatively more important than in 1929, while trade in foodstuffs and manufactured articles still lags behind. Due attention is paid to the statistical difficulties inherent in these calculations, difficulties which have been increased by the complexities of exchange control.

There are few international economic problems which are not illuminated by the careful work of which this Review is the result. The student interested in the repercussions of armament expenditure upon world trade, for example, or in the course of German trade policy in South-Eastern Europe, will be able to direct his investigations with greater precision after a study of this volume. The threatening downward movement towards the end of 1937 is noted, as well as the fact that the prices of manufactured articles, compared with the levels of 1929, are still 12 per cent. higher than those of primary products.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

32. STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH, Volume One. By the Conference on Research in National Income and Wealth. 1937. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; London: Macmillan. 8vo. xviii + 348 pp. 10s. 6d.)

33. NATIONAL INCOME AND CAPITAL FORMATION, 1919–1935: a Preliminary Report. By Simon Kuznets, 1937. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 86 pp. 6s. 6*d*.)

STATISTICAL studies of national income have in recent years assumed increasing importance in view of the large number of practical problems whose solution requires some accurate knowledge of the magnitude of either the whole or some specified part of the national income. Even a superficial investigator, however, soon discovers that there is no simple definition of national income, and as he becomes more immersed in the difficulties which arise when he tries to determine the most appropriate treatment for, say, the income of people who occupy houses owned by themselves, for taxation and government expenditure, for corporate savings, or for changes in inventory valuations, he is likely to feel the need for some general survey of the theoretical issues involved free from the technicalities of the particular case in which he happens to be interested. This need is in large measure met by the publication of a series of papers and discussions organised for a conference on Research in National Income and Wealth by the United States National Bureau of Economic Research. Inevitably the theoretical issues are presented in an American background, but the treatment is sufficiently broad to have great value for workers in similar fields in every country. Dr. Colm's treatment of Public Revenue and Public Expenditure in National Income may be singled out as having special interest.

Dr. Kuznets' concrete application of the principles discussed by the conference leads to the presentation of a formidable mass of statistical material showing movements in the National Income of the United States, its distribution according to industrial origin, and according to its division between employees, entrepreneurial income, interest, etc., and changes in gross and net capital formation. Such studies are a mine wherein students of many problems can dig with confident hope of rich reward, and their full significance is still far from being thoroughly explored. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

34*. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 1937/8. [1938. II.A.4.] 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 336 pp. 10s.; Bound, 12s. 6*d*.)

This invaluable volume of statistical data keeps up its own high standard. The old tables have been brought up to date, and in addition there are several new ones. The resetting of the book, which was begun last year, has been continued, and the explanatory notes have been considerably expanded

35*. DIE EUROPÄISCHE AGRARGUTERVERSORGUNG: Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Rohstoff-Frage. By Georg Rettig. [*Heidelberger Akten der von Portheim-Stiftung, Nr.* 22.] 1938. (Heidelberg Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung. 8vo. 70 pp., tables.)

A detailed analysis of the agricultural production and imports of European countries, with special reference to the resources of the British Empire, the United States, South America and Africa. Textile fibres and vegetable oils are considered as well as cereals, meat, butter, cheese and fruit. B. S. K.

36*. THE COLONIAL PROBLEM: An Economic Analysis. By Giuseppe Ugo Papi. 1938. (London: P. S. King. Sm. 8vo. 70 pp. 4*s*. 6*d*.)

Professor Papi argues that the creditor countries, by refusing to accept payment for their debtors in the form of goods and services, precipitated a "descending spiral" of economic activity and set a premium on colonial expansion. "Territorial possessions, which are of minor importance so long as foreign trade is facilitated, become a vital necessity when each country is enclosed within its own frontiers." The author is also concerned to establish the validity, with certain qualifications, of the theory of comparative costs. B. S. K.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

37*. THE DOMINIONS AS SOVEREIGN STATES: Their Constitutions and Governments. By A. Berriedale Keith. 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xlv + 769 pp. 25*s*.)

SINCE the Imperial Conference of 1926 Professor Berriedale Keith has published over a dozen substantial works on various aspects of the constitutional structure of the British Empire. It may be well, therefore, to indicate at the outset the relation of this present volume to its predecessors in the series. It can be fairly described as a revised edition of the subject-matter which was originally presented in 1929 in *The Sovereignty of the British Dominions* and which had been already revised successively in *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions* in 1933 and in *The Governments of the British Empire* in 1935, at least in so far as this last book dealt with the Members of the British Commonwealth. Since 1935 important events, such as the decisions of the Judicial Committee in *Moore's Case* and in the *British Coal Corporation Case*, the abdication of Edward VIII and the consequent legislation in South Africa and the Free State; and the enactment of the Constitution of Eire, had modified the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom to such an extent that a restatement of their position in the Empire and in the world seemed called for. Further, in Professor Keith's view, the appropriate moment for a thorough revision of his previous work seemed to have come because—

"the time seems at last to have arrived when the status of the Dominions can be set forth with a certain measure of assurance that no events in the near future will happen to disturb the essential principles affecting their place in the Empire or the Commonwealth" (Preface, p. vii).

But it is clear from the new matter which Professor Keith was obliged to introduce into later pages of his Preface, and from events, such as the Anglo-Irish agreement, which have occurred since the book went to press, that Commonwealth Relations still continue to develop in new and unexpected ways, and that, in consequence, in 1940 or so, we may hope to see *The Dominions as Sovereign States* re-emerge, revised, repaired and renamed.

The present volume is a book of great learning, and it is difficult reading in parts; but it is very seldom dull. There is something of a patch-work effect here and there as the result of untidy revision. There are interesting modifications of opinion on matters upon which Professor Keith had formerly expressed strong and usually contemporaneous judgments. In particular one may welcome the moderate account which he gives of the Byng incident in Canada in 1926 and the issues therein raised (pp. 220 ff.). The legal rights of a Dominion by unilateral action to declare war, to remain neutral while the United Kingdom is

at war, and to secede from the Commonwealth are again discussed and again denied. But the grounds of denial are getting weaker. Thus the right to declare war appears to be denied on the ground chiefly that no Dominion claims such a right (pp. 47 ff.).

On some points it is difficult to accept Professor Keith's view without troublesome doubts. For example, there is his firm statement (pp. 75 and 122) that no Dominion has power to amend the Statute of Westminster. And yet the only obstacle to such amendment in South Africa, say, would appear to be repugnancy, and this repugnancy has been removed by section 2 (1) of the Statute, which is not restricted in its operation, as is Section 2 (2), to "existing or future Acts of Parliament." What further obstacle remains? It is true that it could be very awkward if the Dominions, or some of them, exercised this power to amend the Statute. But does it not seem that they in fact have it? There is, again, his statement that the British Government acted with "remarkable illegality" (p. 106) in asking the Union Government to request and consent to the enactment of the Abdication Act. But surely it was not illegal to ask? And is there a necessary opposition between the "request and consent," provided for in section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, and the assent of the Union Parliament provided for in section 2 of the Status Act? Could they not co-operate?

There are some few small points upon which one may suggest corrections. The Australian politician called Mr. O'Duffy on p. 11 should be Mr. Duffy or Mr. Gavan Duffy; the name of the Irish Free State is omitted at the top of p. 23; General Hertzog is called Senator Hertzog on p. 203, note 1. On p. 35 there is a reference to the possibility of a treaty being "ratified" by the British Parliament, where it would seem that the British Government is intended. The Canada Shipping Act, 1934, described in a note on p. 80 as "held over to be proclaimed in due course," was in fact proclaimed to be in force from August 1, 1936. It is incorrectly cited as chapter 34 instead of 44. On p. 143 it is stated that "the essence of a personal union is that it depends merely on the accident of two countries possessing one and the same head." Must it necessarily be the result of "accident"? Why cannot a personal union arise also from agreement? On p. 152 we are told that the existence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was determined by a Royal Proclamation of 1927 under the Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act, 1927. In fact it was the Act itself and not the Proclamation which brought the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into existence. The Proclamation avoided the term "United Kingdom" altogether (see Professor Keith's *Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions*, pp. 171–2). On p. 288 there seems to be a misprint where it is stated that three members of the Newfoundland legislature were elected from two-member constituencies. On p. 404 it is stated that "appeals in all but constitutional issues involving the relations of the federation and States *inter se* or the States *inter se* cannot be affected by Australian legislation." This should be qualified in some way so as to make it clear that it refers to appeals from the State Supreme Courts in Australia, for appeal from the High Court of Australia in any matter whatsoever may be limited by Commonwealth legislation, subject to reservation of such legislation.

It remains to add that the book is enlivened with a plentiful sprinkling of those sharp criticisms of politicians and their policies for which Professor Keith is famous. It is customary for reviewers to deplore

the tone of some of these comments, and it is true that they sometimes mar what should be an unimpassioned constitutional argument.

K. C. WHEARE.

38. L'ANGLETERRE ET L'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE. By Jacques Bainville. Préface de W. Morton Fullerton. 1938. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 8vo. viii + 243 pp.)

JACQUES BAINVILLE ranked high among the small band of writers in France who led the fight against the Third Republic, and whose high distinction in letters formed such an odd contrast to the character of the campaign they waged through their organ, the *Action Française*. Against leading politicians no insinuation was too base, no accusation too scandalous to be printed in the pages of this paper, while its editor, Charles Maurras, and his chief collaborator, Léon Daudet, were publishing volumes of prose and poetry that find their place in the front line of contemporary French literature.

Bainville was the historian of the group. From 1908 until his death in 1936 he contributed his articles on European politics, a shrewd and careful observer, highly suspicious of every move coming from a French statesman, erudite in all details of European history.

The present volume contains a collection of his articles on England and the British Empire which appeared in the *Action Française* and a few other papers (*La Liberte*, *Candide*, and *Le Capital*) between April 1914 and October 1935. They show a wise judgment of political events in England and the Empire and their bearing upon the course of international affairs.

E. A. ALPORT.

39. IRELAND (Eire). By J. Chartres Molony. [*Modern States Series*, No. 15.] 1938. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. 223 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

IT was well and truly said years ago that the English should learn a little Irish history and the Irish learn to forget it. In fact, the average Englishman knows little or nothing of the long story of the relations between England and Ireland save what appears in the newspaper of the day. He has no background, and is often perplexed to know what all the recurring pother in Ireland is about. In this volume of the *Modern States Series*, Mr. Chartres Molony sets out to tell the story of Ireland, and in particular of Anglo-Irish relations, for the enlightenment of the man-in-the-street in England. He tells us in the Preface that he is himself an Irishman, but there is nothing else in the tone or tenor of the book to suggest it. Quite the contrary. As an Irishman, describing the checkered course of Anglo-Irish relations, the churning up of the whole fabric of Irish life by the various plantations and penal codes, and the deliberate destruction of Gaelic civilisation, he might be excused some moments of indignation and partisanship. But there is nothing of this spirit in his book. All Mr. Molony's contempt and irony are reserved for the Irish. His fundamental attitude to the tragic story of Ireland under English rule seems to be that they deserved what they got. He quotes Froude's dictum about superior strength being a symbol of superior merit in justification of British rule in Ireland with seeming conviction. And from the early tale of the Norman invasion to the last pages describing the Black-and-Tans, Mr. Molony's sympathies are always on the side of the invader.

This would not matter at all if Mr. Molony were merely setting down his own personal reactions to the Anglo-Irish problem. But in

his rôle of interpreter of Anglo-Irish history for the average uninformed Englishman, he cannot afford to ignore the persistent dynamic force of Irish nationalism. Irish nationalism is precisely the factor in the situation which the Englishman most misunderstands and underestimates, and which a book of this kind should explain—whatever the political sympathies of the author. Mr. Molony completely fails in this task. There is much in this *Ireland* which is so cheaply offensive and tendencious that it will only mislead the Englishman, and certainly incense most Irishmen. The sterling personality of Arthur Griffiths, for example, is whittled down to a mere "Welsh sorehead." The hot-headed Republicans under Rory O'Connor who established themselves in the Four Courts become "a group of ruffians," and even the worst excesses of the Black and Tans seem to arouse less bitterness in Mr. Molony than the "Irish guerrillas" of the time. In the light of the plantations, the Cromwellian campaigns, the penal codes and the gradual extinction of all industry or learning in Ireland, I am afraid Mr. Molony's plea to Irishmen to forget the "wrongs done by England to Ireland . . . *from ignorance rather than from evil intent*" will not cut much ice, unless self-interest is excluded from the idea of evil intent. Having decided very early in the history of the race that the Irish are unregenerate barbarians, he will not face the obvious issue: the effect of English misrule on the Irish character.

Mr. Molony shows himself to be a keen student of all periods of Irish history. He is provocative but never dull. It is to be regretted that the highly coloured presentation of so much material in this book has spoiled it as a reference work for the type of reader it is in the first place written to help. VIOLET CONOLLY.

40. DEMOCRACY NEEDS SOCIALISM. Issued by the Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction. 1938. (London: Nelson. 8vo. x + 153 pp. 5*s*.)

WHILE this book is written with a single eye to the political situation in Canada, the broad argument has a wider application.

The book is the work of the Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction, founded in Canada in 1932, and is in the nature of a postscript to the larger volume, *Social Planning for Canada*, published in 1935.

The argument is that a planned economy is the only way in which recurrent depressions can be avoided. Democracies therefore face two alternatives—rapid socialisation, or a choice between the extremes of Communism and Fascism. The usual indictment of the present system is made out—absence of real competition, exhaustion of the opportunities offered in the last century by great undeveloped areas in the world.

Without impeaching this general argument, the authors proceed to examine the immediate prospects in Canada, where, they believe, five possible policies present themselves. First is the piecemeal method of socialization, the gradual policy of Liberalism. This is found to be too slow to meet the needs of the times. Second is controlled capitalism, meaning State-organised combines, trade associations, etc. This is the Conservative line, and it, too, is found to be impracticable. Third is inflation—social credit is the most common form in Canada—which is dismissed as a blind alley. Fourth is Corporatism or Fascism, which is making some headway in Quebec. Fascism is described as a form of controlled capitalism, and is not regarded as a practical

policy for Canada. Fifth is Socialism, which is held to be not only the proper policy for Canada, but the only solution of existing problems.

It is interesting to note that while the references to foreign policy are casual, the authors believe that Canadians must demand a policy of complete neutrality.

This book may surprise those who think of Canada as a part of North America—the last stronghold of rugged individualism—but while most of the charges made against economic conditions in the Dominion are true, it is equally true that the L.S.R. and the Socialist party, the C.C.F., have hitherto made small impress on the electorate.

GRANT DEXTER.

41*. THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA, 1534–1937: an Introduction to its Development, Law and Custom. By W. P. M. Kennedy. 2nd edition. 1938. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xxx + 628 pp. 25s.)

THE first edition of this book, when published in 1922, quickly won for itself a position of authority. But much has happened in the intervening years, and Professor Kennedy has met a real need in bringing his book up to date. In this new edition the original text is reproduced without substantial change, and the new matter takes the form of a reasoned analysis of the constitutional developments which have taken place since 1922.

The second part begins by describing the growth of bureaucracy and delegated legislation in Canada, processes which have developed on lines parallel to those with which we are familiar in England. After a chapter devoted to various aspects of constitutional law and practice, Professor Kennedy passes to an analysis of the Statute of Westminster and its implications, expressing a strong opinion in favour of the abolition of Privy Council appeals. The last chapter is a cautious survey of the position of Canada in the British Commonwealth and in the world of nations.

Appendices are added to bring the book up to date. The first discusses and severely criticises the recent decisions of the Privy Council invalidating the "Canadian New Deal." In the second appendix Professor Kennedy briefly analyses those aspects of King Edward's abdication and the Coronation which are of constitutional interest in Canada. The text of the British North America Act is printed in a final appendix. In order to give completeness to the book the amending Acts should also have been included.

Meanwhile much is happening, and it is evident that the question of constitutional reform in Canada is urgently calling for a definite solution. Upon the right approach to this problem Professor Kennedy has his own very clear ideas. By the time a third edition of his book is called for, the material for his penetrating analysis is likely to be abundant.

H. A. SMITH.

42*. BRITISH POLICY IN KENYA COLONY. By Marjorie Ruth Dilley. 1937. (New York and London: Thomas Nelson. 8vo. viii + 296 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS is a very thorough piece of work by an American investigator. It gives a detailed and accurate narrative, based on an extensive and precise citation of sources. Students of any particular episode in Kenya's history, or of any particular aspect of British policy as illustrated by that history, will find in this book a reliable outline of

events and a useful guide to the material. There are a few misprints (p. 134 Avery for Amery, p. 160 Woods for Wood), and Englishmen are not *quite* so ignorant (p. 35) as to confuse Kenya and Ceylon. But the book has very few mistakes, and is on the whole, sound in its judgments. Its general effect is to show how much of the real problem of Kenya remains untouched by general statements about "paramountcy," "dual policy," "association," etc. W. K. HANCOCK.

43*. THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION INTO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. A Symposium of Thirteen Papers by Various Authors. Ed. by W. G. K. Duncan and C. V. Janes. 1937. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Political Science; London: Australian Book Co. vii + 291 pp. Maps. 6s.)

THIS book is a symposium of papers by thirteen authors. The papers were read at the 1937 Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science. Summaries of the discussions on the papers are also published.

An editor claims that the book is "a more or less representative sample of public opinion in Australia concerning migration." This, on the whole, is a fair claim. The reader will not, however, find evenness of quality and interest in the chapters. He will note also divergences of view, even conflict, between the "academic" and the "practical" contributors. He will probably also find little recognisably Australian in some of the opinions, notably that of "practical" Sir Philip Goldfinch, who believes that "a country that has reached the state where its birth-rate is falling, and which is not prepared to make up the deficiency in some other way, is decadent in the sight of God, and in the sight of other countries."

The book is distinguished by a good chapter by Professor Wadham on the absorptive capacity of Australia's primary industries, but it is surprising that more analysis was not made of this concept. Professor Tocker is free of this fault. In his chapter on New Zealand's immigrant absorptive capacity he suggests that it may be regarded as an absolute number (the number required to bring a population up to an optimum), or as an annual rate of absorption without adverse effects on general welfare. He admits that neither is capable of close estimation. For theory, it is at best a dubious concept; if it cannot be measured it lacks practical value as well.

Professor A. G. B. Fisher makes out a case for the view that the test of any policy (of large scale migration) must be "the opportunities it affords for raising the average level of real income," but holds that it is much more important "to pay attention to the provision of the vast miscellaneous variety of goods and services which the world in general and Australia in particular can afford to buy, now that its requirements of basic necessities are being fairly adequately met." But these things "do not require large-scale migration."

No one of the writers cares to be very definite about the future of Australasian migration. The essays will certainly help the reader to think intelligently about the problem. W. E. H. STANNER.

44. AUSTRALIA'S EMPTY SPACES. By Sydney Upton. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 288 pp. 10s. 6d.)

IN this book we have the opinion of a civil engineer, acquainted with the tropics, upon the future of Australia as an area for settlement.

The author has travelled a great deal in the north and north-west of Australia, regions not usually visited by an inquiring traveller. He has also read widely from Australian literature, and is something of a geologist. With such qualities and experiences one hoped for a close study of settlement in Australia, and a helpful one, but the book is somewhat disappointing in these respects. To some extent this disappointment is due to the style of the book, which develops the system of argument colloquially known as "raising Aunt Sallies." It is easy enough to quote extreme views as stated by other writers, or politicians, and then proceed to demolish them, but the result cannot be said to be helpful. In the same way the tendency to over-statement clouds what are obviously sincere opinions. Such a sentence as "Sydney is an oasis of humanity in an enormous desert" tends to give the quite wrong impression of Australia's emptiness, when in truth the author's aim, as quoted in his preface is "to give a true picture." He gives a gloomy picture for most of Australia, as his chapter-headings of "Drought the Destroyer," and "Australia's Spreading Sahara" imply, but again over-statement spoils what might have been a valuable piece of descriptive writing. He joins with several other recent authors in insisting that the more suitable south-east of the continent should be developed first. The arguments throughout the book, however, tend to contradict each other, and it appears to have been written without careful cross-references. The menace of Japan comes in for much attention, chiefly under the title of "Australia's Peril," and the writer is probably correct in pointing out that it is the south-east in particular which would suit Japanese development, rather than the north.

F. DEBENHAM.

EUROPE

45*. THUS DIED AUSTRIA. By Oswald Dutch. 1938. (London: Edward Arnold. 8vo. 270 pp. 10s. 6d.)

How rare it is, in this age of fierce partisanship, to come upon an absolutely impartial, factual eye-witness account of contemporary events—how rare and how satisfying! The pseudonym "Oswald Dutch" masks the identity of a man who has obviously lived in the storm-centre of Austrian politics (one passage suggests that he was an influential journalist) and has throughout the tragic upheavals of the last five or six years preserved a calm, unbiased judgment and a remarkably penetrating eye for a political situation. The result is a book which no one interested in international politics can afford to neglect.

To his intimate knowledge of the Austrian scene we owe a masterly analysis of personalities, movements and policies; for example, his description of the *Heimwehr* on page 78, in which its essential character is brilliantly sketched in a couple of lines, or his careful criticism of the Government's fatal error in alienating the Social Democrats in February 1934. It is interesting to note how, in the course of his close analysis, old material takes on new significance and new material is brought to light, notably the unpublished Note of General Goering to the Austrian Government of November 10th, 1937, and the details of the sensational Tavs plan which revealed the fate the Nazis had intended for von Papen, their own Ambassador.

Yet in spite of the detail with which the internal development of Austria is traced, it need not be thought that the author has given

us an unbalanced picture. He never forgets that Austria's problem was never her own, but Europe's, and it is on a canvas cut to a European scale that the author spreads his colours. That the Nazis failed in July 1934 and triumphed in March 1938 was due above all to the fact that Abyssinia, sanctions and the Spanish Civil War had occurred in between and had forced Mussolini to come to terms with Hitler over Central Europe; the reader will find that the author has followed up the revolution in Italy's foreign policy impartially yet with relentless effect. Primarily, however, the book is a study of the Nazi onslaught upon Austria. Everything else is incidental to this central theme, and it is here that the author scores his most brilliant success. The pertinacity, the brutality, the blatant and cynical disregard for truth, the terrifying disregard for every human decency displayed during the Nazi campaign are set out with a calmness and an objectivity infinitely more effective than all the slightly hysterical anti-Fascist propaganda which pours daily from our printing presses.

Finally it is difficult to leave this book without paying a tribute to its movingly dramatic texture. For all his objectivity, the author is, one feels, a man who passionately loved his vanished country. Nothing could be more vivid and touching than certain of the incidents he describes, for example, the first meeting in four years of the workers in Floridsdorf on March 8th, 1938, when the old flags and insignia were brought out once again, the demonstration in Innsbrück where Schuschnigg roused the Tyrolese with the cry of Andreas Hofer "Mannder, es isch Zeit," the thousand cars abandoned at the closed frontiers on the last tragic night and the arrival of the German bombing squadrons over Vienna—Hitler's vanguard as he returned to his people.

BARBARA WARD.

46. MASARYK ON THOUGHT AND LIFE: Conversations with Karel Capek. Trans. from the Czech by M. and R. Weatherall. 1938. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 214 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THESE conversations range over the wide fields of metaphysics, religion and politics. In reading them one is struck again with the grandeur of this intensely religious man whose religion embraced toleration and rationalism, and whose political career was the outcome of his religious and philosophical experience and of the studies which he resumed in middle life because he was "not yet properly prepared."

To-day it is perhaps inevitable that one's attention should be focussed upon the political talks. "There is no longer (at least in Europe) a burning problem of free and unfree nations," Masaryk said, "but of great and small nations, of powerful and of numerically weaker States" ". . . small States and nations are minorities among the bigger States and nations, and even the greatest States and nations in the last resort are a minority in comparison with the whole of mankind. Therefore, a proper solution of the political problem of minorities is the presupposition of a better and more cosmopolitan organisation in the world." And to the day of his death Masaryk believed in democracy, not as something which had been achieved, but as something whose promise only future generations may hope to fulfil.

The translation is here and there clumsy; it occasionally fails to do justice to the dignity of Masaryk's character.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

47. GERMANY AND WORLD PEACE. By Sven Hedin. Translated from the German by Gerald Griffin. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 358 pp. 15s.)

THE world is indebted to this distinguished Swedish explorer for his numerous and valuable contributions, beginning in 1887, to the scientific knowledge of many parts of Asia. During the Great War he spent more than twelve months visiting the German fronts, but afterwards his travels in Asia continued. In 1935 and early in 1936 he delivered throughout Germany over one hundred lectures on Asia, and it is on his diary, kept during this tour, and on his investigations during a further two months' tour of Germany, late in 1936, that the present book is based. His friendly attitude towards Germany was well known, and for the purpose of the latter tour a scheme for his study of the Third Reich was arranged for him at the instance of the authorities, and a regular library of books, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines supplied to him, together with suitable companionship.

The book, which appears to be admirably translated, furnishes a mass of information. Seven chapters deal with the history of Germany prior to Hitler's advent to power. England's envy of Germany as a commercial rival and the hostility of France are represented as the political conditions under which Germany was "dragged" into the World War. The invasion of Belgium is not mentioned. There are chapters on the new organisation of the German people; unemployment; the position of the peasant in the Third Reich; welfare and relief work; labour service and the reclamation of land; the Hitler Youth; concentration camps; industrial works and synthetic raw materials; air and land traffic; and race culture. The author covers the ground thoroughly and instructively. He makes no claim, however, to be an economist, and when he discusses the National-Socialist principle that work and not capital is the source of all real values in an economic system, and purports to distinguish National-Socialism from Marxism, he is not particularly illuminating. On the major financial problems that Germany is facing he throws no light, not even as they affect "Germany and World Peace," the title of his book. Her economic needs as impairing her capacity to sustain a war are not considered, although as crystallised in her colonial claims they are represented as likely to drive Germany into war.

Art and Culture; the Press; Science; the Church and Religion are separately considered, and the National-Socialist theory and practice in these matters are set forth with a manifest eagerness to present the same in a favourable light. Such eagerness is a matter for criticism if unfavourable aspects have been overlooked or inadequately considered. As a scientist he mildly insists that science "must be absolutely free," and he seems to entertain some anxieties on this score. On the other hand, the conception of Art and Culture demanding inspiration only from German characteristics as formed by National-Socialism seems not to trouble him at all. Of the Press he writes, "What is published in the newspapers is truthful, salutary and practical. Much is suppressed." But the correlation of "*suppressio veri*" and "*suggestio falsi*" is perhaps insufficiently appreciated. The administration of justice in the Third Reich and the activities of the Secret Police are not dealt with.

Twelve pages are devoted to the Jews, but it is not clear how much represents the author's contribution and how much is quoted from German sources. Interesting information is furnished as to the penal

laws " which smote the Jews of Germany like a thunderbolt," but the statement that " the position of the Jews in industry and commerce has on the whole not been circumscribed by legislation " does not, to-day, present a very accurate picture. Reference is also made to the leading, and sometimes controlling, positions in medicine and law held by the Jews in 1933 and " which by right should have been held by the Germans " This state of affairs he describes as " outrageous." Whatever its source, the following statement ought surely, in the interests of accuracy, to have been omitted : " In fact it can be positively asserted that the Jews are the only people who make money out of a war, while all others lose by it."

The foreign policy of Germany, her relations with France, and her relations with Great Britain are dealt with in three separate chapters. It is comforting to read that the author is firmly convinced that " Germany will never start a war unless she is forced to do so by an invasion by another Power," and that " What strikes me most forcibly about the Fuehrer's speeches is the stark sincerity of his desire for peace." This conviction is emphasised over and over again, but it all seems a little inconsistent with the suggestion, in another chapter, that Germany will go to war if her colonial claims are not conceded. Of the youths who are admittedly compelled to spend six months in the Labour Service, he writes : " They are men whose love of peace has prompted them to mould their swords into spades and ploughshares " !

Many of the tributes which the author pays to National-Socialism are doubtless well merited. Nevertheless a more critical and detached examination of the many matters with which he deals would have been more convincing.

" . . . but, sentry, shut your eye,
And it is " Pass ! All's well ! "

C. G. DEHN.

48. OURSELVES AND GERMANY. By The Marquess of Londonderry, K.G. 1938. (London : Robert Hale. 8vo. 184 pp. 5s.)

LORD LONDONDERRY'S book is at once a statement of the problem of Anglo-German relations, the central problem of European peace, and a record of the author's personal activities, particularly those bearing upon this issue.

One of the most interesting chapters is that dealing with the Disarmament Conference, at which Lord Londonderry was a delegate. He rightly shows that the real reason for the fiasco of the Conference was the failure to find a way of satisfying the German demand for equality, and has something to say about Sir John Simon's futile stressing of the purely legal aspect. Instead of boldly tackling the chief difficulty, the Conference dissolved into Committees which " pursued interminable discussions, most of them on completely theoretical lines, with the result that it languished and died unmourned and unsung, with nothing whatsoever of a constructive nature which could possibly be placed to its credit." Lord Londonderry's defence of his own rather unfortunately phrased statements on air bombing is a little sketchy.

The author's conversations with Herr Hitler and other leading figures in Nazi Germany make interesting reading. He experiences the same difficulty as do other lesser personages in obtaining a clear idea of German aims, particularly in Europe. But the general

attitude of Germany was well expressed by General Goering, who contended that wherever Germany sought to make progress, Great Britain invariably stood in the way, and foreshadowed a possible opposition to any legitimate aspirations. The interests of the two countries did not clash in any way, and yet we were unwilling, while claiming naval preponderance throughout the world, to grant to Germany the position of military superiority on the continent of Europe. Why should we claim to interfere in the German policy in Central Europe of seeking to incorporate in the Reich the German-speaking people in Austria and Czechoslovakia?

On the colonial question, a remark of the Führer's is worth noting. "Germany wants to live in close friendly alliance with England," he said, "and for England perhaps the time will come when she will have to consider the question whether an active friendship with Germany, or whether the possession of a couple of colonies which for the British Empire are not of very great value, is the more important." It is in Europe and not in the colonial field that the real obstacles to Anglo-German understanding are likely to arise. H. P. GREENWOOD.

49*. KRIEGSSCHAUPLATZ INNERDEUTSCHLAND. Von "Walter." 1938. (Strasburg: Editions Promethée. 8vo. 93 pp. 5 *frs.*)

50*. KATHOLIKEN UND KOMMUNISTEN IM DEUTSCHEN FREIHEITSKAMPF. Von Jan Jansen. 1938. (Strasburg: Editions Promethée. 8vo. 98 pp. 6.50 *frs.*)

The first of these pamphlets is an attempt to estimate the nature and extent of Socialist and Communist opposition to Nazi policy inside Germany to-day. That opposition is described as the "Achilles heel" of Hitler's war policy.

The second pamphlet describes the Nazi attack on religion, and argues that the workers and the Church can and should struggle together for freedom, since Marxism is no enemy of religious freedom.

51. CONQUEST OF THE PAST. By Prince Hubertus Loewenstein. 1938. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 385 pp. 15*s.*)

THIS book is a simple and sincere record of the steps by which the author slowly found his way to an ideal of Catholic democracy for which he now stands. Connected on his father's side with every ruling house in Europe, and on his mother's descended from a Spanish poet and statesman who traced his ancestry back to David, Prince Loewenstein remained until his twenty-fourth year, despite leanings towards the fantastic and supernatural, a reasonably typical specimen of German upper-class mentality. Some of the most valuable chapters in the book give an intimate picture of German life during the War and immediately post-War years. Of his state of mind in the year 1918 he writes:

"Up to the very end I indignantly refused even to discuss the possibility of our defeat. It also seemed to me to be impossible to conclude peace on terms that would not give us possession of Belgium and parts of France and Serbia. The dogma was: 'Germany is unconquerable, so something is bound to happen. And if we starve in the course of it, what does that matter?'"

In the little Austrian town where the family then lived the November collapse heralded itself thus: "The fathers of some of the boys returned home. On leave? Yes, self-accorded leave. The proportion of officers among those 'on leave' was specially great." Nevertheless the legend of the "stab in the back of the unconquered army" was

brought back from the front by Prince Loewenstein's father on his return home.

"Millions of Germans shared my credulous acceptance of the theory that the Republic and the peace were the cause of all the misery and that the end of both was the necessary prelude to all good things."

Hence he hailed the murder of Kurt Eisner with jubilation until pulled up by words from a master whom he respected. Slowly, under the influence of a few finer types among his masters, and later among his fellow-students at the university, he underwent the religious, moral and political awakening which first cut him off from the approval of his own caste and then made him an exile. A vivid episode in this development was his first sight of Hitler gulping down beer in intervals of haranguing an ecstatic Munich audience. The later chapters, dealing with Prince Loewenstein's work in the service of the democratic Reichsbanner up to the burning of the Reichstag, have not the clarity and perspective of the earlier chapters. The time has perhaps not yet come for an adequate treatment of those years.

I. M. MASSEY.

52*. OBERSCHLESIEN IN DER AUFSTANDSZEIT, 1918–1921. By Generalleutnant A. D. Karl Hoefer. 1938. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. xii + 376 pp.)

THIS appears to be the first book about the Upper Silesian Question published by any writer who has held a responsible position in that country in the critical years 1918–1921. General Hoefer writes with authority about the first and third insurrections, as he took a leading part in putting down the former and in frustrating the latter; and as he was in close touch with the German leaders at the time, he is also on the whole well informed about the second, and is able to present a consecutive, authoritative story of what happened before, during and after all these events. He describes the sufferings of the inhabitants of German sympathies who were exposed to maltreatment at the hands of the insurgents when the latter attempted to seize the country in the interest of Poland in disregard of the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission. As General Hoefer also gives copies of a large number of official documents drawn up on the subject by the Allied, German and Polish authorities and agents, the book is certainly useful for reference purposes.

As might be expected, the author stresses the German point of view. He rather takes it for granted that the Inter-Allied Commission facilitated the machinations of the Polish leader, Korfanty, who was mainly responsible for organising and initiating the insurrections; and does not emphasise the point that every one of Korfanty's schemes for the seizure of Upper Silesia and the upsetting of the plebiscite was brought to nought by measures taken by the Commission sometimes with, at other times without, the help of the local defence forces. Nearly 98 per cent. of the number of those entitled to the vote went to the poll, and were able to record their vote as they wished. And it may be added that the results were in every district in accord with forecasts made by leading residents as early as in March 1920. The Allies can certainly claim that not only was the plebiscite carried out in an orderly, fair and impartial manner, but also that its results represented a proper guide to the real wishes of the people of Upper Silesia.

It is to General Hoefer's outstanding credit that he took the German

defence force in hand and allowed them to be used only for ends which contributed to the pacification of the country. A less far-sighted leader might easily have allowed them to imitate the tactics of their opponents, who by lawless aggression made a crude attempt to create a *fait accompli*, and so have brought about a major catastrophe not only for Silesia, but also for Germany. The evidence for this view as far as the General is concerned is admirably given with much valuable documentation. One could only have wished that he should have added to this also a fuller recital of the excellent, if thankless, work done towards the same end by the German plenipotentiaries, Prince Hatzfeldt and von Moltke, and by the Polish Consul-General M. Keszycki. H. F. P. PERCIVAL.

53. THE MEMEL STATUTE : Its Origin, Legal Nature, and Observation to the Present Day. By Thorsten V. Kalijarvi. 1937. (London : Robert Hale. 8vo. vi + 256 pp. 10s. 6d.)

So far as the reviewer is aware, this is the first monograph published in English devoted entirely to the political and legal status of the Memel Territory in the post-War years. There can be nothing but commendation for the author's choice of subject; nor indeed for his general scheme of treatment. He first gives an historical, geographical and ethnological introduction (pp. 9–26). He then proceeds to a detailed survey of the events and negotiations by which after successive steps the present position was reached; the transfer by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers; the transitional French occupation on the Powers' behalf; the Lithuanian coup of 1923; the prolonged and difficult negotiations between Lithuania and the Conference of Ambassadors to draft the Convention relating to and the Statute governing the territory in accordance with the principles laid down in the Note from the Conference on February 16th, 1923, accepted by Lithuania on March 13th, 1923; the breakdown of these negotiations and the remission of the question for settlement to the Council of the League of Nations; and the final success of the Council Committee headed by Norman H. Davis in obtaining agreement to the present Memel Convention and its three Annexes, the first of which is the Statute or internationally guaranteed constitution of the Memel Territory (pp. 29–125). The third part of the work is a study, article by article, of the evolution of the Convention and Statute to its modern form (pp. 129–196). The fourth essays an analysis of the nature in international and municipal law of the Statute (pp. 200–4), and of the nature of the personality if any, of Memel in international law (pp. 205–18). Finally, there is a part entitled, "The Application of the Statute to the Present Day," which, however, consists of a summary of the respects in which the various articles which have come into dispute, and a conclusion pointing the divergence throughout of Lithuanian and Allied views of Memel's future, the inevitability therefore of conflicting interpretations, and recommending resort to Article 19 of the Covenant as the only hope of improvement.

Unfortunately the execution of the project is amateurish and superficial in basic thought. The style is execrable; so is the spelling and the proof reading. The citations are slipshod or absent, e.g., on Article 18 of the Covenant (p. 133); "the Insular Cases judgment" (p. 211). The whole of Chapter XII is based excessively on second-hand authorities. There is a bibliography, but no index.

If the book were purged of its obscurities, its crudities, its naivetés

and much of its ill-digested details, it would form quite a tolerable introduction to the subject. For the industry and impartiality of the author are clear. In particular, Parts II and III, on the history of the negotiations and drafting, contain much valuable reference material, and if moulded to a form worthy of their content, would form a distinct contribution to knowledge. JULIUS STONE.

54. THE TRIUMPH OF BARABBAS. By Giovanni Giglio. Translated from the Italian by Eric Mosbacher. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 317 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

SIGNOR GIOVANNI GIGLIO, twice expelled from Rome while correspondent of the *Daily Herald* there, has made a book of his likes and dislikes, his scrapes, tiffs, and misadventures, which he takes lightly, for he is, as he observes, a Mediterranean from Malta, and the sunshine or a pleasant encounter quickly has the better of any trouble he has fallen into. Although Maltese, Signor Giglio lived many years in Sicily, working for Italian employers, and taking part in internal Italian politics as a Socialist. He is evidently both robust and sensitive, and not the man to use diplomacy to reconcile the authorities, who kept even closer watch on this Mediterranean investigator than on other foreign journalists who were more wholeheartedly foreign. Signor Giglio met, among Italian Fascists, only the roughs, the poor fishes, and the muddled-heads: all the decent people were his fellow-Socialists, and even they, he shows, made ghastly mistakes. The Catholic Democrats were the "evil genius of Italy," King Victor Emmanuel and the Vatican—all too willing accomplices or even principals in the exploits of the Fascists. Signor Giglio did not fail to turn up, as was his duty, wherever deeds of violence were reported or expected. He witnessed, as few people have done, the train of brutal outrages by which the Italian governing party consolidated their grip—outrages for which they atone with a moral faintness to which the servile press bears witness. This Signor Giglio saw, and reports: and he saw not much else, otherwise he would have something to say of the great civic achievements in bricks and mortar, in reclaimed lands and newly cultivated fields, which people calling themselves Fascists have been responsible for. Yet Signor Giglio gives many pleasant side glances at Italian life and pleasure. In fact anyone who wants to know how an Italian on the losing side feels about the Fascist domination, need only read Signor Giglio: anyone who wants to think clearly about modern Italy may read Signor Giglio with profit, but had better read something else as well. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

55. THE MARTYRDOM OF SPAIN: Origins of a Civil War. By Alfred Mendizabal. Preface by Jacques Maritain. 1938. (London: Geoffrey Bles. 8vo. viii + 276 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

"THE Spaniard", writes Señor Mendizabal, "always has in mind what he does *not* want, and only the vaguest idea of what he is seeking." In spite of the swelling throng of our latter-day fanatics, this is broadly true of most of us living in democratic countries. Certainly it explains the graph of recent Spanish history, marked by a series of revulsions. The former Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oviedo has dared to plot that graph without staking on *rouge* or *noir*. This rare impartiality is in itself a great merit. The book derives special interest, moreover, from an accompanying Preface, on an extensive scale, by M. Jacques Maritain, which effectively trounces the behaviour of so

many of his fellow-Catholics in regarding General Franco's counters revolutionary escapade as a Holy War.

As a chronicle or interpretation of events, the book is necessarily less complete than, say, Professor Allison Peers' *Spanish Tragedy*. But if the author nowhere takes sides, he effectively exposes the hanky-panky of *the Right* at the famous elections of February 1936—in disproof of the story retailed by Franco's propagandists in Great Britain. And he realises that the intervention of Bolshevik Russia—before October 1936—never went beyond " subversive " propaganda. For the general reader the interest lies in the record of personal experience during " that red and monstrous Spanish October "—the Asturias rising of October 1934, and in a brief section dealing with " the new Catholicity " of Señor Gimenez Caballero and a group of intellectuals of the Right—of which Señor Mendizabal was writing already in 1933. Here the author breaks fresh ground. The dithyrambic, mystical outbursts in the D'Annunzio vein are a revelation of elements in Spanish Fascism which owe nothing to the revolutionary dynamic of Nazi Germany.

As a translation—from the French—*The Martydom of Spain* is a pale reflection of the original, and renderings such as Unic Syndicate (for Sindicato Unico) and G.W.U. for the conventional U.G.T. betray a certain unfamiliarity with Spanish politics. W. H. C.

56. AGRARIAN REFORM IN SPAIN. 1938. (London : United Editorial Ltd. 8vo. 75 pp. 6*d*.)

Land reform continues in Spain, even in the midst of the fratricidal struggle. As a statement of the principles governing the work of the Republic in this sphere—" distributive social justice "—this booklet is certainly valuable, and the data set down here amplify and bring up to date the standard work on Spanish latifundia by Pascual Carrion. But the historical background is necessarily sketchy, and the English idiom in places somewhat peculiar—*e g.*, the description of a book as " A classic in every sense, though in some instances it dealt with the actual state of affairs. . . ." W. H. C.

57*. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN SPAIN : A Collection of Documents and Records. Edited by " Hispanicus." 1938. (London : United Editorial Ltd. 8vo. xix + 751 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

The documents in this book are divided according to the intervening countries to which they relate. It is a very one-sided record, based mostly on newspaper reports. Documents of value are the report of Miss Rathbone's unofficial inquiry into foreign intervention in Spain, the texts of speeches made at Geneva, and certain notes and League documents.

58*. TROTSKYISM IN THE SERVICE OF FRANCO. By Georges Soria. 1938. (London : Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 48 pp. 6*d*.)

A collection of documents, attempting to prove that Trotsky is in league with and helping Franco.

59*. FRANCO'S RULE : Back to the Middle Ages. 1938. (London : United Editorial Ltd. 8vo. xiii + 264 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

A survey of insurgent terrorism in Spain. The towns in the hands of General Franco are dealt with in turn, and the happenings there are described in detail. The material is taken verbatim from articles written by journalists in the foreign press, and chapters of Arthur Koestler's *Spanish Testament* are quoted.

60. THE PORTUGAL OF SALAZAR. By Michael Derrick. 1938. (London and Glasgow : Sands, The Paladin Press. 8vo. 158 pp. 5*s*.)

THOSE who see progress not as a straight line but as a spiral (and who does not, these days?) can contemplate with satisfaction the

rehabilitation on a higher plane of the Corporate conception of society which has replaced liberalism. In one country only, however, can the Catholic apologist really feel at home. So we were bound to have sooner or later a panegyric on Portugal. Mr. Derrick has done his job well. He stoutly maintains that the *Estado Novo* is not Fascism—and proves his case. He declares that " the basis of Portugese Foreign Policy is and will remain her British alliance," but, while giving General Franco, on the whole, a clean bill of health, descries a possible anti-British Italian domination over the new Spain, with serious consequences for independent Portugal. W. H. C.

61*. Reform Under Fire: Social Progress in Spain, 1931–1938. By Margaret Stewart. [*New Fabian Research Bureau Pamphlet*, No. 40]. 1938. (London: Gollancz, for N.F.R.B. 8vo. 24 pp. 6*d*.)

A summary of social progress in Spain from 1931 to 1938.

VATICAN

62. La condizione giuridica internazionale della Santa Sede e della Città del Vaticano. By Mario Miele. 1937. (Milano: Dott. A. Jiuffrè-Editore. 8vo. 123 pp. *Lire* 14.)
63. The Papacy and Fascism. By F. A. Ridley. 1937. (London: Martin Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 264 pp. 6*s*.)

The so-called " Lateran Pacts " between the Holy See and the Italian Kingdom have given rise to many interesting juridical problems, and the spate of treatises dealing with the latter still continues. Dr. Miele's work discusses all the more important questions of international law arising from the agreements, and may be recommended as a useful summary, not merely of the author's own solutions, but also of those advanced by other Italian jurists.

Did the Holy See possess international personality between 1876 (the year of the destruction of the Temporal Power) and 1929? Some writers on international law, including nearly all who wrote in English, have denied it, but Dr. Miele has no difficulty in refuting their arguments, and his own affirmative conclusion is certainly reinforced by the evidence of international practice. Further, did the creation of the Vatican City involve the birth of a new international person? Or is this miniature organism fused in the already existing personality of the Holy See? On this point Italian jurists are divided into " unitarists " and " dualists "; Dr. Miele belongs to the latter school and adduces weighty arguments in favour of its view. Lastly, is the Vatican City a sovereign state within the meaning of international law? Some distinguished exponents of the " unitarist " theory are unable to see in it any of the characteristics of a separate sovereignty, regarding it purely as an appanage of the sovereign Papacy. Dr. Miele, on the contrary, holds that it has a separate sovereignty of its own, sovereignty *sui generis* it is true, for the aim and purpose for which the Vatican City has been called into existence are not those of the ordinary state.

A question of more practical importance is raised by the juridical relationship between the Treaty and the Concordat. This has already occasioned differences of opinion between the contracting parties. Pope Pius XI's view that both instruments are indissolubly connected, so that neither can be denounced without involving the destruction of

the other also, has found uncompromising expression in his famous phrase *simul stabunt aut simul cadent*. The politico-religious basis of this view, an attempt to buttress the Concordat against future attacks, is obvious; its juridical basis, however, is by no means clear, and hence it is surprising to find Dr. Miele adopting it unreservedly. Undoubtedly the author is correct in rejecting the extreme thesis of Fascist politicians (and a few Fascist lawyers) that there is no legal link between the two pacts: one has but to read the text of each to realise the absurdity of this thesis. But there is a middle view, adopted by most Italian writers on the subject, that while there was an intimate connection *in origine* between Treaty and Concordat, the latter being a necessary complement of the former, they have each, as from the date of ratification, a separate legal existence which can be terminated for the one without affecting the validity of the other. To an outsider there would seem to be much justification for this opinion, and it is difficult to see how the essential results of the Treaty—elimination of the Roman question and definite recognition of the Kingdom of Italy by the Papacy—could be affected in the very least by an eventual denunciation of the Concordat. At all events, the problem, should it ever arise, will be solved by political action to which (in Fascist Italy at least) legal theory will hastily adjust itself.

The work also studies the legal and administrative relations between the Vatican City and Italy which arise from the situation of the papal statelet as an *enclave* in the heart of one of the Great Powers. Many of them have been regulated by formal conventions, and only one is of outstanding interest to foreigners. How far do the provisions of Article 12 of the Treaty safeguard the future rights of the Holy See to maintain undisturbed contact, and more particularly diplomatic relations, with states which, owing to war or strained relations with Italy, are no longer represented at the Quirinal? Here Dr. Miele is discreetly vague. Having alluded to the withdrawal from Rome of the Austrian, Bavarian and Prussian Ministers to the Vatican on the declaration of war against the Central Powers by Italy in 1915, he adds this suggestive footnote (p. 71): "To-day the question is of purely theoretical importance, for it is impossible to imagine that the Italian state will not be able at any given time, by means of an agreement with the Holy See, to resume complete and entire liberty of action in this regard." If Dr. Miele will forgive us for imagining the "impossible" for a moment, what would happen if at the "given time" the Holy See declined to enter into any such agreement?

The purpose of Mr. Ridley's work is briefly told. It is to expose "the great reactionary alliance of our times" between the Papacy and the authoritarian states, "a sinister, but serious and important subject." The aim of this alliance is the destruction of modern civilisation, modern knowledge, and modern freedom. The history of the various crises that have confronted the Papacy during its long career is briefly sketched and the various allies—Franks, Normans, Jesuits, etc.—who have enabled it to weather these storms are enumerated in suitably unflattering terms. To-day in its life-and-death struggle with modern progress the Papacy has summoned to its aid the dark forces of totalitarianism, with which it has so much in common, for are they not merely attempts to translate into the political sphere the system and technique of the Roman Catholic Church? The latter has been organised on "Fascist" lines ever since the Vatican Council,

and has thus served as a model for Mussolini, Hitler and the smaller dictatorial fry. The ordinary reader may wonder why, given the Vatican's resemblance to and sympathy with totalitarianism, its greatest adversary should be the most totalitarian of all states, the Soviet Union. But this apparent discrepancy—and much else in the book—is cleared up by Mr. Ridley's definition of the "modern progress" which is fighting the battle of human freedom against the "Holy Alliance": "it is collectivism, under the alternative designations of Communism or Socialism, that confronts the Catholic Church as its irreconcilable foe" (p. 133). And right through the book the embarrassed reader is invited by implication to choose between Rome and Moscow.

Like all convinced propagandists, Mr. Ridley sees but two colours, white and black (or should one say red and black?). Reading through the well-written and obviously sincere pages of this book, with their drastic simplification of the most tortuous historical and philosophical questions, the detached student of the latter will at times feel something approaching envy of the single-track mind: the distinction between right and wrong, hero and villain, progress and reaction is so clear and obvious. But he will be amused to find in Mr. Ridley himself much of the temperament of those fanatical minions of the Papacy whose activities evoke such pungent criticism. Sometimes also one feels that Mr. Ridley is a danger to his friends rather than his enemies. How many British Socialists, for example, would accept "Social atheism" as the "essential aim of Socialism," as Mr. Ridley—in frank and unreserved agreement with Pius XI—defines it?

There are no problems for Mr. Ridley. Even the most obvious difficulty in the way of his thesis, the open war between the Nazis and the Vatican, is contemptuously brushed aside as a passing phase. The Encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*, with its sweeping denunciation of the whole Nazi (and for that matter Fascist) ideology, is not even mentioned. But perhaps the author felt that this and similar examples were outside the scope of his work. "It may be observed in conclusion," he writes in the preface, "that the author makes no pretence to an impartiality as impossible as it would be ludicrous." Mr. Ridley is to be congratulated alike on the frankness with which he defines his technique and the consistency with which he adheres to it. C. S.

64. THE POWER AND SECRET OF THE PAPACY. By René Fülöp-Miller. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 202 pp. 7s. 6d.)

HERR FÜLÖP-MILLER has written an interesting and thought-provoking book. Its rather sensational title bears little relation to the contents, and is indeed misleading. What the writer in fact sets out to show is the way in which the Papacy since Leo XIII has come to terms with the modern rationalistic world, not by sacrificing any of the cherished fundamental principles of the Catholic Church, but by seeking to reconcile the rights and claims of human reason with those of divine revelation. He holds that Leo XIII was the first Pope to recognise the importance of modern science and to enlist it in support of faith. It was, however, no new doctrine that the Pope invoked for this purpose, but instead the ancient scholiastic philosophy which culminated in the great *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas. It may seem strange, it is certainly an illustration of the continuity of thought of the Catholic Church, that the age of scientific

discovery should be integrated with religion by means of a system of ideas formulated by a Dominican Friar in the thirteenth century. But the writer contends that it is not so much the underlying nature of the problems as their form which has changed with the passing of the centuries, and he evidently believes that the basic ideas of "Thomism"—the vision of a hierarchy of orders regulating the whole universe (a theocratic ideal)—is applicable to the world to-day.

Chapters V and VI are headed *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*, in honour of the famous papal encyclicals on social reform, the first of which was issued by Leo XIII in 1891 and the second by the present Pope in 1931. *Rerum Novarum*, having regard to the date of its promulgation, was a very remarkable phenomenon, and it is a pity that the writer should not have said something about its origin, in particular about the rôle of Baron Vogelsang, the leader of the Christian Social Movement in Austria, whose ideas, together with their contemporary political success at the polls, appear to have exercised an important influence upon the Pope.

The much more detailed and thorough encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, containing a complete programme of social policy which is affecting Catholic thought throughout the world, is treated by the author in a very summary fashion. His interest all through is in fact in the development of philosophical ideas rather than in their practical application to economic problems. C. W. GUILLEBAUD.

65. POPE PIUS THE ELEVENTH. By Philip Hughes. 1937. (London: Sheed and Ward. 8vo. x + 318 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS most readable book is half a biography, half a précis of the principal diplomatic and doctrinal documents of the present pontificate. Father Hughes' study of the aged Pope's personality has all the marks of a faithful portrait. It is sympathetic without being sycophantic. While it lacks the element of detached criticism which belongs to the art of history—and Pius XI is not yet history—there is an honest recognition of the causes which account for certain apparent inconsistencies between precept and practice. The author's defence of the much-discussed silence of the Holy See in regard to the ethics of the Ethiopian adventure is not wholly satisfying. Marshal de Bono's *Conquest of an Empire* is not in his bibliography. The case which the apologist has to meet is not that the Papacy failed to endorse a judgment of the League of Nations, which none could reasonably expect, but rather did not effectively bear witness to the traditional Christian criterion of just and unjust war. It was a singular tribute to the papal office that many who had never heard of S. Augustine or Vittoria, S. Alfonsus or Taparelli instinctively looked to the old centre of Christendom for such a condemnation of a war of conquest as their consistent doctrine required.

Papal advocacy of that doctrine was active in the days of Leo XIII and in those of Benedict XV. Why of late has it been passive? The author gives the only rational and adequate answer when he writes, "Sentences doomed from the beginning to be void of effect are what no Pope can allow himself to pronounce." The Lateran Treaties are doubtless a gain to Italy; they are as yet no gain to mankind. But it is at least a consolation to realize that Pius XI, in the midst of a totalitarian state unamenable to the restraints of international morality, has maintained a lonely devotion to peace and hatred of *Statolatria* which keep alive the memory of saner times.

If it has not been given to the venerable subject of this book, for reasons which he could not control, to stand with Consalvi and Leo XIII in the great line of pontifical statesmen, he has other titles to fame which reduce to its proper proportions the eclipse of the *munus pacificum Romani pontificis*. The immense extension of the foreign missions, in which native clergy play an even more important part, and the courageous application of traditional principles in his Encyclicals to the restoration of the social order, to the betterment of education and to the defence of marriage and the family against the disintegrating forces of the day—these are massive contributions to the development of Christian teaching and practice.

The author is at his best in studying the intellectual formation, at Milan and particularly in the Ambrosiana, of the vigorous personality who has borne so great burdens and faced such a bewildering variety of social moral and religious problems. J. EPPSTEIN.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH AFRICA

66*. THE MEDITERRANEAN IN POLITICS. By Elizabeth Monroe. 1938. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. x + 259 pp. 10s.)

THIS book is both timely and important. Its production increases the already onerous public debt to the Royal Institute of International Affairs; for it was they who made its appearance possible by granting leave of absence to Miss Monroe, who has for the past five years been on the staff of Chatham House.

The " Mediterranean Question " is a constant subject of discussion, but it rarely receives an intelligible answer, for the good reason that it is seldom defined. Miss Monroe's book is an attempt to put the question clearly, rather than to provide an exhaustive answer to it. To this end, the author selected the best possible method. She visited every country on the littoral of the Mediterranean, and made a detailed investigation on the spot of its policies, personalities and problems. The unique collection of material thus obtained was reinforced by research into historical and economic backgrounds, and the result is an authoritative, concise and admirably readable book, which is indispensable to the student of Mediterranean and Imperial politics.

The English reader may perhaps turn first to the consideration of Great Britain's interests in the Mediterranean, which are dealt with in the second chapter. In sixty pages Miss Monroe describes not only England's territorial responsibilities—namely, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Palestine—but also treats of the Mediterranean as one of the Empire's arteries. No part of the work better demonstrates the author's success in throwing new light on old controversies. It will come, for instance, as a surprise to many to learn that although 18 per cent. of Britain's oil supplies normally reaches England through the Suez Canal, no less than 35 per cent. comes from the Caribbean; and that this quantity could be so increased, if necessity arose, as to enable England to meet the whole of her home demand for oil without using the Mediterranean route at all. In Miss Monroe's opinion, were the Mediterranean Sea to become a sealed lake, with barriers at Gibraltar and Suez, England would be by no means the chief loser.

The survey of French North Africa is the best and most up-to-date that is now available in English. The true nature of French interests and achievements is analysed, and one of the most successful enterprises in the colonisation of Arab countries presented in all its aspects.

So far as Italy is concerned, the "Italian bogey" is robbed of much of its terror by the author's candid analysis of Italy's interests and resources, and her striking demonstration of the damage which Italy has done to her own welfare by her diplomatic vacillation. At the same time prominence is given to Italy's vital interests in the Mediterranean, which would not, Miss Monroe thinks, clash with those of England.

The chapter on Turkey is among the most informative in the book and explains, *inter alia*, the revival of German interest in the Mediterranean and Near East. STEWART PEROWNE.

67*. ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY 1914–1937. By Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona. 1938. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. vii + 353 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS is a review of Italian policy from 1914 to 1937 by two journalists who are well qualified to write on the subject. Mr. Macartney was for many years Rome Correspondent of *The Times*, and Mr. Cremona, having served his apprenticeship with the same journal, is now the Rome Correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*. Both authors have been front-row spectators of the events they describe. Their knowledge is wide and deep, and they add to it the insight which only those possess who have lived history as well as read it. Their book is a valuable aid to understanding, not only what has already happened, but also what is happening now and may happen in the future.

One of the reasons why the Anglo-Italian crisis of 1935–6 so profoundly stirred the British public was their complete unpreparedness for anything of the sort. This was largely due to ignorance. If such of the present book as could have been written so early had appeared, say, towards the end of 1934, nobody who read it would have been surprised by the subsequent events. As the authors demonstrate in their opening chapter on "Guiding Principles and Clues," the foreign policy of any nation is based on certain fundamental factors, which cannot be altered and to which its government, of whatever political colour, must in the last resort always adapt itself. Mussolini himself once admitted the impossibility of being original in foreign policy. If this is so, it should have been possible to predict most of the developments of the last few years. That they were not only predictable, but to a large extent inevitable, is one of the conclusions one is brought to by Messrs. Macartney and Cremona.

Their analysis is made readable by division into chapters, each one dealing with a different aspect of Italian policy. This is much more effective than the chronological method usually adopted. The chapter on Italy's entry into the Great War is of special interest at the present moment, when the question of her attitude in a new conflagration is in everybody's mind, if not on his lips. There is also some new light on the often-discussed subject of the Peace Settlement. As for the general impression left by the book, it is best, perhaps, to quote the final paragraph:

> Every Italian knows and feels that the Mediterranean problem has not yet been solved and that a final solution will have to be reached. Every Italian is convinced that Italy cannot retreat over the road on which she has set out . . . and there are few who believe in the retreat of Great Britain. The stake is supremacy in the Mediterranean with all its consequences.

GEORGE MARTELLI.

68*. MEDITERRANEAN CROSS-CURRENTS: By Margret Boveri. Translated from the German by Louisa Marie Sieveking. 1938. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 451 pp. Map. *21s.*)

UNFORTUNATELY for writers on present-day politics, the bloom on their work fades almost as they write, and Fräulein Boveri's book, excellent when its German edition was published in 1936, is now sadly out of date. Even the preface, which purports to bring the book up to date, is dated December 1937; the writing, therefore, was completed before the *Anschluss* and the Anglo-Italian Agreement altered the whole tempo of Mediterranean politics.

Apart from this drawback, the book is good and interesting. In the first place, it is a piece of literature, and its translator does it justice. Secondly, Fräulein Boveri knows the Mediterranean well, and offers the shrewd comment of a trained observer. One by one she sizes up local strengths and failings—Egyptian lethargy, English sentimentality, Italian drive and Italian vanity, the fact that "anyone who wishes to understand the problems of Spain may with a clear conscience ignore the Civil War." The third advantage of her book is its German origin. English readers will be interested to learn that she considers an Anglo-Italian clash inevitable, and that, writing at the height of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, she talks of both Great Britain and France as stronger Mediterranean Powers than Italy. Both her character-studies and her political estimates are more valuable than her guesses at strategy. For instance, it will come as news to the British Admiralty to learn that in the event of attack from the land Gibraltar can "in a very few hours" be made into an island, and that "the harbours of Cyprus have been extended proportionately with the Italian fortification of the Dodecanese." ELIZABETH MONROE.

69. LA QUESTION D'ORIENT, 1918–1937: LA PAIX DE LA MÉDITERRANÉE. By Edouard Driault. 1938. (Paris: Felix Alcan. 8vo. xvi + 538 pp. 50 *frs.*)

THIS book offers a really promising table of contents: "The post-War settlement; *Mare Nostrum*, 1923–9; the awakening nations of the Mediterranean 1929–35; the Mediterranean and Peace, 1935–6." A final chapter covers 1937, the Spanish war and "le Fascisme plus sage." But the author's preface, resounding with the noble names of prizes he has won with previous works, of wise statesmen who have taken his advice and foolish statesmen who have ignored it, begins to stamp the book for what it is—namely, a history vitiated by the personal and political prejudices of the writer. Even when allowance is made for this weakness, the book remains a poor one. It is written in a tiresome staccato style; the use of short, verbless paragraphs as a dramatic device palls if continued for 515 pages. Nor is it always accurate, particularly in the sections dealing with the Middle East; for instance, Tel-Aviv and Balfourieh were not "déjà des agglomérations israélites d'une activité prodigieuse" in 1917, and few of us would agree that "un certain roi Hussein, qui avait des fils à placer" for this reason "s'installa un moment" at Mecca.

ELIZABETH MONROE.

70*. L'IMPERO. A.O.I. Studi e Documenti Raccolti e Ordinati da Tomaso Sillano, Direttore della "Rassegna Italiana." 1937. (Rome: "La Rassegna Italiana." 15 carte e grafici. *Lire* 35.)

La Rassegna Italiana, and its editor, Tomaso Sillano, are famous

for the publication of a series of volumes each concerned with some phase of the development of modern Italy, at home and overseas. The latest, which appeared at the end of last year, is devoted to the Italian Empire in East Africa, dealing with Eritrea, Somalia and what was formerly Abyssinia. Every contributor is an expert in his subject. Pariani, Under-Secretary for War, writes on the military campaign up to the taking of Addis Ababa, but probably of more interest to foreign readers is the short account by Colonello Frabrizio Serra (accompanied by an excellent map) of the operations between May 1936 and March 1937 against the small Abyssinian forces which were still in the field. These involved a series of miniature campaigns carried out under the greatest difficulties; in some instances even pack-animals were unable to negotiate the mountain paths, and the troops had to carry their own munitions and supplies.

Those interested in the financial aspect of the six-year plan will find tables giving all particulars of the appropriations for roads, ports, hydraulic works, water supplies, mines, health, buildings, land clearance, re-afforestation, etc. Agriculture, commerce, industry, colonisation, organisation of the armed forces, are among the subjects dealt with, while the book ends with chapters on the effect both in Africa and in Europe of the creation of a vast Italian Empire.

Valuable as is this collection of studies and documents, it is inevitably slightly out of date. For example, the system of the administration of justice has already been altered; roads which were in the making have been finished; plans have been modified or improved in the light of further experience. None the less, as a record of the achievements of the first eighteen months of Italian occupation and of the fundamental ideas which guided the organisation and development of an immense territory, this book will always remain the chief authority.

MURIEL CURREY.

71. THE COAST OF BARBARY. By Jane Soames. 1938. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 286 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

MISS SOAMES is to be congratulated upon tackling a subject on which no book has appeared in English for many years. She has produced a short and simply-written history of the rim of North Africa which lies between Egypt and the Atlantic, covering the period from the Third Punic War to the present day.

She is a diffident writer, avoiding enunciations of her own opinion, and preferring to supply the reader with several pages of quotation from rival authorities. The result may be accurate, but the effect is a little colourless. Though she has travelled from Morocco to Libya, she lacks the art of conveying first-hand impressions, and her four superb photographs are almost the only evidence that she writes from personal knowledge of Barbary, and not from histories, press cuttings and maps. Her modern chapter is the weakest part of her book, for she has failed to grasp certain essentials. She says: "The Moslems of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have been drawn (under French rule) into the full current of modern life," but nowhere does she hint that, though her dictum may be true of small, compact Tunisia, which boasts an awakening peasantry, the traveller who penetrates even fifty miles beyond Algiers or Fez begins to realise that it is untrue of two-thirds of the Moslem Algerians and four-fifths of the Moroccans. Again, she opens her section on politics with the sweeping statement that "the native parties in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have similar complaints

and aims." The misleading impression here given is never fully corrected, for though Miss Soames goes on to describe the different party programmes, she fails to emphasise the fundamental contrast between them, which is that while Tunisians and Moroccans present the stock case with which we are familiar in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and clamour for a "treaty," the Algerians—unique in the Moslem world—desire closer assimilation to a Western Power. ELIZABETH MONROE.

72. LES ACTES DE MONTREUX. (ABOLITION DES CAPITULATIONS EN EGYPTE). Annotés d'après les Procès-Verbaux des Séances et les notes personnelles des auteurs. 1937. (Courtrai : Jos. Vermaut Paris : Pedone. Sm. 8vo. xvi + 253 pp.)

This volume includes the documents of Montreux in their complete form. The most important points are commented upon by the compilers.

73*. LE RELAZIONI ITALO-EGIZIANE NELLO SPIRITO DEI NUOVI TEMPI. By Aldo Cassuto. (Estratto dalla "Rassegna Italiana," Marzo 1938). 1938. (Rome : "Rassegna Italiana." 8vo. 12 pp.)

The theme of this article is that, if Egypt wishes to achieve genuine independence, she should balance her foreign policy more evenly as between Great Britain and Italy. The author makes some shrewd comments on the Egyptian character, but he over-estimates Italy's chances of winning popularity in Cairo. For instance, he makes the assumption—most common in Rome—that the Italians in Egypt are more popular than their fellow-foreigners because, being a working class, they live on the same level as the Egyptians. The truth is that, because they compete in the local labour market, they are just as unpopular as are the richer Europeans. ELIZABETH MONROE.

U.S.S.R.

74. EVERYDAY LIFE IN RUSSIA. Compiled by Bertha Malnick. With drawings by Pearl Binder. 1938. (London: Harrap. 8vo. 282 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

IN this attractive scrap-book an effort has been made to give a cross-section of Russian life and thought by means of extracts from the Soviet press, private letters, official announcements, programmes, menus, photographs, and printed matter of all kinds. Many people might have done this, though they would scarcely have translated the Russian letters with the author's verve. Personally I am disappointed to find that Miss Bertha Malnick has chosen to focus all her knowledge of Russia in a compilation, of this kind; however good in itself it must be three-fourths propaganda. Few foreigners in recent years have had her opportunities of studying Russian life at such close quarters. And fewer still have her qualifications for doing it so accurately and well. Already a brilliant Russian scholar of Newnham College, Cambridge, when she came to Russia in 1929, she has lived as the Russians, worked, travelled widely in the U.S.S.R. and taken rest there in the last ten years. With this background, it seems a thousand pities that she should submerge herself in an impersonal record such as this. Moreover, it surely cannot be fairly claimed that the book is a "non-political picture of Soviet town-life" when three-fourths of it is taken from the rigidly controlled Soviet Press? If only Miss Malnick had provided us with a running commentary on the texts of her book, how greatly she would have enriched it. Nevertheless, the reflection of the trend (if not the full reality) of Soviet life and ideas given in this book is immensely stimulating. The enthusiasm for new

fields of work, the wide opportunities for men and women of all ages to study and progress, the constant experimentation and boundless energy revealed here are an inspiration. There is another side to Soviet life, as revealed in the long series of political trials and the constant persecution of the unorthodox, but there is no mention or hint of it in this glamorous picture.

The Russian letters in this book are delightful. Lyuba writing about her first baby and the other "mamas." Nina wailing "in an absolute panic, once more I'm high and dry without a domestic worker. For goodness sake take pity on me and find a nice honest girl in your village and tell her what a lovely place Moscow is, and that she'll have a good home with me and tickets for the cinema and theatre every free day." Children writing about their Zoo and Film and every other kind of circle in which they are intensely interested. "At first I tamed a baby wolf," writes thirteen-year-old Borya. "Then I worked on the hybridisation of chickens."

It is irritating that sections of this book, like that on "Clothes," give a completely false picture of the situation in Russia, by emphasising such very exceptional features as the "service-bureau," the "dress designer," the "individual order," where in fact the most homely essentials are still a problem for most people. In a book of this kind points which are definitely misrepresented by press-cuttings alone should, I think, be omitted altogether, unless the author is prepared to put the dots on the i's for the benefit of the reader who has not been to Russia. Miss Pearl Binder's illustrations are crisp and very racy of the soil, and photographs like the "Child Musicians Practising at Home" are delightful. VIOLET CONOLLY.

75*. WOMEN IN THE SOVIET EAST. By Fannina Halle. Translated from the German by Margaret M. Green. 1938. (London: Martin Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 363 pp. 15s.)

WHEN the Soviet Government first appeared in Central Asia, it was confronted by a most difficult problem in the millions of illiterate, veiled and entirely subject women whom centuries of customary ill-usage had inured to their lot. This book describes their position in the wide area embraced by the Soviet East, from the mouth of the Volga to the distant Far-Eastern Pacific coast. It traces their development from bondage to freedom and the various institutions established by the Soviet Government to serve their interests. Thousands of young women from the ancient cities of Asia, from the steppes and the yurts are now studying and working side by side with their men-folk. This was not accomplished over-night. Nowhere did the Soviet Government encounter more bitter hostility than in Central Asia, and the emancipation of women was one of the most active causes of that hostility. In the early days of the struggle many women who threw aside the veil and tried to adopt the new life proclaimed by the Soviet Government paid dearly at the hands of enraged fathers or husbands for their temerity. The whole story is well told and illustrated with a great store of local detail. I have never been in Central Asia, but I know the cities of the Caucasus and the Black Sea such as Batum, Tiflis, Rostov, Baku, which are described here with so much glamour. Everything unpleasant or drab has been rubbed out of these descriptions. I now close this book wondering how far this process has been applied to the rest of the material? Perhaps I am unduly sceptical, but there is something suspect about the entire lack of criti-

cism of anything Soviet from beginning to end of this otherwise very interesting book. VIOLET CONOLLY

76. THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S.S.R. Edited by M. Gorky, V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, S. Kirov, A. Zhdanov and J. Stalin. Volume I: The Prelude of the Great Proletarian Revolution. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 4to. 297 pp. 15s.)

THIS is the first volume in the series devoted to the official history of the civil war in the U.S.S.R., and covers the period between Lenin's return from abroad in March 1917 and the overthrow of the Provisional Government in November of the same year, with two short introductory chapters on the events of the preceding three years. The book is admirably produced, profusely illustrated with drawings, photographs and maps relevant to the times under review, and its unimpeachable orthodoxy is guaranteed by the list of distinguished names appearing as editors—Messrs. Gorky, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kirov, Zhdanov and Stalin. Two of these, Gorky and Kirov, have been claimed as victims by the counter-revolution since the book was written.

If the remainder of the series fulfils the promise of this first volume, those responsible for the work will have performed a most valuable service by constructing a coherent story out of the chaos and confusion of these troubled times, even if, as is inevitable in the circumstances, the story is told exclusively from the point of view of one political party. The impartial reader will no doubt conclude that the Bolsheviks owed their success in 1917 less to the unerring political wisdom of their leaders than to the remorseless pressure of tremendous events and to the incredible ineptitude of their opponents.

MARGARET MILLER.

77. STALIN ODER TROTZKI? By Max Seydewitz. 1938. (London: Malik-Verlag. 8vo. 512 pp.)

THIS book is heavily over-weighted with propaganda. There is no serious investigation of facts either in the case of the U.S.S.R. or of Trotzky, the two subjects with which it is concerned. The author is a former social-democrat and member of the Reichstag, with a very natural bias against the Fascist State. In Soviet Russia he sees the fulfilment of all humanity's dreams, and he accordingly accepts all the Soviet Government's pronouncements at their face value. The analysis of Germany's claim to raw materials and territory is quite arbitrary, and no more reliable than the author's assumption that the German people's difficulties spring solely from the monopolistic-capitalistic-class basis of the Government. Every phase of Trotzky's political life is examined in detail, and he is automatically found wanting since the first day of his association with Lenin and the revolutionary movement. "Trotzki war eine nicht unwichtige Persönlichkeit in der Oktober Revolution," declared Herr Seydewitz, with characteristic bias. In view of the dominating rôle played by Trotzky at this time, such a verdict is ludicrous. As Trotzky can do no right in this study, so Stalin can do no wrong. The result is an enormous compilation of the commonplaces of pro-Stalin propaganda running to 512 pages of uninspired reading. In view of the relevancy of Trotzkism in the U.S.S.R. to-day, this minute record of the differences between Stalin and Trotzky, however prejudiced, is timely and useful.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

78. THE STORY OF "S.T. 25." By Sir Paul Dukes, K.B.E. 1938. (London: Cassell. 8vo. 380 pp. 15*s*.)

THIS is an amplified version of the author's *Red Dusk and the Morrow*, which created a sensation when it appeared in 1921. New personalities and further exciting incidents have been introduced, including some of the exploits of Captain Agar, V.C.

The story loses nothing of its freshness in re-telling, and as a tale of great courage and often breathless adventure it is a thrilling and sometimes a moving book.

Not only is this one of the most enthralling of secret-service stories, but it is a record of considerable documentary value of the early days of the Bolshevik revolution.

When ordinary channels were closed, Dukes was chosen by H.M. Government to venture into Russia to report on what was happening, and amidst recounting the sequence of effective disguises, perilous escapes and anxious journeys, the author gives glimpses of the terrible conditions that prevailed from December 1918 until he finally left Russia in September 1919.

In the appendix is reproduced one of his reports to the Government, which indicates the importance of those reports as a source of information about the early days of the Soviet régime, the chaos with which the newly-formed Government had to contend and the shifts to which they were driven in maintaining their hold on the country.

It is to be hoped that Sir Paul Dukes will find it possible to collect and publish a collection of these reports, rather than that they should lie neglected in the pigeon-holes of Whitehall. NORMAN NEVILLE.

79. THE RUSSIAN WORKERS' OWN STORY. By Boris Silver. 1938. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 251 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THE author of this book is a Belgian socialist, born and educated in Tzarist Russia, who returned to work in Russia in 1934. His reporting of the "Russian workers' own story" is fantastically anti-Stalin in tone. Everywhere he seems to have run into nests of people who openly jeered at the "beloved leader" and made no secret of their cynical contempt for the governing Communist clan. With very few exceptions, the Russians who appear in these pages assume that another revolution is necessary to re-establish socialist ideals. In all this flood of anti-Stalin testimony there is something definitely unconvincing and unreal. There can be no doubt that millions of Russians are strongly pro-Stalin, whatever may be said about the inspired publicity which has greatly contributed to his popularity. Moreover, the ramifications of the Ogpu are so widespread and menacing to criticism that it is scarcely possible to conceive how all the outspoken sedition laconically described by Boris Silver can flourish under its nose. The longest chapter in the book describes "Little Berditchev," but at the end, one is still very vague as to where "Little Berditchev" is. As there is little or nothing conclusive about the "Conclusion," it might well have been omitted. VIOLET CONOLLY.

80. OBSERVATION IN RUSSIA. By Sidney I. Luck. 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxi + 339 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

81. RUSSIA IN CHAINS. By Ivan Solonevich. 1938. (London: Williams and Norgate. 8vo. 315 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Observation in Russia is the diary of one of the members of the British Expedition which visited Siberia in 1936 to observe the total

eclipse of the sun. The author knew pre-War Russia as a boy, and his book is constantly enlivened by comparisons between old and new Russia and the Soviet and capitalistic world. Passing rapidly through Leningrad and Moscow, most of the notes are concerned with Omsk and the surrounding country where the Expedition settled down to observe the eclipse. Owing to *Intourist* restrictions, few travellers to-day have Mr. Luck's opportunity of seeing something first hand of a Siberian town, and his notes are a considerable contribution to our scanty knowledge. On the large State Farm where the Expedition pitched its tent there was much to admire and to deplore. As elsewhere in Russia, housing, clothing and food depended on the status of the workers, the agricultural labourers living in miserable squalor and poverty. In this most fair-minded chronicle of a three months' sojourn in the U.S.S.R. there are no purple patches and no pontificating on Soviet Russia, good or bad. The general impression given by Mr. Luck is that in spite of many arbitrary measures, the Soviets have aroused the enthusiasm of the majority of the people and are tackling a gigantic programme of work with energy and success. A book well worth adding to the library of contemporary Russia.

There is nothing but horrors in *Russia in Chains*. It is the story of the author's life in a Soviet concentration camp, from which he escaped abroad with his son and brother. As an indictment of the Soviet system, this terrible chronicle of wanton cruelty entirely defeats its own purpose by inflated exaggerations of things outside the concentration camp, easily pricked by the well-informed reader. Conditions in a Soviet concentration camp may be quite as terrible as described here, but it is sheer nonsense to expect anybody to believe that the whole of the Soviet Union is to-day inhabited by a seething mass of discontented, hungry, miserable people forcibly kept in check by the Red Army. This is the worst kind of anti-Soviet propaganda and tends to neutralise all adverse criticism of Russia. In the preface the author describes himself as a kind of anti-Soviet crusader filled with high hopes of overthrowing the Soviet régime, for, as he says, "the path from exile to power is but a step" to-day. It may be in the case of men of the calibre of Lenin or Mussolini, but they were above all realists. Like many another White Russian, M. Solonevich lulls himself into a state of false optimism by turning away from the varied realities of life in the Soviet Union. Nothing can be achieved by this kind of windy extravaganza. Masaryk is mentioned among the strong men who have risen in our time from exile to power. In the second part of this work, which is to follow, the author would do well to remember the scrupulous veracity of the great old man of Czechoslovakia in pleading the Czech cause during its long day of adversity.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

82. HISTOIRE DE LA RUSSIE ET DE L'U.R.S.S. By Edouard Petit. 1937. (Lyon: E. Petit. 8vo. xiv + 425 pp. 35 *frs.*)

THERE are two Monsieur Petits: the detached observer who writes the introduction, and the ardent patriot who draws the conclusion. And both are sincere. The reader should have no difficulty in recognising which of the two is addressing him at the moment. As a technique for conveying the atmosphere of Soviet Russia, this duality is admirable. One oscillates between objective portrayal and subjective reflection, with the borderline between the real and the unreal not sharply defined.

The method is rather over-done in the case of Lenin, who is referred to on some occasions as a Jew, and at other times as the son of a Russian nobleman.

The author makes no claim to a profound study of authorities. Admitting ignorance of the language, he draws his knowledge from other sources. He visited Soviet Russia in 1936, and his observations are acute and impartial. These occupy the second half of the book, and the fifty pages on Moscow are a genuine contribution. The almost hopeless task of indicating the cost of living and the value of the currency is undertaken in a manner which will be appreciated. And there is an excellent table of the population after page 144 which illustrates that Russia was an Empire, is a Union and has various possibilities ahead.

The first part is the historical background, and half of it is devoted to pre-Revolutionary Russia. One suspects that the period from Kerensky to Stalin has been compiled from material supplied by the present authorities. In any case, it supports the author's thesis that Russia is reproducing the same process as France followed in her Revolution. Communism has now been abandoned in favour of sovietism, which is treated as a stage on the way to bourgeoise democracy.

It is a book written by a Frenchman for Frenchmen, and the reader will find as much to enlighten him about modern France as about Soviet Russia. H. FOSTER ANDERSON.

83*. 20 JAHRE SOWJETMACHT: Materialen über den sozialistischen Aufbau und über das politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Leben der Sowjetunion. Edited by G. Friedrich and F. Lang. 1938. (Strasbourg: Editions Prométhée. Sm. 8vo. 318 pp. Tables. 10 *frs.*)

A SUB-TITLE of this volume calls it a " Handbook on the political, economic and cultural structure of the U.S.S.R." This claim is justified by the numerous, although individually brief, chapters, which do indeed cover every aspect of life in the Soviet Union, ranging from Industry, Agriculture and Finance to the Red Army and the Communist Party, and concluding with the Theatre, the Cinema and Sport. Statistical Appendices give figures supporting and supplementing the material in the main body of the book, while diagrams describe the territorial divisions of the U.S.S.R., its economic and political organisation.

The treatment throughout is slight, and so entirely uncritical as to give a misleadingly favourable impression of present-day life in the Soviet Union. The dearth of information on contemporary developments in that country is, however, so acute that even a biassed account of them acquires a " scarcity value," and is sure of a welcome from all who desire to keep in touch with these developments.

MARGARET MILLER.

84. RUSSIA—WITH OPEN EYES. By Paul Winterton. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., for the Friends of the Soviet Union. 8vo. 48 pp. 1s.)

MR. WINTERTON went to Russia in 1937 to report " on the internal situation " for the *News Chronicle*. He was specially interested in the standard of living of the Russian workers, the reported " drift back to capitalism," the stories of public unrest current in England at the time

of the Red Army trial, the public attitude to the new Constitution and to peace and war. This pamphlet incorporates articles originally printed in the *News Chronicle*. Like all who have visited Russia in 1936–37, Mr. Winterton was impressed by the spectacular improvement in the workers' standard of living, and I entirely agree with him. When he passes to a detailed review of "How the Soviet Worker Lives," taking the lowest paid worker with 125 roubles a month as the criterion and comparing him with a British unemployed man, I think the picture is very highly coloured in favour of such a Soviet worker. As food and clothes prices now stand in the U.S.S.R. such a man could scarcely feed and clothe himself, and if there was a family, the situation would be far worse than for the British unemployed. It cannot be assumed—as Mr. Winterton does—that the children would be in a crèche "well fed for a nominal payment." This is the Soviet ideal, but there are still far from enough crèches to look after all the children requiring them. Nor can it be assumed that they would all get a free holiday in a State rest-home. Only workers given a *putëvka* or pass by the Trade Unions for some special service or health reason are admitted free. Unskilled labourers and their families are at present little in evidence in such places, which can at most only accommodate a very small proportion of Russia's millions. It is surely incredibly naïve on Mr. Winterton's part to expect to get reliable information on delicate points of Soviet internal policy from Russians, casually met and interrogated. Yet he quotes information collected in this way, in a country where nobody is free to criticise the régime with impunity, as if no further confirmation were needed. Though the tone of this pamphlet is cool and impartial, it is in the main a piece of special pleading for the U.S.S.R. (as befits its publication under the auspices of the Friends of the Soviet Union). How otherwise explain the author's nonchalant acceptance of the eerie methods of Soviet justice (even supposing that all the victims were genuine conspirators against the State), or his capacity for persuading himself by the most superficial inquiries, as in the case of the virtual suspension of the Constitution or Stalin's position as dictator, that what the Government says is so? VIOLET CONOLLY.

85. TWENTY YEARS AFTER: LIFE IN THE U.S.S.R. TO-DAY. By Hubert Lee. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 172 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

This is an unblushing puff of the Soviet Government's activities since the Revolution, by a member of the Communist Party. Like all Soviet propagandists, the author seems incapable of describing Soviet achievement in a setting of sober serious reality, or of admitting any of the harsher aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is roses all the way in the U.S.S.R., unrelieved misery in the rest of the world. Soviet Russia has many big things to her credit, but the elimination of any reference to the human suffering, difficulties, hitches, . . . all also part of the picture of Soviet life for the last twenty years, defeats its own purpose by arousing considerable scepticism about the entire panegyric. VIOLET CONOLLY.

86*. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1937. By R. Flenley. Reprint from *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Oct. 1937.

87*. THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. [*Life in Other Lands Series*.] By Hebe Spaull. 1938. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Sm. 8vo. 63 pp. 1*s*. 6*d*.)

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

88. THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. By Wilbur W. White. 1937. (University of Chicago Press and Cambridge University Press. 8vo. ix + 313 pp. 16s.)

THE object of Dr. White's thesis is to study the processes of imperial disruption and State-making in the working, as illustrated by the history of the Ottoman Empire, and to show what were the factors which brought about the changes, how they acted, and the resulting legal situations until the splitting-off fractions attained to full national sovereignty or to their present conditions. A secondary object, arising out of the first, is to show the extent to which the process of change by "war and illegality" has been replaced—especially after the European War—by more peaceful procedures. This in turn leads up to a short discussion of the possibility of making permanent provision for peaceful change—too short, indeed, to do more than merely outline an ideal.

So far as the factual content of the book is concerned, it does not add in any material particular to what is already available in other publications; but it puts together in a convenient form, and with scrupulous accuracy in facts, dates and figures, the main stages in the political development of the Near and Middle East. The thread of legal argument upon which the chapters are strung together is, it must be admitted, a little tenuous. The map which serves as frontispiece itself raises some interesting legal questions, and in particular one searches the text of the book in vain for an explanation why Yaman is shown as a "Protectorate or Colony" under Arab rule.

H. A. R. G.

89. LA FIN DU MANDAT FRANÇAIS EN SYRIE ET AU LIBAN. By J. M. Jones. 1938. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 152 pp.)

After long introductions on the establishment of the French mandates in Syria and the termination of the British mandate in Iraq, the author gives a succinct narrative of the Franco-Syrian negotiations since 1933 and of the complications over Alexandretta, the Alawites, the Druses and Tripoli, and indicates the problems which are still to be solved.

H. A. R. G.

90. OSTTÜRKISTAN ZWISCHEN DEN GROSSMÄCHTEN: Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaftskunde Osttürkistans. By Dr. Fuad Kazak. [*Osteuropäische Forschungen*, Neue Folge, Band 23.] 1937. (Königsberg and Berlin: Ost-Europa Verlag. 8vo. viii + 160 pp.)

THIS is a useful study of general conditions in Sin Kiang to-day. There are chapters on the political development, economics, trade, transport and foreign relations of the country. The author has drawn on a wide range of documentary material, chiefly in Russian, German and English, and his well-arranged, comprehensive bibliography should assist all students less familiar with the subject than Dr. Kazak. The ever-increasing Soviet influence in this remote Chinese province is many times stressed, and nowhere more emphatically than in the concluding paragraph. Through her activities in East Turkistan, Soviet Russia has reached the maximum economic and political influence possible without open annexation, which seems unlikely owing to the risk of political complications with Japan. East Turkistan can no longer be regarded as a barrier between British and Russian spheres of influence, as was the case in the post-War years. It tends more

and more to become a Soviet-Russian and Japanese frontier zone, where the conflicting claims of Soviet Russia and Japan may be the determining factor in the future. VIOLET CONOLLY.

91. ESSAI SUR LA CONDITION DES ÉTRANGERS EN IRAN. Par Abdollah Moazzami. 1937. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 275 pp. 65 *frs.*)

THIS work comprises two parts: a historical survey of the position of foreigners in Iran from the Achæmenid period down to the present day, and an analysis of their present legal position. The treatment of the historical part, which includes the judicial reforms of Dāvar culminating in the civil code of 1928, is brief and not particularly informative. The author outlines the general history of the capitulations, the origin of which he attributes to the Treaty of Turkomanchai, without perhaps giving sufficient importance to the fact that the capitulations were a natural growth from Islamic law, and that the Treaty of Turkomanchai merely confirmed and regularised immunities which foreigners had long since enjoyed in Iran.

In the second and main part of the book much space is devoted to an exposition of international law, which the author compares with Iranian law. He points out that the latter is as liberal as, and in some cases more liberal than, the former. The status of the individual and the corporation is dealt with, the former at some length. The author is concerned only with the legal position, and gives no indication of the actual working of the various regulations.

In a concluding chapter Moazzami states that the position of foreigners in Iran is dependent upon the very nature of Persian civilisation from remote centuries. While this may well be so, he has only indicated very briefly the survival of ancient Persian traditions and has done little to substantiate his theory.

ANN K. S. LAMBTON.

INDIA

92. HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF BIKANER: A Biography. By K. M. Panikkar. 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xv + 412 pp. 18s.)

THIS biography of one of the best known Indian Princes is a well-written account of a most interesting career. The writer has had full access to the State records, and is, besides, in a position to have become personally acquainted with the character and outlook of the Maharaja. We are enabled to see the character of this model ruler develop as he meets with one difficult situation after another. The position of the Maharaja of Bikaner was not originally a very favourable one, for many reasons. When His Highness, who had succeeded while still in his seventh year, assumed ruling powers, the State was in an impoverished condition and, owing to the scanty rainfall and the want of proper communications, much exposed to famine. The administration was antiquated, and the feudal Chiefs encroached on the prerogatives of their sovereign. The writer further blames the Government of India for having endeavoured on various occasions to fetter the exercise by the young Maharaja of his ruling powers and for having listened too much to discontented elements within the State.

His Highness has, however, provided a satisfactory system of administration in which the nobles have their place, but not undue predominance. Railways and roads have come into existence, and

against great difficulties (as Bikaner has no rivers) a canal has been constructed irrigating one thousand square miles. But His Highness has not confined his activities to his own State, but has played an important part in the constitutional development of India as a whole. According to his biographer, the Maharaja has on two important occasions suggested the lines on which subsequent changes have been made—namely, before the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the Round Table Conference. While sympathising with the claims of Indian politicians for fuller self-government, His Highness remains a wary and redoubtable champion of the Indian Princes who have been brought into closer collaboration by the Chamber of Princes in the creation of which he took a leading part. An ex-Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, has contributed a preface and an appreciation of the Maharaja by a distinguished retired member of the Indian Civil Service, Sir Walter Lawrence, has been appended by way of epitome. This work should appeal to all interested in India, and a copy of it should be in every library. H. S. CHATFIELD.

93*. THE CHURCH TAKES ROOT IN INDIA. By Basil Mathews. 1938. (London: Edinburgh House Press. Sm. 8vo. 160 pp. Bibl. 2*s*.)

Gives a "picture of the swiftly growing Christian community in India," whose influence is already out of all proportion to its numbers and whose membership increases with such startling speed. Mr. Mathews particularly sets out to convey an impression of "the complex of human relations which gives such inexhaustible fascination to the Indian village—the inevitable foundation of the new India, as of the old." He has spent only a few months in India, but has studied her life for many years and is convinced that such a study, combined with a sympathetic approach, is as likely to give one knowledge and understanding as a lifetime spent exclusively among the British ruling "caste."

AFRICA

94*. CONGO PAST AND PRESENT. By Alfred D. Stonelake. [*World Dominion Survey Series.*] 1937. (London: World Dominion Press. 8vo. 202 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THE Protestant missions in the Congo celebrate their diamond jubilee in 1938, and this book gives a review of the organisation they have built up in sixty years. A glance at the map shows how widely it is distributed, while the Appendices contain useful statistics. The centre of the early Roman Catholic Mission at San Salvador, in what was then known as the Kingdom of Kongo, is now in Angola, and is therefore outside the scope of the book. The Congo was to all intents and purposes a heathen land when the Baptist pioneers entered it. Since then the Roman missions have greatly increased, and now largely out-number the Protestant. They have had official recognition and support, and some of the money paid to the Vatican on the settlement of the Roman question has been spent in the Congo. They have now 255 major missions stations, whereas the Protestants have only 167. H. A. WYNDHAM.

95*. TANGLED JUSTICE. By C. Clifton Roberts. Edited for the Royal African Society by R. Nicholson and Major G. St. J. Orde Browne. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 157 pp.)

MR. CLIFTON ROBERTS, who was a valued member of Chatham House, wrote this book before he died in 1935, and it has now been

published without alteration. It has therefore to be read with this fact in mind. But this does not reduce the value of the book, because it deals with the principles on which Africans should be administered. Moreover, whatever Mr. Roberts has written is from his own personal experience, his desire being to contribute to a lessening of the misunderstandings and vexations that have arisen in introducing European standards into Africa. The Rev. E. W. Smith contributes an introduction.

H. A. WYNDHAM.

96*. LE TOGO: pays d'influence française. By Général Maroix. 1938. (Paris: Larose. 8vo. 136 pp. Map, illus.)

GENERAL MAROIX was in command of the French troops sent to Dahomey in the spring of 1914 to quell a native rebellion, who were thus by pure chance, at the outbreak of war, stationed on the borders of Togoland, and who effected the occupation of that territory in co-operation with British troops from the Gold Coast. A prefatory note explains that a volume originally intended simply as a history of the campaign was later found to be incomplete without some account of the country, its earlier history, and its development under the German and French administrations. The introductory matter, though very brief, is useful for purposes of reference, particularly the outline of German legislation on which material is not easily accessible. The section on the development of the territory under France is even more shortly treated. As reasons against the restoration of the colony to Germany the writer gives the small volume of German trade with it both before and after the War, its unsuitability for white settlement and lack of mineral wealth, and the fact that it forms a geographical and ethnic unit with Dahomey.

L. P. MAIR.

97. A SHORT HISTORY OF NIGERIA. By C. R. Niven. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. x + 262 pp. 3s. 9d.)

THIS history, intended for use in Nigerian middle schools, gives a summary of the political history of those tribes for which records are available, followed by an account of the relations of European powers with the West Coast of Africa and the gradual extension of British authority in Nigeria culminating in the assumption of the Protectorate; the main achievements of British administration are shortly described. An interesting chapter deals with the exploration of the Niger. The metaphorical riches of the English language might perhaps have been more carefully tempered to the needs of the African schoolboy reader; one wonders what he will make of "The diverse peoples stood at the threshold of a united and peaceful future," or "The Nigeria Regiment won its spurs in modern warfare." He may also be puzzled by the fact that Bornu is not shown on the general map, and that Bussa appears only in a small scale map in which hardly any of the places mentioned in the chapter on explorations are marked.

L. P. MAIR.

UNITED STATES

98. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADIAN RELATIONS. By James Morton Callahan. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. x + 576 pp. 20s.)

MR. CALLAHAN'S study of the foreign policy of the United States towards Canada covers the period from the revolution of 1774 to the present time. It is based on a wide study of original materials and secondary works, and will remain a standard book of reference on the

subject. The arrangement is a chronological one, which is probably necessary in general, but is carried rather far in detail. Two consecutive pages, which are not an unfair example of the whole, contain eight original paragraphs, of which six begin with dates.

Readers will be grateful to Mr. Callahan for refraining from the often-repeated statements about the "unguarded frontier" and two hundred years of peace. He has shown the true picture, which is one of progress from an era when annexation of Canada was a powerful motive in the United States, to the gradual development of an acceptance of the international boundary and a mutual respect of each country for the other. His chapter on the antecedents of the war of 1812 is a good corrective to the lingering belief that that war was primarily caused by the British blockade.

The establishment of a Canadian Legation at Washington gives the author occasion to refer to "the long period in which all negotiations in regard to American-Canadian questions were complicated and embarrassed by the necessity of constant reference to the British Imperial Government in London." As a comment on the period before Confederation this is somewhat puzzling, for one can hardly picture the original British provinces as conducting foreign policy when (at least before 1850) they had not even reached the stage of autonomy in local affairs. In reference to the period after Confederation such a comment has another significance. Mr. Callahan shows the difference that arose between the British and the Canadian representative in the negotiation of the Washington Treaty of 1871, and in the case of the Alaska boundary dispute. It still remains problematical, however, whether negotiations conducted purely by the Canadian Government would have produced more acceptable results.

The value of Mr. Callahan's book is primarily as a study of diplomatic or political relations. He is less concerned with the analysis of motives or conditions in the two countries. Some of his brief descriptions of Canadian internal affairs are not very happy. For example, it is hardly accurate to say that "the roots of the rebellion of 1837 may be found in a series of controversies resulting from inherent defects in the blundering British Constitutional Act of 1791 which divided Canada into two separate provinces and thereby prevented the coalescing of French and British Stock" (p. 162). Lord Durham did not recommend "complete responsible government" (p. 171), but only in purely Canadian affairs. The North-West was not "Canadian" in 1867, and the Hudson's Bay Company had a different status in Ruperts' Land from that in the rest of the area (p. 309). It might, perhaps, have been helpful to say something of United States' capital in Canada, instead of leaving it to the last paragraph of the book; and, finally, there might well have been more stress on the Monroe doctrine and Pan-Americanism.

Such comments are intended more to indicate the scope of the book than to stand as major criticisms. Mr. Callahan's theme is the conduct of foreign policy; and, if he interprets foreign policy more narrowly than some students might, he covers his chosen field with detachment and accurate scholarship. G. DE T. GLAZEBROOK.

99. COLONIAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES. By Theodore Roosevelt. 1937. (London: Nelson. 8vo. 204 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

EARLY last year Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most attractive figures in American public life, delivered the Watson Chair

Lectures on "The United States of America as a Colonial Power," and upon these lectures this book is based. Colonel Roosevelt was Governor of Puerto Rico from October 1929 to January 1932, when he was appointed Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a post which he held until March 1933. As the only American who has served as the chief executive of both of the principal overseas territories of the United States, he should have something valuable to say. But although interestingly written, his book contains almost nothing that is new. It is a superficial study, and none too well planned; indeed, some of the book seems scarcely relevant to the main topic. The chapter on Puerto Rico nowhere gets to grips with the fundamental problems of that island, and the same is true of the chapter on the Philippines. This is merely a popular outline, written, unfortunately, with little time-sense and with an inexcusable disregard for historical accuracy. However, the last chapter—a review of the present-day situation in and the future prospects of both territories—is of more value. IFOR B. POWELL.

100. THE RECOVERY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber; Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 8vo. xiv + 709 pp. 18s.)

THIS work, which is the result of the collaboration of a number of experts, is an attempt at a thorough-going analysis of President Roosevelt's New Deal. Part I draws a general picture of the world in depression and of the upward trend noticeable from 1933 on. Against this background Part II describes in considerable detail the course of the depression in the United States and its effect upon the American economy. Part III is entitled "Readjustments Required for Recovery," its final chapter attempting a general appraisal of the current situation and classifying factors in it as either "favourable" or "unfavourable."

Of particular interest is a suggested "integrated programme designed to promote further recovery." The ultimate goal is the complete elimination of unemployment and an increase in the standard of living. Certain "essential requirements" for such a programme are enumerated. They include a balanced federal budget, the continuance of the present policy with regard to gold, the stabilisation of foreign exchange, more reciprocal trade agreements, the maintenance of "the generally favourable ratio of prices and wages," the retention of the existing hours of labour, the elimination of all industrial practices tending toward restriction of output, and, finally, "shifting the emphasis in agricultural policy from restricted output and rising prices to the abundant furnishing of the supplies of raw material and foodstuffs required by gradually expanding markets."

As may be gathered from the above, the work is a tabulation of the facts resulting from an amazing amount of research, occasionally embellished by an excursion into the economic theories involved. A serious discussion of the New Deal taken as an organic economic and political whole is lacking. As a result the reader is left with a feeling that, while he has picked up a lot of information, he is little the wiser for it. The suggested programme for further recovery is particularly disappointing. One could imagine the first five suggestions being put into effect without materially altering the prevailing situation. Items six and seven suggest a reversion to pre-depression days, completely overlooking the fact that such a state of affairs was at least partly

responsible for the depression. What would happen to the farming population if such a policy were carried out? Can the United States be economically healthy with a diseased agriculture? Is the thing *politically* feasible?

In conclusion, it seems to the reviewer that this work raises more questions than it answers. If such was the intention of its authors, it is an almost unqualified success. LORNE T. MORGAN.

101. THE DOLLAR: A Study of the "New" National and International System. By John Donaldson. 1937. (New York and London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xix + 271 pp. 16s.)

THIS book is a useful record of the monetary measures taken in the United States between the spring of 1933 and the autumn of 1936, and of the effects, internal and external, of the devaluation of the dollar. In so far as the devaluation was deliberate, the author shows that the consequences were in many ways different from what was intended, and this leads him to some conservative conclusions regarding the efficacy of monetary management in curing depressions. The main object of dollar devaluation was to raise prices internally, but at the end of 1936 prices had risen by less than 20 per cent., compared with an external depreciation of the dollar of 40 per cent.; and the rise of prices was by no means uniform. Indeed, the rise in prices was greatest for those agricultural commodities which were most influenced by the non-monetary factor of restriction schemes. The basis of credit was automatically enlarged, gold flowed in from 1934 onwards and yet the volume of credit in use increased but slowly until 1935. The stimulation of dollar devaluation upon exports was small; imports rose as well, and in 1936 the United States actually had a passive trade balance.

This book is addressed to experts, and therefore less space might perhaps have been devoted to definitions and re-statements of current monetary theories, and more to the circumstances giving rise to dollar devaluation, the political pressure of an over-indebted farming community and the breakdown of the banking system. The reader may be tempted to draw his own conclusion that the artificial rising of the price of gold to $35 an ounce was more than was needed, and that if the dollar had been left free to find its own level the international stabilisation of currencies in some form was practical business at the London Conference in June 1933. GEORGE MITCHELL.

102. AMERICA GROPES FOR PEACE. By Harold B. Hinton. 1938. (Richmond, Virginia: Johnson Publishing Company. 8vo. vii + 214 pp. Illus. $2.00.)

THIS review, for American readers, of recent events in Europe which have a direct influence on American policy, is straightforward, graphically written and gives on the whole a fair picture. Two points, however, require modification. Mr. Hinton quotes on p. 147 the Nazi suggestion that the German language is forbidden in Prague and that Germans are not eligible to hold public office, but does not make it clear how fantastically untrue the suggestion is. On p. 127 Mr. Hinton states that the World War "was facilitated, if not caused, by the increasing rivalry between Germany and Great Britain in the world's foreign trade." Without going over much-trodden ground, it is safe to say that this view is wide of the mark.

Mr. Hinton deals faithfully with the recent outbreak of "international immorality" in international relationships and with the revival of piracy in the Mediterranean. The futility of the Neutrality Acts recently passed in the United States is exposed. The chapters on "The Far East" and the "Virus of Autocracy" are well balanced and interesting. Mr. Hinton pays a well-deserved tribute to the policy of reciprocal trade treaties inaugurated by Mr. Hull in 1934, and to Mr. Roosevelt's Chicago speech in the autumn of 1937, which he places in its true perspective. But he does not make it clear what he thinks the next step should be. The book has good maps and illustrations. C. WALEY COHEN.

103. FROM BRYAN TO STALIN. By William Z. Foster. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 352 pp. 8s. 6d.)

From Bryan to Stalin is the political autobiography of William Z. Foster, who has been three times Presidential candidate for the Communist Party in the U.S.A. Foster, influenced by a visit to France in 1910, has ever since favoured the policy of penetrating Conservative Trade Unions with militant workers. The support which he received for this policy from the Red International of Labour Unions in 1921, and the opposition which Lenin had expressed to dual unionism, were largely responsible for Foster's conversion to Communism. The struggle between Foster and Gompers is analogous to the conflict of John L. Lewis with William Green, but the detailed descriptions of the unionisation of the meat-packing industry during the War and of the famous steel strike of 1919 are perhaps less interesting than the account of Communist activities in the Trade Unions. Foster has long since given up his trust in Syndicalism, and he thinks it is now the duty of the Trade Union movement to take the lead in the formation of a great national Farmer-Labour Party. The book might have been pruned with advantage. One grows a little tired of "boring from within" and of the "toiling masses" even when they become the "masses of toilers." JANE RENDEL.

LATIN AMERICA

104*. LATIN AMERICA: Its Place in World Life. By Samuel Guy Inman. 1937. (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. 8vo. vi + 462 pp. $3.75.)

THE merit of Mr. Inman's book lies in the fact that it deals in detail with subjects that are often quite inadequately treated in general works on the region. There is an admirable account of student life, of the organisation of labour, and of the main political tendencies. Economic interests, which ordinarily loom large in such treatises, are only discussed in so far as they affect the social and political life of the republics.

The book is based on the assumption that North and Latin America are in most respects fundamentally different regions with different backgrounds, and that as these differences will remain, it is vitally important for these two Americas to understand each other. This can be achieved not only through political agreement, but also through cultural contact, and better acquaintance with the characteristics of Latin-American life. Serious obstacles to such understanding reside in foreign intervention, economic imperialism, and such activities as those of the agents for armament firms. The methods of the latter and the mischief thus caused are the subject of an illuminating discussion, to

which it would be interesting to see a reasoned reply. Mr. Inman is at times a little hard on the capitalists and lending banks, and fails to make necessary discriminations. But he brings out vividly the basis of insecurity, covered often by adulation and bribery, on which some financial deals have been conducted. While, for example, Juan Leguía, the son of the late President of Peru, was receiving $405,000 to secure official approval of a loan, the United States' ambassador allowed himself to be publicly quoted as saying of the father "After God comes Leguía."

The newer nationalism, the respective appeals of Fascism and Communism, the question of immigration in relation to the demands of Europe, and many other subjects, are briefly discussed. To have compressed all this material into one volume, even though a substantial one, is an achievement in itself; and the detail and insight with which successive subjects are analysed entitles the work to be regarded as one of the most useful which have appeared in its class for many years.

KENNETH GRUBB.

105*. RELIGION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Kenneth G. Grubb. [*World Dominion Survey Series.*] 1937. (London: World Dominion Press. 8vo. 147 pp. Illus., maps, tables. 5s.)

THE title of this volume cannot be said to be justified by its contents. Its scope is limited, with some slight exception in the way of notes on historical subjects, to a detailed account of the present status of some twenty evangelising bodies working in different parts of the five Republics of Central America, as well as British Honduras and Panama (both in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama). These are the only Christian activities dealt with in this summary, and omissions may strike readers familiar with regions between Mexico and Colombia, as, for instance, in the case of the Cuna Indians of Darien; the only missionary work mentioned is that of a former lady evangelist and her successor.

Most of the organizations referred to derive support from headquarters in the United States. The American Baptist Home Missionary Society, the American Bible Society, the Friends Church of California, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, Moravians, the Salvation Army, and Seventh Day Adventists, are among workers in a field that includes indigenous folk of the country, negroes from the West Indies, East Indians, Chinese, and people of partly Spanish blood. To-day, there is one evangelical Christian to every 78 of the population, it is stated.

Appendices and charts are adequate to their purpose; outlines of maps need accurate revision.

L. E. JOYCE.

106*. LAND OF TO-MORROW: a story of South America. By R. W. Thompson. 1937. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 459 pp. 16s.)

THIS is a disappointing book. The author travelled in Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia during the Chaco War, but he did not visit the actual fighting forces; nor, in spite of his impressions, was he ever in very remote places. There are the usual errors. The gentleman who ran launches *up* the Beni to join the Amazon certainly deserved mention. The author's wife is not the first Englishwoman to have visited the Chaco; an English lady did this in 1893. The failure to build the Madera (*sic*)-Mamore railroad in the 'eighties is stated, but not the

success in 1913. On the other hand, a map which purports to show (*inter alia*) Bolivia's railways, credits that country, in the best South American manner, with some 500 miles which it does not possess.

The book (except for a useful summary of the Chaco War at the end) mainly consists of conversations spun out at much length. Some people, however, who have a most intimate knowledge of general conditions, are either ignored or dismissed in a few lines. On the other hand, the book is redeemed by the really brilliant descriptions (in a few telling phrases) of natural phenomena and well-known types of settlers and adventurers. These characterisations at once create a feeling of sympathetic recognition among those familiar with the region.

"I am no photographer," remarks the author on p. 192; the illustrations, with one or two notable exceptions, bear this out—assuming that they were taken by him. KENNETH GRUBB.

THE FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

107*. EASTERN INDUSTRIALISATION AND ITS EFFECT ON THE WEST. By G. E. Hubbard. Second Edition, enlarged and revised. 1938. (Oxford University Press, for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. xx + 418 pp. 18*s.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 15*s.*)

HARDLY had Mr. Hubbard's book appeared than the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War upset the assumption that the Far East would remain at peace. He has boldly tackled the task of revising his work for this second edition. Naturally he could not carry revision to the prophetic plane, so in adjusting the chapters on China he has recast them to bring them into line with the "major economic developments which occurred in the interval between the date of the first publication of the book in 1935" and the outbreak in 1937. He has felt impelled by the new conditions to omit the discussion of the effects of Eastern Industrialisation on trade relationships in the British Commonwealth. Specially valuable in preserving the original authority of the book is the rewriting of the chapters on Japan with the help of Professor N. Skene Smith of Tokyo University. Of the effect of the conflict Mr. Hubbard observes that the chief factors are the destruction of industrial capital in China, war strain on Japan's industry and finance, and political changes in Far Eastern territories. The answers to those questions cannot yet be gauged. E. H.

108*. JAPAN IN CHINA. By T. A. Bisson. 1938. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. 417 pp., map. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

109*. JAPAN'S GAMBLE IN CHINA. By Freda Utley. 1938. (Secker and Warburg. 8vo. xi + 302 pp., bibl. 6*s.*)

IF Miss Utley would sit at Mr. Bisson's feet to learn something of his careful methods of documentation, her technique would improve without necessarily impairing her vivid portrayal of events. Her close study of Japan's economic and political structure, influenced though it be by a clear distaste for the capitalist system, gives her survey value. Eagerness to make certain points which, it must be confessed, have their significance, leads her to an airy disregard of incidental facts, and so exposes her to criticism. She may be right in her assertion that the British Press in July 1937 failed to realise the true significance of events in North China. She is patently wrong in developing the theme by suggesting that the British "Conservative Press" only changed its

tone when the war spread to Shanghai and "the immense loss of British property in the aerial bombardment by the Japanese, the shooting of Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the deliberate firing on British gunboats by the Japanese navy and the clear evidence that Japan had no intention of respecting British interests" were grasped so that "as early as August 20th the leading article in *The Times* struck a new note." The shooting of Sir Hughe occurred on August 26th. If Miss Utley had included in her bibliography the daily Press circulating in the Far East, she would have known that by August 16th *Reuter* had telegraphed copious extracts from British newspaper comments which, although legitimately solicitous for British interests, were uncompromising in condemning and recognising the aggression of Japanese militarism. To quote only from *The Times* which Miss Utley regards as a belated critic of Japanese aims, its comment on August 16th, virtually the first possible date on which it could have dealt with the Shanghai affair, contained the following :

> "To those who attach more importance to Japanese actions rather than to Japanese declarations of policy it seems pretty clear that the incidents of which the Japanese Government complains have been, if not deliberately provoked, at any rate welcomed and exploited as facilitating the detachment of another big slice of Chinese territory."

Miss Utley has such admirable intentions that it is distressing to find this uncritical impulsiveness marring her work. She recalls, for example, that Japan's attack on Chapei in 1932 was regarded by a section of British opinion on the spot as a salutary effort to "teach the Chinese a lesson." She rightly castigates that view, as also the preposterous comments of a retired British Admiral who was concerned last October to refute reports of Japanese aerial bombing from correspondents in China. Yet she does not present a true picture of the general feeling among the British community in China. It is difficult, of course, for, even up to the close of last year and perhaps longer, that community proportionately held more apologists for Japanese action than in any other non-Japanese region of the world. If Miss Utley could have approached that part of her task with a greater circumspection and study of the relevant data, she might have done a real service. Otherwise her analysis of the origins of the war, her appreciation of its possible effects on Japan's ultimate position deserve study. The gamble of Japan in her view is threefold :

> "Seizure of North China without a major war;
> Attraction to her side of a section of the Kuomintang leaders after the fall of Nanking,
> Non-intervention by Great Britain and the United States of America."

The first two "throws" Japan has lost, but, says Miss Utley, "her third gamble has so far been successful."

From this it will be seen that she is intensely critical of Great Britain's policy in China as being too complaisant to Japanese aggression, although later informed by a desire to support the unification of the Chinese Government under General Chiang Kai-shek. Here again she would be on firmer ground if her suspicions of capitalism were under better control. British efforts to avert a major war in July 1937 were not based on purely selfish motives. It is a little absurd for Miss Utley to stress the tendentiousness of Japanese propaganda, and yet naïvely cite a Japanese newspaper as an authority for quotation of the advice given by the British Ambassador to Nanking for solution of the crisis. Those who went through that anxious month and the horrors of

its successors know well that British solicitude was exercised to prevent China from taking a plunge which would inevitably destroy the splendid work accomplished by the Government in laying the foundations of economic and political reconstruction. The cruelty of General Chiang Kai-shek's dilemma was readily recognised. Neither he nor his Government could be blamed for the fateful decision—non-resistance seemed to connote certain political extinction—but the enormous disparity in the strengths of the two countries made it impossible for any outsider to assume the terrible responsibility of counselling or appearing to countenance war. Yet Miss Utley is not far wrong when she suggests that Mr. Anthony Eden's statements in the House of Commons fell short of a clarity which might have made Japan realise British disapproval of an attack on China's integrity.

She correctly defines the Austen Chamberlain policy as a realist acceptance of the practical fact that force in maintaining British interests in China had become outmoded. She is no less correct in the view that that policy was much resented by a not uninfluential and unvocal section of the community on the spot. The interesting question is how it was that British diplomacy in China allowed itself for over eleven years to be persistently hampered and, occasionally, stultified by officials and non-officials over whom it could have exercised control, either directly or indirectly. To the extent to which that freak of conduct assisted in the tragedy some future historian—perhaps Miss Utley and Mr. Bisson in concert—might give useful attention.

By implication enough has been said to commend Mr. Bisson's competent survey of the causes of the Sino-Japanese conflict up to April last. He sums up :

> "For Japan the supreme objective must continue to be a smashing victory and collapse of the opponent's morale and will to resist. . . . For China there is the necessity of maintaining a stubborn refusal to admit defeat in the face of overwhelming devastation and apparent disaster."

He discerns " nervousness " in Miss Utley's gambler's hands " as the wheel spins." He calls attention to the emergence of the Chinese soldier as the " defender of an independent national existence," fighting with a united country behind him. Of that view the Japanese report that the slain in the fighting for Hankow include several hundred Chinese students is poignantly confirmatory. As Mr. Bisson says, on China's side " genuine patriotism rules more supreme than at any time in this century," whereas " in the opposing trenches the motivating force is the zeal for conquest, domination, even for loot." He thinks that this advantage may well turn the scales in China's favour. Mr. Bisson's book should find its place on any shelf devoted to authoritative records of the Far Eastern struggle. EDWIN HAWARD.

110*. JAPAN IN TRANSITION. By Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler. 1938. (New Haven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 260 pp. 14s.; $3.00.)

WERE it not for the statement in the Preface, it is doubtful if readers of this work would recognise it as a translation. Written in clear, scholarly English, the translators are to be congratulated, not only for making this German analysis of Japanese life and character available to the Anglo-Saxon student, but also for the faultless grammar and style into which they have translated it.

Published originally in German in 1929, it is, in its present form, thoroughly up-to-date, as it has been largely re-written and amended so as to include the far-reaching social and political developments of the past few years. In so far as the earlier chapters are concerned, it may be assumed that little revision has been necessary. They deal primarily with the basic factors which have helped to mould the psychology and general outlook of the Japanese as a nation. The influence of religion, myth and history, the influence of climatic and geographical conditions, and the influence of the old feudal conceptions of loyalty and self-sacrifice are all considered in turn. Not least in importance and interest is the chapter on the Japanese language and the way in which it shows the great gulf between the mental processes of Japanese and Occidentals. Those who have struggled vainly to master the intricacies of the written language will agree fully with the emphasis laid on the immense difficulties to be overcome and with the conclusions reached.

It is in the later chapters that consideration is given to the great changes and developments, political, social and economic, of the past few years. Analysed in the light of what has been written in the earlier part of the book, these chapters provide a most interesting and valuable commentary on the momentous events now taking place in the Far East.

M. D. KENNEDY.

111*. IMPERIAL JAPAN, 1926–1938. By A. Morgan Young. 1938. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 328 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IN the preface to his book, Mr. Morgan Young briefly describes the aim and scope of the work, as well as the method he has followed.

Imperial Japan is in some sense a sequel to the author's *Japan Under Taisho Tenno*, 1912–1926, continuing the record of events at home and abroad discussed in the earlier volume. Mr. Morgan Young describes his book as written for those who demand facts. During ten of the eleven years covered, he writes, " I was seldom absent from the editorial desk of the *Japan Chronicle* (a British newspaper published in Japan), so there was little about current events that did not come my way, and I have tried to select from the mass the most significant and the most closely related.

" The Taisho era ended on Christmas Day 1926. Taisho was made the posthumous name of the deceased Emperor, and the new era was named Showa. Taisho means Great Righteousness. . . . Showa might be translated Peace Made Manifest, and was to be marked by a constant prating about Japan's sacred mission of keeping the peace in the Far East and by a progressive breaking of that peace and a cynical disregard of truth and justice "

Thus Mr. Morgan Young discloses his point of view in his opening sentence, a point of view which is shared by the majority of Western nations. The theme is developed throughout the volume, in plain and moderate language for the most part, though considerable passages are not without a rather bitter irony, and some are characterised by the coined words and sweeping assertions typical of the journalistic touch.

The general scheme of the book is an account of Japanese policy and action in Manchuria and China during the eleven years under review. The chapters dealing with these stirring events alternate with descriptions of the doings of the Diet and Government at home. There are also sections dealing with institutions and phases of public

feeling, a criticism of justice as administered in Japan and an appreciation of topical trade and economic questions.

Mr. Morgan Young acknowledges that his method scarcely permits a strict chronological sequence in the presentation of events. This may be found somewhat confusing at first, but any disadvantage is more than compensated for by the very clear description of the intricate interplay of motive and personality, incessant repercussions and reactions caused by happenings at home and abroad.

In what purports to be a "plain unvarnished tale" Mr. Morgan Young shows considerable subtlety, and, considering the welter of material at his disposal, a very great skill in the power of selection. He has achieved a sense of simplicity and directness, drawing order from confusion and continuity from complexity of plot and counterplot and an infinity of pledges given and broken. The result is a very informative précis of the long sequence of activities culminating in the present Far-Eastern situation.

The history of war and the supremacy of the Japanese Military Party gains very considerably from its setting against a background of home affairs. The narrative is well balanced, and the scene shifts naturally, and without apparent effort, from Tokyo to Manchuria, to China and back again to Tokyo. Mr. Morgan Young is particularly successful in stressing the divergence of views between the all-powerful Military Party and the distracted members of a government who, never being strong enough for bold, independent action, were continually at a loss as to how to tide over situations and how to act for the best. He makes it abundantly clear how the Army and Navy, being answerable to nothing and to nobody for their actions, save to the Emperor alone, have become a law unto themselves.

In this comparatively brief survey of national expansion, national aggrandisement and modern tendencies, the author has stressed every regrettable quality of the makers of Imperial Japan. He has literally no good word for the members of the Services, though he accredits a modicum of honesty and sincere well meaning to certain of the statesmen who laboured at home only to be overborne and outclassed at every turn.

It is perhaps a pity that the book presents no picture of a great nation as a whole, nor does it attempt to explain why or how a people who embraced a new civilisation with high courage and high ideals should so swiftly be brought to such a pass.

As to the future of Japan, Mr. Morgan Young is discreetly silent. His nearest approaches to prophesy are hints dropped here and there of a tentative but increasing restlessness among the people of Japan. In the great cities, in country towns, in remote villages there is doubt and questioning. In spite of all discouragement, the great public is beginning to think for itself. Is the moment of enlightenment at hand? If so, what next? GRACE JAMES.

112. DER ARBEITSLOHN IN CHINA. By Prof. Dr. Paul Arndt, Dr. Djini Shen and Dr. Chü Fen-lo. 1937. (Leipzig: Hans Buske Verlag. 8vo. xii + 352 pp. *Rm.* 7.50; bound, *Rm.* 9.)

113. DER STAATSHAUSHALT UND DAS FINANZSYSTEM CHINAS. By Dr. Pakong Chu. 1937. (Leipzig: Hans Buske Verlag. 8vo. 133 pp. *Rm.* 3.75.)

THESE admirable publications are doubtless evidence of the reawakening of German interest in China. This development, and

probably these studies, have been cut short by the Japanese invasion; but this does not invalidate their usefulness, since, whether the Japanese are in occupation or not, the fundamental economic problems of China remain. It may be doubted whether they have ever been more clearly presented in any European language than they are in the former of these two volumes. The title is deceptive, for the book deals with much more than "wages"; it encompasses the whole economic social system and the current theories of political economy as applied to China. These do not always fit the oriental figure; but the elementary needs and activities of human kind are everywhere the same, though it strikes the reader that social and economic adjustments in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century China were in many respects more just and reasonable than they have ever been in Europe. Since the death of Chien-lung, however, the state of China has deteriorated; her adaptation to the new Western ideas has been much less agile than that of Japan; she is now suffering for her unreadiness by temporary eclipse. The Japanese conquerors, if conquer they do, will be faced by something more formidable than her ill-equipped armies, by the misery and distress of two to three hundred millions. They have this to encourage them, that in Manchuria, the province where their system has been tried, economic and social conditions seem to be much better than elsewhere in China. Average factory wages (men) in the four great cities in Manchuria were $53.51 per month; the corresponding figure in Shanghai, where wages are highest in China, was $30.20, the average figure for all China being $20.90. "Not only nominal but real wages in Manchuria are higher than in other parts of China." These figures apparently date from 1930, when Manchuria was influenced but not ruled by Japan; they are, however, encouraging to the Japanese theories and pretexts; and it is on the betterment of China that Japan's policy will in the long run be judged.

The book is in three parts. The first, by Dr. Arndt, attempts to apply certain occidental conceptions—feudalism, capitalism, liberalism, communism—to the Chinese development. Part II deals historically with the question of wages, or more broadly with social conditions generally in China from the earliest times—the influence of religion and philosophy, of the family system, the state system, the systems of capital formation, of currency and of credit. The third part deals more specifically with the ostensible subject of the book—*viz.*, rates and levels of wages, productivity in agriculture and industry, the condition of the workers, wage differentiation according to employment, locality, etc. This is a very creditable piece of work, arranged in excellent order, and full of information which must have given the authors much trouble to collect, and which is not easily available elsewhere.

The second of these Hans Buske publications is of the monograph type, and deals with the fiscal and budgetary system in China since earliest times, and with the modern phenomenon of the foreign loans. It is competently and accurately written, not without a typical Chinese regret for the good old days before the foreigners came. The history of the various taxes—land tax, customs, likin, salt, wine and tobacco, etc.—is clearly and conveniently set forth; also the new system which the Nanking Government were trying to introduce amid the difficulties created by disproportionate military expenditure and a heavy burden of

foreign debt. An income-tax law exists in draft only; but it is typical of Chinese respect for literary culture, even in these days, that incomes derived from artistic and literary activity were among the exceptions to the incidence of the tax. It is interesting also to observe that a death duty or inheritance tax is peculiarly difficult to apply in China, since the property belongs not to the individual, but to the family, and the family never dies. P. J.

114. PROBLEMS OF CHINESE EDUCATION. By Victor Purcell. 1936. (London: Kegan Paul. 8vo. viii + 261 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THIS is a provocative book which raises and discusses some of the fundamental problems set for Chinese education and for the world by the irruption of the West into the conservative culture of China. The author states his central query as follows: "Can China naturalise Western Civilisation and at the same time retain the essentials of her own? Many think that she can. But even if she can, it is first of all necessary for her to comprehend what the main ideas of Western Civilisation are. So far she has failed to do so in any large measure, and her language and her past history obstruct her path."

Dr. Purcell's book is both comprehensive and stimulating. He examines the language problem in great detail. He regrets that he had to sacrifice the material he had collected on the mass education movement; readers will share his regret, and also wish that he had dealt more adequately with the remarkable developments of women's education in recent years. One of his proposals—that basic English should be the medium for teaching Western scientific ideas in China—will at least provoke strenuous opposition. The book concludes with an Appendix, prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, giving an analysis of representative Chinese school text-books.

This book contains shrewd criticism, but does less than justice to the real though chequered advance made by Chinese education in the last few decades. H. T. SILCOCK.

115. THE PHILIPPINES: A Nation in the Making. By Felix M. Keesing. [Issued under the auspices of the University of Hawaii and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.] 1937. (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh. 8vo. x + 137 pp.)

IN 1935 the Hawaiian Group of the I.P.R. issued, in mimeographed form, a brief survey of the Philippines, which Dr. Keesing, the professor of anthropology in the University of Hawaii and a well-known authority on colonial administration in the Pacific area, had prepared for use in Hawaiian schools. This draft has since been revised, and is now published for the use of schools and colleges elsewhere, and also for discussion clubs and the general reader. Though brief, the book is thorough and profound, revealing sound scholarship, and notable for its well-balanced approach and its interesting treatment. In the first forty-two pages Dr. Keesing describes the country, the racial origins of the people, their history, and, very ably, their Spanish heritage. He next outlines the developments of the American period, and then discusses such problems as population, language, education, colonisation, labour, commerce, and the agrarian situation (just now very much to the fore), and concludes with a review of Philippine self-government and its future prospects. The book also contains an interesting study of Philippine art and literature, and Dr. Keesing

has had the happy idea of illustrating the growing Filipino literature in the English language by devoting a whole chapter to examples. He has selected these from the *Philippine Magazine*, whose editor, Mr. A. V. H. Hartendorp, has done remarkable work in encouraging young Filipino writers. The few criticisms which might be made, if space were available, in no way detract from Dr. Keesing's successful presentation of this "nation in the making." His book, which is illustrated by useful sketch-maps and by some fine pictures, mainly from the *Philippine Magazine*, is the best introduction to the Philippines that has appeared. IFOR B. POWELL.

116. CHINESE EVERGREEN. By Victor Purcell. 1938. (London: Michael Joseph. 8vo. 287 pp. 10s. 6d.)

WHEN you have accepted the offer of a lift over a three-hundred-mile journey from a high official of the country in which you are travelling, it is not in the very best taste to make of him a figure of fun when you write your travels. Readers of *Chinese Evergreen* may find it mildly amusing to read Mr. Purcell's remarks about the "perky" Mr. Hsueh—the Chinese Vice-Minister who befriended him—and his description of members of the Vice-Ministerial staff, one of whom is described as wearing "an idiotic little Homburg" above "a comedian face much like a baked apple." But this sort of ridicule is a doubtful credential for a writer, who, having been engaged in the study of Chinese "culture contacts," sets out to elucidate Chinese mentality and character; for to offend the Chinese feeling for "face" shows a lack of that innate sympathy which is surely the first requisite of a faithful interpretation of any alien culture. The author, one must hasten to add, possesses the saving grace that he is also ready on occasion to laugh at himself and at his fellow-countrymen.

Mr. Purcell's journey in search of material for his study took him by air from Hongkong to Changsha and thence, in the said Vice-Minister's company, by road to Kweilin and Nanning, in the province of Kwangsi, over the Tongking border, and so by rail to the port of Hanoi. It is an unusual feature of the book that, although the war was in progress before the journey began, the author barely refers to the Sino-Japanese conflict. The part of China through which Mr. Purcell travelled was, of course, remote from the fighting, and he was more concerned, as he tells us, "to get an inkling of the Chinese system of thought, than to know the disposition of their army corps." Although his whole attitude towards the Chinese is too much *de haut en bas* to make the book really valuable, as a basis for psychological study, it is liberally garnished with the fruits of the author's erudition, which is undeniably wide, ranging from Chinese history, language, and literature to the construction of Chinese junks and the relationship of the sexes. The book has something in common with the *Reisebuch eines Philosophen*, but though Mr. Purcell has a little of the Keyserling touch, he lacks the German's powers of synthesis. He is at his best when discussing the effect upon China of blending Western ideas with her own classical system.

"The grafting," he remarks, "was not a success. It was operating on dead fibre. Little by little the intellectual leaders realised the truth. The mechanical methods of the West had their own appropriate systems of thought. You cannot introduce Western guns, say, without introducing things like Western municipal government. At the beginning of the century the educational reform began as a trickle; to-day it is a rivulet; to-morrow it will be a river. The waters of enlightenment have been held up by civil disturbance, by revolution,

and now, when they are beginning to flow freely, by conflict with Japan. But the rains in incessant trickles are gathering in the watershed and nothing will eventually stop them from filtering down till they join together in the surging flood of the New China."

A graphic and true description of a movement of great significance for the whole civilised world.

It is a pity that the writer allows himself so often to descend from the high literary level which marks many passages of the book, to a style which is frankly—and, one imagines, intentionally—slapdash. The same adjective must be applied to the proof-reading, with results which are not always without their humour, as, for instance, the slip which has crept in on page 42, where the staple crops of North China are described as "millet, kaolin and beans." Kaolin, which is china-clay, is presumably the type-setter's version of *kaoliang*, the sorghum, or giant millet, which covers the plains of North China, and at the present time is playing its part in the war by providing excellent cover for the Chinese irregulars who harass the Japanese.

G. E. HUBBARD.

117*. CHIANG KAI-SHEK: SOLDIER AND STATESMAN. By Hollington K. Tong. 2 vols. 1938. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. xxvii + 682 pp. Illus., map. 15s. each volume.)

AN "authorised biography" of a statesman, whom some accuse of being a dictator and who is still alive, is hardly likely to preserve those qualities of detachment and objectivity necessary for one who seeks to thread his way through the mazes of the Chinese scene; and in fact this book, though well worth reading, hardly deserves the encomiums quoted in the publisher's blurb. In the selection of his material Mr. Tong might have paid more attention to the constitutional and economic issues in which the Generalissimo played as important a part as in the military side of the revolution, and if in its presentation he had adopted a less superficial and discursive style it might with advantage have been compressed into more manageable compass than these two unwieldy volumes. With regard to the civil wars that continued right up to the resumption of aggression by Japan in 1931, Mr. Tong is refreshingly frank. He speaks of "bloody extravagant and purposeless civil strife" and points out that the struggle for power in China was rarely ideological. The one important fact that emerges with great clarity is the Generalissimo's unrelenting hostility to Communism and every attempt to organise a Soviet system in China. But in dealing with certain episodes, such as the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute with Russia in 1929 or the disposition of the Chinese forces fighting against the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, Mr. Tong's narrative is inadequate; in his account of the arrest of Li Chi-sen and later of Hu Han-min—two cardinal blunders—Mr. Tong can hardly escape the charge of being disingenuous.

In spite of these defects, out of Mr. Tong's discursive narrative, eked out with extensive quotations from Chiang Kai-shek's own speeches, there does emerge a truthful picture of a soldier trained in the hard school of many years of revolution, living with an intense zeal for the regeneration of his country and devoted to the memory of his lost leader Sun Yat-sen; with no thought of self and endowed with courage, both moral and physical, of the highest order; endowed also with a dynamic personality and an untiring energy that enabled him to impress his personal influence upon every province in China; and added to all

this the mental grasp and vision of a statesman—in short, as l Japanese enemies are the first to admit, a very great man.

J. T. PRATT.

118*. LA PRESSE CHINOISE ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS 193 Japanese Aggression and Chinese Opinion. Issued by tl Bureau du Koumintang en Europe (Paris). 1938. (Paris Pedone. 8vo. 156 pp. 20 *frs.*)

THIS book comprises a selection of leading articles, translated int French or English, from the Chinese press during the first six month of the present war. The papers chosen include the great Chines dailies, others which are little known except in their immediate localities and a few publications produced by Chinese abroad—*e.g.*, in Chicago Rangoon, and Paris. All deal with the war. As one would expect ir a work of this kind—which is frankly propaganda, and none the worse for that—there is complete unanimity of expression on all war issues, but the tone of unity rings true, and is the more impressive when it is remembered that it is supported by all available evidence from other sources. What is more notable, perhaps, is the total lack of hysteria or bombast in these extracts. In general, the war is discussed with extraordinary objectivity and realism. Though every effort is made to drive home the argument that China is fighting the battles of all decent peoples, and needs allies, no bitterness is expressed that she has so far been left to fight alone. That the *Ta Kung Pao*, for instance, can say after the Brussels Conference, " We are disappointed at this outcome . . . but have no word of blame for either the United States or Great Britain. . . . We can understand their difficulties," is surely, in all the circumstances, magnanimous. Chinese opinion has naturally long been disillusioned regarding the League of Nations, but throughout these articles there runs a belief that international order can only be maintained by force and that sooner or later such force will be forthcoming. The extracts are finally well summed up in a short essay refuting Japanese arguments.

E. W. MEAD.

ERRATA

MR. H. WICKHAM STEED'S PAPER ON " FROM FREDERICK THE GREAT TO HITLER."

In Mr. Wickham Steed's paper on " From Frederick the Great to Hitler " the sentence beginning on line 2 (p. 659) should read :

> " His son, Frederick I, grandfather of Frederick the Great, discarded the title of Elector and, with the assent of the Emperor, crowned himself King in the Cathedral of Königsberg. The son and successor of Frederick I, Frederick William I, gave cohesion to his mongrel people."

REVIEW OF MR. HAROLD BUTLER'S *PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRY IN THE EAST*.

The reviewer of Mr. Harold Butler's *Problems of Industry in the East* in the last issue of the Journal (p. 748) wishes to withdraw his one criticism which was made in error. Mr. Butler wrote of French India, and not of French China.